Russian public opinion finds itself largely in tune with the official discursive lineand the mainstream textbook narrative. Whether conducted in the early 1990sor the 2010s, surveys confirm that about three-quarters of Russians think of theGreat Patriotic War as the major event in Russian history.
Great social consensus around the GPW; it is seen as a salient historical event.
In 2016, public attention turned to the Panfilov division, famous in Soviet his-toriography for its role in defending Moscow from Nazi tanks. A screen adapta-tion of the story, 28 Panfilovtsy, was in production with the support of both theRussian and Kazakh governments. Yet the story of twenty-eight Panfilov soldiersdefeating fifty Nazi tanks was a propaganda construction,
Hyperbolic military propaganda. Someone who tried to shut it down was shut down. Putin protected it.
In 2014,for the seventieth anniversary of the siege of Leningrad, the independent Dozhdchannel or ga nized a survey asking, “Would it have been better to give up Lenin-grad to Nazi troops in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives?” The ques-tion outraged many citizens, especially veterans’ associations.
Some censorship of debates?
But the debate has also taken on a more politi cal tone for three reasons. First,it has become part of a broader discussion on the reintegration of Russian émi-gré culture into contemporary Russia, since some of its main representatives, cel-ebrated for their inestimable contribution to Russian culture, collaborated withNazi Germany against the Soviet Union.
The debate is more political. Is part of a wider discussion on the reintegration of Russian culture into contemp. Russia; some of its main reps collaborated with the Nazis and against the Soviet Union.
Most notorious collaborationist is a neofascist hero who is seen as deserving rehabilitation--blurs the lines between historical judgement and contemporary debates.
Also, Russia is fighting against the regrowrth of collaborationist movements but isn't really discussing the ones at home.
Highly polarizing.
In the 2000s and 2010s, a growing number of academic studies appeared oncollaborationism in Soviet territories occupied by Nazi troops. It became one ofthe most sensitive historical topics related to the issue of fascism, as it impliedthe existence, backed by documentary evidence, of Russian citizens who sympa-thized with Nazi Germany.
More academic studies looked at collaborationism in Soviet territories by Nazi troops. Sensitive because it implied the existence of Russians who were Nazi sympathizers.
On several occasions, President Putin and his government have stated that themission of schools is to form the patriotic spirit of youth, and, by extension, thatambivalent historical moments or dark pages of national history are not propersubjects for pupils and should be left to professional historians.
Putin's justification for leaving out salient historical events in textbooks.
Analyses of Nazism as an ideology are absent from the vast majority of text-books.
Most textbooks do not analyze the concept of Nazism, do not contain accounts of Hitler's rise to power. Holocaust barely discussed. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact plus consequences neglected.
Not taught the concept of fascism.
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 is presented as a by-product of boththe Munich Agreement and the British and French refusal to sign a nonaggres-sion treaty with the Soviet Union.
Pact that allied Russia with Germany portrayed as a matter of desperation/necessity.
Broadly speaking, the 1945 victory is portrayed asboth the people’s victory and Stalin’s personal success.
1945 victory portrayed as people's and Stalin's success.
The state’s failed desire to produce a unified historical narrative can be ex-plained by the vivid and contradictory debates on the interpretation of the Stalinera, the most conflictual period in recent history, and one seen by the authorities ascarrying a risk of politicization against the current status quo. T
The state wants to create a unified historical narrative, but there is no consensus among the debates surrounding the Stalain era. These debates have the potential to polarize, specifically against the regime/status quo,
As soon as Putin came to power, he imposed his famous “power verti-cal,” retaking control over some aspects of society, including the textbook mar-ket.
After the Soviet state collapsed, teachers had to deal with contradictory information and dicourses with no instruction on how to teach Soviet history. Textbooks competed in the market with no established academic standard. Putin changed this, began to deal with the textbook issue. Deemed some textbooks too anti-Soviet.
Created a set of rules for history textbooks to follow. Increased conformity with state narratives.
The introduction of religious symbols, even if the celebration remains largelysecular, constitutes another visi ble transformation in the commemoration pro-cess.
Both visible and symoblic religious symbols have been introduced as new commemorations. Maintaining a ritual "effect." Makes commemorations, and therefore insults targeted towards them, personal.
There is also consumerism/commercialization of Soviet nostalgia, Victory Day is a commercial occasion.
Another “invented tradition” has been the massive use of the orange-and-black-striped St. George’s Ribbon. Conveniently, it combines tsarist and Sovietsymbolism.
Another example of a recent GPW commemoration practice: the St. George's Ribbon that combines the tsarist and Soviet eras. Used as an anti-Orange Revolution symbol, worn as an act of remembrance by civilians.
Second World War dead the right to vote,
interesting...
Yet a central focus of the Great Patriotic War’s commemorations, its veterans,has been gradually disappearing.
An essential of GPW commemorations is that it is an individual/family holiday AND a patriotic one due to its veterans. But their veterans are dying.
Russian instutions did try to address this, to preserve the cult of war, through new means of commemoration and immortalization.
Several factors can explain the structural need to reprise Brezhnev-era com-memorations.
Brezhnev-era Victory Day commemorations are needed for various reasons.
The unique status of May 9 has been reinforced by the Kremlin’s heavy invest-ment in commemorations.
The 1945 Russian victory over Nazi Germany is celebrated by the Kremlin. Victory Day is being turned into a way to celebrate Russia (inc. Putin, the state) on an annual basis.
Attempts at reviving the image of Stalin in 2010 received backlash.
There is an explicit link between Victory Day and the legitimacy of the current political status quo.
After becoming president in 2000, Putin’s policy of rehabilitating Soviet sym-bols contributed to relegitimizing the war as a critical moment in the nation’s his-tory.
Then when Putin assumed office in 2000, Putin's glorification of the Soviet era involved portraying the war as a vital aspect of Russia's history.
The perestroika-era debates criticizing the way the Soviet leadership conductedthe war were therefore short-lived and came to a halt with the fiftieth anniver-sary of the victory in 1995, when the master narrative inherited from the Sovietregime was restored.3
As a result, perestroikas that criticized the way the Great Patriotic War failed, so Yeltsin started reviving the memory of it. The GPW sparks great patriotic sentiment among Russian citizens (Russia s a victor).
The Great Patriotic War occupies a unique space in Russia’s contemporary mem-ory for several reasons.
The Great Patriotic War helps with memory wars/memory control.
Historically,Russia has offered a large spectrum of reactionary or ultraconservative ideolo-gies that cannot be subsumed under the fascism label, or that share some charac-teristics with it but also have a wider appeal.
Para-fascism has been fairly present in Russia. Three main ideologies:
The success of this classical fascism—Umland calls it “mimetical fascist,”74 as it copies and pastes foreign models—inRussia is minimal.
Classical fascism is minimally successful in Russia.
Rus sia’s Three Layers: Classical Fascism,Para- Fascism, and Illiberalism
The author discusses three layers of Russia:
If all nonliberal figures are said to fall under the category of a new fascism ris-ing, this inaccurate generalization overlooks the genuine popular support that il-liberal movements have gained in recent years, the structural mechanisms thatexplain their success once in power (as in Hungary or Poland, for instance), andthe need to rethink liberalism in order to respond to these new trials. The samelogic applies to Russia
You can't call all illiberal figures fascists. This would fail to ackowledge these figures'/illiberal movements' popular support, the way that political structures facilitate their success when they are in power, and the fact that we need to rethink liberalism to explain these phenomena.
Calling Putin fascist would present issues as a result (read para).
If one labels the Rus-sian regime as a whole as fascist, one loses the ability to perceive the plasticity ofits foreign policy, the plurality of its ideological references, and the ad hoc natureof its political consensus.
Labeling Russia as fascist
First, illiberalism is not necessarily synonymous with the classical Far Right.Illiberal movements do not want to remain in a marginal countercultural position;in fact, they hope to do just the opposite and to become the new mainstream.
Further definition of illiberalism.
I thus define illiberalism as a new, postliberal politi cal paradigm that reassertsthe rights of a supposed silent majority by promoting sovereignty in the spheresof politics (rejection of supranational and multilateral institutions, reassertion ofthe nation-state), the economy (protectionism), and culture (rejection of multi-culturalism and minority rights, essentialist definition of who is part of the na-tion and what the nation’s genuine cultural features should be)
Illiberalism is specific to countries that have experienced liberalism and is constrained by time, having begun after the 2000s.
It promotes sovereignty in political spheres, the economy, and culture. "Reasserts the rights of a supposed silent majority." A rejection of multiculturalism, human rights, etc.
The concept of illiberalism gives definition to trends that cannot perfectly be described in terms of the Far Right, populism, democratic backlash, or fascism.
I see illiberalism not as the opposite of liberalism (that is, not as a nonliberal-ism or an antiliberalism) but more as a postliberalism,
Illiberalism isn't the opposite of liberalism but is a postliberalism, pushback against liberalism after having experienced it.
This nuance is extremely important for separating today's events from developments in regimes that did not experience liberalism.
It also (usefully) takes away from the idea that illiberalism is a contagion that spread from the East (Russia/China) to the West. Instead, it is cocreational, springing up simultaneously in many different contexts.
Liberalism emphasizes individualautonomy over the will of the collective; the protection of individual rights; and,for the past few decades, the defense of some forms of multiculturalism domesti-cally and multilateralism on the international scene. Yet it remains highly con-textualized, depending on space
Expands on the definition of liberalism while acknowledging its contextual elements.
In this book, I state that the terminological inflation of fascism that we cur-rently observe obscures more than explains the structural transformations of oursocie ties: the term illiberalism offers a significantly more heuristically helpful ap-proach to capture these evolutions.
The author says that "illiberalism" is the term we should turn to instead. "Facism" obscures our understanding of things.
Beyond the issue of the (in)efficacy of the Reductio ad Hitlerum, the currenttrend of trivializing references to Hitler may have dangerous repercussions forpo liti cal life and civic consensus
Also, Reductio ad Hitlerum
Controlling the labeling of politi cal opponents and assassinating a country’sbrand through the accusation of fascism is inscribed into a broader trend: the riseof character assassination in world politics.
The author spends more time on the trend of using the Reductio ad Hitlerum.
Finger-pointing/accusations of fascism are part of a global trend of character assassination in international politics. Reductio ad Hitlerum.
The Internet is helping with this.
But read on--does the Reductio ad Hitlerum minimize the horros of the Nazi regime? Or does it do something helpful?
The persuasiveness of the Reductio ad Hitlerum is dual: it vilifies the enemy byidentifying it with the most murderous ideology, and it identifies the attacker withthose who fought against Nazism or were its victims, thus using a very powerfulhistorical reference to establish the attacker’s moral superiority.
Reductio ad Hitlerum is a persuasive rhetorical tool; degrades the enemy, raises the accuser.
Sophie Pinkham notes,“downplay[s] the role of homegrown political forces and exaggerate[s] the deci-siveness of Russian propaganda campaigns”
Someone else's criticism of Snyder.
They shared a vibrant nationalistcounterculture embodied in an active illiberal civil society, as well as a belief inSonderweg, a special path for their country (osobyi put ́ in Russian).27 Yet differ-ences between Weimar Germany and Yeltsin’s Russia are critical in explaining theirdivergent trajectories. Germany had a well-developed party system; this has neverbeen the case in Russia, where patronal mechanisms probably help to prevent ide-ological polarization. The lack of a well-organized civil society in Russia, com-pared to Germany, is also helpful in illuminating where the similarities betweenthe two countries end.
The author criticizes comparisons of Weimar's Germany with Yeltsin's Russia.
being a nonliberal or antiliberal regime does not equate to beingfascist.
Again: how fascist is fascist enough? Some nonfascist nations have fascist elements.
Over the years, almost all social science disciplines have been involved in thestudy of fascism
Additional issues with the study of fascism in this paragraph.
Another dividing line has separated historians of fascism: some see fascism asan answer to communism and therefore they tend to study fascism and commu-nism as two products that mirror and influence each other, based on the totali-tarianism theory that equates them both.
Another roadblock to consensus: some view fascism and communism as mirrors of each other and so study fascism in combination with communisation, while others view it as a cultural, rather than political, notion that refutes universalism, rationalism, and materialism.
Fascism constitutes a puzzling ideology for the social sciences.
Academics have not reached a consensus on what fascism means. There are different theories behind its definition.
The tendency to accuse everyone who challenges liberalism of being anew fascist has dramatically obscured our understanding of today’s Russia aswell as the current transformations of the world order and Western domesticscenes.1RUS SIA’S “FASCISM”OR “ILLIBERALISM”?
The author questions the idea of labeling critics of liberalism as fascists; says that it prevents us from understanding the modern political scene--Russian, Western, or otherwise.
Where does fascism begin? How many fea-tures considered fascist by scholars should a country accumulate to be labeledas such?
How fascist is fascist enough?
It is based on the presup-position that because perceptions are always embedded in the speaker’s ownworld, the only legitimate path to questioning Russia’s politi cal development isquestioning “our own”—the West’s.
The author says that because our perceptions are embedded in our own worlds, we can only really question Russia's political development is to question the West's perceptions.
Identities are situational, so need to consider that 1. fascism is discursive as a description of hte world and esp. Europe and Europe-US/Europe-Russia relations.
Second, Russia allows us to address the apparent paradox of a country whosecultural consensus is founded on being the antifascism power par excellence but,still, is seen by many outsiders and some insiders as fascist, whatever the exactdefinition of the term.
Russia presents a paradox: defines itself as antifascist yet is seen by many as the opposite. Is an example of how generic notions of fascism and fascism in specific historical contexts can clash.
First, although fascism studies scholars have beenworking hard to develop a consensual definition of what types of regime or mind-set can be qualified as fascist, hesitations remain in identifying the boundaries offascism: How many fascist features must a regime accumulate to be labeled fas-cist?
Issues with defining a fascist regime: how fascist is fascist enough? What qualities are fascist? Should you need to have all of them to be described as fascist?
What about when some features of fascism align with deomcracy?
In this book, I argue that fascism has become one of Russia’s strategic narratives,operationalized at two levels.
The author argues that fascism is a strategic narrative of Russia's. Two levels:
Source of Russian values.
To legitimize themselves in the eyes of both their domestic and interna-tional audiences, states build myths—that is, depoliticized speech that asserts acertain picture of the world without explanation, thereby helping to naturalizeparticular worldviews and power relations, through which they offer a self-portrayal, a storyline with plot, characters, and morality.2
States build legitimacy through narratives. "Spectrum of persuasion," controlling behavior on a small scale and constructing an experience on the international scene
"Social theory of international affairs" --> state's position is a product of intra-state interaction and domestic determinants.
See the next highlight about Russia's challenges on both fronts.
The new line of divide on Western liberalism versus Rus sia’s fascism (and,on the Russian side, on Rus sia’s antifascism against Western renewed fascism) onlycontributes another black-and-white pair with very limited heuristic value. Pro-paganda,
"Western liberalism" vs "Russian fascism" is an oversimplification
The book takes away from this and uses social constructionism. Identities are not static, can be transformed discursively.
Discursiveness is important. See the next highlight.
The exercise of assessing the “nature” of the Russian po liti cal regime is diffi-cult because it is largely based on value judgments and has a very pronouncednormative character.
The debate on the Russian regime is riddled with issues. Some Western-centric views, believing that Western liberal values are correct, while some adopt "relativism" which could favor Russia.
Too many binaries used to describe Rusisa in the past.
Labeling Russia as fascist thus often performs the simple role ofreducing the country to being the other of the West, embodying everything thatis not desirable for “us.”
Sort of as a result, there is a vagueness associated with "fascist." Does it just been undesirable, as Orwell said? Just not the West?
The author says that Russia isn't different from the West, necessarily, but is part of a "continuum" with it.
See the next highlight.
As one can glean from the above quotations, fascism can be deployed for name-calling as part of a politi cal strategy for delegitimizing the enemy; it can be usedas an academic definition by scholars who apply it to a phenomenon based ontheir own characterization of the term; and it can be an emic definition used bypeople who attribute the term to themselves and claim it proudly.
The term "fascism" can be used as an accusation or an insult, an academic term, or a self-identification label.
In each of these contexts, the audience is different, and there are different meanings.
But in these examples, two narratives collide directly: one asserts thatRussia is a fascist country—or that its leaders are fascist—whereas the other definesRussia as a country that defeated fascism.
Two competing narratives: 1. Russia is a facist country/its leaders are fascist. 2. Russia defeated fascism.
Can these be reconciled? Are they mutually exclusive?
We need to determine whether Russia is fascist because there is a large-scale debate going on, and it has policy implications on the international scene.
In Russia, po liti cal opponents have also used the label “fascist” to denouncethe current regime.
Russian political opponents have also accused Russia of fascism.
See the next paragraph for remarks by the chess champion Garry Kasparov in 2013 - Putin turned Russia fascist. Condemned the West for not boycotting the Sochi Olympics Games.
“Today, we see how a number of countries aredeliberately distorting war events, and how those who, forgetting honor and humandignity, served the Nazis, are now being glorified, and how shamelessly they lieto their children and betray their ancestors. Our sacred duty is to protect the realheroes.”
Russia posing as anti-Nazi (and therefore anti-fascist?).
Also accused the West of having an appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany - provides this reason among others for why WWII started.
Comparisons are drawn betwen modern-day Russia and pre-WWII Nazi Germany.
The label has also permeated the Ukraine-Russia relationship. Entangled in acomplex mirror game since the beginning of the 2014 war, both Moscow and Kyivhave been accusing each other of fascism.
Another reason why discussing Russian fascism is important; it plays a central role in current Ukraine-Russia relations. Both parties are accusing each other of fascism.
Ukraine has created a term "Rashizm," i.e. Russia and fascism.
“The fascist regime evoked na-tional greatness, discipline, and exalted myths of an allegedly glorious past. Sim-ilarly, Putin is trying to blend the traditions of the Cheka (Lenin’s Gestapo, wherehis own grandfather started his career), with Stalin’s wartime leadership, with Rus-sian Orthodoxy’s claims to the status of the Third Rome, with Slavophile dreamsof a single large Slavic state ruled from the Kremlin.
US national security adviser called Putin a fascist. Former CIA director James Woolsey followed suit. Then Hillary Clinton.
Then several scholars.
Although both Putin and Medvedev have defended the memory of Russia’scritical role in the 1945 victory
Russia was criticical to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
Even today, seventy years after theend of the war, the consensus around the Soviet Union’s victory over fascism inEurope remains a pivotal component of Russia’s social and cultural cohesion.
The majority of the Russian population disapprove of fascism.
Today, 70 years after WWII ended, the Soviet Union as a victor against fascism is an important part of Russia's social and cultural cohesion.
Fascism is viewed as a product of the West and having nothing to do with Russian tradition.
Of those admitted during the same 1-month period, anestimated 5% were treated for opioid withdrawal. Ofthe estimated 734,470 persons confined in local jails atmidyear 2019, about 1% were receiving MAT for OUD.
hmm?
this is a snapshot but a 1% treatment reception rate is... hmm but more than half of jails offer meds for opioid withdrawal so what do we conclude from this but also 0.51% receive MAT?
The NGOs’ environmental and human rights concerns are often real. But the crusading and frequently patronizing nature of Western engagement with these issues, combined with the fact that the NGOs’ local campaigns against major energy projects are mainly financed, staffed, and organized by the West, has tapped into a deep reservoir of anti-Western sentiment going back to the colonial era.
good argument, follows from that^
have always hobbled its ability to advocate for effective climate policies at the scale needed to have much effect on warming. Ironically, decentering climate and centering energy security, particularly in the West, is likely to do far more to address climate
interesting
most of the world’s solar panel and battery production is controlled by another dictator—Chinese President Xi Jinping
oops!
Meanwhile, the headlong rush across Western Europe to replace Russian oil, gas, and coal with alternative sources of these fuels has made a mockery of the net-zero emissions pledges
Western Europe trying to find alternatives to Russian-imported energy. This means that they aren't holding to their net-zero pledges.
Energy security is an issue.
Putin is not escalating from a position of strength. His fake referendums, absurd annexations, nuclear threats, and anti-Western rants all point to the fact that he is losing the war in Ukraine.
This announcement was a sign of desperation
It is crucial that the democratic world stands up to Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Failure to do so will have potentially catastrophic consequences for international security.
Article emphasizes a need for the West to retaliate and address Putin's nuclear threat
holding the world hostage with the thinly-veiled threat of nuclear apocalypse.
Putin subtly (or at least implicitly?) threatening nuclear warfare
At present, few countries from the developing world seem ready to align themselves with Russia.
Russia doesn't have many allies, though. Who knows if this will work? (Does have some allies.)
distract domestic attention away from Russia’s embarrassing battlefield defeats in Ukraine and place the war in a broader geopolitical context.
Article believes that Putin's vehemence is an attempt at directing attention away from Russia's military failures in Ukraine
Putin painting himself and Russia on the forefront of a global anti-colonial movement
Many veteran Kremlin observers commented that this was comfortably the most vitriolic public attack on the West ever delivered by the Russian leader.
This was Putin's strongest, most vehement insult to the West
for years he has been transforming Russia into a fascist state while presenting himself an anti-fascist. Why not also pose as an anti-imperialist while engaging in naked imperial aggression?
The article calls Putin a hypocrite, a fascist.
However, his main focus was the allegedly imperialistic policies of the West.
The usual accusations; Western leaders are racist, propogate Russophobia.
But: the additional accusation of imperialism.
Kirill’s apparent connection to the Kremlin has enhanced his influence, and he clearly enjoys good relations with Putin in particular.
Associating with Putin has expanded Kirill's influence.
But Kirill’s influence outweighs other patriarchs, as he represents a membership of around 100 million faithful within Russia — making it the largest jurisdiction in Orthodoxy.
Kirill has a disproportionate influence within the Orthodox Church.
The U.K. chose to sanction Kirill largely because of his rhetoric.
The UK did sanction Kirill, though. Because of his pro-invasion rhetoric.
Some analysts and former U.S. officials, however, suspect Kirill’s case might be extra complicated because he’s a religious figure.
Oligarchs have been sanctioned, but Kirill hasn't so far. Maybe because of America's hesitance to sanction religious figures.
Kirill routinely urges his flock of millions to support Putin’s war effort, waving away any culpability over the invasion, while describing Russia’s opponents in Ukraine as “evil forces.”
Kirill demonizes Ukraine, victimizes Russia, romanticizes the struggle by young officers on the battlefield (sorta)
Kirill’s reputed wealth, friendliness with Putin and long-suspected ties to Russia’s spy and security outfits have drawn comparisons to the dozens of oligarchs whose Kremlin connections have led to a battery of U.S. sanctions in recent months.
Kirill compared to the oligarchs that Putin is friends with. He's reputed to be wealthy and linked to Russia's spy and security forces.
The cathedral has floors paved with metal from melted down weaponsseized from the Wehrmacht, Nazi Germany's armed forces, murals ofbattle scenes and annexes dedicated to the Russian military's patronsaints.
intensely military- and war-themed decor
Under Patriarch Kirill, new churches devoted to the Federal SecurityService, the Airborne Forces and the National Guard have beenconsecrated, along with the Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces,where Patriarch Kirill delivered his militant message about the war inUkraine
Kirill: more support for militarization
At the public meeting, the patriarch praised Mr. Putin for helpingRussia recover from the economic collapse of the 1990s, and comparedMr. Putin's rule to a "miracle from God."
Kirill's strong public support for Putin, although some suggest that this meeting was forced by Putin.
Putin's spokesperson confirmed that the meeting was organized by the office of hte president, but that there was no coercion of any sort.
"There's absolutely no doubt that Kirill was an agent of the KGB,"saidFelix Corley, a U.K.-based author who has researched KGBlinks tochurch leaders.
Some are absolutely sure that Kirill is ex-KGB.
On Feb. 25, the priest of a rural parish located northeast of Moscowcompared the campaign announced by Mr. Putin the previousmorning to Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939.
A priest who criticized Putin's military campaign was arrested for allegedly disrespecting the army.
Mr. Legoida, the patriarch's spokesman, said the patriarch had longappealed to both Ukrainians and Russians to try to bring themtogether. "
Kirill's spokesperson claims that Kirill had tried to unite Ukrainians and Russians, but that he wasn't listened to.
opposition to military conflict with a desire to topple the Russianstate. "Pacifism is more dangerous than war," he said
Support of militarization,
Kirill and the ROC have high trust ratings.
In Ukraine, most churches are still officially aligned with the ROC. That's how (? hopefully) the ROC maintained some influence in Ukraine
Under the patriarch, the church has backed Mr. Putin's push to regaininfluence over territories Moscow controlled during the Soviet era,
Kirill's ROC supports militarization and Russia's "reclamation" of lands that Moscow controlled during the Soviet era. Includes support for annexing Crimean Peninsula (2014).
As part of his annual Easter message, the presidentpersonally thanked the church leader f
Putin seems grateful.
People think that Kirill may be a former KGB agent, though his spokesperson has denied this.
n March, the patriarch bestowed a revered relic of the Virgin Mary onthe director of Russia's National Guard, a general who had beensanctioned by both Europe and the U.S., saying he hoped it wouldinspire young soldiers to defend the fatherland. I
Kirill associating holiness with militarization, in a sense, by giving a relic away.
Outside of Russia, the patriarch 's loyalty to Mr. Putin has aggravatedimlits in the broader Eastern Orthodox community: of some 220million faithful. In the face of criticism, he has doubled down.
Russian military dying off, failing in Ukraine. Kirill's assistance in propaganda or at least state backing can maintain domestic respect and support for the invasion.
Kirill denies his role in the propaganda, claiming to unite "spiritual and material" forces to keep Russia safe
Under Patriarch Kirill, theRussian Orthodox Churchhas become a primarypurveyor of thepresident's nationalistideas.
Kirill is a nationalist and under him, the Russian Orthodox Church conveys nationalist messages that mirror the president's.
A former coworker of Kirill says that the ROC is part of the regime as much as state television
Patriarch Kirill, a crucialally of Mr. Putin, has placed the moral authoritY. of the RussianOrthodox Church sguarelY.behind the P.resident
Thanks to Kirill, Putin has the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. Benefits Putin because 63% of the population is Orthodox.
"It was we who broke the back of fascism, which would haveconquered the world if not for Russia," said Patriarch Kirill,
Massacre on one side, Patriarch Kirill saying Russia saved the world from fascism in reference to WWII. Supported by troops.
Kirill is an important ally of Putin's.
To stir up homophobic sentiment among the public, propagandists try to convince the heterosexual and cisgender majority that LGBT+ people’s worldviews and psyches make them something akin to invaders from another planet.
Associate homosexuality with a negative trait. Fear-mongering.
These leaders' reliance on “hegemonic masculinity” – the idea that men should be strong, tough, and dominant – to bolster their position should not be surprising. Authoritarian states are fundamentally weak, and dictators are fundamentally insecure. So, they constantly attempt to project strength.
An argument: Homosexuality seen as the antithesis of masculinity. Masculinity as a sign of strength, needs to be projected by authoritarian states since they are fundamentally weak.
Like in many dictatorships, the image of LGBT+ people that the Nazis pushed was based on two contradictory premises.
Nazis: gay people weak, pathetic, sick. Also, homosexuality as a virus, threatening the fabric of society.
Contradictory; one part of reasoning portrayed them as weak, the other part implied that they were a powerful enemy.
In the minds of Nazi propagandists, gay people were the antithesis of everything Aryan patriots were supposed to embody: asceticism, masculinity, and a willingness to forego pleasure
Third Reich: gay people antithesis of Arynan asceticism, masculinity, hedonism.
The idea of a government-recognized union between one man and one woman as the only permissible kind of romantic relationship is one of the fundamental principles of most fascist regimes.
Discrimination against LGBTQ+ people tends to be a fundamental part of fascist regimes.
“militant faggots have become the main defenders of Ukrainian values.”
goddamn
Meanwhile, for Putin and his propagandists, the idea that there are more than two genders has gone from a “perversion” to an “existential threat to the country and its people.”
Exaggeration: the idea of there being more than 2 genders is not only perverse, but an existential threat to Russian citizens.
Nonetheless, while Putin used to at least pretend that LGBT+ people have the same rights in Russia as everybody else (apart from the “propaganda” law), he now speaks about them as a force to be fought against.
Putin has shifted from pretending that LGBTQ+ people weren't discriminated against (probably a rebuttal against accusations of discrimination from abroad) but now actively wants to persecute them.
“there’s serious talk of registering parties that aim to promote pedophilia.”
Putin has implied a connection between LGBTQ+ people and pedophiles.
The probable reason is that it banks on a society already permeated with the moral and social norms borrowed from the prison subculture.
Anti-LGBTQ legislation is a useful political move since (maybe) it's less common than other "non-traditional" values and Russian citizens are already kind of homophobic
A century ago, Russia tried the communist route. This time around, it’s trying the fascist one.
The article says that Russia is fascist.
In practice, traditions that have been under attack for decades are very difficult to resurrect. Russia’s urbanization patterns and individualism levels are not all that different from what you might find in Western countries.
The so-called traditional values that Putin is pushing for actually aren't very present in Russia.
This inevitably led to a messianic sense of the USSR’s role as the world’s leader towards global communism.
"Us vs. them" --> we're pure, our ideology is the best
Russian revolutionaries inherited this binary: once they emerged from the underground and became the ruling party, the Communists adopted a revolutionary approach to politics.
An "us vs. them" mentality is extremely useful. The Communists used this.
the point of the Soviet anti-gay law was not so much to persecute homosexuals at home as to blackmail and get rid of inconvenient foreigners.
1930s: Soviets re-criminalized homosexuality. Perhaps because of the fear that it would have slowed down population growth.
One historian suggests that anti-gay law wasn't to persecute Soviet citizens, but to get rid of foreigners and blackmail them.
If people were punished for homosexuality, this took the form of refusing the sacrament, obligatory repentance, and fasting. Only under Peter I did the religious rejection of homosexuality get codified in the law,
So before Western intervention, discrimination against gay people was religious, moral, but not embedded in legislation.
If there is any such thing as a “traditional” lawmakers’ attitude towards non-heterosexual relations, it’s probably a lukewarm attitude verging on indifference,
Putin claims to be a protector of traditional values, but w.r.t LGBTQ+ relationships, traditional values are generally lukewarm or indifferent. The British were the ones criminalized homosexual relationships in India. Westernized laws can increase the level of discrimination.
“us” and “them,” the regime tries to convince the population that it’s on their side
Creating an "us vs. them" mentality allows Putin to get people on his side who otherwise aren't motivated enough to serve his cause.
Hence, the constantly changing “reasons” for the war — that kaleidoscope of “denazification,” resisting Satanism, pushing back against “non-traditional” sexual relations and values, and the urgent necessity of new territories.
Putin needs his citizens to strengthen his army/help with the war. So he has begun to cite different reasons to rouse a desire to help: 1. Satanism 2. Denazification 3. Non-traditional sexual relations/values 4. Need for new territories
But this isn't enough. That's why Putin has to keep providing new reasons, inventing new groups of enemies.
And yet, this model has reached a dead end: the war unleashed by Putin has confronted him with the inconvenient fact of needing the citizens after all.
But Putin cannot disempower citizens forever. Now he needs them as 1. Soldiers 2. Workers 4. Volunteers
This escape from accountability is carried out by means of cancelling elections, limiting access to public office, and transferring the state’s responsibilities to the regional and municipal administrations. Meanwhile, it is a key objective of Russian propaganda to glorify the president — and to blame other people for his failures.
Russian leadership (federal) has avoided accountabilty for the suffering of its nation by 1. Cancelling elections 2. Limiting access to public office 3. Transferring state responsibilies to regional and municipal authorities 4. Glorifying the president and blaming other people for his failures 5. Disempowering Russian citizens
Also concerning is the ambiguity of the wording “non-traditional sexual preferences” — it’s not clear what the court would consider “non-traditional.”
The term "non-traditional" is an important piece of this legislation, but it is not clearly defined.
The law does not thoroughly lay out what it considers to be “propaganda.”
Putin (or Duma? or both?) once again creating enough ambiguity in legislation to broaden the demographic who can be arrested. "Propaganda" is not properly defined.
The new rules enter into force immediately. LGBTQ+ “propaganda” has been banned in Russia since June 2013, but only among minors. The authorities have now significantly expanded the list of restrictions: “propaganda” and “impositions” are now prohibited in the presence of children and adults alike.
Before Nov 24, 2022, LGBTQ+ propaganda was only banned for minors. Now it has been banned for everyone.
This law applies to: 1. Films 2. Books 3. Advertising 4. Television 5. Social media 6. Any other form of media
Hundreds of administrative cases have been opened, and new administrative and criminal cases are being opened every day.
Creation and abusive of new administrative laws to suppress public opposition
Growing frustration among young people is why the authorities probably won’t attempt a second major mobilization, according to Schulmann.
This frustration will probably lead the authorities to decide against a second major invasion or mobilization.
Since the summer, the number of people who believe the war is not going to plan has been growing steadily.
More and more people believe that the war isn't going according to plan, both younger and older people. The former are increasingly aware of Russia's military failures.
However, Volkov points out that, when respondents are offered an alternative like peace talks (such as in Levada Center polls), a growing number of people choose this option.
BUT: More and more people like the alternatives to continuing the war, like holding peace talks.
"Recently, propagandists have been pushing the idea that it isn’t so important if it was right or wrong for Russia to start all this. But now it’s allegedly clear that Russia is fighting against NATO, and Russia will be crushed if it doesn’t win,"
More recent propaganda: whether the war should have been started isn't important. Russia is under attack by NATO now, it is dealing with an existential threat. This could explain, at least partly, the changes in polling numbers.
Paradoxically, despite more and more people believing the war should never have been started, the share of those who support a continuation of the war has been growing.
Strange: More people believe the war shouldn't have been started, but more people believe that the war should be continued.
Perhaps it's because they think Russia is losing and needs to fight harder for a victory.
Yudin attributed the rising number of “unsure” responses to Russia’s “partial” mobilization announced in September
Respondents afraid that there is a right answer and a wrong answer, suspect that the polls are state-conducted.
Another interesting nuance is that, among younger people, there has been a sharp increase in the number of respondents replying "unsure" — now at 36%.
More and more younger people unsure of whether the war should have been started. Could be a way of avoiding the question. (Unsure about the partial mobilization in September.)
After nine months of war in Ukraine, fewer and fewer Russians believe Putin did the right thing by starting the conflict — 60% as of Nov. 17. This is still a majority, but it’s at its lowest level in six months and has dropped 10 percentage points since spring.
Fewer people thinking that the war should have been started - but still a majority. Mostly younger people.
political managers and experts have been carrying out confidential opinion polls on attitudes toward the war for at least six months
Political managers and experts have been carrying out secret, confidential polls on attitudes for the war. Surveys conducted by a polling service controlled by the Kremlin.
Questions asked in the survey: 1. Should the war have been started? 2. Is it going according to plan? 3. Should it be continued?
Weekly telephone polls surveyed 900 people.
Russian officials have access to much more information on attitudes than is ever released to the public — and it is well known that the Kremlin keeps a close eye on public opinion.
The Kremlin has more knowledge about public opinion than the public does.
Russia’s Investigative Committee is investigating employees of Memorial, a group founded to study human rights violations committed under Stalin, for “rehabilitation of Nazism,” a source in law enforcement told Russian news agency TASS.
Employees accused of rehabilitating Nazism.
For the FSB in Ingushetia, this has all been just a way to get revenge: Memorial reported on the protests in Magas and assisted the suspects involved in criminal and administrative cases, which annoyed security officials,
Ingushetia FSB annoyed at Memorial; they assisted suscepts in criminal and administrative cases.
What’s more, Memorial didn’t find out that it was required to include the foreign agent label on every social media post until after it had been fined
Memorial found out about its label AFTER it was fined.
In 2020, at Memorial International’s request, Moscow municipal deputy Yelena Kotenochkina wrote a letter to Roskomnadzor asking them to clearly explain the labelling requirements for foreign agents to ensure Memorial could avoid further violations. The agency said in a response that “existing legislation does not include requirements for the form and order [of ‘foreign agent’ labels],” and that the Justice Ministry was responsible for monitoring NGOs.
2020: Roskomnadzor did not help w/ Memorial Intl's request for exact information on how to format "foreign agent" labels. Just told them that the Justice Ministry was responsible.
In July 2019, however, Roskomnadzor received a report from the FSB’s Ingushetia office.
2019: Ingushetia complains about the same thing. ALso linked to a book.
In 2014, the Justice Ministry added Memorial’s Human Rights Center to its “foreign agents” registry, and in 2016, its parent organization, Memorial International.
2014: Memorial's Human Rights Center added to foreign agents registry (Justice Ministry) 2016: Memorial International, the parent company, added to the registry
Russia’s law on “foreign agent” nonprofits was passed in 2012. Starting then, any NGO designated a “foreign agent” was required to include a special label on all of its materials. Unlike “foreign agent” media outlets, which are required by a separate Roskomnadzor order to include a specific text in a specific font size to their content, the exact requirements for NGOs were not specified.
2012: foreign agent law passed, requirements for NGOs vague - possibly on purpose?
Another suit — this one intended to liquidate Memorial’s Human Rights Center — was filed by the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office at the Moscow City Court, though it’s also connected to the Ingushetian authorities
Dad’s Letter: Letters sent by fathers from the Gulag to their children,” “Creativity and Everyday Life in the Gulag,” “The Sandarmokh Memorial Site,”
The Prosecutor General’s Supreme Court lawsuit against the NGO consists of 20 points:
In November 2021, the Prosecutor General called for Memorial International to be liquidated for showing “persistent disregard for the law.”
2021: Prosecutor General ordered liquidation bc it was being unlawful
According to Memorial’s lawyer Natalia Morozova, the Ingushetian FSB’s attacks on Memorial are in part due to Memorial’s work defending the Bolotnoe Case suspects.
Part of attack on Memorial by Ingushetian office of FSB is bc Memorial defended Bolotneo Case suspects in 2019
Almost all of Memorial’s alleged violations were reported to Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal censorship agency, by the FSB’s Ingushetia office
FSB's Ingushetia office v important
Human rights activists warn that the Russian authorities want to establish a monopoly on all sensitive topics
A form of media control.
Memorial’s Moscow Office was stormed in October 2021, during a screening of a film about the Holodomor.
Holodomor; Russia does not view Ukraine as its main victim. Memorial's Moscow Office made a film about it in 2021.
The law on “foreign agents” was adopted in 2012; the Memorial Human Rights Center was blacklisted as a “foreign agent” a year later.
foreign agent law adopted in 2012
memorial called foreign agents in 2016
Russian Attorney General’s Office moved to liquidate the group’s parent organization, Memorial International, for allegedly violating the country’s legislation on “foreign agents”
Encroaching on Memorial's parent org, Memorial International, because it was not publicly declaring its relations to foreign agents.
The escalation from gays to Nazis to Satan follows a kind of video game logic: keeping the players engaged means finding ever-bigger bosses for them to fight
Russia is using anti-Satanist thought as a rhetorical ploy but what purpose would this ploy serve?
It’s highly unlikely that Medvedev, Putin, or anyone high up in the Russian government believes they are fighting Satan, but their beliefs matter only so much.
Article says that higher-ups probably do not believe in the movement, but their beliefs don't matter. They're just creating an environment in which people (fanatics) are motivated to destroy supposedly Satanic forces
And yet something about Russia’s war in Ukraine has repeatedly activated theocratic, reactionary forces.
Invasion of Ukraine has just aggravated or intensified the anti-Satanist movement
The rise of the Russian anti-cult movement and the fundamentalist fight against secular culture are part of an ideological pipeline that leads back to the Great Satan itself,
The article hints that the Russian anti-cult, anti-Satanist, anti-secular movement has roots in American far-right/evangelical orgs hwo were interested in the post-Soviet state
This was a movement that crossed church and state boundaries long before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
anti-Satanist drive not just invented to justify the invasion of Ukraine - existed long before.
in politics, the deliberate revival and revamping of old cultures, practices, and
Traditionalism: favoring established ideas and institutions.
Neotraditionalism: Reviving these ideas and modifying them to fit the current political situation.
Putin doesn’t want to be associated with unpopular steps, such as vehicle searches or converting private businesses to military needs in exchange for largely symbolic compensation. Therefore, it falls on regional leaders
Putin's delegation essentially shifts the blame for unpopular actions to regional governments
NGOs labeled foreign agents have been allowed to nominate their candidates for public councils under federal government agencies
bright side
After that, they are expected to report on their activities, including spending of foreign funds, at least once every six months.
the Justice Ministry requires foreign agents to report on their activities at least once every six months. Foreign agents also have to declare themselves as such
Obviously, in this way, one foreign agent can lead to another.
Foreign agents create foreign agents
“political activities” on Russian soil that are in the interests of a “foreign source.”
Political activity that is in the interests of a foreign source
label could be applied not only to mass media outlets but also to individual people who post information online and receive income from abroad (regardless of what they are actually being paid for).
If you're a mass media outlet, you can be labeled as a foreign agent. If you are an individual blogger and receive income abroad, you can be labeled as a foreign agent.
If you distribute information from media outlets recognized as foreign agents, you can be labeled as a foreign agent youtself.
if they are involved in political activity in Russia and receive assistance from abroad
Foreign agents = involved in political activity, receive assistance from abroad. Assistance can be financial but also take other forms
If you fail to register yourself as a foreign agent, you can get fined and/or jailed
In theirperception, the war has become inevitable because the West refused to considerRussia’s security concerns in Ukraine and larger Europe
Inevitability of the war: Russia ignored by the West because it refused to take Russia's security into account with respect to Ukraine and the rest of Europe.
Long geopolitical borders and a sizable landmassseparating the Russian heartland from European states have served as principalguarantees of Russia’s security
Realist thinking in International Relations stresses the importance of preservingstate sovereignty, national security, international stability, and great power status
In IR, realistic thinking stresses the importance of
The Russian president has it in his head that the rules of the game were broken and destroyed not by Russia.
Putin is convinced that he is right
Now, protectinghis power base increasingly became the goalof Putin’s use of history.
Writer argues that Putin preserves his popularity and position of power through the use of history. Post-Crimean annexation, he propagated the idea that Western sanctions had been used to suppress Russia's power in the past. Russia was being threatened by the sanctions, and who else could help but the President?
2012, he was no longer as pro-European as he used to be
2012: Identified less with European values. Writer says that this have been because the EU and NATO had gained access to many Eastern European countries in 2004...
As relations with the West were fairly goodduring his first two terms, Putin also usedimperial history on different occasions tofurther strengthen these ties
First two terms: Still used imperialist rhetoric to justify having close relations with the US; they had history. History where Russia provided support to America, for example.
used this argument in 2007
It was in this period that Putin argued ondifferent occasions that Russia is a Europeancountry with deep European roots. Putinargued that his country has felt part of theEuropean continent since the time of Peterthe Great.
He argued that Russian is European in its values? in 2007 claims credit (for Russia, not himself) for aiding European integration in the past
called themselvesRussians and Orthodox Christians.
He refers to faith a lot.
However, this portrayal does not do justiceto historical reality. Only when Catherinethe Great annexed the Crimean Khanate inthe spring of 1783
For all that Putin claims that Russia has always owned (or rightfully been the owner of) Crimea, he doesn't seem to consider evidence against the fact. Catherine the Great annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1783. It had hosted diverse populations, and when all-holy St. Vladimir was baptized in a town in Crimea, it was owned by the Byzantine Empire.
Also the idea of a Russian empire was not very popular as far back in history as he implies.
After the annexation, Putin continued thisuse of (imperial) history to legitimise thisact.
Lots of imperialist rhetoric. The Bolsheviks committed an act of theft by distributing Crime to Ukraine. Claims that Crimea has been important in centuries of Russian history, and that the Russian Empire was its rightful owner. Russia, period, has been its rightful owner for centuries.
10th century: in the Ancient Russian State. 17th, 18th, 19th centuries: given back to Russia.
As therehad been an unconstitutional coup inUkraine, Putin argued, a new country wasborn in 2014, just like after the revolutionof 1917 in imperial Russia
Used a 2014 coup (Maidan Revolution) in Ukraine to delegitimize it as a country with valid territorial claims.
possibility of using troops on Ukrainianterritory by drawing a parallel betweenthe October Revolution of 1917 and theMaidan Revolution of 2014.
This was 2 weeks before Crimea was annexed.
In a similar fashion, Putin has used imperialRussian history to justify the annexationof Crimea in March 2014
2014 Crimea annexation: Putin refers to Russia's imperial past as justification.
2 weeks before annexation:
in (4) anattempt to find support for his policy.
Used to build support for himself as a leader?
a large majority of the Ukrainianrespondents (70 per cent) indicated thatthey disagreed
Putin leaves out dissenting Ukrainian opinions out of his article.
Putin noticeablystarted to make this claim a few monthsbefore the annexation of Crimea, at a timewhen Ukraine was pursuing an associationagreement with the European Union
His one-nation argument preceded the invasion of Crimea. At that time, Ukraine was trying to build ties with the European Union. Threatened by the EU, it seems.
Putin explained here that many “littleRussians” (Ukrainians) served in the upperechelons of Russia, and
One argument he uses to support that claim is that many Ukrainians have flourished in Russia. (Refer to his article when he said that Russia welcomes Ukrainians who cross the border).
Also says that Putin doesn't believe that Ukrainian lands could have developed to the extent that they have without the aid of Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries. Refer to Putin's article where he talked about Russia uplifting the Ukrainian economy.
Putin alreadysaw Russians and Ukrainians as united, hestill perceived them to be different peoples.
2001: Putin talks about St. Vladimir, just like in his new article. and how his baptism spread the faith that united Russians and Ukrainians.
Nuance to the unity idea; Putin did acknowledge some uniqueness of Ukrainians as a people But in 2013, began to see them as the exact same nation.
But in his hands, history graduallytransformed into a weapon.
Argues that Putin is weaponizing history; justifying events in Ukraine. The unity of Ukraine.
Over the years, he hasincreasingly and repeatedly referred to thehistory of the Russian Empire, as a discourseanalysis of over 500 of his speeches andother sources over the years reveals.
Putin refers to the Russian Empire very frequently
As I have reported for years, some members of Mr. Putin’s entourage have long worked to convince him that he is the only person who can save Russia, that every other potential leader would only fail the country.
Again, the author attributes part of Putin's (alleged) conviction that Putin can save Russia to the fact that Putin has been surrounded by people who tell him what they want to hear. Apparently, when he considered leaving office, he was convinced to stay on.
But it also showed that Mr. Putin is completely fed up with his old guard:
He has publicly demonstrated his distaste for part of his older circle, e.g. when he humiliated the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service on TV.
The “collective Putin” still exists: The whole world saw it on the eve of the invasion when he summoned top officials, one by one, and asked them their views on the coming war. All of them understood their task and submissively tried to describe the president’s thoughts in their own words.
Is the author implying that part of Putin's plans are motivated by an army of sycophants? An echo chamber?
Now she is gone and it’s time for Russia to avenge the humiliations of the 1990s.
Author argues that Putin believes that he has an opportunity to recover from some sort of "humiliation" from when post-Soviet Russia was unstable in the 1990s.
The West, they believe, took advantage of Russia’s weakness to push NATO as close as possible to the country’s borders.
When the Soviet Union fell in the 1990s, instability ensued, and Putin believes that during that period Russia was exploited by the Western powers i.e. they brought Russia close to being targeted by NATO.
Now, the West is called weak.
Mr. Kovalchuk has a doctorate in physics and was once employed by an institute headed by the Nobel laureate Zhores Alferov. But he isn’t just a man of science. He is also an ideologue, subscribing to a worldview that combines Orthodox Christian mysticism, anti-American conspiracy theories and hedonism. This appears to be Mr. Putin’s worldview, too.
Says that just like his left-hand man, Putin believes in rhetoric and conspiracies against America, he dislikes hedonism, and he subscribed to Orthodox mysticism
Не ordered his"special military operation" because hebelieves that it is Russia's divine right to rule Ukraine, to wipe out thecountry's national identity, and to integrate its people into а Greater Russia.
The Ukrainian invasion isn't an attempt to defend Russia in some way - Putin doesn't feel threatened by NATO, but just believes in its "sphere of control" and that Ukraine should be in that sphere. "Divine right to rule."
This treatise, and similar puЬlic statements, make clear that Putin wants аworld where Russia presides over а new Slavic union composed of Belarus,Russia, Ukraine, and perhaps the northern part of Kazakhstan
Ukraine is just one of several Slavic territories that Putin wants to control. Alleges that Putin has made this clear.
If economic ties between our countries had been retained, Ukrainewould enjoy the benefit of tens of billions of dollars.
The Russian Fed. had apparently recognized Ukraine and helped it grow as a sovereign nation. Namely in economic ways. The Ukrainian economy is not close to what it once was and this is because they no longer have economic ties with Russia. Ukraine could have prevented this.
We respect Ukrainians' desire to seetheir country free, safe and prosperous.
Respects Ukrainian language, culture, and Ukraine's desire to be free. But true freedom/independence is only possible via collaboration with Russia - historical ties, they are one people.
nd we willnever allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used againstRussia
Refers to historical territories and people being weaponized against russia
Today, the ”right“ patriot of Ukraine is only the one who hates Russia.
The very foundation upon which Ukrainian identity is built is anti-Russian-ness. Putin believes that this is not a strong foundation.
Again, for many people in Ukraine, the anti-Russia project is simply unacceptable.And there are millions of such people.
Once again, Putin separated Ukrainian leadership from the common public and says that the former oppresses, murders, censors, the latter.
there is no place either for a sovereign Ukraineor for the political forces that are trying to defend its real independence.
Confused.
The anti-Russia project and a sovereign Ukraine are incompatible? Links this to censorship of pro-Russian sentiment. He refers to some "real independence" - what does this mean?
The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political systemin such a way that presidents, members of parliament and ministers would change butthe attitude of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain.
The West has manipulated Ukraine's governing infrastructure to generate anti-Russian sentiment. Zelensky's promise for peace is disingenuous. And not only have things not improved, but they are getting worse - Putin also mentions the area around the Donbas here.
This is also a disguise for the takeover of the rest of the Ukrainian economyand the exploitation of its natural resources
Ukraine is going to be taken over by foreign forces - it is only a matter of time. Also, it is given loans and Putin is skeptical of Ukraine's ability to pay them back. The debt burden will be carried by the coming generations.
Also, Ukraine's international aid favors Western companies.
First of all, we are facing the creation of a climateof fear in Ukrainian society, aggressive rhetoric, indulging neo-Nazis and militarisingthe country.
Putin says that Ukraine is manufacturing fear and supporting the neo-Nazis. Confused as to why he says that militarizing the country is an issue - does he mean this literally?
Also, once again, Ukraine is dependent on and being controlled by foreign advisors and forces such as NATO. He links Ukraine's indigenous classification with NATO exercises, but why?
And it can only be sustainedby the constant cultivation of the image of an internal and external enemy.
Ukraine is painting Russia as the enemy
Kiev simply does notneed Donbas
Putin says that the Kiev should let go of the Donbas because its people will not accept Ukrainian domination? and these minsk agreements apparently contradict Ukraine's anti-Russia project.
(Minsk-1 and minsk-2 are violated/unimplemented)
In short, theyattract the attention of external patrons and masters by all means.
they weaponize the idea of an independent ukraine to receive some sort of external support?
They do not intendto seriously discuss either the special status of Donbas or safeguards for the peopleliving there.
Ukraine's leadership don't care about the Donbas, about the people who live there.
Russia has done everything to stop fratricide
Russia has tried everything
The anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians.
Again, Putin separates Ukrainian people from Ukraine. He has some sort of sympathy for the people and believes that the ruling elite are doing a disservice to them as well as ignoring their popular (not anti-Russian) opinions.
Ukrainians who try to rebel are called terrorists and punished for their dissent.
For the Ukrainians who fought in the Red Army, in partisan units, the Great Patriotic Warwas indeed a patriotic war because they were defending their home, their great commonMotherland.
Putin is acknowledging the Ukrainians who fought for the USSR or the shared "Motherland" in the Red Army - they are being ignored, and this is a disservice to them.