Moreover, in partiality-appropriate choice conditions, larger differences may exist in cultures that more strongly value relationship obligations over justice (Miller & Bersoff, 1992), whereas in impartiality-appropriate choice conditions, smaller differences (or no differ-ences) may exist in those same cultures.In addition to between-culture differences, individual differences may also provide clues to the relationship between values and judgments in this paradigm. In exploratory analyses, endorsement of specific morality-as-cooperation values statistically moderated the reported patterns (see the Supplemental Online Material file at https://osf.io/bnwdv/). For example, in partiality-appropriate contexts, the more participants endorsed family values and reciprocity, the larger the difference was in their judgments of moral goodness in choice

Our results are consistent with, but add nuance to, this view. Specifically, people are judged even more positively when they help strangers (but less positively when helping strangers instead of kin), and they are judged more negatively when they fail to help kin than when they fail to help strangers. Relatedly, developmental research has found that children expect other people to behave prosocially toward in-group members (Chalik & Dunham, 2020), and they guide others to give more resources to family than to strang-ers (Olson & Spelke, 2008), suggesting an early-emerging understanding of relationship-oriented obligations.

For impartiality contexts, we found no interaction between relationship and choice when comparing the no-choice and choice conditions, b = −0.086, 95% CI = [−0.486, 0.318], SE = 0.204, t = 0.422, p = .673; however, when comparing the choice and failure conditions, we found a significant interaction, b = 0.420, 95% CI = [0.020, 0.820], SE = 0.204, t = 2.063, p = .039. In no-choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger were judged as fulfilling an obligation significantly more than agents who helped kin.

In no-choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger were judged to be significantly better morally than those who helped kin. In choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were also judged as significantly more morally good than those who helped kin instead of a stranger.

In no-choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger were judged to be no better morally than those who helped kin. In choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as signifi-cantly less morally good than agents who helped kin. In failure conditions, agents who failed to help a stranger were judged as significantly less morally bad than those who failed to help kin

Because help-ing kin may be perceived as showing inappropriate favoritism in these contexts, agents who help kin instead of strangers should be judged less positively, and as having fulfilled an obligation to a lesser extent, than agents who do the opposite.

However, in the choice conditions, agents who helped kin instead of a stranger were judged as significantly more morally good than those who helped a stranger instead of kin. In the failure conditions, agents who failed to help a stranger were judged as significantly less mor-ally bad than those who failed to help kin, and, replicat-ing the findings of Study 3, agents who failed to help kin were judged as significantly less morally good than agents who helped a stranger instead of kin

In the failure conditions, agents who failed to help a stranger were judged as more morally good than agents who failed to help kin. Additionally, agents who failed to help kin were judged as less morally good than agents who helped a stranger instead of kin, suggesting that neglecting kin but still helping someone is better than simply neglecting kin.

As predicted, there was a significant interaction between relationship and choice for moral-goodness judgments, b = −0.532, 95% CI = [−0.389, −0.675], SE = 0.073, t = 7.277, p < .001. In no-choice con-ditions, agents who helped a stranger were judged as significantly more morally good than agents who helped kin, whereas in choice conditions, agents who helped kin instead of a stranger were judged as significantly more morally good than agents who helped a stranger instead of kin

As predicted, there was a significant interaction between relationship and choice for moral-goodness judgments, b = −0.640, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [−0.456, −0.824], SE = 0.094, t = 6.843, p < .001. No means crossed below the midpoint into “morally bad.” In no-choice conditions, agents who helped a stranger were judged as significantly more morally good than agents who helped kin, whereas in choice conditions, agents who helped kin instead of a stranger were judged as sig-nificantly more morally good than agents who helped a stranger instead of their ki

We propose that when agents occupy roles requiring impartiality (e.g., professors helping their new students), those who help their kin instead of a stranger should be judged less positively than those who do the opposite

Finally, in third-party evaluations, people judge others as morally worse when they abuse family than when they abuse friends or coworkers (Hughes, Creech, & Strosser, 2016)

However, a recent theory, known as morality as cooperation, suggests that family obliga-tions are widely considered morally relevant (Curry, Chesters, & Van Lissa, 2019). In this article, we provide evidence that in everyday contexts, people indeed rec-ognize a positive obligation to help kin more than nonkin, and these perceptions influence moral judgments

However, had Singer continued helping strang-ers instead of his mother, not only might this have been judged as less praiseworthy, but also he may have been condemned for violating a special obligation to family.

Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite.

Moreover, when annexed states lack the basic governance capacity vis-a`-vis society to carry out basic governance func-tions, political leaders in the political center are tempted by the prospects of sweeping away existing units, leading the way to greater centralization.

Not only do parliamentary states serve as more effective negotiation part-ners, but more importantly, states with highly developed infrastructures can deliver the precise benefits that nation-state builders seek: greater tax revenue, greater access to military manpower, and greater social stability

The account I offer identifies a different precondition of the negotiation necessary to create federalism: highly developed infra-structural power of the subunits.

Instead, we should focus on what Michael Mann in his important book on state formation, calls “infrastructural power.” If militar y power refers to the social organization of physical force, deriving from the necessity of defense and aggression, infrastructural power describes state-society relations that determine the capacity of a cen-tral state to penetrate its territories and implement decisions logistically.

It is true that federa-tions, once established, have the effect of balancing military competition among subunits as well as ameliorating ethnic or religious territorial cleav-ages, but one clear lesson of this book is that the effects of federalism can-not explain its origins

First, I argue that the bargaining that gives rise to federa-tions is not related to the military power of the center. Against the expecta-tions of existing theory, limiting the military power of the political core to create symmetrically powerful units to negotiate a federal “contract” between the core and subunits is not the pathway to federalism.

A unifying political center’s first preference will always be a unitary system and the only factor that can thwart this goal is the “military incapacity” of the political center.38 The expectations of this theory are clear and logical: the militarily stronger the political center vis-a`-vis the regions, the less likely a federal structure, and con-versely, the militarily weaker the political center vis-a`-vis the regions, the more likely a federal or confederal structur

nlike Germany, the new Italian state for-mally erased region from its political map. With regard to the three di-mensions above, the outcomes were these: (1) the formerly independent constituent states had no formal seat in a territorial chamber at the na-tional level; (2) these states retained no public finance discretion; and (3) the formerly independent states retained limited administrative auton-omy. Despite similar starting conditions in the factors normally thought to cause federalism, national unification resulted in two starkly divergen

First, as this work will make clear, the chief architects of national unification in Italy and Germany in the 1860s—Cavour and Bismarck— undertook their political projects with a similar ideological awareness of the dangers of excessive centralization, and in both cases there was a simi-lar ideological commitment among key intellectual and political leaders to the notion of “federalism” as a solution to the history of regional divisions in both contexts, given international misgivings over the potential of cre-ating two powerful and centralized states in the middle of Europe.

The definition of federalism is more contested. Some scholars define federalism in cultural or ideological terms.12 Others have expanded the definition to incorporate as necessary components such concepts as “democracy” or even “political stability.”13 I find it more use-ful, when engaging in empirically based social scientific analysis, to define “federal” nation-states as those with subnational sovereign governments that possess three constitutionally embedded institutional characteristics that tend to cluster together: (1) formal and informal access of subnational governments in the decision-making process of national governments, (2) subnational public finance (taxing and spending) discretion, and (3) ad-ministrative autonomy of regional governments within a nation-state.

If, by contrast, a political core—whether mili-tarily strong or weak—begins the process of absorbing states that do not have this infrastructural capacity, then a more difficult relationship be-tween core and subunits emerges. Since absorbed states are perceived as not able to deliver the benefits of national unification, they are viewed simply as an impediment to unification. This makes negotiation less likely, resulting in a path of nation-state formation through conquest, and the creation of a unitary political system

If a political core absorbs these types of states, then the potentially conten-tious relationship of a political core and its subunits that makes federations so difficult to construct can be overcome. With highly infrastructural states in place, a process of primarily negotiated nation-state formation is possible in which authority is conceded to the subunits.

once a process of national unification is under way, the way out of the paradox of federalism’s origins for political leaders with federal aspirations is for the political core to absorb states

Italy and Belgium, any existing regional governments were erased from the map as sovereign entities and left without formal access to the new national governments, without public finance discretion, and with-out formal administrative autonomy.

regional governments had formal access to the national government, discretion over public finance (i.e., taxing and spending), and administrative autonomy.

The political systems that emerged out of this set of nearly simultaneous experiences of nation-state formation were marked by a wide array of institutional forms that provide a diverse set of empirical cases for contemporary scholars of political development.

an age when the issues of state building and federalism have returned to the center stage of politics in discussions of the European Union and nation building more broadly, a comparative analysis of nineteenth-cen-tury European nation-state formation offers a fruitful way to investigate questions that are once again concerns for scholars and policymakers: What are the conditions under which a new political entity is created? What determines the institutional form of that entity? What are the condi-tions under which federalism can be created?

Intermediary state apparatuses are most vulnerable to the negative conse- quences of neoutilitarian policies. Stringent cuts in real wages and the reduc- tion of resources for training of personnel will undermine the "islands of efficiency" that still exist in these bureaucracies, undercutting any possibility of moving in the direction of becoming developmental states and pushing those who remain trapped in the bureaucracy to become predators in order to main- tain their standards of living.

The differential effectiveness of Third World states as agents of industrial transformation can in fact be connected to differences in their internal struc- tures and external ties. The most effective states are characterized by embed- ded autonomy, which joins well-developed, bureaucratic internal organization with dense public-private ties. In the least effective states, the mirror image- "incoherent absolutist domination"- combines undisciplined internal struc- tures with external ties ruled by the "invisible han

The principal difference between the Brazilian state and the archetypal developmental state is that embedded autonomy is a par- tial rather than a global attribute in the Brazilian case.

Brazilian bureaucrats shift agen- cies every four or five years (Schneider, 1987a). Since the top four or five layers of most organizations are appointed from outside the agency itself, long-term commitment to agency-relevant expertise has only a limited return and construction of an ethos that can act effectively to restrain strategies oriented toward individual gain is difficul

e result- ing apparatus has been characterized as "segmented" (Barzelay, 1986), "divid- ed" (Abranches, 1978), or "fragmented" (Schneider, 1987a). It is a structure that not only makes policy coordination difficult, but encourages resort to personalistic solutions. As Schneider (1987a:27) puts it, "personalism . . . is now made indispensible by bureaucratic fragmentatio

Unable to transform the bureaucracy as a whole, political leaders try to create "pockets of efficiency" (bolsoes de eficiencia) within the bureaucracy (Geddes, 1986:105), thus modernizing the state apparatus by addition rather than transformation (see Schmitter, 1971; Schneider, 1987a:45). The BNDE (National Development Bank), favored especially by Kubitschek as an in- strument of his developmentalism in the 1950s, was, at least until recently, a good example of a "pocket of efficiency"

7 The differences between the apparatus that they describe and the ideal typical developmental state begin with the simple question of how people get jobs in the state. Geddes (1986) chronicles the difficulty that Brazil has experienced in instituting meritocratic recruitment procedures that approximate the Japanese or Korean

Embedded autonomy depends on the existence of a project shared by a highly developed bureaucratic apparatus with interventive capacity built on historical experience and a relatively organized set of private actors who can provide useful intelligence and a possibility of decentralized implemen- tation

It depends on the ability to construct an apparently contradictory combination of Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding social structure.

batsu," which bring together the alumni of Tokyo University Law School who comprised in to- tal an astounding 73%7 of higher bureaucrat

There is clearly a Weberian aspect to the Japanese developmental state. Officials have the special status that Weber felt was essential to a true bureaucracy. They follow long-term career paths within the bureaucracy, and generally operate in accordance with rules and established norms. In gener- al, individual maximization must take place via conformity to bureaucratic rules rather than via exploitation of individual opportunities presented by the invisible han

e hardly immune to corruption. In addition, it must be acknowledged that there are important differences among them in terms of both internal structures and state-society relations. Nonetheless, they have, on balance, played a developmental role, and looking for shared features among them is probably the best starting point for an inductive un- derstanding of the organizational and social structural characteristics that allow the state to play a developmental role

Zaire confirms our initial suspicion that it is not bureaucracy that im- pedes development so much as the lack of capacity to behave like a bureaucra- cy, but it poses some problems for conventional definitions of state autonomy. On the one hand, the state as a corporate entity is incapable of formulating goals or implementing them. Because decisions are eminently up for sale to private elites, the state lacks autonomy. In this optic the Zairian state con- firms the idea that autonomy is a necessary prerequisite for effective state action

One of the most striking aspects of the Zairian state is the extent to which the "invisible hand of the market" dominates administrative behavior, again almost as a caricature of the neoutilitarian image of how state appara- tuses are likely to work. A Zairian archbishop (cited in Callaghy, 1984:420) described it as follows

What Zaire does not demonstrate, however, is that excessive bureaucratization lies at the heart of the problem. To the contrary, most descriptions of the Zairian state seem to vindicate Weber. Callaghy (1984:32-79) emphasizes its patrimonial qualities-the mixture of tradition- alism and arbitrariness that Weber argued retards capitalist deve

Ger- schenkron's argument also raises a new issue-the problem of risk taking. The crux of the problem faced by late developers is that institutions allow- ing large risks to be spread across a wide network of capital holders do not exist, and individual capitalists are neither able nor interested in taking them on. Under these circumstances the state must serve as surrogate entrepreneu

, "capitalism and bureaucracy have found each other and belong intimately together.

From the be- ginning, according to Polanyi, the life of the market has been intertwined not just with other kinds of social ties, but with the forms and policies of the state

Analyzing the behavior of incumbents as though they were atomistic individuals is a dubious starting point. Even the most primitive activity of the state - coercion - requires an apparatus that acts corporatively rather than as a collection of individuals.

o the contrary, it assumes only that incumbents in public office, like all other social actors, are ration- al maximizers. Incumbents require political supporters to survive and these in turn must be provided with incentives sufficient to retain their support. The exchange relation between incumbents and supporters is the essence of the state. Incumbents may distribute resources directly to supporters- subsidies, cheap loans, jobs, contracts, dams, water, etc. Alternatively, they may use their rule-making authority to create rents by restricting the ability of market forces to operate-rationing imports, licensing a limited number of producers, prohibiting the introduction of new products, etc. I

Thinking about states as varying along a continuum from predatory to developmental is a heuristic device, not an end in itself.

They may not be im- mune to "rent seeking" or to using some of the social surplus for the ends of incumbents and their friends rather that those of the citizenry as a whole, but on balance, the consequences of their actions promote rather than imped- ing transformation. They are legitimately considered "developmental states" (cf. Jonhson, 1982; White and Wade, 1988). The East Asian NICs are usual- ly cited as examples of this type of stat

State are not standardized commodities. They come in a wide array of sizes, shapes, and styles. That incumbents sometimes use the state appara- tus to extract and distribute unproductive rents is undeniable. That all states perform certain functions indispensable to economic transformation is equally so. That both characteristics are randomly distributed across states is very unlikely, yet we have only a hazy sense of the range of variation, to say noth- ing of its causes

eking." This paper argues for a more differentiated view, one that connects differences in per- formance to differences in state structure. The "incoherent absolutist domi- nation" of the "klepto-patrimonial" Zairian state are contrasted to the "embedded autonomy" of the East Asian developmental state. Then the in- ternal structure and external ties of an intermediate state-Brazil- are ana- lyzed in relation to both polar types. The comparative evidence suggests that the efficacy of the developmental state depends on a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong sense of corporate identity and a dense set of institu- tionalized links to private e

To this end, the development of theory about the impact of democracy on thestate is a key imperative. The sketch of such a theory in the context of the territorialstate offers some clues about how to proceed. Yet more work is needed to specifythe conditions under which democratization and democracy contribute to politicalorder. Moreover, such a task must begin practically from scratch with regard to thenational state and, as noted, with only some leads concerning the possible effect ofdemocracy on the administrative state

Ultimately, the case for reforming the administration before democratizationrests on the claim that an alternative sequence – starting with democratization –is not viable. Yet it is not the case that a country that democratizes before havingdeveloped a bureaucratic administration is doomed to have a weak state.

Framing the problem of the state’s capacity to deliver public goods beyondorder as one of public administration rather than of democracy, as Huntingtondoes, has clear advantages

dditionally, thetrade-off between democracy and state capacity that lies at the core of Hunting-ton’s thesis does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. While some authoritariancountries have high state capacity (for example Singapore) and some democraticcountries have low state capacity (for example the Dominican Republic), thereare plenty of high capacity democracies (for example Germany) and lowcapacity autocracies (for example Zimbabwe). Thus, differing views on the rela-tive normative value of democracy and state capacity aside, the claim that alimitation of political democracy will solve the problem of state capacity isunwarranted.

Democratization allows for the expression of nationalist claims and hence chal-lenges to authoritarianism can open the door to questions about the appropriatenessof being ruled from a given political centre. However, countries are not therebydoomed. Countries undergoing democratization have confronted the challengeof national identity in diverse ways without derailing the democratizationprocess.

Rustow

Yet these two processes give rise to a new issue:whether the outcome of these two processes is a tight fit between the nation as a cul-tural identity and the territorial state or, for short, a nation-state. Hence, the relation-ship between democracy and the national state is a distinct state-democracy nexu

In other words, the co-evolution of democracy and politicalorder through an agreement to prevent civil war is frequently contingent on theadoption of mechanisms that favour power sharing

The rich elite of a population, when faced with a revolutionarythreat, can either repress the rebels and initiate a civil war or promise economicredistribution of all future income. However, even if the rich ex ante prefer redistri-bution over repression, once the revolutionary forces demobilize, they are left withno incentives to redistribute. Hence, promises about future income are not credible.For the rich to be credible, they must make not a policy concession but a deeper insti-tutional one, redistributing legal political power through the institutionalization ofclean elections and universal suffrage, so that the wide population is not forced to re-mobilize and depend on fragile collective action to ensure economic redistributionin the future.

For Tilly thedensity of the commercial and urban setting is key: where the density of citieswas low, state formation resulted in autocratic regimes.6 In contrast, forDowning and Ertman the strength of the medieval legacy of institutional checkson the executive power is determinant: state formation resulted in autocraticregimes where medieval constitutions were weak

One perspective holds that, to ensure success-ful democratization and enduring democracy, various challenges concerning theconstruction of a state must be tackled before the democracy question is addressed.This is the better known perspective and its catchy proposition, “no state, nodemocracy”,2 is widely treated as the conventional wisdom. It is not the only per-spective on the state-democracy nexus, however. Indeed, the alternative perspec-tive, which holds that challenges regarding the state can be confronted in thecourse of democratization or in democracy, offers a crucial counterpoint to the con-ventional view in the context of all three state-democracy nexuses.

The aim of this article, then, is to convey thestate of knowledge regarding the explanatory relationships between democracy,understood in minimalist terms, and each of these three notions of the state.1

Thus, there is no democracywithout a state; the state is a definitional aspect of democracy.

This article addresses the links between democracy, understood in minimalprocedural terms, and the state, considered as a political centre that (1) hasthe monopoly of violence within a territory, (2) rules over a population thatshares a sense of nationhood, and (3) delivers public goods other thanpolitical order.

All of these approaches are doomed to failure. Neither military juntas nor charismatic personalities nor free elections can be a long- term substitute for effective political organizatio

Modernizing states with multiparty systems are much more unstable and prone to military intervention than mod- ernizing states with one party, with one dominant party, or with two parties

ow. The vulnerability of a traditional regime to revolution varies directly with the capability of the regime for modernization

The problem is: how can the tra- ditional political institutions be adapted to accommodate the social forces unleashed by modernization

But in the contemporary world, political leaders prefer modernization to institution-building, and no matter who leads modernization

rity. Thus from a rela- tively stable one-party system, Turkey passed through a brief two- party era to military rule and a multiparty system: the familiar syn- drome of states where mobilization has outrun institutionalization. In the process, not only were political institutions weakened, but the tradi- tional-minded were brought into politics in such a way as to create obstacles to the achievement of many modernizing goa

ization. Thus, mobilization should be slower in India than in the new African states where horizontal divisions are weak and tribal divisions strong, or in those Latin American coun- tries where the middle strata are weak and a small oligarchy con- fronts a peasant ma

In general, the more highly stratified a society is and the more complicated its social structure, the more gradual is the process of political mobiliz

If decay of political institutions is a widespread phenomenon in the "developing" countries and if a major cause of this decay is the high rate of social mobilization, it behooves us, as social scientists, to call a spade a spade and to incorporate these tendencies into any general model of political change which we employ to understand the politics of these areas. If effective political institutions are necessary for stable and eventually democratic government and if they are also a pre- condition of sustained economic growth, it behooves us, as policy analysts, to suggest strategies of institutional development. In doing this, we should recognize two general considerations affecting proba- bilities of success in institution-buildin

The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Presidium) capable of giving substance to public interests distin- guishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones. The "ultimate test of development," as Lucian Pye has said, "is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible or- ganizational forms."

st. Those Presidents, such as Buchanan, Grant, Harding, who failed to defend the power of their institution against other groups are also thought to have done less good for the country. Institutional interest coincides with public interest. The power of the Presidency is identified with the good of the polity.

Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realizing its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public intere

. The Latin American parallel here would be Mexico, where, as Johnson puts it, "not the armed forces but the PRI is the best organized institution, and the party rather than the armed forces has been the unifying force at the national leve

7 So long as a country like Argentina retains a politics of coup and countercoup and a feeble state surrounded by massive social forces, it cannot be considered politically developed, no matter how urbane and prosperous and educated are its citize

The differences which may exist in mobilization and institutional- ization suggest four ideal-types of politics (see Table I). Modern, developed, civic polities (the United States, the Soviet Union) have high levels of both mobilization and institutionalization. Primitive polities (such as Banfield's backward society) have low levels of

Rapid social and economic change calls into question exist- ing values and behavior patterns. It thus often breeds personal cor- ruption. In some circumstances this corruption may play a positive role in the modernizing process, enabling dynamic new groups to get things done which would have been blocked by the existing value system and social structure. At the same time, however, corruption undermines the autonomy and coherence of political instituti

Increased communication may thus generate demands for more "modernity" than can be delivered. It may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is normally dominated by the more modern groups, it can bring into the arena new, anti-modern groups and break whatever consen- sus exists among the leading political participants. It may also mobi- lize minority ethnic groups who had been indifferent to politics but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide the political system along ethnic lines. Nationalism, it has often been assumed, makes for national integration. But in actuality, nationalism and other forms of ethnic consciousness often stimulate political disintegration, tear- ing apart the body politi

Social mobilization and political participation are rapidly increas- ing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These processes, in turn, are directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these area

Autonomy is perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to pin down: it can, how- ever, be measured by the distinctiveness of the norms and values of the organization compared with those of other groups, by the personnel controls (in terms of cooptation, penetration, and purging) existing between the organization and other groups, and by the de- gree to which the organization controls its own material resources. Coherence may be measured by the ratio of contested successions to total successions, by the cumulation or non-cumulation of cleavages among leaders and members, by the incidence of overt alienation and dissent within the organization, and, conceivably, by opinion surveys of the loyalties and preferences of organization member

Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in pol

Thus the political system assimi- lates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its in- stitutional integrity. In a political system which lacks such defenses, new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapi

Organizations and individuals thus differ significantly in their cumulative capacity to adapt to changes. Individuals usually grow up through childhood and adolescence without deep commitments to highly specific functions. The process of commitment begins in late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change those functions and to unlearn the responses which he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His personality has been formed; he has become "set in his ways." Organizations, on the other hand, are usually created to perform very specific functions. When the organization confronts a changing environment, it must, if it is to survive, weaken its commitment to its original functions. As the organization matures, it becomes "unset" in its w

One is simply chronological: the longer an organization or pro- cedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time perio

The strength of political organizations and procedures varies with their scope of support and their level of institutionalization. Scope re- fers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the po- litical procedures, the scope is broad.

efine political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures

. A theory of political development needs to be mated to a theory of political decay. Indeed, as was suggested above, theories of instability, corruption, author- itarianism, domestic violence, institutional decline, and political disin- tegration may tell us a lot more about the "developing" areas than their more hopefully defined opposite

A concept of political development should be reversible. It should define both political development and the circumstances under which political decay is encourag

Instead of stability, there have been repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there have been repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there has frequently been a decay of the adminis- trative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.15 Only the concept of political develop- ment as mobilization and participation appears to be generally ap- plicable to the "developing" world. Rationalization, competitiveness, and nation-building, in contrast, seem to have only a dim relation to reality

nt." The broader the definition of develop- ment, moreover, the more inevitable development becomes. The all- encompassing definitions make development seem easy by making it seem inescapable. Development becomes an omnipresent first cause, which explains everything but distinguishes noth

None of these political systems was modern. Is it also useful to consider them underdevelop

First, the identification of political development with moderniza- tion or with factors usually associated with modernization drastically limits the applicability of the concept in both time and space. It is defined in parochial and immediate terms, its relevance limited to modern nation-states or the emergence of modern nation-state

al development. A third approach focuses on democratization: pluralism, competitivene

This involves movement from particularism to universalism, from diffuseness to specificity, from ascription to achievement, and from affectivity to affective neutrality. In terms of political develop, ment, functional differentiation and achievement criteria are partic- ularly emphasized.4 A second set of characteristics identified with de- velopment involves nationalism and national integration. Almost all writers recognize the problem of the "crisis of national identity" and the necessity of establishing a firmly delimited ethnic basis for the political community.

Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but po- litical decay

Brazilian towns and cities. First, the idea to split sanitation systems into two linked systems - large-scale public works and small-scale community works - allowed for the separation of what had been one production function into two com- ponent parts. The effectiveness of the public sector inputs into the construction of systems requiring deep trenches and large pipes is considerable. This advan- tage disappears in the construction of shallow trenches and small pipes. Further, the opportunity costs of organizing residents to construct condominial systems in one neighborhood are much lower than trying to coordinate residential work teams for a citywide pro- ject.

When the inputs from a government and citizen are complementary, as shown in Figure 2, output is best produced by some combination of input from both sources.

Third, we realized that the production of a service, as contrasted to a good, was difficult without the active participation of those supposedly receiving the service.

Without parental support, the teachers were incapaci- tated and demoralized. In these villages, children obtained a scattered education, if at all, and only a few successfully passed their school-level examination. The number of children from these villages going on to secondary education was also smaller.

hus, throughout the 1970s and 198Os, turbulent change characterized national, state, and LGA policies related to the organization of primary education. Early claims were made that neither local nor state govem- ments were capable of providing and producing ade- quate levels of education, and that a massive infusion of funds from the national level was essential. As the costs of carrying out such policies became apparent, however, diverse strategies were adopted to shift the costs through changes in funding formulae.

(i) the organiza- tion of citizens and their fulfillment of promises to undertake collective action (what Judith Tendler, 1995, refers to as social capital outside the govem- ment), (ii) good teamwork within a public agency (what Tendler calls social capital within the govem- ment), and (iii) effective coordination between citi- zens and an agency. In many regards, the citizens in a condominial system face a similar set of problems to those of any group of potential beneficiaries facing the problem of producing a collective benefit.

All of this effort to involve citizens is directed, how- ever, toward facilitating their making real decisions in a process of negotiation among neighbors and with project personnel.

The reform plan initiated by de Melo combined an innovative approach to the design of engineering works combined with an active role for citizens.4 Instead of designing all sanitation systems with large cast-iron pipes sunk deep under urban streets at high per household costs, de Melo proposed much smaller feeder lines that can run through urban blocks either in the back yards, front yards, or sidewalks of those being served. By placing these feeder lines away from heavy traffic, the costs of constructing the feeder section are about one-fourth that of conventional designs. Local residents have the skills needed to dig and maintain the feeder lines. The condominial feeder lines are then connected to larger trunk lines that are constructed to regular engineering standards, located under urban streets, and lead to treatment plants.

The actual construction of infrastructure facilities has usually been undertaken by public agencies themselves or arranged for by these agencies through contracts with large-scale, private for-profit contractors. The opportunities for illegal side payments in this form of provision and production are substantial. This system has not, however, been successful in providing safe water and adequate sanitation to citi- zens living in developing countries even after a decade (198 l-90) devoted by the international donor commu- nity to enhancement of drinking water supply and san- itation. While the percentage of urban dwellers receiv- ing water and sanitation increased during 1980-90, the absolute number of urban dwellers without adequate sanitation rose by about 70 million people

Coproduction implies that citizens can play an active role in producing pub- lic goods and services of consequence to them.

Since I think the great divide between the Market and the State or between Government and Civil Soci- ety is a conceptual trap arising from overly rigid disci- plinary walls surrounding the study of human institu- tions, I am delighted to be considered a radical.

Brazil, public officials actively encourage a high level of citizen input to the production of urban infrastructure. In Nigeria, public officials discourage citizen contributions to primary education. The third section of the paper provides a brief overview of the theory of coproduction and its relevance for understanding the two cases.

My main disagreement is on the relative influence of different forces on the origins of African state institutions. Rather than emphasize population den- sity, I would instead argue that it is the expansion of Europe starting in the fif- teenth century and ultimately leading to full colonization that played the major role

Due to low population density, lack of interstate conflict, and the perverse role of colonialism and the international state system, African states did not de- velop institutions that could effectively control and police their territories

We should therefore exercise caution in discussing state capacity without at the same time discussing institutions for determining the goals to which the capacity is used.

I would hypothesize that slavery induced predatory institutions and significant adverse influence on development paths not just in the Americas where the slaves were used, but also in Africa where the slaves originated

mous with the control of land," my hunch is that, relative to other factors, he underestimates the impact of the trade on institutions. As Manning (1990, p. 147) argues, "with the allure of imported goods and the brutality of capture, slave traders broke down barri- ers isolating Africans in their communi- ties. Merchants and warlords spread the tentacles of their influence into almost every corner of the continent. By the nineteenth century, much of the conti- nent was militarized; great kingdoms and powerful warlords rose and fell, their fate linked to fluctuations in the slave trade." There is a lot of evidence that the slave trade had a significant and sustained impact on political and social institutions in Africa (see Miller 1988, ch. 4 for examples). One major casual chan

My feeling is that the general evidence about the relationship within European colonies between population density and institutions within the last five hun- dred years should make us somewhat skeptical about the specific argument for Afric

Paradoxically therefore, the more a country had developed previous to European contact, the worse it sub- sequently performed

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001b) show that, amongst former colonies of the European powers, there is a robust and statistically significant inverse relationship between population density in 1500 and per-capita GDP in 199

The same is true of Africa and Asia. Yet if we look at the five hun- dred years following this date, what is the connection between population density and state formation outside of Europe? The countries today that have the most effective and well-developed states are not those that had high pop

it seems likely that the density of popula- tion may affect the desirability of pro- viding a public good, and more preda- tory theories have similar implications

Since states never had to fight to survive, rulers never had to consolidate their rule and crush domestic opposition; hence the incidence of warlordism

Herbst argues that the lack of devel- opment of African state institutions helps explain many aspects of modern Africa. Since states never had to fight to survive they never had to build effec- tive fiscal institutions

What economists lack is a social scientific explanatio

In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst proposes a theory of state for- mation in Africa. Economists with the slightest familiarity with development will know of "Africa's Growth Tragedy" (to use the evocative phrase of Easterly and Levine 1997), and they are also doubtless aware from the evening news and journalistic accounts of the appar- ent chaos, instability, and disorganiza- tion of African states and polities.

The institutional approach to com- parative development accounts for eco- nomic divergence by positing institu- tional divergence. There are two key questions. First, exactly what institu- tions are causally important in stimulat- ing or retarding development? Second, what explains why different countries have different institutions?

Indeed, greater similaritiesbetween children of two individualistic cultures (Canadaand the United States) and one collectivist culture(China) were present than between the two explicitlycollectivist cultures (China and Turkey).

Generosity, used as a proxy for moral and prosocialbehavior, is particularly interesting as it changes with ageand is influenced by several intrinsic and extrinsicfactors

In the US,Canada, and China, there were more egalitarian sharersthan hoarders. In South Africa and Turkey, there weremore hoarders than egalitarian sharers.

Children across cultures shared significantly differently(F(4, 995) =28.17, p <.001, g2 =.11), and there weresignificant gender differences in sharing, though thiseffect did not remain significant after controlling forfamily-wise error, using Bonferroni correction (F(1, 998)=26.44, p <.05, g2 =.007). Moreover, age-relatedchanges in generosity were also significant (F(3, 996) =68.29, p <.001, g2 =.176) and there was a significantculture 9age interaction (F(12, 987) =1.95, p <.05, g2 =.024). Post-hoc t-tests using Bonferonni corrections forfamily-wise error revealed that children in South Africaand Turkey shared significantly less than children in theUS, Canada, and China and that children in Chinashared significantly less than children in Canada.

Children shared on average 3.52 stickers out of 10 (SD =2.52)

Finally, recent studieshave indicated that the size of the country’s economyand degree of market integration are better predictors ofcultural differences than more rudimentary dichotomiessuch as Eastern/Western or individualistic versus collec-tivist. Given this latter conceptualization, South Africamay differ from all other sites due to its relatively delayedworldwide market integration. In addition, South Africaand Turkey have the smallest economies based on grossdomestic product (GDP) and as such generosity in bothcountries may be lower than in the other three sites thathave larger economies

Children from rural, suburban, and urban populationsoften differ more within country than across country insimilar environmental context

Moreover,socioeconomic status within culture also influencessharing behaviors, with some studies indicating thatchildren from higher SES households are more altruistic(Benenson et al., 2007). Maternal education has beenused as a proxy for socioeconomic status in hundreds ofstudies and a lack of maternal education has been linkedto a variety of deficits in long-term social competenceand health (Winkleby, Jatulis, Frank & Fortmann, 1992).Moreover, parental education has been increasinglyexamined in the literature, and thus far, it has providedthe most accurate predictor of mother and child behavioras compared to a composite SES index (Bornstein,Hahn, Suwalsky & Haynes, 2003

In sum, the role ofdeveloping empathic abilities and affective processes,generally, in expressions of generosity remains ambigu-ous.

Takentogether, there is compelling evidence that the develop-ment of sharing behavior and moral cognition varies byculture, and may also be differentially influenced bydomain-general social cognitive and affective capacities,including general moral development, affective pro-cesses, executive function, and theory of mind/perspec-tive-taking

While prosocialbehavior has traditionally been conceptualized as aglobal concept, recently many scholars have argued formore fine-grained analysis of the multidimensionalfacets of this construct (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013).Furthermore, distributive justice and generosity is inter-esting because it is, by nature, costly to onesel

Results demonstrate that age, gender, SES,culture, and social cognitive mechanisms explain over 20% of the variance worldwide in children’s resource allocation. Thesefindings are discussed in reference to standard cultural comparisons (individualist/collectivist), as well as the degree of marketintegration, and highlight continuities and discontinuities in children’s generosity across urban contexts

furthering our knowledge ofwhen such preferences and biases emerge is the first step in uncovering how such biases mightbe overcome

Older children are also more likely to recognize the moral standing of entities in need (e.g.,the sick and disabled), both in absolute terms, and in comparison to authority figures (e.g.,police and teachers), than younger children.

This pattern of results, when considered alongside evidence that moral expansiveness isdriven by shifts in cultural attitudes [2], is consistent with the assertion that children, as theyage, learn to be more morally expansive than they are otherwise predisposed to be [30]. Beyondthis, though previously untested to our knowledge, it is consistent with the existence of amoral/compassion quota; that if there are limits to the scope of moral consideration we areable to extend, the structure of moral circles may fluctuate to accommodate for changes in per-ceptions of basic moral worth

For the purposes of these analyses, moral concern was operationalized as acontinuous variable (1: did not care at all, 2: cared a little, 3: cared a lot), as this allowed us topredict donation behavior as a function of the mean moral concern score across a number ofrelevant entities. The number of stickers that children donated (continuous DV: 0–6) variedpositively and significantly with age, r (144) = .450, p < .001, with older children donatingmore than younger children.

As summarized in Fig 3, the model suggests that older children cared significantly moreabout people in wheelchairs (b = .28, SE = .09, p = .002, 95% CI [.10, .46]), sick children (b =.38, SE = .11, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .59]), and trees (b = .31, SE = .10, p = .002, 95% CI [.12,.49]) than younger children. On the other hand, older children cared significantly less aboutcats (b = -.29, SE = .09, p = .002, 95% CI [.-.47, -.10]), and plates

Specifically, youn-ger children gave a much higher proportion of ‘not caring at all’ responses than older children(see Fig 2).

suggests that girls showed a higherlevel of moral concern than boys across all entities included in the task

suggests that children cared about different entities as they got older.

Thus, there was no evidence that chil-dren’s overall level of moral concern changed as they became older

After the game, the experimenter told the child that they would receive six stickers as areward for doing a good job. She explained that the child could keep as many of the stickers asthey wanted, but that there were some children coming in later who might not get any stickers,and that–if the child wanted–they could give some stickers away to those children. She pro-vided a donation box and an envelope and reiterated that the child could give away as many ofthe 6 stickers as they liked by putting them in the box, and keep as many stickers as they likedby putting them in the envelope.

he entity items spanned 12 categories: fam-ily & friends, ingroup, outgroup, revered, needy, villains, high-sentient animals, low-sentientanimals, food animals, pets, plants, and objects (categories were selected based on originalMoral Expansiveness Scale (MES) entities used in Crimston and colleagues’ study (2016

The use of vignettes [19,20] or hypothetical scenarios involving individual characters [18] istypical of the existing literature (e.g., asking children what they think about a group memberwho violated a particular group norm). As such, these moral scenarios are embedded within anarrative that might itself individualize the character to the child, thus influencing the associ-ated moral judgments made. This limits our capacity to understand children’s perceptions of arange of entities outside of their direct and momentary experience.

There is extensive existing research exploring moral development and reasoning through-out childhood. For example, there is evidence for basic prosocial preferences emerging from asyoung as three months [8,9]. Children act prosocially early in development [10,11] andincreasingly engage in higher-cost prosocial behavior as they enter middle childhood (aroundeight years; see [12] for review)

Moral consideration can be defined as the acknowledgement that an entity has inherent moralstanding, tied to a perceived moral obligation and commitment to actively defend their well-being

Early humans lacked the knowledge, time and resources to consider the welfare of entitiesbeyond their direct kin and ingroups. Over recent generations, however, societies have begunto extend moral rights to an increasingly broader array of human groups, as well as towardscertain non-human animals and elements of the natural environment

Notably, children’s level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocialbehavior.

Althoughyounger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older childrendemonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within theouter reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as asimple in vs. out binary decision)

Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concernfor a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past

While existing evidence shows that children do not begin tounderstand self-promotional reputation enhancement until aroundeight years of age [71,72,77], our findings reveal that children asyoung as five years of age behave in ways consistent with adultpatterns of prosociality in response to audience and transparencycues.

possibility that transparency and audience cues work theopposite way– rather than increasing children’s generosity, suchcues might instead inhibit children’s ungenerous behavior

One additional explanation for the low rates of giving weobserved in our study is that children may have been uninten-tionally primed to think of our experiment as a competition

One striking aspect of our results is that children wereconsiderably ungenerous in our task. Indeed, children onlyshowed consistently prosocial behavior in our study in thecondition when they could see the recipient and their allocationswere fully visible; in all other conditions, children were statisticallyungenerous, giving the recipient the smaller amount of stickers

When visibility between the actor and the recipient wasoccluded and, thus, the recipient could not see either the actor orthe allocation distributions, overall rates of generosity were verylow. When allocations were presented in transparent containers,actors were significantly more likely than chance to distribute onesticker to the recipient when they received one sticker (M = 25%),t(15) = 2.74, p = .015, but not when they received four stickers,(M = 34%), t(15) = 1.78, p = .096, themselves. Additionally, whenvisibility between the actor and the recipient was occluded andallocations were presented in opaque containers, rates of givingfour stickers were the lowest (and therefore rates of giving onesticker were the highest) and therefore most different fromchance; this was true when actors received four stickers(M = 13%), t(15) = 6.71, p,.001, or one sticker (M = 16%),t(15) = 4.57, p,.001,

suggesting that the amount of informa-tion available to the recipient regarding the allocation options alsoplayed a role in children’s allocation decisions.

We found a main effect of recipientvisibility, indicating that actors were more prosocial when therecipient was visible (M = 48%) than when the recipient wasoccluded from view (M = 22%), F(1, 30) = 15.32, p,.001, suggest-ing that the lack of a visible audience led to more ungenerousbehavior in this task.

Finally, to examine the influence of audience cues on allocationdecisions, we varied the visibility of the recipient between subjects.Half of our actors were tested in a visible condition, in which theactor and recipient were able to maintain visual contactthroughout the test session. The other half of actors were testedin an occluded condition,

irst,participants were told the experiment was a ‘‘quiet game’’ andasked not to communicate with one another during the duration ofthe test session; this eliminated any verbal and non-verbal cuingthat took place and freed the actor from having to answerquestions about her allocation choices. Second, both children wereasked to place their allocations into separate, opaque cloth bagsafter each trial to minimize distractions and also to reduce theability of the recipient to directly compare her own allocation tothe one received by the actor. At the end of the test session,children were taken to opposite ends of the testing room withdifferent experimenters to count their stickers.

Overall, children seemed tofind the apparatus quite intuitive and learned how to operate italmost immediately upon interacting with it.

Overall, the logic behind the current study is as follows: if, infact, prosocial behavior in children is largely intrinsicallymotivated, our subjects should act generously, regardless of if therecipient is aware of their actions. However, if children’s prosocialbehavior is sensitive to extrinsic social factors, we should seevariation in their allocation decisions relative to the differentconditions. Specifically, if children are sensitive to audience cues,then five year-olds should act more generously on the allocationtask when the recipient is visible than when the recipient is not.

Overall, mostauthors fail to discuss or account for audience or transparencyeffects when interpreting levels of prosociality (but see: [86,87]); asa result, there is still much to learn regarding whether youngchildren’s prosocial decisions are sensitive to these cues.

s a result, it is possiblethat children’s own prosocial behavior may also be sensitive toaudience and transparency cues years before they possess explicitknowledge of the social function of, and possibility for, strategicreputation management in others.

ehavior more generally is influenced by thepresence or opinions of others (see [58] for review). For example,around age three, children begin to engage in deceptive behavior(e.g., lying) to spare the feelings of others

Overall, such cues– which we will refer to here as audiencecues– appear to be extremely important in determining the extentof people’s prosocial behavior across a number of situations,although it is not clear that people are consciously consideringtheir reputations in cases in which they are affected by these cues

For the purposes of this paper, reputation is defined asinformation-based inferences about an agent’s character that mayserve to inform others of the general nature of his/her possibleactions in the future, thus leading to possible future reciprocationor punishment.

Research shows that infants as young as eight months of agewillingly share toys with family members, peers, and completestrangers [5–7]. At 14 months of age, children will help an adultexperimenter complete a goal [8] and will even take a cost to helpothers by the time they are 20 months of age [9]. Finally, betweenthe ages of two and four, children begin to share resources withothers voluntarily [10], even when those resources are easilymonopolizable [11–12]

Children were consistently generous onlywhen the recipient wasfully aware of the donation options; in all cases in which the recipient was not aware of the donation options, children werestrikingly ungenerous. These results demonstrate that five-year-olds exhibit ‘‘strategic prosociality,’’ behaving differentiallygenerous as a function of the amount of information available to the recipient about their actions. T

This study examined the developmental origins of sensitivity to cues associated with reputationally motivatedprosociality by presenting five-year-olds with the option to provide one or four stickers to a familiar peer recipient at no costto themselves. We systematically manipulated the recipient’s knowledge of the actor’s choices in two different ways: (1)occluding the recipient’s view of both the actor and the allocation options and (2) presenting allocations in opaquecontainers whose contents were visible only to the actor.

Applying this distinction to the pres-ent context would thus indicate that children view within-group harm as a moral transgression but view between- group harm as breaking only conventional rules.

Instead, children use novel labeled social categories to evaluate how people should relate to one another, as shown in the present studies, following a fairly brief introduction to the categories. Thus, the phe-nomenon revealed here may have resulted from the interplay between the general effects of labeling and chil-dren’s intuitive theory of how categories shape the social world

identical to that found in previous studies: Ratings of within-group harm did not change across questions, p > .40, but ratings of between-group harm became less nega-tive after children received the rule information, p < .001, d = 1.20. Thus, older children, like the younger children in Studies 1 and 2, treated social categories as marking people who are intrinsically obligated to one another.

he purpose of Study 2 was to rule out the possibility that children consider categories as marking intrinsic obligations only in contexts that might be conducive to between-group competition. Although no competition was described in Study 1, the groups were referred to as teams, which could have led children to infer the pres-ence of a contest.

Immediately after the event was described, children were asked, “Was what the Zaz did OK or not OK?” If they answered that it was not OK, they were asked, “Was it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad?” (scoring: 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = very, very bad). Then, we provided information about the characters’ environment: “What if there was no rule in their school against teasing?

We directly tested whether young children view cate-gories as marking people who are intrinsically obligated to each other. To do so, we built on methods from previ-ous work on moral development (Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983), which tested beliefs regarding intrinsic obligations by examining judgments about whether the wrongness of violations of obligations depends on the presence of explicit rules. Using this method, when children maintain that an action (e.g., hitting someone) is wrong, even if there are no rules in the agent’s environment prohibiting the action (e.g., no rules against hitting), it suggests that they view the action as violating an intrinsic obligation—an obligation that exists regardless of the external envi-ronment. In contrast, if children view the wrongness of an action as dependent on rules, this indicates that they view the action as violating an obligation that exists only in the context of explicit social agreements. Thus, by applying this method in our studies, we tested whether children view people as intrinsically obligated not to harm members of their own category, but as prohibited from harming members of other categories only in the presence of explicit social rules

they often do not view race as marking people who are fundamentally similar to each other

First, by preschool, children can categorize people in many ways (e.g., by gender, race, language, teams, and shirt colors) and are sensitive to many of these categorical distinctions in their feelings and behaviors toward their own group members (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Dunham et al., 2011; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987); however, children use only a small subset of categories to make the types of inferences just described

Thus, an intuitive theory that social catego-ries mark fundamental similarities supports a powerful mechanism for using social categories to predict human behavior

These data indicate that children view social categories as marking patterns of intrinsic interpersonal obligations, suggesting that a key function of social categories is to support inferences about how people will relate to members of their own and other group

The dissolution of six existing states and the creation of an all-encompassing apparatus of a unitary state centered first in Turin (inPiedmont) and later in Rome was above all a response to the lack ofembeddedness and institutionalization and to the low infrastructuralcapacity of the preexisting states of the Italian peninsula.

In sum, the first step of unification involved the am-bitious strategy of dislodging all existing institutions and state actorsfrom their previous positions of authority, shutting down former gov-ernment ministries, removing leaders from their positions, and replac-ing these institutions and personnel with new Piedmontese institutionsand personnel.49The second step in this unitary strategy of state formation to growout of the legacy of low infrastructural capacity in the Italian states (re-inforced by the first step of unification) was the turn to unitary institu-tions and to a rejection of federalism in parliamentary debates between1860 and 1865. Despite last-ditch efforts by Ministry of Interior offi-cials to bring some system of decentralization to Italy, federalismfoundered.50 G

Cavour received frequent calls mirroring the same sentimentfrom his officials in the south—“Permit me, excellency, to repeat to youthe need for policemen (Carabinieri) to save this country from ruin!”41Also, to the surprised eyes of Piedmontese officials arriving in Naples,another basic governmental task—elementary school education—wasin desperate disrepair.

In sum, both Bismarck and Cavour preferred and in fact initiallysought negotiated settlements to national unification as the least costlyroute—diplomatically, politically, and financially—to national unifica-tion. Though both actors considered the two options of forced “merger”or gradual “indulgence” of local particularities, there existed in bothcontexts an ideological preference for a gradual, negotiated unificationin which monarchical leaders would remain in power. Motivated by do-mestic and international considerations, there existed in both settings ademand for federalism.

he analysis proceeds in two steps to demonstrate that in Italy it wasthe structure of state-society relations that stood as the main barrier tofederalism while in Germany it was a different pattern of state-societyrelations that made federalism possible.

In short, when new states are forming and when political leadersseek federalism, it is not the military power of the political center thatdetermines the structure of a state. Instead, the nature of state-societyrelations inside the states is key; highly institutionalized and hencehighly infrastructural states provide the crucial building blocks of fed-eralism.19

I arguethat high infrastructural subunits that are constitutional, parliamentary,and administratively modernized states serve as a pathway to federal-ism, for two reasons. First, they can serve as credible negotiating part-ners in a process of state formation. Second, they can also deliver thebenefits that state builders seek with state formation in the first place:greater tax revenue, greater access to military manpower, and greatersocial stability.

“Military power” refers to the social or-ganization of physical force

State buildingtherefore results in unitary governance structures when the politicalcenter is militarily strong enough to impose itself on the periphery atthe moment of polity formation. By contrast, federal “concessions” aregranted when the political center is militarily too weak to impose itselfon the periphery.1

Riker identifiestwo constraints that determine whether the political core offers conces-sions: “Though they desire to expand, they are not able to do so by con-quest because of either military incapacity or ideological distaste.