27 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2022
  2. Sep 2015
    1. It is not asserted that sorting areas of information science with respect to their relationship to informa- tion-as-thing would produce clearly distinct popula- tions. Nor is any hierarchy of scholarly respectability intended.

      It does seem implied though. The activity of objectifying information is a useful fulcrum for discovering the topology of information systems. But I suspect that one could have written similar papers using one of the other cells of his matrix? Or perhaps it wouldn't have been concrete enough? Is information as thing a requirement for information science? Science after all is the study of the physical universe, the things. Could there be a science of information without treating information as a thing? It makes me think of the role of the observer in quantum mechanics. Also, Kuhn's paradigm shifts. We can't really write ourselves out of the equation can we?

    2. ultimately information systems, including “expert systems” and information re- trieval systems, can deal directly with information only in this sense

      Is this really true? Don't people interact with these systems all the time? Aren't they used as communication devices between people now all the time? I could imagine someone saying that information is never just a thing, but always part of a process.

    3. “Information-as-thing”, then, is meaningful in two senses: (1) At quite specific situations and points in time an object or event may actually be informative, i.e., constitute evidence that is used in a way that affects someone’s beliefs; and (2) Since the use of evidence is predictable, albeit imperfectly, the term “information” is commonly and reasonably used to denote some popu- lation of objects to which some significant probability of being usefully informative in the future has been at- tributed.

      This sounds spot on, but it doesn't sounds like information as thing anymore. It has people as a fundamental part of the equation.

    4. As a practical matter some consensus is needed to agree on what to collect and store

      So the problem of scoping information is really an economical problem of what do we store, what do we keep, and what do we forget and let go of.

    5. Therefore we retain our simpler view of “in- formation-as-thing” as being tantamount to physical evidence: Whatever thing one might learn from (Orna & Pettit, 1980, p. 3)

      Why is that simpler? I would've thought the broader definition was simpler to justify.

    6. Indeed it would be a logical development of current trends in the use of computers to expect a blurring of the distinction between the retrieval of the results of old analyses and the presentation of the results of a fresh analysis

      Not only that, but computer systems and networks are so complex that information itself is becoming event like in its dependencies and contingencies.

    7. Hence “document” originally denoted a means of teach- ing or informing, whether a lesson, an experience, or a text.

      It's almost as if something must be made into a document in order for it to be observed in a particular way. Or that looking at something in a particular way turns it into a document.

    8. ny concrete or symbolic indication, preserved or recorded, for reconstructing or for proving a phe- nomenon, whether physical or mental.

      ahh, now this is more like it ; what role does reconstructing play here. Did he translate "représenter" as reconstruct? They seem quite different.

    9. It is wise not to assume any firm distinction between data, docu- ment, and text.

      Why is it wise to not distinguish between them, but to distinguish between different uses of the word information?

    10. Further, the term “evidence” implies passiveness. Evidence, like information-as-thing, does not do any- thing actively. Human beings do things with it or to it.

      Is evidence truly not doing anything? Reminds me of non-human actors in Latour.

    11. However, the representation is no more knowledge than the film is the event. Any such representation is necessarily in tangible form (sign, sig- nal, data, text, film, etc.) and so representations of knowledge (and of events) are necessarily “information- as-thing.”

      Don't these information things need to have people around to make them information?

    12. But if the principal uses can be identified, sorted, and characterized, then some progress might be made.

      So this paper is itself an information processing problem. Why does information science always have to feel like mirrors pointed at mirrors, or a Borgesian nightmare?