699 Matching Annotations
  1. Feb 2023
  2. learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com
    1. I think it is also natural that the representatives of Ukraine over and over again voteagainst the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism.Marches and torchlit processions in honor of remaining war criminals from the SS unitstake place under the protection of the official authorities.

      Ukraine full of Nazis; glorifies prominent Nazi collaborators

    2. As a result of such a harsh and artificial divisionof Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundredsof thousands or even millions

      existential threat

    3. But the fact is that the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because itinvolves a forced change of identity.

      His issue is Russophobia: the forced erasure of Russian identity. Putin believes that Russians in Ukraine are being brainwashed to hate Russia. Says Ukraine wants to create an ethnically pure state, and this is an existential threat - compares it to using weapons of mass destruction.

    4. Especially sincethe determination of nationality, particularly in mixed families, is the right of everyindividual, free to make his or her own choice.

      This is interesting. This is an individualistic approach. He doesn't like individualism - what the state says, goes.

    5. All the things that united us and bring us together so far came under attack. Firstand foremost, the Russian language.

      Again, the Russian language --> source of unity.

      Putin talks about how Ukraine is snuffing out the Russian-ness of its people. Being very picky in who it calls/who can be called indigenous.

    6. Their slogans, ideology,and blatant aggressive Russophobia have to a large extent become defining elementsof state policy in Ukraine

      Russophobia is inherent to the idea of the Ukrainian independent state.

    7. And there is no need to deceive anyonethat this is being done in the interests of the people of Ukraine. The Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth never needed Ukrainian culture, much less Cossack autonomy.In Austria-Hungary, historical Russian lands were mercilessly exploited and remainedthe poorest. The Nazis, abetted by collaborators from the OUN-UPA, did not needUkraine, but a living space and slaves for Aryan overlord

      They aren't doing this for Ukraine or in its best interests. Ukrainian autonomy was never needed.

      Also, Nazi propaganda again.

    8. Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turningUkraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia.

      Ukraine manipulated in an anti-Russian agenda

    9. I recall that long ago, well before 2014, the U.S. and EU countries systematicallyand consistently pushed Ukraine to curtail and limit economic cooperation with Russia.

      Ukraine was manipulated by the West to limit economic ties between Russia and Ukraine. Putin says that Russia wanted open dialogue but this desire was not reciprocated - it was pushed out of the conversation.

    10. Radicals and neo-Nazis were open and more and more insolent about their ambitions.They were indulged by both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed

      And here's the neo-Nazi propaganda. They were bold and supported by authorities and oligarchs in draining Ukraine's wallets and keeping the money in Western banks - a defense of their capital.

    11. Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independencethrough the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They beganto mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and referto the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Unionas an occupation.

      Many Russian and Ukrainian people alike had faith that their shared cultural, spiritual, and economic ties would last after the dissolution of the USSR. The ruling elite of Ukraine prevented this from happening. Attempted to rewrite the past and leave out everything that (in Putin's opinion) united Russia and Ukraine. They said that Ukraine was occupied, not just a republic part of the USSR.

    12. However, there was and is still no mutual will to do the same.Nevertheless, Russia is still one of Ukraine's top three trading partners, and hundredsof thousands of Ukrainians are coming to us to work, and they find a welcome receptionand support. So that what the ”aggressor state“ is.

      Russia is trying to build a good relationship with Ukraine - but their efforts are being ignored, even though they still do have economic ties with Ukraine (trading partners). How can Russia be the villain if it is welcoming Ukrainian people and workers with open arms?

    13. Who is to blame for this? Is it the people of Ukraine's fault? Certainly not. It wasthe Ukrainian authorities who waisted and frittered away the achievements of manygenerations

      The leadership of Ukraine, not its people, are to blame for its shortfalling.

    14. Ukrainian leaders promised thatthe Ukrainian economy would be one of the leading ones and the standard of livingwould be among the best in Europe.Today, high-tech industrial giants that were once the pride of Ukraine and the entireUnion, are sinking

      Putin talks about how Ukraine was destined to be far greater than it is; what its economy could have been versus what it is now are starkly different from once another.

    15. Ukraine and Russia have developed as a single economic system over decadesand centuries. The profound cooperation we had 30 years ago is an examplefor the European Union to look up to.

      So Russia and Ukraine have a shared history, language, culture, and economy. They are meant to be economic partners. They should be - this would benefit Ukraine.

    16. t. How should we treat that? There is only oneanswer: with respect!You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome! But what are the terms?I will recall the assessment given by one of the most prominent political figures of newRussia, first mayor of Saint Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak.

      Putin cites the first mayor of St. Petersburg, who said that the founders of the Union, if they left the Union, would have to return to their former boundaries.

      So Putin respects when nations want to become independent, but they cannot take what they did not originally own?

      Says that the Bolsheviks disregarded public opinion in its quest to manipulate boundaries.

    17. They do not miss a chance, however,both inside the country and abroad, to condemn ”the crimes of the Soviet regime,“ listingamong them events with which neither the CPSU, nor the USSR, let alone modernRussia, have anything to do.

      Ukraine apparently ignores the factual evidence that Putin uses to back his claims. They talk about the crimes of Soviet rulers as if the CPSU or USSR or modern Russia had anything to do with it (Putin says they didn't).

      Complains that Bolsheviks to separate Russia from its historical territories - emphasizing Russia's right to various lands, talking about how Russia was stolen form - should also be looked at negatively.

    18. afterthe liberation of Transcarpathia by Soviet troops the congress of the Orthodoxpopulation of the region voted for the inclusion of Carpathian Ruthenia in the RSFSR or,as a separate Carpathian republic, in the USSR proper. Yet the choice of people wasignored. In summer 1945, the historical act of the reunification of Carpathian Ukraine”with its ancient motherland, Ukraine“ –

      Transcarpathia, after Soviet troops "liberated it", voted to be part of the RSFSR but yet its identity merged with that of Ukraine - so this is illegitimate. Russia had a right to it.

      So modern Ukraine has no historical basis beyond the days of the Soviet Union. Bolsheviks abused Russian people, divided the country.

    19. At the same time,under the guise of combating the so-called Russian great-power chauvinism,Ukrainization was often imposed on those who did not see themselves as Ukrainians.

      Ukrainization was supposedly meant to combat Russian chauvinism but it was imposed on people who did identify with the Ukrainian identity

    20. the Crimean Region of the RSFSR was given to the Ukrainian SSR,in gross violation of legal norms that were in force at the time

      an example of how the construction of ukraine (i think) involved illegal, illegitimate activities

    21. Lenin's plan to form a union state as a federationof equal republics. The right for the republics to freely secede from the Union wasincluded in the text of the Declaration on the Creation of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics and, subsequently, in the 1924 USSR Constitution. By doing so, the authorsplanted in the foundation of our statehood the most dangerous time bomb,

      Lenin implemented the right for Soviet republics to secede from the Union. Putin calls this a time bomb. A mistake. Led to a shitshow of declarations of sovereignty.

    22. Later,during World War II, radical groups of Ukrainian nationalists used this as a pretextfor terror not only against Polish, but also against Jewish and Russian populations.

      Ukrainian nationalists in WWII used this excuse - Poland trying to Polonize Western Ukraine etc - as an excuse to terrorize the Polish, Jewish, and Russian.

    23. The example of the UPR shows that different kinds of quasi-state formations thatemerged across the former Russian Empire at the time of the Civil War and turbulencewere inherently unstable

      Putin has just been describing the instability of Ukrainian mini-states in the Russian Empire.

    24. ”Ukraine is to take the lead in the formation of an All-Russian Federation

      Some German and Austria-Hungarian revolutions later, Skoropadskyi, who was losing German support, said that Ukraine was to take the lead in the formation of an All-Russian Federation.

      But then the regime changed again.

      Here there is a theme of the idea of a Ukrainian nation being thrown around as a political tool. No inherent truth to it.

    25. The declared sovereignty did not last long.

      oops

      Treaty with German bloc countries who needed Ukrainian supplies. They were given permission to enter the Ukrainian People's Republic - sort of a Trojan horse as they used this to occupy the UPR. Interfered in running of Kiev. The Central Rada was overthrown.

      Declared the Ukrainian State instead of the UPR.

    26. Ukrainian delegation read out a note proclaiming the independence of Ukraine.Subsequently, the Central Rada proclaimed Ukraine independent in its Fourth Universal.

      Then the Central Rada said that Ukraine was independent. Question: so they meant to say that it was no longer part of the Russian empire?

    27. After the February Revolution, in March 1917, the Central Rada was established in Kiev,intended to become the organ of supreme power. In November 1917, in its ThirdUniversal, it declared the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) as partof Russia.

      The Central Rada in Kiev declared the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic as part of Russia

    28. Since the late 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities had latched onto thisnarrative, using it as a counterbalance to the Polish national movement and pro-Muscovite sentiments in Galicia. During World War I, Vienna played a rolein the formation of the so-called Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen.

      an example of Ukraine as a nation being used to oppress

    29. At the same time, the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russiansstarted to form and gain ground among the Polish elite and a part of the Malorussianintelligentsia. Since there was no historical basis

      The concept of a Ukrainian nation began to grow in the Polish elite and Malorussian intelligentsia. Putin says this has no historical basis even though this happened in history... Some went as far as to claim that Ukrainians were the true Slavs - not the Russians/Muscovites.

      The idea of Ukraine as a separate nation was propagated to divide the Empire (acc to him)

    30. I should add thatworks of fiction, books of Ukrainian poetry and folk songs continued to be published.There is objective evidence that the Russian Empire was witnessing an active processof development of the Malorussian cultural identity within the greater Russian nation,which united the Velikorussians, the Malorussians and the Belorussians

      Malorussian identity grew, uniting nations within Russia

    31. The south-western lands of the Russian Empire, Malorussia and Novorossiya,and the Crimea developed as ethnically and religiously diverse entities.

      As ethnic and religious variation grew, in Crimea, people kept their culture, their faith.

    32. Many centuries of fragmentation and living within different states naturally brought aboutregional language peculiarities, resulting in the emergence of dialects. The vernacularenriched the literary language. Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Grigory Skovoroda, and TarasShevchenko played a huge role here. Their works are our common literary and culturalheritage.

      fragmentation created variation in language. Some artists/figures used both Ukrainian and Russian in their art. An example of how Russian and Ukrainian history cannot be separated.

    33. The incorporation of the western Russian lands into the single state was not merelythe result of political and diplomatic decisions. It was underlain by the common faith,shared cultural traditions, and – I would like to emphasize it once again – languagesimilarity.

      Here, Putin talks about something higher than simple colonization or politics. The Russian empire was built on a common faith, culture, and language.

    34. In the second half of the 18th century, following the wars with the Ottoman Empire,Russia incorporated Crimea and the lands of the Black Sea region, which becameknown as Novorossiya

      Then Russia absorbed Crimea

    35. Incidentally,during the Soviet period, natives of Ukraine held major, including the highest, postsin the leadership of the unified state.

      Ukrainians were among top leadership during soviet era

    36. Cossack senior officers belonging to the nobility would reach the heights of political,diplomatic, and military careers in Russia. Graduates of Kiev-Mohyla Academy playeda leading role in church life.

      Cossacks were well-integrated into Russia - high positions occupied

    37. Only a small portion of the Cossacks supportedMazepa's rebellion. People of all orders and degrees considered themselves Russianand Orthodox

      The Cossacks largely considered themselves to be allied with the Russian Orthodoxy

    38. The name ”Ukraine“ was used more often in the meaning of the Old Russian word”okraina“ (periphery), which is found in written sources from the 12th century, referringto various border territories

      Ukraine's name derived from Old Russian

    39. he Russian state incorporated the city of Kiev and the lands on the left bankof the Dnieper River, including Poltava region, Chernigov region, and Zaporozhye. Theirinhabitants were reunited with the main part of the Russian Orthodox people.

      There was a war between the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. A peace treaty was created and Kiev was included as a member of the Russian state.

    40. It means that, in their appeals to both the Polishking and the Russian tsar, the Cossacks referred to and defined themselves as RussianOrthodox people.

      Cossacks then called themselves Russian and followers of Orthodoxy

    41. Subsequently, the ambassadors of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow visited dozensof cities, including Kiev, whose populations swore allegiance to the Russian tsar

      Appeals were made to Moscow, and Kiev swore allegiance to the Russian tsar

    42. thatthe voivode of Kiev be Russian and of Greek faith, and that the persecutionof the churches of God be stopped. But the Cossacks were not heard

      Specifically demanding religious rights for Kiev

    43. t so happened that Moscow became the center of reunification, continuing the traditionof ancient Russian statehood.

      Moscow became a source of power and an upholder of tradition

    44. Most importantly, people both in the western and eastern Russian lands spoke the samelanguage. Their faith was Orthodox. Up to the middle of the 15th century, the unifiedchurch government remained in place

      Citing a shared language and the Orthodox Church till the 15th century

    1. It was this experience that came to mind for many observers when it was revealed that Abramovich and several other members of the Ukrainian delegation were experiencing symptoms of poisoning after one of their first meetings. My source, who is familiar with the details of the negotiation process, said that Abramovich did experience symptoms of poisoning after his first trip to Kyiv.

      But Abramovich showed signs of poisoning after his first visit to Kyiv... source of poisoning unknown. Culprit unknown.

      Putin's spokesman called this fake news; there's no way that Russia could have been involved in his poisoning. The US has doubts about this.

    2. The businessman had all the resources necessary for a mediator, my sources knowing him noted: access to the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, their approval of his mediation, the means and ability to travel between Moscow and Kyiv (he flew back and forth via Poland twice),

      Part of what prepares him to be a negotiator is that he has approval from both Russian and Ukranian leadership and can travel between the two places

      He has connections

    3. Since it is no longer useful to have fundamental conversations with Putin about who is right and who is wrong, as my sources say, Abramovich focuses on simply offering various options for resolving the conflict. His position differs from that of the President’s subordinate civil servants and dependent businessmen, and allows him to be a compromise unofficial truce envoy.

      Abramovich seems to be playing the role of the negotiator and as someone who merely suggests potential solutions; again this trend of finding it useless to contradict/disagree/have a conversation with Putin. Because his opinions do differ from his, though, he's seen as a negotiator.

    4. The incomparably more powerful billionaire Roman Abramovich suddenly expressed his supposedly anti-war stance by serving as people’s diplomat without making any public statements. From the first days of the military conflict, Abramovich, who usually keeps a very low profile, participated in the organisation of peace negotations at the Ukrainian side’s request.

      this one billionaire apparently expressed anti-war views but not publicly. But Zelensky is skeptical about these sorts of people - believes that they're not patriotic but just acting in self-interest/protection.

      Abramovich has been called a mediator by a Ukraine delegation member.

      Zelensky has reportedly tried to get protection for him behind closed doors, though

    5. It’s worth noting that there is probably no more unpopular statesman in Russia than Chubais. Officials and propagandists have greeted his departure with schadenfreude, so Chubais’ stunt is unlikely to inspire anyone to do the same again.

      Chubais is fairly unpopular, though, so he's probably not going to start a trend.

    6. So far, only one member of Putin's elite appears to have resigned precisely because he disagreed with the decision to invade Ukraine. Anatoly Chubais,

      This elite, however, seems to have resigned in protest.

    7. Former Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich voiced his opposition to the war in mid-March. This came as his position as president of the International Chess Federation

      Publicly opposed war, was punished for it. Criticized. Led him to resign. Resignation may have been due to criticism and not as a display of anti-war sentiment/rebellion.

    8. Since the military operation began, Gref himself and Sberbank, which he has run since 2007, have been put under heavy US and EU sanctions. However, according to my sources, this has not prompted Gref to talk to Putin about the need to stop the bloodshed. Moreover, Sberbank has taken a tough stance on its employees who left the country when the war started and wanted to work remotely. They are being asked to return to Russia or resign

      This firm Sberbank doesn't seem to be cracking under the pressure of sanctions. It won't talk to Putin about ending the war when it is at its height.

    9. Over the past month, there has been no publicly reported one-on-one meeting between Putin and anyone in the Russian elite who might, for ideological reasons, say anything against the war.

      It seems that Putin isn't meeting anyone who would disagree with him. People in his inner circle do, however, express their opinions. One of them, Kudrin, may have warned Putin that the invasion wasn't a good idea.

    10. “No one can demand anything. They can have a chat, but it's no use. He has a clear picture in his head that he is rubbing in everyone’s head. “We wanted to be friends, they declared us their enemies, they surrounded us from all sides, they were ready to accept Ukraine into NATO and deploy missiles.

      Putin pulling the Russia-is-a-victim card

    11. It's useless and pointless – roughly is the answer of all the people I spoke to, when asked if the part of the Russian elite that disagrees with Putin's actions against Ukraine is trying to unite and influence him.

      Everyone seems to be resigned; don't think they could stop Putin even if they tried.

    12. Those who manage to talk to Putin complain that he himself speaks earnestly, but does not particularly listen to what he is told, says a person who has spoken to the President within the past month.

      Some of them say that Putin believes what he says but that he isn't receptive to feedback. Putin uses peace talks as a stalling tactic, not to hear arguments.

    13. The imposition of personal sanctions and the severing of ties with the outside world have led to another consequence for Russian elites. Because of the loss of their financial position and the enormous political consequences, different interest groups and clans have, as one of my sources put it, “squeezed together.”

      Sanctions --> loss of wealth and accompanying consequences --> uniting different elite circles.

    14. Middle-aged people of about 45-50 years old, who caught the end of the Soviet era in their youth, are also continuing their affairs — without any special enthusiasm, but with understanding and acceptance of the situation

      45-50-year-olds who witnessed the end of the Soviet Union aren't enthusiastic about the war but they're dispassionate and resigned - not planning to overthrow Putin.

      35-40-year-olds are the angriest. Feel abandoned, resentful towards people who left and try trying to tell citizens from a place of safety how the Russian government should be overthrown.

      Some also just feel trapped.

    15. According to several people on different levels of power, the personal sanctions have done Putin a big favor, having helped him accomplish what he had failed to do for many years:  to turn the Russian elites into a near monolith.

      The sanctions have actually been helping Putin. Consolidating the elites. Citizens and high society uniting.

      Three groups that Rustamova forms.

    16. "When I saw what they were doing to those poor Paralympians, that was it for me... I don't care about iPhones, I can use a Chinese phone. I have a German car — let me drive a Chinese or Russian one instead. Now I understand that the boss is right, that this whole thing had to happen one way or another. They would have imposed these sanctions anyway,"

      Western sanctions/boycotts working - using Paralympians as an example. A high-ranking civil servant.

    17. The people I interviewed said in one voice that, for many ordinary citizens — at least until there is a big increase in unemployment — the sanctions and other economic and political consequences of the war have had the opposite effect from what Western countries may have intended.

      The sanctions have generated anti-West sentiment. Caused political consolidation. A significant increase in support of Putin.

      BUT: the invasion is being called a "special military operation". Maybe there would be less support if the "war" descriptor were used.

    18. Gubernatorial elections are to be held in that region this year, which means that the authorities are constantly measuring public sentiment. According to this source, the position of “let’s end this” no longer exists — people want to end it, “but on our terms.”

      People still want to end the war but "in their own terms"... what does this mean

    19. . But then all the [state media] got together and started releasing decent content. And then, when they [in the West] began to say that all Russians are bad, to boycott artists and athletes, everything changed. Now about 75 percent support the military operation. That is, there’s a social consolidation happening.

      Public outcry also controlled by anti-Russian sentiment and boycotts by the US; support for the invasion increased.

    20. All this followed a wave of public discontent with the war. In the first days people took to the streets and signed open letters and petitions, while nationally renowned artists, directors, writers, and public figures spoke out against the war on social networks. This didn’t last long. Within a week, the authorities had blocked and shut down almost all independent media outlets, intimidated citizens with new laws on military censorship,

      Afterwards, there was significant public outcry that was shut down by severe censorship policies.

    21. Putin said on March 16. In his opinion, the collective West is trying to split Russian society. In order to convince everyone that Russians support his decisions, Putin holds meetings and rallies with citizens who are dependent on the state.

      Putin: Opponents of the war are enemies of the state. Uses people who depend on the government to his advantage - holds meetings and rallies with them to convince people that Russian citizens support him.

    22. The population is being brainwashed into believing that Russia is fighting Nazis who themselves had prepared an attack on the Donbass. To cause even more fear, stories are being told about Ukrainian biolaboratories,

      propaganda about Ukrainian bioweapons supported by the US, about Nazis who wanted to attack the Donbass

    23. In short, it can be said that, over the past month, Putin’s dream of a consolidation among the Russian elite has come true. These people understand that their lives are now tied only to Russia, and that that’s where they’ll need to build them.

      Putin has been successful in forming an echo chamber. The elites have realized that they're tied too closely to Russia to form any sort of life that is distant from it. Positions and resources have been lost. Elites say that peace will come but things will not go back to where they were before.

    24. First of all, to understand the mood among the Russian elites and people close to them after the imposition of unprecedented sanctions on Russia. Secondly, to find out whether anyone is trying to convince President Putin to stop the bloodshed — and why Roman Abramovich ended up playing the role of mediator/diplomat.

      Rustamova wanted to get a sense of the elites' and their circles' views on the invasion post-sanctions, and to see if anyone is trying to dissuade Putin from escalating the situation.

    25. ​​However, during the past month, there has been no mass exodus of officials or state managers. Big business is either staying silent or limiting itself to neutral phrases in favor of peace

      BUT it seems to just be in private. Nobody seems to be leaving their posts - not in significant numbers, anyway. Not businesspeople, either. Restricting their speech to be peace-loving in a more neutral way.

    26. He wasn’t the only one. There are no “disloyal” people left in power in Russia. But civil servants, employees and heads of state companies, legislators, business elites close to the government — all were expressing, in private conversations, at least bewilderment at the invasion of Ukraine.

      There are a lot of people who are privately skeptical or critical of the war in Ukraine.

    27. “Since they adopted sanctions against us, we’re going to f*ck them. Now they’ll have to buy rubles on the Moscow Exchange to buy gas from us. But that's just the beginning. Now we're going to f*ck them all.”

      Strong statement from a high-ranking official. Been a member of Putin's team, seen as liberal, but a month before the article was written, he spoke out against the bloodshed in Ukraine.

    1. Billionaire Oleg Tinkov spoke out against the war on the fourth day. “Innocent people are dying in Ukraine, every day, it is unthinkable and unacceptable

      So is this billionaire.

    2. The president of state bank VTB, Andrey Kostin, is also rumored to be extremely disapproving of military action in Ukraine because of the heavy sanctions. “He is in mourning,” says an acquaintance of his. “He says he's been building the bank for 20 years, and now it's all down the drain because of some stupidity.”

      President of state bank VTB is unhappy, too.

    3. So far, none of the officials have dared to object to what’s happening in the slightest public way, much less to resign. Among the richest Russian businessmen, only Mikhail Fridman, the founder of Alfa Group, who is now threatened with sanctions, has spoken out in a critical manner.

      Rare case of somewhat public dissent: rich business, threatened with sanctions. A letter to employees "obtained" by the Financial Times.

    4. "On the one hand, there’s a really unfair state of affairs, where we are constantly being harmed year after year on various scales, and declared  as enemies long before Ukraine,” he said. “On the other hand, there’s our inability to build and execute our policies intelligently, including publicly. And the third thing is Putin’s degradation from being in power for too long.”

      ^Same official: Yes, Russia has been mistreated in the past and been villanized, but we've been bad at policy implementation. Putin is also facing the negative effects of being in power for too long. He's listening to what some officials are telling him, things that seem to goad him on - they say things that make success sound inevitable.

    5. Another source— let's call him a good acquaintance of Putin's — puts it this way: The Russian president has it in his head that the rules of the game were broken and destroyed not by Russia. And if this is a fight without rules, then it’s a fight without rules — the new reality in which we live.

      Another official points out that Putin claims that he had to start the war, as if the rules that were broken were not broken by him. Putin is paranoid, insulted, and apparently sincerely believed that he had initially put effort into building relationships with the West.

    6. If Russia considers itself an empire, why not become attractive to its neighbors by developing the country instead of by forcing their loyalty? Let's build good roads, quality health care and education, and eventually come up with the kind of technology that would allow us to be the first to colonize Mars. That would be quite empire-like," a high-ranking official said brokenly when I asked him what he thought of Putin's motives for starting the war.

      High-ranking official: Russia should focus on development, building good relations, instead of taking over.

    7. However, the Russian economy is unlikely to quickly recover from the severe sanctions that were actually imposed — and no one was prepared for this, my interlocutors say.

      None of Rustamov's sources were prepared for the war to escalate like this and have such a negative effect on the Russian economy. It's especially bad because Russia has stakes in the international market.

    8. The government and the Central Bank have been preparing for sanctions, and for some time the financial infrastructure will withstand the pressure. The Bell has reported that, shortly before the war, First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov had held several meetings to prepare for possible challenges, including disconnection from SWIFT and a ban on high-tech imports

      It seems that Putin wasn't completely unprepared before starting the war - meetings to discuss possible challenges.

    9. The session itself was an attempt at improvisation, to present the image of a real discussion."That's why everyone there was fidgeting so much,” the source said. “If they had been told to firmly say ‘Yes, we support it,’ they would have done so.”

      The SC meeting was an exercise in improvization, which caught the officials off guard. Otherwise they may have voiced unequivocal support for Putin.

    10. Some officials aren’t associating themselves with what’s happening at all, viewing Putin's decision as a historical choice over which they have no influence, and the meaning of which no one will understand for a some time to come.

      Some officials are trying to distance themselves from Putin's actions, seeing that they have no influence over what he does

    11. I see that officials, deputies, and even journalists at government outlets who have left their posts are relieved that they no longer have anything to do with this, and are speaking out against the war.

      Officials and journalists who quit are able to speak out against the war.

    12. In reality, the attitude toward the war within the corridors of power is ambiguous. I came to this conclusion after speaking with several members of parliament and officials at various levels. Many of them are discouraged, frightened, and are making apocalyptic forecasts.

      The officials express different opinions behind closed doors. Rustamova says that they are discouraged, frightened, pessimistic. Some Duma members are (or were) considering giving up their seats.

    13. In the depths of their souls, officials and legilsators may disagree with the decisions of their leaders — but only in the depths of their souls. There are very few left who can contradict him out loud, directly to his face.

      As per usual, officials are too scared to openly criticize or express dissenting opinions of Putin's decisions. Their words must be his words.

    14. As a former chekist [security official], he always wants to catch everyone off-guard, in order to frighten them and to impress on them that he can do whatever he wants. We witnessed this once again during the emergency meeting of the Security Council three days before the war

      Putin tends to catch people, including his own officials, off-guard when he reveals his plans. A prime example of this is the Security Council meeting that took place 3 days before the Ukraine war.

      Rustamova believes this has to do with Putin's background as a security official.

      The Security Council were not discussing the war but the recognition of self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics."

    15. The most influential people in Russia sat before Putin like schoolchildren before a teacher who had suddenly announced an exam

      The foreign intelligence head, the Moscow mayor, the deputy Kremlin administration head, all seemed confused.

    1. Results yield significant coefficients for powder cocaine (2002 = 47.87 months; 2017 = 43.20 months; percent change = −9.8%), crack cocaine (2002 = 48.41 months; 2017 = 39.33 months; percent change = 18.8%), heroin (2002 = 48.09 months

      overall results

    2. While average marijuana sentences decreased by 75.63 months in 2002 to 58.23 months in 2017 (percent change = −23.1%), there were smaller reductions in the average sentence length for heroin (2002 = 69.14 months; 2017 = 64.42

      for Black subsample

  3. learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com
    1. Empire's story divides subjects from objects. As thephilosopher Frantz Farron argued, colonizers seethemselves as actors with purpose, and the colonized asinstruments to realize the imperial vision.

      empire

    1. I had to write a request to DNR officials for the release of personal information, collect all the documents that show I really am Stas’s sister. I did all that and I’m waiting for a response from the DNR’s justice ministry.”

      difficult to get back in contact with her brother

    2. the outlet once published a fake news story using a photo of an actor on the set of the Russian filmWe are from the Future pretending to eat a severed hand. The article was given the headline, “‘Uke eats Rusky’s hand’ — fiendish humor from Banderite blogs.”

      spreading fake news

    1. Russian tactical narratives targeting the Global South are curious in that they are focusing predominantly on the West, rather than Ukraine, because for many in the Global South, especially in Africa, Latin America, and Southern and Western Asia, there is little difference in perceptions of Russia and Ukraine.

      Narratives for the Global South focus on the West instead of Ukraine bc Ukrainians and Russians are the same to them

    2. Finally, the Kremlin is pushing three strategic narratives for the Global South:

      Strategic narratives for the Global South:

      1. Russia is super duper anti-imperialist and anti-colonial.
      2. Ukraine is being used by the West to reclaim global domination.
      3. Ukraine is part of Russia's sphere of influence.
    3. For the Western audience, Russia has the following major strategic narratives:

      For the West:

      Russia has a right to be a global superpower and take Ukraine under its control. It is being targeted by NATO, and Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia.

      The West is anti-Russia, Ukraine is full of Nazis, Western sanctions are bad for European business and households, etc... many more listed here

    4. One can easily notice that strategic and tactical narratives targeting the Ukrainian audience are less aggressive towards Ukraine in comparison to those directed as the Russian domestic audience.

      Russia softens its anti-Ukrainian language with Ukrainians. This is to break their spirit - to limit resistance - and pacify them.

    5. With the Ukrainian audience, the main strategic narratives are as follows:

      Strategic narratives:

      Russia to Ukrainian audience: Ukraine is part of Russia, Russia is its only shot at prosperity, they're sibling nations.

      Tactical narratives:

      Ukrainian leadership failing Ukrainian people. Also "Gayropa", the West, is impure/degenerate and should not be joined.

    6. However, some messages will only work in Russia.

      De-Nazification used as a narrative in other countries, too, but some narratives only work for Russia. Like Ukrainians being Satanists. Enemies of all believers regardless of faith.

    7. But there are many more tactical narratives that the Russian leadership uses to support their strategic narratives:

      Tactical narratives:

      1. War = "special military operation"
      2. Ukrainians (who oppose/resist the invasion) are Nazis
      3. Ukraine used by NATO to attack Russia - a conduit for the enemy
      4. Ukraine belongs to Russia
      5. Ukraine's leaders are Satanists
    8. The Ukrainian nation does not exist, while so-called ‘Ukrainians’ are simply confused or manipulated Russians”

      Strategic narratives:

      The Ukrainian identity is not real; Ukraine belongs under Russia's control, it is part of Russia. It is Russia's right to take it back. It is also anti-Russian.

    9. Moscow directs strategic and tactical narratives at different audiences

      The populations at which strategic and tactical narratives are directed are segmented.

      1. Domestic audience
      2. Ukrainian audience --> targeted to destroy their will to resist the invasion
      3. Collective west --> targeted to undermine support for Ukraine
      4. Global South
    10. Tactical narratives serve as individual steps that aim to strengthen the validity of strategic narratives.

      Tactical narratives pave the way to increase the validity of strategic narratives. They are manipulative, appeal to emotions, can contradict each other. Short lifespans, sporadic.

    11. Strategic narratives reflect the long-term vision of Russian political and kinetic warfare. More often than not, they reflect genuine, deep-seated beliefs of the Russian leadership linked to Ukraine or the broader context of the aggression.

      Strategic narratives are long-term, reflect beliefs of russian leadership

  4. Jan 2023
    1. Authorities responded with mass detentions, intimidation, and police brutality. Despite this, daily protests have persisted, with protesters holding anti-war placards and chanting anti-war slogans.

      protests persisting

    2. aw enforcement and courts have interpreted it to include significant financial loss and bodily harm or death. What might constitute a grave consequence of disseminating alleged false information, is therefore essentially at the discretion of the prosecution.

      vague punishments for criticizing armed forces etc

    3. strict censorship on all discussion of Russia’s war with Ukraine, with Russian authorities banning the description of it as “war” or “an invasion

      it's not a war, it's a special military operation!

    1. Pozhalov says Kiriyenko hasn’t yet developed a core intellectual concept, and the Kremlin’s proposed program to develop the country by implementing a series of costly national projects “so far looks more like a bureaucratic model for managing change than an ideology the public can grasp.”

      kiriyenko so far not contributing to the formation of the Russian Idea

    2. This is why the administration's domestic-policy bloc turned to a tried-and-tested gimmick: recruit famous but harmless rivals for Putin. The most colorful individuals retained for this role were Lenin State Farm director Pavel Grudinin and television socialite Ksenia Sobchak. 

      choosing political opponents that were bound to lose

    3. The newspaper RBC wrote about one of these training sessions in October 2017, citing video footage from a mobile phone showing future governors leaping from a cliff into a mountain river somewhere outside Sochi. “I

      what...

    4. According to Meduza’s source, Yarin’s peculiar appointment happened despite Kiriyenko’s efforts to give this important job to an ally named Alexander

      yarin succeeded despite kiriyekno's attempts to elect one of his own allies

    5. Slowly but surely, Kiriyenko managed to wrest power from Volodin and gain influence outside the State Duma. Within a year of his appointment, Kiriyenko had weakened Volodin’s position inside United Russia, managing it with surprising sophistication.

      kiriyenko was successful in weakening volodin

    6. Despite Volodin’s direct attacks, Kiriyenko ordered even the most belligerent members of his team not to respond. Though they were itching to do it!” recalls a source close to Kiriyenko

      kiriyenko ignoring volodin

    7. Volodin and Surkov had grown so strong that they started to threaten the system of authority.

      was volodin and surkov's strength the reason putin (supposedly) wanted to weaken them?

    8. Kiriyenko could immediately bring in people who knew how to handle elections,”

      kiriyenko had connections that he could work with to keep elections under control. he was also good at dealing with elites at a time when putin was integrating them into the power vertical. another source says, though, that kiriyenko's connections probably weren't the reason that putin chose him

      one of volodin's advisers believes that putin appointed kiriyenko because he wanted to weaken both him and volodin; being integrated into new work environments was a heavy task and required decision-making that they were not used to.

      question: what does it mean to "take on" an elite?

    1. But another “methodologist,” Kiriyenko’s former advisor Sergey Gradirovsky, understood the concept of the “Russian world” differently: namely, as Russia’s “integration with the countries of the former USSR,” which still have Russian-speaking populations

      want russia to absorb former soviet regions whose people speak russian

      question: did gradirovsky support his definition of the russian world? as in, did he support pursuing his idea?

    2. the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 began with Putin repeating claims about the need to defend the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas

      putin took gradirovsky's idea and used it to justify war

    3. I’ll be honest with you, even though others might throw stones at me for this: I don’t see a difference between totalitarianism and non-totalitarianism. Is that clear? I don’t see it. And I think that totalitarian organization is the only form of organization for any human society.

      totalitarianism is good i guess and necessary

    4. “Ukro-Nazism contains a greater, not lesser danger to the world and to Russia than Hitler’s German Nazism,”

      hitler and the holocaust; one of the other readings for today talks about how putin undermines the severity and tragedy of the holocaust. russia is suffering more; russia, the superior nation under attack

    5. “The Ukraine We Don’t Need.” The article attempted to justify the need for the “denazification” of Ukraine

      justifying the annexation of ukraine; russia as a purifying force for its social ills

    1. In that context, one important concept is sovereignty interpreted as autarky and as boundless political and repressive rule within the country; sovereignty as a target for adversaries who want to weaken, dismember, and destroy Russia

      this is (probably) especially ideologically important given that russia is experiencing sanctions and pushback from the west bc of ukraine; they have to maintain an image of independence, that they don't need the west, probably to maintain the dignity that underlies putin's state "ideology"

    2. In just a few years, the regime has evolved from a cult of the victory of 1945 to a cult of war itself, and Putin has managed to persuade a large section of Russians that the “special operation” of 2022 is a natural continuation of the Great Patriotic War

      annexation of ukraine an extension of the great patriotic war - appealing to the war cult

    3. Imperialism and colonialism are key components of Putinism and key factors in the war. There is nothing new about this ideology; it comes almost verbatim from Stalinism

      inspiration from soviet era - stalin in particular

    4. the modernization that Russia has experienced conflicts with this traditionalism verging on fundamentalism, as did the pragmatic interests of a Russian society that had adapted to a market economy

      why

    5. However, Scientific Putinism lacks key components: development goals and a corresponding vision for the future.

      they rely on history because they have no realistic or promising hope for the future yet - especially given their current economic situation

    6. There is a belief that the Russian elite under President Vladimir Putin has only ever been interested in money. Yet Putin’s militant, anti-liberal, anti-Western, isolationist

      this and blackboard reading guy think that there is an ideology

    1. During Putin’s two first presidential terms and the first two years of Dmitry Medvedev’spresidency (2008–09), the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive anti-Western memory politicswas nonetheless partly counterbalanced by its unwillingness to burn bridges with theWest

      degrading the west and painting it as an aggressor but unwilling to completely cut ties... maybe because it wanted to join the west in creating a poor image of eastern europe?

    2. Several consecutive versions of the Foreign Policy Concept of theRussian Federation claim that one of its main tasks is to counter the attempts to under-mine the post-Yalta international order by “falsifying” history and substituting theoutcome of the Cold War (in which Russia has been defeated) to that of the SecondWorld War (which it won).

      ??

    3. Following a cliché of Soviet propaganda, the West is also presented as deeplyfascist: everyone who is against Russia is fascist because Russia has saved the worldfrom the “brown plague.”

      russia views itself as a savior (from the brown plague)

      the west are portrayed as being afraid of russia's power, as fascists, blamed for the memory wars

    4. In the West, the Holocaust came to be seen as the war’s most horribletragedy since the 1970s and 1980s. 24 In contrast, the Soviet/Russian myth of the war mar-ginalizes the memory of the Holocaust and presents the Russian people as the primaryvictim and hero of the war.

      russia and the west have very different views of who was most affected by the second world war

      russia seems to play victim a lot under putin's rule

    5. Putin’s war cult includes, as one of its main components, the notion of the Yaltapostwar political order, which legitimizes the Kremlin’s neo-imperial ambitions

      war cult involves neo-imperialism, like stalin'sa

    6. the revelations of perestroika made it impossible to silence the dark side of the war.The renewed war narrative has become much more tragic and realistic. However, it stillexcludes a few things, such as the Kremlin’s complicity in unleashing the war

      putin knows that he can't hide things that the west already knows. it still excludes russia's less savory actions

    7. However, the Putin regimeembraced the Soviet legacy very selectively. Its communist component was rejected asfirmly as under Yeltsin. The new elites had no intention to revert the development ofstate capitalism in Russia. To be integrated into the longue durée of Russian history, theSoviet period had to be purified from its specifically communist

      Putin wanted to glorify the soviet era without the communism bit, but embraced the authoritarianism, nationalism, imperialism, and militarism of the soviet union's legacy. this is something that putin has in common with stalin

    8. Boris Yeltsin’s emphasis on Russia’s cultural achievements had a better chance toensure such support.

      Yeltsin focused less on a specific figure but more on Russia's past achievements; history still important here

    9. However, the regime did not dare tomake Stalin one of its symbols openly, not only because this was even less compatiblewith the notion of democracy. T

      Putin began to glorify Stalin but had to avoid using him explicitly because he wanted to make Russia look like a democracy

    10. The new Russian ruling class, which consisted of the corrupt bureaucracy,secret services, and the big business put under their tutelage, enthusiastically supportedthis cult,

      support from the elites who had an incentive to care about the state

    11. The creation of his authoritarian regime was accompanied by sustainedefforts to promote a cult of the state, including the notion of its continuity from thepre-revolutionary period through the Soviet epoch to Putin’s attempts to “make Russiagreat again.

      Russian wanted to center the State in Russian citizens' lives. he came into power at a time of disrepair

    12. The cult of the war was significantly compromised by the revelations of the perestroikaperiod (that is, facts commonly known in the West but recognized in Russia only after theend of the CPSU ideological monopoly

      war cult compromised by truths known by the western world???

    13. In contrast, the Soviet pantheon survived the fall of the USSR without major troubles.Some communist leaders (such as Mikhail Kalinin, Stalin’s chairperson of the SupremeSoviet) fell out of it. In contrast, some “anti-heroes” of the Soviet times (such as Pyotr Sto-lypin, prime minister in 1907–11, known for progressive economic reforms and ruthlesssuppression of the 1905 Revolution) joined it

      many who were deemed Soviet-era heroes remained, even after the fall of communism, considered part of the great pantheon - some fell out, but some also entered it.

      A major part was Stalin being removed from it, although his popularity came back when Yeltsin's economic reforms worked poorly.

    14. The fall of communism was accompanied (and in part prepared) by the decompositionof this ideology. However, its different parts suffered to a different degree. The “theoreti-cal” clichés of Marxist philosophy went entirely out of style: in the 1980s and even more soin the 1990s, few people believed in the notions of basis and superstructure, classstruggle, the liberating mission of the working class,

      faith in communism completely dissipated

    15. The 1993 Russian Constitution forbade any “State or obligatory” ideology.1 The 2020 con-stitutional reform has left this provision unchanged, although many pro-Kremlin politicianshad called for amending it.2 Putin, however, has not supported them. In 2019, he claimedthat “patriotism [was] the only possible ideology in the modern democratic society.

      Putin still does not want an official state ideology; only patriotism. This is not an ideology, but something everyone has.

      The text argues, though, that there IS a State ideology that centers on Russia as a powerhouse and the "Great Patriotic War."

      What is the cult of the Great Patriotic War?

    1. All these tales about him — that he doesn’t eat or sleep, working like a galley slave — it’s so far from the truth.

      putin not as tough as the masculine image he projects

    1. What is more, it would be a mistake not to understand its historic futility. Communism and thepower of the Soviets did not make Russia a prosperous country with a dynamically developingsociety and free peopl

      communism bad

    2. For most of the twentieth century, Russia lived under the communist doctrine. It would be amistake not to recognize the unquestionable achievements of those times. But it would be an evenbigger mistake not to realize the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for thatsocial experiment

      analyzing history; seeing what to keep and what not to keep

    3. The monarchdoesn't have to worry about whether or not he will be elected, or about petty political interests,or about how to influence the electorate.

      alluding to his lack of care for actual democracy

    4. The law has to be observed, but if it becomes outdated, it must be altered. One of the postulatesof legal theory is that the law always lags behind life.

      the law can change, but it is the law and must also be followed. he changed the constitution in his favor so this checks out

    5. I think that we have to preserve both local self-government and a system of election forgovernors. But all of these connections have to be more balanced. While preserving the systemof electing governors, for instance, we should consider applying sanctions against them. Toremove them from office, for example. That is, elect some and remove others. We can developsystems to link them more closely to the center. They cannot have complete independence.

      like the seven administrative regions

    6. : We began talking about Russia's relationship with Europe, and we have narrowed it downto our relations with NATO. Even with the North Atlantic orientation of today's European policy,we cannot forget that NATO and Europe are not one and the same thing. And I've already said thatRussia is a country of European culture not NATO culture

      separating NATO and Europe

    7. You forget that we used force in Germany in 1953, too. In my view, these were major mistakes.And the Russophobia that we see in Eastern Europe today is the fruit of those mistakes

      Putin admitting that Russia has made mistakes in the past?

    Annotators

    1. He lifted otherideas on how to achieve national or societal unity—as we will discussin the next chapter—directly from Russian history, including from an

      again, using history

    2. For Russia . . . the highest priority task is not rebirth but the con-struction of a new state

      why are rebirth and the construction of a new state different? the latter involves structural change such as reforming the economy

    3. Next to KGB leaderYury Andropov, Bobkov was the key official in the creation of the “NewKGB” that recruited Putin’s cohort of young officers into the institution.In 1995, Bobkov produced a memoir,

      Putin's support trickled into the KGB - a power ministry.

    4. tribute suggested that as Russianpresident, Putin had been nothing less than a savior. Putin had fulfilled amission to reunify and restore the state

      Putin was given credit for his unification of the states by multiple prominent figures.

    5. The idea of a united state that Pavlovsky cites is a key one for Putin.

      Perhaps this is why he was opposed to Orthodoxy and ethnonationalism being the center of the Russian Idra. Unit is something that Putin desires, although this desire is expressed through authoritarian means. Wanted everybody to be on board with his mission to fix and empower the Russian state.

    6. Fears of the collapse, raspad, and disintegration or break-up, razval,of the Russian state dominated debates among the Russian elite duringthe 1990s.

      go back to intro of chapter

    7. Putin’s manifesto called for Russia to overcome its crisis and recreate thestate—by rediscovering and taking back its fundamental values, reener-gizing its historical traditions, and abandoning the desire to blindly copyabstract Western models.

      Anti-Western, appealing to nationalist ideals. Go back to history to fix what is currently broken. Use historical traditions but also see how Russia had been in upheaval before to prevent the repetition of that upheaval

    8. Putin’s Millennium Message was also an emotional appeal. In additionto evoking the almost mystical, historically rooted conception of Rus-sian gosudarstvennichestvo, it was loaded with references to the Russianstate (gosudarstvo) and the idea of Russia as a great power (derzhava)

      Part of Putin's rhetoric in his Millennium Message was elevating Russia beyond the status of a country and to a concept - a long-standing, historical concept and a symbol of power.

    9. Putin was explicit in his assertionthat he did this to ensure the constitutional security of the gosudarstvo.“I will not change the constitution and in line with the constitution, youcannot run for president three times in a row,”

      stickler for law

    10. The constitution enshrines the president as the guarantor of the consti-tution. The president is elected by the entire Russian people and standsabove the system of separated executive, legislative, and judicial powers

      The president, supported by the constitution, is above all branches of government. Elected by the people, for the people, guarantees rights of the people.

    11. Like Zorkin, Putin has underscored the intimate connection betweenthe Russian presidency and the Russian constitution. The constitution isthe embodiment of the concept of gosudarstvennichestvo that Putin firstrolled out in the Millennium Message. It strengthens and unifies the Rus-sian state. It is the primary building block of the pravovoye gosudarstvo.

      importance of constitution; a framework of law

    12. In his speech, Putin under-scored the influence of his legal training at the university, noting, “Forpeople like me who are now engaged in the construction of a new Russianstate, we know that this project must be founded on the principles thathave for decades developed within the walls of the Faculty of Law ofthe University of St. Petersburg.”

      putin the lawyer

    13. Although Sobchak was seen as a leading Rus-sian democrat in the 1990s, his legal views were much less liberal thanhis political reputation might have suggested

      Again, Putin identifying with conservatism.

    14. The reference to the law (pravo) in the poslaniye is another importantelement. Anatoly Chubais and his team wanted the law to set the newrules of the market economy and provide the means to enforce them.They wanted to get everything back on the right track of reform again(their track). Putin, after becoming acting president in 2000, would alsoemphasize the importance of the law.

      The poslaniye and Putin emphasized the important of the law in restoring and maintaining "order" in Russia.

    15. The poslaniye also claimed (as Putin would later in his MillenniumMessage) that Russian society was crying out for order.

      The poslaniye claimed, like Putin, that Russian society needed order. Again, acknowledging that Russia was in disarray.

    16. It was a very unusual addressto the nation. It contained nothing about the government’s accomplish-ments. Nor did it offer a broader vision for the state in spite of all themachinations on this topic and the official creation of the Satarov group.It did not say much about foreign and defense policy, apart from a fewshort final paragraphs mostly condemning the expansion of NATO. Theposlaniye was a nuts-and-bolts speech that honed in on the importanceof restoring government control over the country’s political disarray

      The poslaniye was different from other national addresses; it focused on the important of restoration (again, a recurring theme) of the state, although I don't know if it was the State.

    17. The main obstacle to establishing a new economic order and a newpolitical system is the low effectiveness of the government authori-ties [vlasti] .

      The poslaniye acknowledged Russia's state of disarray and the ineffectiveness of the government.

    18. although Putin gives a much moreconservative spin to the concepts in the poslaniye on the role of law andorder in contributing to the development of a strong state

      Putin even took inspiration from Yeltsin's "poslaniye", although in a more conservative way. He seemed to have agreed with the importance of state laws to protect the state.

      The poslaniye pondered on how to define the order that Russia required as well as how to achieve this order.

    19. “I am against the creation in Russia of a state, officialideology in any form.”

      Putin didn't want an official ideology. Certainly not an ethnic one - focused on the people as a whole.

    20. ladi-mir Putin explicitly talked about a Rossiyskaya ideya, not a Russkayaideya in his manifesto.

      focusing less on Russian ethnicity than Russia as a whole. Wanted to create a Russian Idea that fit more people under its umbrella; not exclusive, like ethnonationalism.

    21. Putin, however, has consistently proved more circumspect on the issueof russkost’ and russkiy than General Leonov and the other profes-sional patriots in Russian nationalist circles.

      even though he wasn't clearly leaning towards nationalism vs. ethnonationalism, unlike his supporters. H

    Annotators