6 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2020
    1. By 2005 blogs had crashed the cultural gates. China’s editors, station directors, and pub-lishers had always acted as cultural “gatekeepers:” deciding who could and couldn’t becomeknown through publication, TV and film appearances, and musical performances. In a majorcultural power-shift, pop cultural icons could emerge through blogs, forums, chatrooms, andpersonal websites, completely outside of the government approved cultural structures.But while Communist Party propaganda department had lost control over China’s cul-ture, in the realm of politics the gates and walls are constantly being rebuilt, upgraded, andreinforced. It would be impossible for a dissident political leader to rise to popularity in thesame way that Mu Zimei rose to stardom.

      Even though China's publishing class lost control as cultural gatekeepers with the advent of blogs, the Communist Party propaganda department constantly rebuilds, upgrades and reinforces the gates.

    2. This situation is reinforced by recent survey results—surprisingto many Westerners—showing that most urban Chinese Internet users actually trust domesticsources of news and information more than they trust the information found on foreign newswebsites (Guo et al.2005, pp. 66–67).

      Survey results reveal that Chinese citizens trust domestic sources more than foreign sources.

      This is a curious result and something I'm beginning to see in the West. I wonder if it's a result of their policies. I wonder if this means that the filtering and manufacturing of opinion is successful.

    3. While the Chinese government has supportedthe development of the Internet as a tool for business, entertainment, education, and infor-mation exchange, it has succeeded in preventing people from using the Internet to organizeany kind of viable political opposition.

      The Chinese government has succeeded in leveraging the internet to generate economic benefits, without succumbing to its predicted democratizing effects.

    4. They are determined to prevent the Internet from serving as a tool for “colorrevolution” in the way that online media and communication tools empowered activists inUkraine and Lebanon. Thus in 2005 the Chinese government updated its regulations control-ling online news and information, and aggressively leaned on organizations hosting onlinechatrooms and blogs to stop the spread of online discussions about recent local governmentcrackdowns against farmer protests in the Chinese countryside.

      China is determined to not have the internet serve as a tool that helps bring about another color revolution, like in Ukraine and Lebanon.

      In the past they've leaned aggressive on organizations hosting discussions about government crackdowns.

    1. Though government statements emphasize anti-pornography crackdowns, ONI found the primary focus of China's filtering system to be on political content. Public security organs and internet service providers employ thousands of people – nationwide, at multiple levels – as monitors and censors. Their job is to monitor everything posted online by ordinary Chinese people and to delete objectionable content.

      The Chinese government employs thousands of people to monitor and censor content. Their job is to filter out anything objectionable that gets posted.

  2. Feb 2018