97 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2019
    1. The Money and Society Mass Open Online Course
    2. Restoration asks us “what can we bring back to help us with the coming difficulties and tragedies?”
    3. Relinquishment asks us “what do we need to let go of in order to notmake matters worse?”
    4. Resilience asks us “how do we keep what we really want to keep?”
    5. The third area can be called “restoration.” It involves people and communities rediscovering attitudes and approaches to life and organisation that our hydrocarbon-fuelled civilisation eroded.
    6. second area of this agenda, which I have named “relinquishment.” It involves people andcommunities letting go of certain assets, behaviours and beliefs where retaining them could make matters worse.
    7. we can conceive of resilience of human societies as the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances so as to survive with valued norms and behaviours.
    8. funding being made available to climate adaptation has grown, with all the international development institutions active on adaptation finance. In 2018 the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian DevelopmentBank (ADB), Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the World Bank each agreed major financing for governments to increase resilience of their communities.
    9. Marshall explains: “The denial of death is a ‘vital lie’ that leads us to invest
    10. Studies on seagrass (Greiner et al, 2013) and seaweed (Flannery, 2015) indicate we could be taking millions of tonnes of carbon from the
    11. dramaticloss in sea ice, the average September extent of which has been decreasing
    12. Can professionals in sustainability management, policy and research – myself included - continue to work with the assumption or hope that we canslow down climate change, or respond to it sufficiently to sustain our
    13. Ihave seen how the idea of INTHE can lead me to focus on truth, love and joyin the now, which is wonderful, but how it can also make me lose interest in planning for the future.
    14. Inevitable Near Term
    15. In my work with mature students, I have found that inviting them to consider collapse as inevitable, catastrophe as probable and extinction as possible, has not led to apathy or depression. Instead, in a supportive environment, where we have enjoyed community with each other, celebrating ancestors and enjoying nature before then looking at this information and possible framings for it, something positive happens. I havewitnessed a shedding of concern for conforming to the status quo, and a new creativity about what to focus on going forward.
    16. In my conversations with both professionals in sustainability or climate, and others not directly involved, I have found that people choose a scenario and a probability depending not on what the data and its analysis might suggest, but what they are choosing to live with as a story about this topic.
    17. This assessment that we face near-term human extinction can draw on the conclusions by geologists that the last mass extinction of life on earth, where 95% of species disappeared, was due to methane-induced rapid warming of the atmosphere (Lee, 2014; Brand et al, 2016).
    18. Then others go further still and argue that the data can be interpreted as indicating climate change is now in a runaway pattern, with inevitable methane release from the seafloor leading to a rapid collapse of societies that will trigger multiple meltdowns of some of the world’s 400 nuclear power-stations, leading to the extinction of the human race (McPherson, 2016).
    19. The perspective that natural or spiritual reconnection might save us from catastrophe is, however, a psychological response one could analyse as a form of denial.
    20. If we allow ourselves to accept that a climate-induced form of economic andsocial collapse is now likely, then we can begin to explore the nature and likelihood of that collapse. That is when we discover a range of different views.
    21. This evidence suggests that the idea we “experts” need to be careful about what to tell “them” the “unsupported public” may be a narcissistic delusion in need of immediate remedy.
    22. A 2017 global survey found that only 13% of the public think the world is getting better, which is major change from the ten years before (Ipsos MORI, 2017).
    23. In 2017, a survey of more than 8,000 people across 8 different countries – Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, India, South Africa, the UK, and the US – asked respondents to gauge their perceived level of security as compared to two years ago in regards to global risks. A total of 61% said they felt more insecure, while only 18% said they felt more secure. On climate change, 48% of respondents strongly agreed that it is a global catastrophic risk, with an additional 36% of people tending to agree with that. Only 14% of respondents disagreed to some degree with the idea that climate change presented a catastrophic risk (Hill, 2017).
    24. WWF, as an example of thisprocess of organisational drivers of implicative denial. I worked for them when we were striving towards all UK wood product imports being from sustainable forests by 1995. Then it became “well-managed” forests by 2000.
    25. third factor influencing denial is institutional. I have worked for over 20 years within or with organisations working on the sustainability agenda, in non-profit, private and governmental sectors. In none of these sectors is there an obvious institutional self-interest in articulating the probability or inevitability of social collapse
    26. Marshall also explains how our typical fear of death means that we do not give our full attention to information that reminds us of that.
    27. In this paper I have had to mix information from peer-reviewed articles with recent data from individual scientists and their research institutions to provide the evidence which suggests we are now in a non-linear situation ofclimactic changes and effects.
    28. A more detailed study of this process across issues and institutions found that climate-change scientists routinely underestimate impacts “by erring on theside of least drama” - (Brysse et al, 2013).
    29. If we recognise the troubling implications of these facts but respond by busying ourselves on activities that do not arise from a full assessment of the situation, then that is “implicative denial”.
    30. If we accept certain facts but interpret them in a way that makes them “safer” to our personal psychology, it is a form of “interpretative denial”
    31. Drawing on sociologist Stanley Cohen, Foster (2015) identifies two subtle forms of denial – interpretative and implicative
    32. It is to help break this semi-censorship of our own community of inquiry on sustainability that motivatedme to write this article
    33. the way of “creative adaptation.
    34. “What makes this hope radical, is that it is directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is” (ibid)
    35. Lear (2008) looked at what he calls the “blind spot” of any culture: the inability to conceive of its own destruction and possible extinction.
    36. “In abandoning hope that one way of life will continue, we open up a space for alternative hopes,” wrote Tommy Lynch (2017).
    37. A fourth insight is that “hopelessness” and its related emotions of dismay and despair are understandably feared but wrongly assumed to be entirely negative and to be avoided whatever the situation.
    38. A third insight from the debates about whether to publish information on the probable collapse of our societies is that sometimes people can express a paternalistic relationship between themselves as environmental experts and other people whom they categorise as “the public”. That is related to the non-populist anti-politics technocratic attitude that has pervaded contemporary environmentalism.
    39. Second, bad news and extreme scenarios impact on human psychology. We sometimes overlook that the question of how they impact is a matter for informed discussion that can draw upon psychology and communications theories. Indeed, there are journals dedicated to environmental psychology. There is some evidence from social psychology to suggest that by focusing on impacts now, it makes climate change more proximate, which increases support for mitigation (McDonald et al, 2015).
    40. First, it is not untypical for people to respond to data in terms of what perspectives we wish for ourselves and others to have, rather than what the data may suggest is happening.
    41. The argument made is that to discuss the likelihood and nature of social collapse due to climate change is irresponsible because it might trigger hopelessness amongst the general public
    42. others will consider that the probability of collapse means that effort at reforming our current system is no longer the pragmatic choice. My conclusion to this situation has been that we need to expand our work on “sustainability” to consider how communities, countries and humanity can adapt to the coming troubles. I have dubbed this the “Deep Adaptation Agenda,” to contrast it with the limited scope of current climate adaptation activities.
    43. But when I say starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war, I mean in your own life. With the power down, soon you wouldn’t have water coming out of your tap. You will depend on your neighbours for food and some warmth. You will become malnourished. You won’t know whether to stay or go. You will fear being violently killed before starving to death. These descriptions may seem overly dramatic. Some readers might consider them an unacademic form of writing. Which would be an interesting comment on why we even write at all. I chose the words above as an attempt to cut through the sense that this topic is purely theoretical.
    44. But the evidence before us suggests that we are set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war
    45. releasing chemicals in the upper atmosphere so the Sun’s rays are reflected. The unpredictability of geoengineering the climate through the latter method, in particular the dangers of disturbances to seasonal rains that billions of people rely on, make it unlikely to be used (Keller et al, 2014).
    46. warming of the Arctic could lead to a speed and scale of methane release that would be catastrophic to life on earth through atmospheric heating of over 5 degrees within just a few years of such a release (Shakhova et al, 2010).
    47. A recent attempt at consensus on methane risk from melting surface permafrost concluded methane release would happen over centuries or millennia, not this decade (Schuur et al. 2015). Yet within three years that consensus was broken by one of the most detailed experiments which found that if the melting permafrost remains waterlogged, which is likely, then it produces significant amounts of methane within just a few years (Knoblauch et al, 2018).
    48. The authors of the 2016 Global Methane Budget report found that in the early years of this century, concentrations of methane rose by only about 0.5ppb each year, compared with 10ppb in 2014 and 2015. Various sources were identified, from fossil fuels - to agriculture to melting permafrost (Saunois et al, 2016).
    49. CO2 removal from the atmosphere could work at scale,it would not prevent massive damage to marine life, which is locked in for many years due to acidification from the dissolving of CO2 in the oceans (Mathesius et al, 2015).
    50. In addition, no-till methods of horticulture can sequester as much as two tons of carbon per hectare per year, so could alsomake significant contributions
    51. The world uses about 3.5 billion hectares of land for pasture and fodder crops. Using the 8 tons figure above, converting a tenth of that land to MIRG practices would sequester a quarter of present emissions.
    52. Research into “management-intensive rotational grazing” practices (MIRG), also known as holistic grazing, show how a healthy grassland can store carbon. A 2014 study measured annual per-hectare increases in soil carbon at 8 tons per year on farms converted to these practices (Machmuller et al, 2015).
    53. Unfortunately, the current technology needs to be scaled by a factor of 2 million within 2 years, all powered by renewables, alongside massive emission cuts, to reduce the amount of heating already locked into the system (Wadhams, 2018).
    54. In any case the IPCC estimate of a carbon budget was controversial with manyscientists who estimated that existing CO2 in the atmosphere should already produce global ambient temperature rises over 5°C and so there is no carbon budget – it has already been overspent (Wasdell, 2015)
    55. Total global emissions remain at around 11 billion tonnes ofcarbon per year (which is 37 billion tonnes of CO2).
    56. It is therefore not a figure that many scientists would advise, given that many ecosystems will be lost and many risks created if we approach 2 degrees global ambient warming (Wadhams, 2018).
    57. The IPCC agreed in 2013 that if the world does not keep further anthropogenic emissions below a total of 800 billion tonnes of carbon we are not likely to keep average temperatures below 2 degrees of global averaged warming. That left about 270 billion tonnes of carbon to burn (Pidcock, 2013)
    58. It has led others to conclude that we should be exploring how to live in an unstable post-Sustainability situation (Benson and Craig, 2014; Foster, 2015).
    59. The World Bank reported in 2018 that countries needed to prepare for over 100 million internally displaced people due to the effects of climate change (Rigaud et al, 2018), in addition to millions of international refugees.
    60. The loss of coral and the acidification of the seas is predicted to reduce fisheries productivity by over half (Rogers et al, 2017).
    61. Naresh Kumar et al. (2014) project a 6–23 and 15–25% reduction in the wheat yield in India during the 2050s and 2080s, respectively, under themainstream projected climate change scenarios.
    62. They predict a decline of normal agriculture, including the compromising of mass production of grains in the northern hemisphere and intermittent disruption to rice production in the tropics. That includes predicted declines in the yields of rice, wheat, and corn in China by 36.25%,18.26%, and 45.10%, respectively, by the end of this century (Zhang et al, 2016).
    63. It is difficult to predict future impacts. But it is more difficult not to predict them. Because the reported impacts today are at the very worst end of predictions being madein the early 1990s
    64. In ten years prior to 2016 the Atlantic Ocean soaked up 50 percent more carbon dioxide than it did the previous decade, measurably speeding up theacidification of the ocean (Woosley et al, 2016).
    65. he UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reports that weather abnormalities related to climate change are costing billions of dollars a year, and growing exponentially
    66. Already we see impacts on storm, drought and flood frequency and strengthdue to increased volatility from more energy in the atmosphere (Herring et al, 2018). We are witnessing negative impacts on agriculture. Climate change has reduced growth in crop yields by 1–2 percent per decade over the past century (Wiebe et al, 2015).
    67. Stating a figure per year implies a linear increase, which is what has been assumed by IPCC and others in making their predictions. However, recent data shows that theupward trend is non-linear (Malmquist, 2018). That means sea level is risingdue to non-linear increases in the melting of land-based ice.
    68. Along with other melting of land ice, and the thermal expansion of water, this has contributed to a global mean sea level rise of about 3.2 mm/year, representing a total increase of over 80 mm, since 1993 (JPL/PO.DAAC, 2018).
    69. Given a reduction in the reflection of the Sun’s rays from the surface of white ice, an ice-free Arctic is predicted to increase warming globally by a substantial degree. Writing in 2014, scientists calculated this change is already equivalent to 25% of the direct forcing of temperature increase from CO2 during the past 30 years (Pistone et al, 2014)
    70. At one point in early 2018, temperature recordings from the Arctic were 20 degrees Celsius above the average for that date (Watts, 2018).
    71. Non-linear changes are of central importance to understanding climate change, as they suggestboth that impacts will be far more rapid and severe than predictions based on linear projections and that the changes no longer correlate with the rate of anthropogenic carbon emissions. In other words - ‘runaway climate change.’
    72. slowly produced reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This international institution has done useful work but has a track record of significantly underestimating the pace of change, which has been more accurately predicted over past decades by eminent climate scientists.
    73. In this section I summarise the findings to establish the premise that it is time we consider the implications of it being too late to avert a global environmental catastrophe in the lifetimes of people alive today.
    74. answering the questions I set for myself in this paper, I will not be reviewing that existing field and scholarship. One might ask “why not”? The answer is that the fieldof climate adaptation is oriented around ways to maintain our current societies as they face manageable climactic perturbations (ibid)
    75. To illustrate, a search on Google Scholar returns over 40,000 hits for the term “climate adaptation.”
    76. focusing on a phenomenon. That phenomenon is not climate change per se, but the state of climate change in 2018, which I will argue from a secondary review of research now indicates near term social collapse.
    77. what could provide a map for people to navigate this extremely difficult issue.
    78. fourth question on what are the ways that people are talking about collapse on social media.
    79. a third question, on why sustainability professionals are not exploring this fundamentally important issue to our whole field as well as our personal lives
    80. Have professionals in the sustainability field discussed the possibility that it is too late to avert an environmental catastrophe and the implications for their work?
    81. The approach of the paper is to analyse recent studies on climate change and its implications for our ecosystems, economies and societies, as provided by academic journals and publications direct from research institutes. That synthesis leads to a conclusion there will be a near-term collapse in society with serious ramifications for the lives of readers.
    82. The purpose of this conceptual paper is to provide readers with an opportunity to reassess their work and life in the face of an inevitable near-term social collapse due to climate change.
    83. The first is the way the natural scientific community operates.

      First Factor encouraging professional environmentalists in their denial of social collapse in the near term

    84. Especially in situations of shared powerlessness, it can be perceived as safer to hide one's views and do nothing if it goes against the status quo.
  2. Sep 2018
    1. TABLE I:Communication protocols used by some of the main Industrial robot manufacturers

      No EtherCAT at ABB

  3. Jun 2018
    1. ARM consumption ~44.1% of one core (4 cores available 400% - this means something like 16.5% of total). However, only the capture is 11.25% so the dual h264 consumes 5.25%

      Capture supposedly takes 11.25% of all 4 cores (=400%) here

  4. Feb 2018
    1. Lossless and lossy streaming

      No streaming and no inter-frame compression - along the temporal axis... Just bz2, (google's) snappy and zlib...

      It was far more important to focu s our efforts on compressing the depth data . Developing our own algorithm wa s outside the scope of this project, and existing work on depth data compression is not yet sufficiently developed to implement here, so we decided to work with popular and freely available lossless algorithms implemented in C++. We chose three separate algorithms with different performance characteristics. First, the bzip2 algorithm aims for maximum compression with slower speed. A second algorithm developed by Google, snappy , aim s for maximum speed with less compression. Finally the zlib algorithm aims for a middle ground between speed and compression. To test, we compress ed 500 different depth frames with each algorithm and calculate the mean speed and compression ratio for each.

    2. CAR - Recording compressed RGB-D data

      Seems to be for storing RGB-D data only...

    3. Compressing RGD-D data for cloud robotics with the open source LibAV tool

      FFV1 - "intra-frame" only compression - no compression along the temporal axis and no hardware-acceleration

    4. Compressed sensing and sparse coding

      They only do map compression. Nothing with compressing a stream. However, they seem to use the RGB data to aid the decompression of the Depth channel. That is quite smart.

      a new depth map compression scheme using Compressed Sensing and Sparse Coding that exploits the statistical relationship between the RGB image channels and the depth map.