Panel Aalso shows that farm value was not affected by tax policy. Overall, thereis little evidence that tax policy broke up farms or lowered farm value

exactly the opposite effect of thetax policies advocated by black politicians.

$0.96 in 1870 to $0.98 in1880, while for counties with black politicians, revenue went from $1.56in 1870 to $0.89 in 1880.

–0.0129*** –0.0629***

0.197

manumission

This is the first quantitative evidence suggesting a strong effect of blackpolitical leadership on local public finance.

0.0993*** 0.0993*** 0.0986*** 0.0925**

far above estimates of literacy for the black population as a whole.

1,893.83

he existing scholarship about the known black politicianswas often incorrect and narratives about the illiteracy and poverty of theblack politicians was repeated in the historical narrative until the archivalwork in Foner (1996) and other histories were compiled. Indeed, thehistories of Reconstruction that noted black officials often did so deri-sively.

20 percent and expendi-tures per pupil declined by 60 percent from 1871 to 1880.

notes that while some white officials sought to drasti-cally reduce all education expenditures after Redemption, the popularityof public schooling among whites led to fewer reductions in educationalexpenditures for whites

Southern whites began a widespreadcampaign to undo the Congressional Reconstruction process

In Alabama, a property tax was proposed; inTexas, the sale of public lands was offered; in Maryland, changes to thestate tax code to allow local taxation were put forth; in South Carolina,Murray suggested that unclaimed Civil War bounties could be used; andNorth Carolina debated a specific consumer tax for education. GovernorHarrison Reed’s plan in Florida was to increase land assessments to fundpublic goods, and this model was followed in other Southern states byblack political leaders

Southerners of both races noted that the low taxes in the antebellumera encouraged the acquisition of unimproved land by wealthy land-owners

The results here show that black political leadershipis an important and omitted factor in black socioeconomic outcomes afterthe Civil War.

public education and land redis-tribution

Put another way, the tax effects of black poli-cymakers left no lasting effects on local public finance.

0.62 standard deviations

$0.09 increase in per capita county taxrevenue.

In particular,did their time in service have any effects on local public finance, publicgoods provision, land reform, and socioeconomic outcomes?

You never saw a people more excited on the subject of politics than are thenegroes of the South. They are perfectly wild

By pri-vatizing carceral functions, Southern states were able to furtherscale incarceration, in particular of freedpeople, at essentiallyzero cost.

The work of reformation must be begun and prosecuted with the coloredmasses outside of the Penitentiary. The only difference existing betweenthe colored convicts and the colored people at large consists in the factthat the former have been caught in the commission of crime, tried andconvicted, while the latter have not. The same results would happen tothe latter should the same opportunities for criminal action and criminalconviction occur. The entire race is destitute of pride of character.

While the investigationuncovered widespread mistreatment and neglect of convicts, itproved difficult to end the contract altogether—in no small partbecause some of the main stakeholders in the leasing companieswere also current and former Bourbon politicians.

it became difficult for the state torenegotiate—let alone terminate—leases before they eventuallyexpired in 1896.

redi-rect institutions or policies toward purposes beyond their originalintent.

the legislators were more con-cerned with taking steps to reduce expenditures for incarcerationeven further.

Interestingly, of the twenty-five blackstate legislators in Louisiana, all but one voted in favor of theact.

The seemingly bipartisan support of the lease system inGeorgia, or at least the lack of partisan opposition to it, mirroredthe experience in other Southern states during CongressionalReconstruction

his will increase the debt of the State that amount.... It seems tous a propitious time to revise our Penal Code, and abolish the penitentiarysystem—adopting in lieu thereof the principles embodied in the Codes ofSouth and North Carolina [corporal and capital punishment].

Importantly, however, this surge in prisoner popula-tions after the Civil War preceded—not followed—theintroduction of convict leasing.

First, they wereused to restrict African American labor market mobility.Land-owning whites in particular saw their wealth and fortunedwindle with Emancipation

The resultis, that we have more than three times as many convicts in the State prisonas there were before the war.

less

First,antebellum Georgia was extremely wealthy and, by extension, fis-cally healthy.

Precisely because Southern whites were committed to upholdwhite supremacy and dwarf notions of equality, governmentsremained reluctant to expand taxation capacity and, thus,remained cash-strapped and burdened by debt throughoutmuch of second half of the nineteenth century.

Southern prisonpopulations would likely not have outgrown the existing prisoninfrastructure as fast as they did—a development that forced statesto look for alternatives to penitentiary imprisonment in the firstplace.

leasing outconvicts appeared to be a cost-effective short-term alternative tothe more resource-intensive penitentiary model.

he South cohered as a low-wage, undereducated, and underdeveloped sec-tion in part because the commitments of its representatives to racial hier-archy and regional autonomy dramatically limited their ability to securefederal support on terms they could accept or to block fiscal policiesthat disproportionately burdened the South.

that leasing initiallyseemed to be a response to growing prisoner numbers but overtime became a driving force of incarceration in the postbellumSouth.

were predomi-nantly employed in emerging industries of the New South, grad-ing railroad beds or laboring in mining camps and lumberproduction.

ystem of sharecrop-ping contracts and debt peonage

especially in the South wherebureaucratic and fiscal capacities remained limited

Consequently, illness and diseases resulting from poor hygieneand malnutrition were rampant. In many states, the penitentiaryphysicians reported regular outbreaks of dysentery and typhoidfever. A large share of prisoners ended up in the hospital wardsat some point or another, especially as leasing camps becamemore and more crowded.

Prisoners no longer worked withinprison walls, and while contracts with lessees typically specifiedthe type of labor convicts were expected to perform, the statehad very little control over working conditions in the camps.

he state also gave up its custodial responsibility as lesseeswere to hire overseers and guards to ensure order in the campsand prevent prison escapes

First, by leasing prisoners to private com-panies or individuals, the state was absolved of the task of housingand caring for them.

What is more, the penitentiary movement introduced penallabor in addition to carceral confinement as reformers consideredhard labor within prison walls an opportunity to teach trade skillsand instill Protestant work ethic in prisoners

inade-quate for deterring criminal activity and forming law-abidingcitizens.

In this article, I reflecton how these contracted state and fiscal capacities paradoxicallyconditioned the expansion of state coercive capacities in the post-bellum South

In particular, I argue that, while thepost-Emancipation South saw patterns of incarceration growthquite similar to the post–Civil Rights era, the fiscal conditionsand capacity issues that Southern states faced after the CivilWar led them to introduce carceral “innovations” that were dis-tinct—both from the penitentiaries maintained in Northern statesat the time and from today’s prison institutions.

despite their limited institutional and imple-mentation capacities.

Over time, however, leasinggrew more profitable, in particular for “New South” industrialistswho benefitted from cheap convict labor. Thus, as demand forconvict labor increased post-Reconstruction, the system got fur-ther entrenched—despite its increasingly abusive nature.

on rail-roads and plantations, in coal mines and lumber camps, and atbrickyards all over the South

That these sentences shape voter turnout in the nextelection is quite striking

Incourt systems with only one judge or without randomassignment, we can imagine that small differences in ajudge’s mood or calendar could lead to sentencingvariation that deters voting.

between 100,000 and 156,000 Black Americans stayedhome from the polls in the 2012 election due to jailsentences served during that election cycle

Black voters from the electorate couldlead to different patterns of representation and policyoutcomes

This could be due to differing arrest patterns by race,with Black citizens more likely to face arrest than Whiteones.

It is possible thatindividuals still believe in the value of voting [contraryto the theory of Weaver and Lerman (2014)], but thatthey find it too difficult to vote when they are dealingwith other problems (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady1995).

0.045(0.034)Constant 20.0001 0.142*(0.029) (0.019

he negative coefficient on jail in the firstcolumn suggests that jail could be associated with lowervoter turnout in the next election,

Or, Black defendants sen-tenced to jail could interpret the sentence differently,perceiving the court system’s treatment as more unfairthan a White defendant in similar circumstances

“Stop-and-Frisk”

Black men, especially those withoutcollege education, are disproportionately likely to bearrested, convicted, and incarcerated

misdemeanants have more tolearn about the state from these experiences, and moreto lose in their political participation

Any of these experiencescould also prevent people from voting, consistent withpast work on the participation of people with differentlevels of available resources

“custodial citi-zens come to see participation in political life not only assomething that is unlikely to yield returns, but assomething to be actively avoided.”

describesa mechanism by which people learn to fear and avoidgovernment through criminal justice interactions, andso do not vote

Latino defendants show a decrease in turnout due to jail,and Black defendants’ turnout in the next

heterogeneity

while Black defendants show substantial turnout decreases due to jailtime.

isinippt 503 9South Carolina 468 entAlabama 169 44Georgia

the Negro.

grandoutl1¢sthepoliticsoftheSouthreveiar

heJongHabituationofmanyofitspeopletopoapardimpoliticalHO—alltheseand othersocialcharseiriistothinfluencethenat

ratedthem,mnaylikewisebeT

Democracy functions best when its citizens hold elected officials account-able; are exposed to public discourse representing a wide variety of views,including dissenting ones; and consider alternative viewpoints as legitim-ate and compromise as an option. Religious sorting, both directly andindirectly, has undermined these key components of a healthy democracy

Rather, identities and feelings towardgroups now play an important role in the religious-political sorting story,even if issues helped precipitate the sorting

who is discriminated against and which party willbetter help the aggrieved group – shape their political attachments

owest when answering abouta religious out-group and when group membership and partisanshipmatch. White evangelical Republicans (Democratic non-identifiers) per-ceive the lowest rates of discrimination against atheists (evangelicals)

non-evangelical Republicans seem as attuned tothe plight of their political compatriots, despite not being members of thereligious group, as white evangelical Democrats who are, themselves, mem-bers of the group in question. Non-evangelical Democrats report thatevangelicals face discrimination at the lowest rate: 22 percent.

combined power is even stronger

charged andpersonal struggles where one’s survival (or in this case, soul) is at stake

identity-based mobilization

Non-identifiers, there-fore, do not have descriptive representation in Congress

vangelicals make up 40 percent of Republicans elected toCongress compared to just 5 percent

data toward stronglyidentifying as a Christian and with other Christians

Because the religiosity gap does not extend toAfrican Americans, secular white Americans and highly devout BlackAmericans are now on the same political team.

how it formed

will not tolerate criticism of theirpolitical leaders and views

Social group membership,however, can offer a workaround to this problem by offering shortcuts togroup members.

My own work,however, shows that these same changes in the political environment duringthe latter part of twentieth century encouraged Americans – particularlywhite Americans – to become more or less religious on account of theirpreexisting partisan identities.

dislike and distrust toward one another in order towork toward a common set of social and political goals

particularly during polarized times

Democratic erosion, by whichI mean the intentional undermining of democratic values – includingelectoral accountability, free exchange of ideas, and recognizing the legit-imacy of others’ grievances – threatens America’s democratic resilience, orthe ability to withstand stresses as a nation.

In short, the more religious a personis, the more likely it is that he or she identifies with the Republican Party andsupports Republican candidates

the margin of victory would have turned negative, implying that theDemocrats rather than the Republicans would have carried the state

Finally, we analyze the impact of theimmigrant shares (overall, low-skilled, and high-skilled) on individual attitudestoward immigrants. We find, consistently with the above results, that an inflow oflow skilled immigrants in the county increases and an inflow of high skilled immi-grants decreases the anti-immigration position of an individual

Urban areas

An increase of high-skilled immigrants of 1 percent of the adult populationproduces a decline in the Republican vote share by 1.522 percentage points.

Note that significantcorrelations with other contemporaneous variables do not invalidate the instrumentsbut suggest possible economic and demographic variables as channels of the effectof immigration on political preferences.

contemporaneous

reverse causation

The first threat to identifying a causal connection from immigration to votes isthat some counties have persistent economic, cultural, and institutional features thatattract immigrants and also affect citizens’ political preferences

percentage of the population in the 1990–2016 period

estimate the impact of the shareof foreign citizens on election outcomes using variation over time across districts inthe city of Hamburg between 1987 and 2000. The authors find evidence of a positivecorrelation between the population share of immigrants in a district and the share ofvotes received by extreme right-wing parties with a clearly anti-immigration stance.

A scatter plot of the change in the share of Republican votes against the changein the share of immigrants, between the years 1990–1992 and 2014–2016, shows anegative and significant correlation

foreign-born residents with no high-school degree. The high-skilled immigrants Hitare counted as the number of adult foreign-born residents with a high-school degreeor more

Relative to these works, our paper is the first tofocus on US elections including the whole country, using variation across countiesand isolating a causal mechanism by the use of skill-specific shift-share instruments.

t

high-skilled than low-skilled immigrants

A simple explanation is that immigrants to theEuropean countries analyzed above (Italy, Austria, and Germany) are on averageless skilled than immigrants to the United States.

we confirm the negative andsignificant impact of high-skilled immigrants on the vote share to the Republicansand the positive and significant impact of low-skilled immigrants

These effects,

This implies that the vote share of the Republican Party shouldincrease if voting residents perceive immigrants as a net cost rather than a benefit

Political leaders’ positions on the topic of immigration can be an important deter-minant of their electoral success.

By recent estimates, 23.2 million of the people eligible to vote in the 2020 presidentialelection, or one-in-ten eligible voters, were naturalized immigrant citizens – a number that hasmore than doubled since 2000

Here, too, people who arrived from the Soviet Bloc at older ages are more likely to reportsupporting right-wing political parties.

It’s important to remember that the family fixed effect also accounts for much of thepost-migration experience for children, meaning that the primary vehicles for the assimilation ofchildren (e.g. schools, neighborhoods, social milieu) in the US are also fixed once families arrive

relatively close in age

Our results remain unchanged in thisspecification too, represented in Table B.5, suggesting that this is more consistent with exposurethan an “oldest child” effect since it is just as likely to appear in second oldest children relative toyounger siblings.

The fact that the effects we measure are comparable for this group of refugeesto the effects we measure for those who leave when repression is coupled with economic crisissuggests that repression is the dominant mechanism behind the effects we document in this paper

the emergence of an economic crisisthat threatened the welfare of the middle class

The probability plateaus untilthe mid 40s, when the probability of being registered as a Democrat starts rising again. There isno trend for registering as an independent with age of arrival until the beginning of middle-age,when increasing age appears to make non-partisan registration less likely

1.9% increase in the probability of voting in a generalpresidential election.

A and B of Figure 5 present a residualized binned scatter plot of the relationship between age atarrival and voting in 2016 and 2014, respectively

behaviors and preferences of siblings.

yij = α + βArrivalAgeij + θFemaleij + ωij + φj + ηij

family members forall families in our data.

Overall therelationship between age of arrival is positive, with every additional year associated with a 0.18percentage point increase in the probability of voting in 2016

he trend is clearly increasing with agefor newborn arrivals up through early middle-age, flat for middle-aged arrivals through earlyretirement-age, and decreasing with age among those who arrive after 60 or 65.

hose who are civically engaged enough to register

Most children in our data have siblings who are 10 years orfewer apart from them.

likely to express skepticism of democracy oropenness to other forms of government

this population as right-wing prior to migration.

ven when thoseparties are anti-immigrant (

is affective more than itis ideological.

but it might also motivate survivors toparticipate more post-migration to fulfill pent up demand for political voice, cast votes againstparties similar to oppresive ones in their birth countries, or a number of other possible psycho-logical mechanisms beyond the scope of this study

The extant literature suggests a “back-lash effect” for victims who remain in affected areas; victims are more hostile to the perpetratingregime and persistently less likely to express loyalty unless the regime can credibly threaten themagain

will have been a survivor ofsome form of political repression.

. Ironically, the liberalization of free expressionrules under Gorbachev’s Perestroika heralded an increase in public anti-semitic demonstrations(Gitelman, 1991), all prompting subsequent waves of emigration out of the Soviet Union thatwould continue after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991

children are not typically responsible for migrationdecisions

Moreover, we also establish similar patternswithin the same refugee population in a different national context (Israel) using data from a largemulti-election survey

more likely to participatein presidential and midterm elections and to register as Republicans in the US. Our findings holdwithin our simplest within-family design,

political consequences

Public trust, turnout, andother measures of political participation t

which we attribute to backlash against commu-nism.

God he created them;cmale and female he created them

AndGod saw that it was good.

And God said,

Lord d God

while a wind from God bswept over the face of the waters.

ToEnoch was born Irad; and Irad was the fatherof Mehujael, and Mehujael the father ofMethushael, and Methushael the father ofLamech.

Enoch

the tree was to be desired to make one wise,she took of its fruit and ate;

our

Whether partycoalitions can again be disrupted depends on shifting party dynamics insome fundamental way, by some future partisan coalition- builders, in waysthat we cannot foresee.

dominated by Southerners, and the partywas facing pressures to pursue the policies of cultural conservatives” costingthe GOP support elsewhere as “the Northeast wing was not receptive to thisemphasis”

Party leaders and their strategic efforts built partisan coalitions in NewEngland during changing circumstances, often by trying to attract particulardemographic groups through outreach, party organization, and issue appeals

Similar shifts took place in regard to congressional representation, too.

Since Reagan, the Republican Party has become even more wed to far-right messages and has moved in an anti- government, even anti-democraticdirection, which swept in conspiracy theorists, while undermining governance(Fried and Harris 2020, 2021). Partisan polarization is increasingly racializedand asymmetric, with Republicans more extreme than Democrats (Mannand Ornstein 2012; Tesler 2016).

New England, bycontrast, continued its tradition of electing mostly moderate Republicanswho were pro-choice, comparatively feminist and, particularly in comingdecades, pro-LGBTQ+ rights.

assiduously

As this chapter noted at the start, the Democratic Party’s embrace of civilrights in the latter decades of the twentieth century is key to understandingparty transformation in New England.

Muskie and Reagan: Post-FDR Coalition-Buildersand New England Politics

the famed Austin-Boston alliance in the HouseDemocratic leadership was born

recalcitrant

the South alone couldnot yield victory.

Franklin Roosevelt’s highly successful NewDeal coalition was to graft more liberal elements— mainly ethnic and urbanliberals— onto the party’s traditional Southern base

Perhaps it was the Democrats’ confirmed status as a nationalminority that made them more risk acceptant by 1928 when they nominateda Tammany Hall- affiliated northerner

New England’ssupport for the GOP was mostly uniform due to the lingering resentmentsof the Civil War and to Republicans’ continuing support of nationalizing,coordinative efforts as they related to commerce.

based in the South, were,among other things, committed to states’ rights and slavery protections.When late Jacksonian era Democrats,

elite

preeminence

least Democratic

New England’s swing in party supporthas been at least as dramatic as what occurred in the former confederacy.

This Republican Party of Lincolnhas become a party of theocracy . . .

Vulgate

This methodology is called “textual criticism” because itis a way of assessing a text through critical comparisonof its different copies.

n response to this critique of their canonical status,the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation position wasto declare these works definitively a part of the Bible.The Catholic church to this day maintains the canoni-cal status of Tobit, Judith, the longer version of Esther,1 and 2 Maccabees, the Wisdom of Solomon, Sirach,Baruch (including the Le*er of Jeremiah), and the Addi-tions to Daniel. The Orthodox churches also maintainedthe canonical status of these works, and in addition re-garded some or all of the following books as canonical:1 Esdras, the Prayer of Manasseh, Psalm 151, 3 Maccabees,2 Esdras, and (in an appendix) 4 Maccabees. The NRSVincludes headings within the Apocryphal/Deuteroca-nonical Books calling a*ention to the varying canonicalstatus of these works.

Luther wanted these texts to be available for readingand meditation, but he did not regard them as scripture

continued to cite the Greek Bible, though argu-ing for the superiority of the Hebrew text and canon.

This is, fundamental-ly, a typical ancient Near Eastern process: Instead of cre-ating a small, highly consistent text, as we perhaps mightnow do, those responsible for the process included manyof the viewpoints in ancient Israel, incorporating differ-ing and even contradictory traditions into this single, andsingular, book—the Hebrew Bible

Canonization is fundamentally a process of selection,but we cannot reconstruct why particular texts were can-onized while others were not