1) Tools that I have: R, I'm learning Python, and I'm learning SQL. I know how to learn new coding languages.
I've also taken advanced econometrics.
2) I've done research, been a research assistant, and worked with people.
I've also taken a course on microeconomics that did talk about asymmetric information and competition, so antitrust is fairly exciting to me!
n its current version, sensobol comprises four first-order and eight total-order variance-based estimators, from the classic formulae of Sobol’ (1993) or Jansen (1999) to the morerecent contributions by Glen and Isaacs (2012), Razavi and Gupta (2016b,a) (VARS-TO) or Azzini, Mara, and Rosati (2020b).
Contains multiple methods
Most studiescontinue to prioritize local sensitivity or one-at-a-time analyses, which explore how the modeloutput changes when one factor is varied and the rest is kept fixed at their nominal values(Saltelli, Aleksankina, Becker, Fennell, Ferretti, Holst, Li, and Wu 2019).
So you vary multiple parameters at once.
how algebraically that in the linear RD with no interaction, it doesn’t matter whether we center or not.
Same slope?
In other words, the benefit videogames can offer public life isto de-emphasize politicking in favor of policy.
important
s far as storyis concerned, procedural works tend to employ metaphor or vi-gnette instead of narrative.
So Life is Strange is not procedural
Increasingly for Putin, regathering the former Russian imperial lands and peoples has moved from being an instrument of foreign policy influence to a goal.
this doesn't have sufficient evidence
However, such analogies rely on loose definitions of the term.
Snyder defines fascism in a loose, vague way that you could use to describe other regimes.
In 1944, as fascism was being defeated on the battlefield, George Orwell wrote that the term had been reduced to the level of a swearword, hurled at anyone and everything
Just like Laruelle said.
"This is not who Putin is," she concluded. "It is not just that he is not charismatic.
Saying that you cannot compare Putin to Hitler
Another key difference between Putin's Russia and classical fascism is the lack of mass mobilization.
Another missing feature of fascism: no mass mobilization. I think Laruelle discussed this.
"Most importantly," Snegovaya said, "[Putin's Russia] lacks a vision of the future.
Putin doesn't have a specific future in mind.
t has developed the characteristics of what some political analysts have called a 'mafia state,' though under centralized personal dictatorship."
Russia isn't fascist... mafia state.
Putin, on the other hand, rose to power in 1999 and 2000 largely riding on the anxiety of the Second Chechen War by pledging to defend and guarantee the Russian Constitution.
So Hitler and Putin aren't the best comparison.
Although Putin espouses a similar "core myth," he is a reactionary politician who is not trying to create a new order "but to recreate a modified version of the Soviet Union,"
Griffin says that Putin is reactionary, not revolutionary, and fascism has to be revolutionary.
Among the characteristics Putin's Russia manifests that mirror fascism are historical revanchism and the embrace of hypermasculine authority -- "the macho cult of Putin"
A fascist feature. Does Laurelle agree with this fully as a part of militia culture?
And the distinctions between classical fascist dictatorship and Putin's system, they say, can shed light on how Russia is ruled today
The author states that it is important to distinguish classical fascism from the state of Putin's rule. Many scholars argue that Russia isn't fascist; is a dictatorship, but there are non-fascist and fascist dictatorships out there. Etc.
If Russia wins in Ukraine, it won’t be just the destruction of a democracy by force, though that is bad enough. It will be a demoralization for democracies everywhere.
Is Snyder failing to acknowledge that democracies have fascist elements? Laurelle does.
Fascism is not a debating position, but a cult of will that emanates fiction. It is about the mystique of a man who heals the world with violence, and it will be sustained by propaganda right to the end.
Laurelle does agree that with fascism comes violence. Compare it fully w/ their defintion through.
Actual Russian fascists, such as Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prokhanov, were given time in mass media.
Ivan Ilyin isn't a guru for Putin--Laurelle talks about this.
The Kremlin defines Ukraine as an artificial state, whose Jewish president proves it cannot be real.
I mean, this is true... Does it meet Laruelle's definition of fascism?
It’s not the first time Ukraine has been the object of fascist war. The conquest of the country was Hitler’s main war aim in 1941.
Like Laruelle mentions, Snyder draws parallels between Putin and Hitler in their conquests, or attempted conquests, of Ukraine.
But today’s Russia meets most of the criteria that scholars tend to apply. It has a cult around a single leader, Vladimir Putin. It has a cult of the dead, organized around World War II. It has a myth of a past golden age of imperial greatness, to be restored by a war of healing violence — the murderous war on Ukraine.
Claims that Putin's Russia meets the general criteria of fascism, but Laurelle disputes some of these.
We err in limiting our fears of fascism to a certain image of Hitler and the Holocaust.
Snyder acknowledges a somewhat broader definition of fascism, i.e. a definition that is not just restricted to the beliefs and actions of Hitler.
Calls fascism difficult to give a proper definition too--Laruelle sort of agrees, although they do come up with their own definition.
Second, it says that “Putinism” is not a fixed category.
Putinism is a concrete regime, either, although it does have some consistent elements.
What does all this tell us about Russia? First, it says that the Russian regimedoes not exhibit doctrinal coherence.
Russia doesn't have a concrete ideology.
Other criteria brought by proponents of “Russia’s fascism” cannot resist scru-tiny. Russia’s supposed imperialism is better understood as a classic feature ofpostcolonialism that can also be found in democratic regimes.
Russia is not imperialist, but postcolonialist.
The only component that I identify as relevant to the clas-sical fascism repertoire in today’s Russia is the militia subculture
The only element of fascism that is present is a militia subculture.
Eschewing simplistic binaries also prevents us from primordializing Russia asthe West’s other. The differences between the United States, Europe, and Russiaare not a matter of essence, but of shades along a shared continuum. I
Russia isn't entirely different from the US; cannot be spoken of as though it belongs to another realm.
We do find in Russia ele ments that Umberto Eco categorized as Ur-Fascism,yet these are not specific to fascist regimes and can also be found in establisheddemocracies
There are some fascist elements in Russia, but these are present in democracies, too.
If there is an overarching mainstream ideological trend to identify, it is illib-eralism in the definition I advanced previously
Illiberalism is what is happening.
This does not mean that groups supporting these ide-ologies cannot exist in the interstices allowed by the system, but they do not rep-resent a bigger risk than that in any other Western society, and they certainlycannot rely on solid constituencies as in the United States
classical fascism remains on the fringes. Parafascism is what we should look like since it lies on the extremes ends of the spectrum of acceptable, classic ideologies. Certain examples of such doctrines still aren't promoted by the regime.
CONFPOP
-Inmates held for other jurisdictions
-Persons in community-based programs that return to jail at night
-Persons on transfer to treatment facilities but are still under your jurisdiction
-Persons out to court while under the jurisdiction of your jail facilities
I add to this analysis a comparison withGaullism.
Comparing w/ Gaullism is an interesting exercise
Moreover, the lack of comparative approaches reduces our ability to under-stand the regime outside of a supposed Russian exceptionalism.
Not enough comparative research; hinders our ability to understand the regime from a lens other than that of Russian exceptionalism.Need to comepare Putinism to other nonfascist ideologies.
Out of the array of core components that qualify a regime as fascist, Russia dis-plays only one: a constituted paramilitary culture directly supported by state in-stitutions.
A feature of fascism that Russia doesn't lack: militia culture supported by the state/paramilitary culture supported by the state.
This list gives the impression of being long, yet it has remained limited to thesame names for two decades and represents only a minimal portion of Russianpolitical elites as a whole.
Yes, there are prominent far-right officials. But not as many as one would think.
Third, and most important, the Russian state is a plural conglomerate com-prising several ruling groups.
Also, Russia has many ruling groups. Again, the Kremlin isn't totally cohesive.
Second, space is important to consider: Russia is a huge country, and locationmatters.
Also, Russia is huge. Certain localities contribute more than others in terms of grassroots-authorities interactions.
This umbrella gives them atleast partial protection from repression by other sectors of the state, as well asadvantages during competition with rivals.
Russia is pluralistic. Some fascists do manage to gain protection by being part of some instutional body.
They have created a kind of “transfilling” pattern:
This is how they treat their fascist groups--not consistently well.
Another argument used to claim that Russia is fascist is the presence of fascistgroups. Yet, as we have discussed, the existence of such fringes is common in themajority of Western countries—and much more developed, for instance, in theUnited States.
Also, fascist groups only exist in the margins of Russian politics. Their existence is more common in the West.
The supposed historical parallel between Russia and Nazi Germany around ir-redentism does not hold, either: irredentist narratives are present in many coun-tries and politi cal cultures without any mechanical link to the fascist repertoire.
Irridentism also doesn't necessarily belong to a fascist regime.
Also, Russia doesn't have official irridentist policies towards Russian minorities. Crimea is really its only example of irridentism.
It would also be a mistake to analyze Russia’s “spheres of influence” as some-thing unique to the country, with no other models for comparison.
Also, Russia has a sphere of influence that isn't unique to it' non-fascist regimes have had spheres of influence, so you can't use the presence of this feature to determine whether a regime is fascist.
From the Russian perspective, Moscow’s actions in the “near abroad” are notexpansionist but rather protectionist.
Moscow's actions seem to be protectionist and not expansionist.
Imperialism is probably one of the most debatable issues related to Russiatoday. But here, too, the terminology is ambiguous: Is Russia an imperialist or apostcolonial power?
So... it's vague. Is Russia imperialist or post-colonial? Russia is most postcolonial.
Together with ultranationalism, imperialism is considered another key com-ponent of a fascist regime.
Missing feature of fascism in addition to ultranationalism: imperialism. There's the cult of war, but that can't be used to describe Russia.
Yes, Russia invests heavily in the military and the military-industrial complex etc, but that isn't a sign of war; it just Russia, as a self-described great power, attempting to remain influential. Plus there is the turmoil of the post-Cold War era, which has led to order being dependent on deterrence.
Another feature considered core to any fascist regime is imperialism, often inter-preted as a form of ultranationalism.
Another missing feature of fascism: imperialism. The regime doesn't have this. Russian fascist groups tend to have it, but these sentiments aren't vocally present on the state level. You can't have an official nationalist doctrine.
Furthermore, organizational elements associated with fascist utopianism areabsent from contemporary Russia.
Another missing feature of fascism: organizational elements that are able to actually indoctrinate people. The Kremlin has only been able to create mobilization twice, in 2005 and 2008.
The Putin regime not only fails to advance any official coherent doctrine butalso lacks what most scholars consider to be the lowest common denominator offascism
Another missing feature of fascism: a utopian project that would be achieved by violent mobilization of the masses. No demonstrated regeneration myth or cult of violence, no desire to create a completely new world.
Despite this—or perhaps because of it—several Western observers have beensearching for Putin’s hypothetical ideological guru since the early 2000s.
People call Dugin Putin's ideological "guru," and yet, as stated in the previous chapter, Dugin isn't very successful or connected to the upper echelons of the Presidential Administration.
The Putin regime also misses another core element of fascism: mass indoctrina-tion and mobilization.
Another missing feature of fascism: mass indoctrination and mobilization.
Commenting on the application of the term fascism to Putin’s Russia, RogerGriffin nicely summarizes:
Useful summary: Russia not fascist for various reasons. Putin is a "pragmatist." Fascism isn't the only way you can describe the flaws of the regime.
What if fascism is not automatically a feature of an authoritarian/dictatorial re-gime, but something that can appear in a pluralistic, even democratic, system?
Key question which takes us back to: how fascist is fascist enough?
You don't need to call Russia totalitarian, a Nazi regime, Stalinist, or dictatorial to call it fascist or discuss fascist elements that are present. Fascism can exist in pluralistic societies.
Even a comparison with southernEuropean- or Latin American-style military authoritarianism does not work. Rus-sia thus cannot be labeled totalitarian, nor is it dictatorial; it is even less fascist.
So Russia isn't totalitarian or dictatorial.
Even the qualification of authoritarianism should thus be deployed with nu-ance in the Russian case. Obviously, public freedoms have been curbed over thepast decade, the electoral options offered by political parties are limited, oppo-nents are hampered in their expression, and the media are increasingly controlled.
So you need to be careful when you try to label Russia as an authoritarian regime. Limited freedoms but also ideological diversity.
The Polity IV project offers a much more granular ranking for capturing thenature of the Russian political regime by
The Polity IV project has a better scale than Mortyl, and it judges Russia as an "anocracy"--a mixed or incoherent authority regime.
The Putin regime focuses on outlawing liberal opposition and invites citizensto be busy with their private lives and individual well-being, permitting as manyfree spaces as pos si ble for nonpoliti cal expression in order to avoid resentment,which could become a driver of antiregime mobilization.
One feature that the Putin regime does have in common with authoritarianism. So is Putin a dictator? Mortyl says so, but he uses an overly simplistic scale of judgement to call him one.
Today’s Russia offers no indications that would qualify it as a totalitarian state:no system of terror is in place, no mandatory indoctrination exists to subjugatethe masses, and no mobilization mechanisms are present.
Is this fully true, though?
In all cases, Nazi-style totalitarianism, southern European- and Latin American-style military authoritarianism, and Stalinism, these parallels fail to work for Pu-tin’s Russia.
Comparing current Russia with Nazi-style totalitarianism, military authoritarianism in some places, and Stalinism is fruitless. The tool of totalitarianism is terror and domination of every aspect of life. Russia as we see it now is not totalitarian.
The totalitarianism theory, established by Hannah Arendt inher 1951 book—even if the term was largely used before her by scholars describ-ing Italian Fascism and by writers such as George Orwell—states that totalitari-anism is a novel form of government that cannot be considered a higher degreeof authoritarianism but is instead one of a kind.1
A definition of totalitarianism that has been criticized for various reasons, e.g. most fascist regimes weren't actually totalitarian.
Snyder’s fourth argument is to accuse Putin of having justified the annexationof Crimea by reference to Germany’s “changing borders” doctrine, implying thatPutin openly compared his actions to those of Nazi Germany:
Snyder's fourth argument: Putin justified his annexation of Crimea by refering Nazi Germany. But Putin was referring to Germany's reunification in 1990s, not its annexations.
Additionally, Snyder has obscured the many occasions on which Ilyin’s posi-tions are in fundamental opposition to Putin’s.
Ilyin's beliefs also conflict with Putin's in several ways.
A third set of arguments advanced by Snyder relates to Ivan Ilyin’s alleged rolein Putin’s ideology.
Snyder's third argument: Ivan Ilyin is a fascist and has played a role in Putin's ideology.
The author refutes this, says that while fascism and national socialism did appeal to Ilyin and he was anti-Semitic, he refused to work with the Nazis. He can't be neatly placed in the category of fascism; more of a German Conservative Revolutionist.
Also, Ilyin doesn't play the main role in Putin's ideology. Putin has quoted Ilyin, but these quotes aren't sympathetic to Nazism or fascism.
Second, Snyder suggests that the Kremlin’s support for the European Far Rightis a continuation of Stalin’s alliance with Hitler, the goal of which was to destroythe Euro pean world order
Snyder's second argument: the Kremlin's outreach to the European Far Right lies in the same realm as the Hitler-Stalin alliance. This alliance also seeked to upend order in Europe.
The author says that this isn't true. Scholars are actively working on "far-right renewal," European populist movements don't overtly hold Russophile sentiments, and deep-rooted illiberalism in certain countries can't be blamed on Russia. Russia is also trying to reach out to far-left groups, mainstream conservatives; want a political handle on some part of Europe.
Snyder advances four arguments to support his thesis on Russia’s fascism
Snyder's first argument is a comparison between modern day Russia and the Soviet Union after the Molotov-Ribbentrip Pact was concluded. Says that Putin wants to rehabilitate it, that the Putin regime and the Stalinist Soviet Union both desired to become destructive forces in Europe.
The author says that nothing indicates that Putin's, or the regime's, thinking about the Pact has changed at all.
In a December 2016 lecture at Yale University, Snyder spelled out how historymust be political, in the sense that knowledge of what happened before helps thedevelopment of political imagination and therefore heightens awareness.
TImothy Snyder uses historical analogies to explain why Russia is a fascist country because, according to him, you need to understand what happened in the past to develop a fully developed toolkit for the present. The author calls this simplistic, says that more detailed academic tools need to be used.
They conveniently overlook the many other concepts used by so-cial sciences to comprehend Russia’s political and cultural features that make fas-cism an irrelevant analytical category.
Fascism becomes a useless analytical tool when you consider all of the other concepts and lenses that the social sciences use to analyze Russian culture and politics.
The author acknowledges that there is only one feature of fascism that Russia displays, that being the militia subculture.
Given Russia’s difficulties in finding enough allies in mainstream conservativeEu ro pean circles, it had no choice but to consolidate ties with the only groupsthat were ready for a tactical alliance: far–right groups
Russia hasn't been very successful in establishing connections with mainstream conservatives in Europe, so it is falling back on far-right groups. It values the former more than the latter.
But again, genuine ideological commonalities.
However, it would be a mistaketo think that Dugin is directly feeding far-right contacts to the Kremlin simplybecause his Eu ro pean liaisons predate those of the Presidential Administration.
Dugin isn't really directly connecting far-right people with the Kremlin. There are other, more influential people.
The Kremlin's relationships are mostly with mainstream parties with the common belief of conservative values. A "marriage of convenience" but also a sign of genuine and long-term ideological commonalities.
However, this outreach strategy has also produced some resounding failures.In March 2015, Rodina organized a Russian International Conservative Forumin St. Petersburg, with representatives from eleven European countries.
A certain movement wasn't even attended by high-ranking Russian officials. Even caused some officials to withdraw support.
Russia’s leverage over the U.S. Far Right has been minimal compared to its le-verage over Europe’s.
Russia hasn't been as successful at establishing connections with the U.S. Far Right as it has been with Europe's. Nothing concrete.
During a third wave of contacts, coinciding with Putin’s third presidential man-date (2012–2018), the Presidential Administration and the Russian governmentadopted a more overt strategy of reaching out to the European Far Right.
Attempts at connecting with the European Far Right (by the govt.) were far more obvious during Putin's third term.
but the Kremlin is betting on the long-term character of the religiousangle: it guarantees that pro-Russian voices will remain present in U.S. politics,the strategic value of which was confirmed, for instance, by Russian lobbyism atthe National Prayer Breakfast and by Donald Trump’s election.
The Kremlin needs this; it will help keep pro-Russian sentiment in US political circles.
The Russian Orthodox Church has been the other driving force behind thissecond wave of contacts between Russia and the European Far Right.
Then there's the Russian Orthodox Church making contact between the European Far Right. Has been trying to connect or reconnect with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, and Putin involved himself in this process as well. Because of the RoC, the state was indirectly able to contact Russians abroad and use them to build connections with Europe and the US.
To promote its agenda, Rodina initiated a trend that would later become main-stream in Russia
Rodina also began to look at European as a model and a warning, calling Europe to too liberal with migrants. But also, European far-right parties that criticized Europe's loss of identity were seen as an inspiration.
n the 2000s, a second wave of contact with the Euro pean Far Right took shape,driven by two new institutions: the Rodina party, which claimed that Russia wasa Eu ro pean (read: white) country that must protect itself against migrants, andthe Moscow Patriarchate, which took the lead in branding Russia as the bastionof Christian values.
Rodina and the Moscow Patriarchate also established contact with the European Far Right.
This wave of contacts established in the early 1990s became foundational tothe Kremlin’s policy of reaching out to the European Far Right a decade later.
These politicians reaching out to far-right groups was extremely important for the Kremlin's policy of establishing contact with the European Far Right a decade after.
Last but not least, in the early 1990s, more mainstream politicians such as Vlad-imir Zhirinovsky and Sergey Glazyev were also looking for new allie
Some mainstream politicians were seeking international allies in the 1990s, too. Zhirinovsky was the biggest, first to develop a network in Europe. Had media attention. Had friends in Germany, too, unlike Dugin.
he raciology school, too, managed to weave an international network of soli-darity with parts of the New Right in France and Germany.
Raciologists were making contact with the New Right in France and Germany. Visibility of the movement on the international scene hit its max in a 2006 conference. which was partly sponsored by the Russian branch of European Synergies. Didn't manage to capture a wider audience because it was too radical.
Duke’s bookwas reportedly available at the State Duma bookstore at a very affordable price,and the first printing of five thousand copies quickly sold out.
David Duke's book was sold at the State Duma bookstore for pretty cheap. He was the KKK grand wizard and Holocausts denier.
Dugin may have been the Russian Far Right’s most visi ble ambassador to Eu-rope, but he was not the only one reaching out.
Dugin wasn't the only one in the Russian Far Right reaching out to the European Far Right. Lots of white nationalist groups were contacting white supremacists/far-right gruops in the West.
Dugin established connections withcircles that were more openly nostalgic for Nazism,
Dugin built connection with Nazi nostalgics e.g. in Spain.
Aleksandr Dugin was the first Russian ideologue to build personal contacts withthe Euro pean Far Right, mostly the New Right.
Dugin was the first to build personal connections with the European Far Right.
Although the European Far Right has always been decidedly anticommunist,some of its groups have not hidden their Russophile tendencies
The European Far Right is generally anticommunist but there are Russophile beliefs, too.
BUT: During the Soviet era, there was limited interaction between Russians and the European Far Right. This changed when the Iron Curtain fell.
At the same time that the Kremlin has successfully managed and maintained con-trol over grassroots fascist tendencies at home, it has developed a policy of reach-ing out globally to Western far-right and populist parties.
The Kremlin can suppress fascist grassroots movements but is also reaching out to the Western far-right and populists.
the key ambivalence of Russia’s posture toward fas-cism: it is acceptable only through culturally Russified references expressed as partof a broader continuum of conservative and/or nationalist frames.
Russia's stance on fascism is called "ambivalent;" acceptable is conditional on Russified cultural references.
the direct embrace of historical fascism or national socialism provokes immedi-ate rejection from the public and therefore marginalizes those who claim it.
The public seems to reject obvious fascism.
Finally, in 2008, Dugin succeeded in penetrating a respectable institution,namely, Moscow State University (MSU).
BUT: in 2008, he managed to secure a position at the highly regarded Moscow State University. But he wasn't tenured, his research center wasn't integrated into the sociology department.
At one point, the Kremlin wanted to drown out liberal movements, so Dugin had some success there. Brief again.
Dugin has had only two periods of success.
He only has two periods of success. 1990s due to support from military and security services (plus some ideological strategizing). Also served in the Duma in 1998, his only official involvement in policymaking.
Short-lived success; opposed to Putin in the 200s, his small Eurasian party failed.
Dugin has little direct accessto the highest echelons of the Presidential Administration.
Dugin has little access to the upper Presidential Administration, isn't a member of any institutions or the Civic Chamber. Does get support from some military circles and Church leaders; but his source of status is different.
Dugin has thus played a critical role in trying to rehabilitate the fascist uni-verse of doctrines and symbols in Russia. He remains the most famous Russianthinker quoted and referred to abroad by those sharing his worldviews, but hissuccess at home has been limited.
Dugin has had limited success at home.
What accentuates Dugin’s difficulties in elaborating a renewed fascist doctrine
He is struggling to create a new fascist doctrine, though.
Dugin renewed his commitment to the Conservative Revolution in 2009 withthe publication of The Fourth Political Theory,
Really into the Conservative Revolution. Rejected liberalism, communism, and fascism, but also acknowledged that the Nazi doctrine contained the Revolution.
Yet it re-mains challenging to determine how much of the population supports a narra-tive of Russia’s whiteness in one way or another.
But we can't quite tell how much of the public supports the concept of Russia's whiteness.
Faced with heavy criticism and unable to openly rehabilitate fascist ideologyin Russia, Dugin turned to a less direct promotion of doctrines that borrow someelements of fascism
Dugin has been forced to become more subtle in his fascism because he has dealt with criticism. Subtlety = wanting the German Conservative Revolution. Calls this far-left, calls Hitlerism far-right.
Dugin’s personal contribution to the philosophy of fascism is the assertion thatthe regeneration of the Russian nation will be realized by the total—andtotalitarian—transformation of the Russian state on the international stage.
Dugin states (contributes to fascist dialogue) by saying that the Russian nation will reach actualization only by revamping itself on the international scene. Revionist geopolitics are key, a fascist solution.
Dugin is a complex doctrinaire. He is a chameleon thinker:
Is he a grifter? The author says that he can adapt his talks or opinions to the audience that he is addressing. Combines many different doctrines.
Fascism is the core element of his ideology.
The second and most systematic attempt to revamp fascism has come fromAleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), the most renowned Russian geopolitical and far-righttheoretician
The most systematic rehabilitation/attempt at rehabilitation of fascism came from Dugin since the 1990s. Well-known in the West and in Russia.
Yet these numbers do not tell us whether readers consider them to be worksof fiction or “documentation” of a supposed objective Aryanness.
Some concerning statistics, but not necessarily showing support for the far-right.
In 2005, the col-lection was under investigation by Moscow’s Office of the Procurator, but itspublisher managed to convince a judge of its scientific character, which allowedits editors to avoid a criminal investigation despite their repeated calls forpogroms.79
Moscow's Office of the Procurator didn't ban their Nazi-adjacent collection because it was presented as scientific. Phenotypes etc.
The most systematic group, one more interested in race theories than in Ary-anism, was structured around the so-called school of raciology
The most systemic far-right group discussed race theories rather than Aryanism. "Raciology."
Far-right groups stepped into the Aryan breach early in the perestroika years,promoting both an Aryan credo and the neopagan theme of Russia’s pre-Christianfaith.
Far-right groups embraced the concept of Aryanness during the perestroika era. Russian Party of Russia, for example.
Exchanged Hitler for Stalin as a leader later on.
Like many other countries around the world, Russia has also been facing a seriesof attempts to rehabilitate fascism as a doctrine among small intellectual circles.
As part of a global trend, there are some Russian intellectual circles that are reviving fascism.
Aryan shit flooded Russian publishing in the 1990s.
Many of the Donbas fighter brigades exhibit the clas-sic traits shared by almost all fascist movements:
Lots of Donbas fighters displayed fascist qualities.
Last but not least, the Donbas insurgency contributed to the romanticizationof militia among some segments of Russian nationalist-minded youth.
The Donbas insurgency also seemed to inspire nationalist youth.
The club also offersbiker tours to Berlin on Victory Day but, so far, has been regularly stopped at theborders of Poland and Lithuania,6
Offers bike tours on Victory Day. Huh.
Another ecosystem close to the vigilante realm is the infamous Night Wolves(nochnye volki), celebrated as Putin’s personal biker club
Another vigilante-adjecent group are the Night Wolves. Very popular, apparently called Putin's "personal biker club." Putin attended one of their rallies.
Takes some elements from Western biker culture and blending it with ideology that advances the Krmelin's agenda.
Putin also led the launch of theSambo Wrestling Presidential Cup in 2006.
Putin is a fan of Sambo, too. Lobbied to turn it into an official Olympic sport.Some institutional support; introduced "military sambo."
These different martial arts are highly supported by Putin, and these arts/clubs dedicated to these arts appeal to far-right groups.
The broader context of this rise of militia culture relies on a less ideologicallyclear-cut but more deeply embedded social trend—the popularity of a Russianversion of martial arts, sambo (self-defense without weapons).
Rise of militia culture is less ideological and more due to the popularity of sambo, a Russian martial art. Sambo athletes tend to join their combat skills with Orthodox values.
So the Moscow Patriarchate has supported this type of sport and combat sports via patriotic clubs.
The Communist Party and liberals, the movement’s main targets, haveaccused Sorok Sorokov of being a neo-Nazi organization.
Has been accused by liberals and the Communist Party of being liberals.
The Sorok Sorokov is influential and has some institutional support; Moscow municipality, Archpriest, Patriarch Kirill.
Another form of militia has developed more recently, on a smaller scale, outof the Russian Orthodox Church.
There is also the militia of the Russian Orthodox Church. Instituionalized by the Patriarchate. Wants Christianization, more churches, intiially disrupted LGBTQ pride parades but also has some charitable projects.
Patriarchate instiutionalized this Orthodox militia with the Sorok Sorokov movement.
The militia realmand the activities associated with it—extreme combat sports—are obviously notautomatically correlated with fascism and may exist outside any doctrinal frame-work. Yet some ideological bridges exist around notions like muscular masculin-ity, male camaraderie, the sense of sacrifice, and the cult of violence and death
Some of its militia activities aren't necessarily fascist, but there are certain fascist elements e.g. muscular masculinity, cult of violence. Strengthens the vigilante movement.
seem to support some of its goals.
Even so, there are some Far Right groups that seem to support the regime.
Today, the Russian Far Right has been largely dismantled.
The Russian Far Right isn't very present today. "Dismantled."
At its peak in the mid-2000s, the Russian White Power movement countedabout fifty thousand skinheads,
In the mid-2000s, Russia may have had the largest number of skinheads in the world. Ethnic violence/Russian White Power movement peaked in 2007-2008.
Some friendliness bween law enforcement and radical groups meant that insufficient action was taken, but became more strict in 2008-2010. More pressure from federal authorities against antimigrant riots, skinhead activities.
Concerned about the politicization of the skinhead movement, which was pro-moting increasingly anti-Putin slogans, the authorities first tried to divide theextreme-right scene by promoting more conciliatory groups,
Increasing anti-Putinism by skinheads; authorities concerned. Wanted to promot "conciliatory" groups.
Another key institution, the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) ledby Aleksandr Belov (b. 1976), attempted to mediate between Russian politiciansand skinhead groups.
Another group: Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) run by Belov. Wanted to create some sort of reconciliation between Russian politicians and skinhead groups.
Anti-migrant stance as the right/needed unifying factor for the Russian Far Right. Most influential in the mid-2000s. A march featured some U.S. White Power activists.
Banned in 2011.
In 2008, at the first DPNI congress, Belov announced a shift in strategy, a moveaway from radicalism in order to transform the DPNI into a “respectable nation-alist movement with European tendencies.”2
DPNI changed a bit in 2008. Became less radical; wanted a "respectable" Europe-based nationalist movement. Weakened the movement a bit due to disagreements, but taught younger far-right leaders that they could gain more support/a higher status if they connected with the US Far Right etc.
By the early 2000s, with the exception of Limonov, the older generation ofextreme-right leaders, including Barkashov and his competitors, had largely dis-appeared, having been replaced by skinheads (britogolovnye or “shaved heads” inRus sian; also skinkhedy).
2000s: most older extreme-right leaders were gone and were replaced by skinheads. These were against migrants, moved to visceral racism, changed the Russian Far Right from classically fascist/postfascist to "White Power."
The skinhead movement was inspired by the US White Power movement.
Yet the NBP blended this exaltation of fascism with a celebration of Lenin, Sta-lin, Beria, the Bolshevik revolution, and Soviet culture.
Also celebrated Lenin, Stalin, Bolsheviks, Soviet era.
The NBP ideological principle is an explicit miscegenation of contradictorydoctrines from both the Far Right and the Far Left, based on the idea that in or-der to challenge the system, paradox should be the new norm.
NBP mixed contradictory beliefs from the Far Right and the Far Left; believed that a paradox was necessary to make systemic change. Said that national revolution and social revolution are based on the same principle, or must be, and so the Left and Right extremes should come together.
Limonov, the poet/leader, made allusions to Mussolini and Hitler. 1990s dress codes inspired by Italian fascists.
The newspaper, Limonka, presented several definitions of fascism, all positive.
Another political group was interested by the fascist reference, but with a totallydifferent political agenda: the National Bolshevik Party
Then there was another group that was "interested by the fascist reference:" the National Bolshevik Party, led by a poet. Wasn't as popular/didn't have as many members as RNE, had a newspaper with a distinct political expression and influential culture of violence protest.
Was anti-Putinism, so received backlash from the regime.
RNE appeared to have developed close contacts with key minis-tries, such as those of the Interior and Defense.
The RNE was closely connected to some major power institutions. Collabs with regional military, "discreetly" supported by authorities to import order in the streets. Recruited street kids, some communist leaders used RNE bodyguards.
ce this trainingwas successfully completed, the new partisans (soratniki) led small groups of about10 people, which were in turn integrated into a larger pyramidal structure. Theparty offered members the chance to either engage in a volunteer militia or workin the private security sector for businessmen sympathetic to the party.
Ways that RNE members could go; paramilitary, RNE-sympathetic businessmen's security
The party expressed a beliefin an anti-Russian plot on the part of the world’s cosmopolitans, refused to con-demn Christian ity despite cultivating neopagan innuendos, and tried to demon-strate Christ’s Aryanness and Slavicness.
RNE's Christianness; Christ's Aryan blood. Hitler, etc.
The foremost rehabilitation of fascism as a political ideology in post-SovietRussia took shape with Russian National Unity (Russkoe natsional ́noe edinstvo,RNE)
The main fascist rehabilitation movement in post-Soviet Russia was the Russian National Unity; "black shirts" paramilitary group. Less prominent yet still active even in 2014.
Borrowed from classical fascism, Nazism, swastika, Hitler salute, NSDAP program, eugenics, mixed economy. RNE was special because it defined Russia in a facist way; genetic purity above all, more important than religion. Wanted to ban mixed marriages.
Forthree decades, all Russian extreme-right groups have been characterized by a lackof institutional longevity, personal rivalries among leaders, and shaky popularsupport, and they have been subject to alternating periods of tolerance and re-pression by the authorities
Russian extremist far-right groups have trouble surviving and gaining public support.
Not onlycan these groupuscules not enter the legal politi cal game, but their sociolog i calbasis remains difficult to grasp.
Russia does have far-right extremist groups but they cannot legally enter the political scene. They're grassroots groups. On the fringes.
These grassroots groups can be divided into several categories
Different types of far-right groups.
These groups aren't a product of the Kremlin. They just make the Russian public more confusing to identify in terms of antifascism.
This Orthodox realm, with its tsarist nostalgia and fascination with Russianemigration, is not devoid of contacts among the security services.
The Orthodox political scape has contacts in the security forces.
alofeev has also been funding the Don-bas insurgency—even if, officially, he is simply providing humanitarian assistanceper an agreement between his fund and the Donetsk People’s Republic.69 Closeto Tikhon and proud of his monarchist convictions,70 he has funded severalmeetings at which the European and Russian Far Right have become acquaintedwith one another and with monarchist circles.
Example of an Orthodox businessman's connection to the Far Right.
They are disinterestedin the theological and liturgical side of religion and advance a more politicalagenda
Some Church figures don't care about the religious part of Orthodoxy; they use it as a political tool.
Author calls them "power brokers" between the Church and state institutions and the Orthodox society. Three broad groups. Want autocracy.
As we will see later, Tikhon has been at the vanguard ofreaching out to European far- right groups and rehabilitating tsarist figures.
Rehabilitating Tsarist figures.
These “familyvalues” groups do not foster any agenda that can be directly associated with fas-cism, but they position themselves at the forefront of the effort to connect withEuropean and U.S. far-right movements in the name of fighting for shared Chris-tian values.
It's the idea of family values again. The Orthodoxy claims to want these and they want to connect with the US and European far-right due to their shared desire to spread Christian values. Still, the groups don't seem to align directly with a fascist ideology.
The third ecosystem, the Orthodox realm, is less structured than the military–industrial complex: it lacks the concrete economic and industrial backbone of thelatter, even if the Church can be considered its core element.
The Orthodox realm is less structured than the M-I complex, less ideologically concrete, with certain sources of power being institutionalized while others consist of personal contacts. The Church can be considered as a central element.
The Church wants to "re-Christianize" the country in the long term to become a privileged, state-backed institution. On the other hand, political Orthodoxy groups see the religion as a political ideology and want to advance their agenda from that lens.
some of Rodina’s new rising ideological stars continued to ex-hibit roots in neo-Nazi subcultures,
Some Rodina members have revealed neo-Nazi beliefs.
Like Prokhanov, Rogozin has beencareful to restrain his ideological arsenal so that it would remain in the world ofpolitical correctness, yet Rodina shelters much more radical figures.
A friend of Prokhanov leads the Rodina, which hides radical figures in its midst. Treating migrants like second-class citizens, etc.
Kalashnikoveven draws an explicit parallel to Nazism by explaining the need for a RussianAhnenerbe (Ancestral Heritage), referring to the SS institution in charge of theNazi quest, from Scandinavia to Tibet,
This club figure has made parallels with Nazism.
For its part, the Izborsky Club makes appeals for the creationof an oprichnina—Ivan the Terrible’s first private militia, which inaugurated thetradition of security services
Izborsky wants Ivan the Terrible's first private militia to be revived, to supervise a moral revolution and patriotic indoctrination of the elites. A main club figure says that the members of the militia should be able to "act outside the law."
In 2012, at age seventy-four, Prokhanov found renewed political visibility withthe launching of the Izborsky Club, composed of about thirty prominent Rus-sian nationalists and proponents of conservatism.31 The club works as theideology- producing machine for the military–industrial complex and appears tofunction on a fairly generous budget largely provided by the main military firms.3
The Izborsky Club formed in 2012 (ny Prokhanov, who borrows a bit from fascist ideology) and is the main source of ideology for the M-I complex. It is mostly funded by the main military firms.
Wants to reconcile Soviet nostalgia with Orthodoxy while also reconciling the Soviet and tsarist eras. Wanting to "sanctify" the SU and bring it into Orthodoxy.
CPRF insists on the cornerstone of Russia’s antifascist destiny, but someof its radical trends,
CPRF stands against fascism but has some radical elements of mystical Stalinism and elements of fascism.
The LDPR isn't cohesive like the CPRF. Zhirinovsky has been called fascist as he wants totalitarianism to revive the nation.
he party’s definition of communismhas remained imprecise, focusing mostly on the memory of the Soviet welfare sys-tem.
M-I complex works best with CPRF (communist party) and LDPR, and Rodin. Communist Party is the best at maintaining Soviet nostalgia (great power) and Orthodoxy.
The second ecosystem, the military–industrial complex, encompasses all poweragencies: the Ministry of Defense; the Ministry of the Interior and its security ser-vices; the new National Guard (founded in 2016); and the large military indus-tries, both public and semiprivate
The military-industrial complex is most aligned with the Soviet era regime. Defends relatively static political/industrial interests etc, consists mostly of old Soviet servants and high-ranking military officials.
The M-I complex wants ideological control. Traditional Soviet = good, created "healthy patriots." Patriotic-military education for the youth.
While the Presidential Administration has perfectly mastered playing withmyriad ideational projects, it never favors groups that could, one way or another,be identified as fascist.
The PA, although diverse, doesn't ally itself with groups that you could call fascist.
In the Presidential Administration’s language, conservatism does not clearlyrefer to a precise time in the past.
For Russia, as long as the 1990s are condemned, there is no ideal conservative period from the Soviet past. There are several periods that could fit the regime's needs.
More about establishing its geopolitical power by reacting against current progress.
the idea of Russia as a globalized country creating a multipolarworld with its BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) allies alter-nates with the notion of Russia as a besieged fortress in need of protection andisolation.11 The narratives of Russia as the protector of Russian ethnic minoritiesabroad and of its Orthodox brothers
Russia needs to be protected, but is also a protector. Among other things in this paragraph.
Even in such a context, the Presidential Administration’s promotion of ideo-logical products appears indeed quite eclectic and evolutionary. It offers a broadpalette, aiming at a “pick and choose” policy that will allow it to achieve a broadconsensus.
The PA aims at achieving a broad concensus. The most fundamental element of its ideology is patriotism. Helps disqualify political lbieralism that caters to Western ideology.
After liberalism, there isn't some clear, cohesive ideology or policy. It's fairly anti-West and antiliberal, nostalgic for the Soviet past, and emphasis on Russia ruled by a single state.
Except for calling for Russia’s stabilization and revival and for citizens to bemore patriotic, Putin had long cast himself as a-ideological, claiming to be work-ing solely in line with technocratic objectives.
Putin has called himself a technocrat without a specific ideology. After he returnerd to power in 2012 (after certain mass protests), three things changed w.r.t the regime and ideology:
More structured, stronger emphasis on anti-Western and antiliberal stance, Russia's greatness, Soviet leaders being infallible." The intent to have a unified notion of the importance of the state began to outweigh emphasis on diversity.
Authorities more repressive against political opposition.
For two decades, the Presidential Administration conducted a hesitant and cau-tious pursuit of ideational policy that can be defined in three main dimensions.
The PA's three main pursuits of ideational policy are:
his decisions are made through a flexible vision of the world, motivatedby changing circumstances.
Putin bases his decisions on shifting circumstances/needs of the regime.
There is no single Kremlin; there are too many competing ideologies. The Kremlin can't avoid that. It is a collection of what people call "ecosystems."
The common theme or point is what we may define as Putinism.
There is a common theme, a concept, called "Putinism." Not a full-fledged ideology but a "guiding mentality, a personality, and an historical moment." Habits and beliefs geared towards survival that can only be achieved through international power and an uncontested domestic regime.
Law and order trump diversity, etc.
Three schools work to decipher the “nature” of the Putin regime.
Three views of the Putin regime:
Inside such a complex conglomerate, one can identify only two segments thatsometimes play with the fascist repertoire as part of a broader continuum of re-actionary ideologies: the military–industrial complex and the Orthodox realm.
The Orthodoxy and military-industrial compex fllirt with or borrow elements from fascist ideology.
Far from being an im-mobile structure, it has deeply evolved over the past two decades, and has shownan impressive capacity to adapt to new contexts and take on new challenginggeopolitical environments.
The Russian political structure has evolved over time. It hosts a diversity of movements and beliefs.
The war for Donbas has indeedbeen largely a war on and for memory of the Second World War and about whetherRussia should be seen as a liberating or an occupying power.
War for Donbas extremely important in the memory wars
In Moscow’s view, the Second World War began in 1941 with the Nazi inva-sion; in no way can it be backdated to 1939 because this would mean, first, thatthe Soviet Union entered the war as an ally of Germany, and second, that the oc-cupations of parts of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states were acts of war.
Defining the beginning of WWII in such a way that Russia avoids responsibility for occupation.
After this failure, Moscow decided to make explicit its position on Russia’s sta-tus as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. In 2010, the lawmaker KonstantinKosachev proposed a comprehensive set of principles to define once and for allRussia’s (ambivalent) status toward the Soviet Union: as the USSR’s successorstate, the Russian Federation fulfills all its international obligations, but it doesnot recognize any moral responsibility or legal obligation for crimes committedby the Soviet authorities.
Declared that Russia inherits no responsibility for the Soviet Union's crimes.
Moscow hoped to decouple the parallel between Nazism and commu-nism/Stalinism and to build a broad consensus around Nazism as racism.
Moscow tried to conceptually detach Nazism from communism/Stalinism and instead define it as racism.
Russia’s response to these new memories articulated by Central and EasternEu ro pean countries has been twofold: legal and historiographical
Russia is responding to Central and Eastern European countries' role in the memory wars.
In many ways,Ukraine has been applying the same censorship tools as Russia in a mirror gamebetween the two countries that has gone largely unrecognized
Anti-semitism has been rising in Ukraine.
In 2016, the first anniversary of these laws was marked by the initiation of acriminal investigation into attempts by veterans to unfurl a red flag on VictoryDay, and in 2017, Viatrovych stated that displaying the Waffen-SS Division Gali-zien symbols did not fall under the law.46
Criminalizing displays of support for Russia
For the Kyiv authorities, Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist fighting for hiscountry’s independence—first in the 1930s against Poland, then in the early 1940sagainst the Soviet Union
Bandera was rehabilitated as a hero even though he cooperated with Nazi Germany.
In Ukraine, the rehabilitation of collaborationist movements has taken a morewinding route, shifting along with an evolving political stance toward Russia
Collaborationist movements have been coming alive in Ukraine in tandem with a shifting stance on Russia. Two of the biggest insurgent movements were praised as freedom fighters by diaspora Ukrainians.
As Central and Eastern Europe’s new official memories elevate the Soviet Unionto the status of a threat of equal magnitude to Nazi Germany, their virulent anti-Sovietism produces an ambivalent stance toward cases of collaborationism withthe Nazi regime, diminishing the role local authorities and residents played in theHolocaust.
On the other side, in elevating the status of the Soviet Union as a threat, Central and Eastern Europe produce an ambivalent stance towards their own role in collaborationism.
History of negation of the Holocaust.
In 2010, however, the new, pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, changedthe official tone by stating that the Holodomor did not specifically target theUkrainian nation; rather, it was part of the “common tragedy” that affected So-viet peoples.
But then in 2010, there was a pro-Russian president who instead said that the Holodomor was a "common tragedy," not something that was targeted at the Ukrainian people.
But he didn't appeal a certain law, and the Kyiv Court of Appeal found Soviet leaders guilty of genocide.
It was a man-made disaster, but not a genocidespecifically targeting Ukrainians.25 To others, the famine was planned by theKremlin to eliminate the Ukrainian inde pendence movement and should there-fore be classified as genocide, defined by the intention to kill.
Some say that the Kremlin organized the famine to squash the Ukrainian independence movement. So it should be classified as genocide instead.
Ukraine joined this Central and Eastern European chorus after the 2004 Or-ange Revolution, but with a slightly different focus: the Holodomor (or famine)of 1932–1933, which killed an estimated seven to ten million people.
Ukraine's focus in the memory wars is on Holodomor.
These blunt statements encapsulate the meaning of the Sec-ond World War as a currency on the international scene: at stake is the recogni-tion of Russia’s having a legitimate say in European affairs because of the Sovietvictory
It is important for Russia to present itself as an antifascist power that contributed significantly to the defeat of Nazi Germany; that is how it gains recognition on the international scene, as having a legitimate role in European politics.
Memory wars are important as a result.
From the mid-1960s onward, defending the “Russian cause” within state in-stitutions allowed for the structuring of many ideological trends that, in one wayor another, rehabilitated elements of the fascist or national-socialist repertoire
Mid-1960s: "defending the 'Russian cause'" meant that ideological trends shifted, rehabilitated some fascist or nationalist-socialist stuff. Expressed through nostalgia for the tsarist era. Another defense of the "Russian cause" was anti-Semitism. Some, on the other hand, recalled protofascist movements.
More broadly, after de-Stalinization, the Soviet state apparatus and the Com-munist Party discreetly and progressively began to reintegrate elements of thetsarist past into the official culture.
Parts of the tsarist era were brought back into the Soviet state. University spheres etc.
We know, for instance, that LeonidBrezhnev and many members of the Politburo were big fans of Seventeen Momentsof Spring.
Some Nazism spread through Brezhnev and Soviet officials themselves--they loved Seventeen Moments of Spring, it was required viewing, motivated Putin to embark on his career.
The cult of Nazi aesthetics and its fundamentally provocative character in So-viet society was particularly attractive to younger generations.
Nazi aesthetics especially appealed to younger generations. Actual knowledge about the Nazi regime/Nazism wasn't very common among them, though.
The third source of knowledge about fashizm, the most diffuse and the least ideo-logically rooted, comes from the cultural realm, particularly cinema.
Cinema was the least ideologically rooted.
In the majority of cases, however, these symbols served simplyas proud displays of an individual’s or group’s subversive identity and were de-void of any other ideological meaning.
Tattoos and slogans that could have been interpreted as Nazism were often just an expression of an against-the-grain identity or rebellion.
Still, prison culture had some kind of influence on Soviet society.
Nonetheless, as AlekseiPlutser-Samo stated, “many of these anti-communist tattoos actually have no con-nection with political dissidence” and should not be interpreted literally.45 Forinstance, the Nazi swastika was not necessarily a sign of support for some Nazi-related ideology, but rather the symbol of all the antisocials and anarchists whorebelled against the camp authorities and refused to respect the rules and etiquetteof the criminal world.
Swastikas weren't always Nazi symbolism.
Many zeks pro-claimed themselves either fascists or capi talists so as to demonstrate their rejec-tion of the Soviet system.4
Post-1945 labor camp prisons preserved certain Nazi slogans--at least for longer than the Soviets did.
Although Soviet public opinion has been shaped by its rejection of fascism as thenation’s absolute threat, this has existed in parallel with a cryptic fascination withNazi Germany that has gone largely undiscussed.
Anti-fascism is a huge part of public opinion, but there has also developed a "cryptic dascination" with Nazi Germany.
Sources: 1. Nazi propaganda 2. Criminal culture 3. Cinema
During perestroika and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many once-official narratives were challenged and sometimes revised
Perestroika + after the USSR fell challenged some official narratives surrounding the war. Archives were opened, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was recognized, the Holocaust was discussed with official commemorations. Russian govt. acknowledged some Soviet responsibility for the massacre of Polish officers but didn't call it a war crime.
With a few exceptions, the Holocaust was never given the unprece dented sta-tus in Soviet liter a ture that it acquired in the West during the same period.
The Holocaust wasn't treated as a uniquely terrible event as it was by the West. Some attributed this to Stalin's antisemitism, but there are other explanations.
Under Brezhnev, several volumes of documents referring to Jewish suffer-ing were published, and through his novels, the Soviet writer Sergei Smirnov(1915– 1976) helped the broader public learn the degree to which Jews were thecentral victims of Nazism.
Under Brezhnev, literature emerged on the suffering of Jewish people under Nazism. Academic research on Nazism began to get published, although the Holocaust wasn't explicitly called the Holocaust.
Academic discourse on the topic of fascism remained constrained by the ide-ological boundaries of the Soviet regime.
Wasn't a lot of academic discourse on fascism until the 1960s, although there was one encyclopedia that included entries on Hitler, Nazism, and Facism in the 1950s.
After the war, the term fashist continued to have a life of its own in Soviet cul-ture as a very common insult. Enemies of all sorts were labeled fashisty in officialdiscourse—it referred to almost everyone promoting an ideology of aggressiontoward the Soviet Union, from British conservatives to Chinese communists.
Aggressive towards the Soviet Union? Get called a fashist. In official discourse.
Also used in regular language. Dislike someone? Call them a fashist.
As an adjective, fashist was usually paired with one of twonames, okkupanty (occupants) or zakhvachiki (invaders). Fashist was thus an epi-thet associated more with the notion of invasion than with any doctrinal con-tent.
Antifascist art and slogans were propagated during the war. "Fashisty," "Nemtsy," and "Fritsty" were the most popular terms. Then, for the first time, someone equated Germans with fascists.
Fashist became associated with invasion rather than ideology. "Nazi" was generally for more educated audience.
The Soviet apparatus grew concerned not only about the birth of dissidentcultures but also about the younger generation’s growing disillusionment with theregime, which made it more laborious to mobilize society behind the ideologicalgoals promoted by the state.
New social identities and dissident groups thrived during the Brezhnev era. The dissident groups were a concern. So was the young generation's "disillusionment" with the regime and military.
So in the 1970s, there began an era of military-patriotic education for the youth. Celebrating the end of the war seemed to be the most effective and resonant.
In the first twenty years following the end of the war, up until 1965, the Sovietregime took an ambivalent stance on commemorating the war.
Until 1965, Russia didn't really commemorate the war. That changed in the Brezhnev era.
Brezhnev created the image of the victory as a victory for/by the people. Not political.
Commemoration became a symbol of the Soviet Union and the success of its socialist regime.
In the Soviet tradition, as in today’s Russia, the term fashizm does not define a setof abstract principles related to the nature of a political regime and its mass in-doctrination techniques but rather embodies a very concrete enemy of the na-tion: Nazi Germany.
In contemporary + Soviet Russia, "fashizm" isn't very abstract. It is just Nazi Germany. The GPW was an incredibly important moment in Russian history. Russia says it contributed massively to the defeat of NG.
Contribution justifies socialism over capitalism. Created a narrative around a GPW. But some parts of Soviet society appreciated some elements of Nazi culture.
Illiberalism is the only ideology in powerin today’s Russia, that is, the only ideology directly supported by the PresidentialAdministration and the government.
Illiberalism is the only among the three layers that is in power today. Supported by the state.
As these examples illustrate, most academic liter a ture does not integrate thefascism lens into its analysis of Russia’s regime; the accusation of Russia as fascistcomes from the margins of research, from figures who do not belong to politi calscience or who present themselves as public intellectuals. However, because of thesymbolic strength of the accusation and the Western tradition of othering Rus-sia, these voices, while still in the minority, have become particularly vocal.
The author points out a flaw in discourse on fascism: accusations of Russia as fascist come from academics who present themselves as public intellectuals or who aren't political scientists. Calls these the "margins" of research.
Despite being at the margins, because "fascism" has so much power, and the West has a long history of "othering" Russia, these accusations are listened to.
His allieson the Far Right are precisely the politi cal forces that wish to bring an end to thecurrent Eu ro pean order: the European Union.
Again according to Snyder.
But thebook omitted differences between the two totalitarianisms, particularly in the ide-ological reasons for state violence against certain groups, and it neglected to takeinto account the actions of local governments and populations, which had agencyof their own.
A professor and researcher of the Holocaust (Timothy Snyder) compared Putin's Russia with Hitler's Germany. He was very vocal about calling Russia a fascist regime.
The author takes issue with this, says it ignores certain differences between the regimes.
In this book, I definefascism as a metapo liti cal ideology that calls for the total destruction of moder-nity by creating an alternative world based on ancient values reconstructed withviolent means.
The author does not want to place fascism in the more generic term of nationalism. Needs to discuss it as its own ideology.
The author defines fascism as a "metapolitical ideology" that seeks to destroy modernity by creating an alternative world based on ancient values resconstructed with violent means.
Says this definition has an "apocalyptic" element, "destroying to rebuild," which is why it would be reductive to call it an extreme version of nationalism.
The author, as a result, quotes the defintion by Aleksandr A. Galkin. Emphasizes revolution over nationalism. "Rightist-conservative revolutionarism."
In an authoritative 2012 article,he proposes a less jargon-laden and more explicit definition of fascism as “a revo-lutionary form of nationalism which assumes unique ideological, cultural, politi-cal, and organizational expressions according to the circumstances and nationalcontext where it takes shape.”
Griffin brought some consensus around the definition of fascism as an actual ideology.
"A revolutionary form of nationalism which assumes unique, ideological, cultural, political, and organizational expressions according to the circumstances and national context where it takes shape."
Read the quote at the end of the paragraph. Fascism can take on new forms; Italy and Germany aren't the models of fascism that we should look to.
With some exceptions, this subfield ofstudy has been developing outside of any comparative framework, which hascontributed to the idea that Russia shows unique features of “deviance” and arecurring “illness” of radical nationalism, often explained by certain culturalcharacteristics.
There is the notion of a specifically Russian brand of fascism. It became more popular with the 2014 invasion of Ukraine in addition to riding a rising wave of 'Reductio ad Hitlerum' in international political discourse.
Reductio ad Hitlerum is a "tool of character assassination," stemming from the rise of illiberal movements. Russia is seem to be a major source of these.
Accusing illiberal societies of being fascist prevents us from understanding today's Russia and both its transformations and transformations in the West.
Yet the state is gradually becoming the sole custodian ofthat memory, the deployment of which is more and more orchestrated.
Cult of war dying with the death of veterans?
However, unlikein most Western countries, “fascist” concentration camps are not associated withthe Holocaust or Jews, but with the deaths of human beings, the planned destruc-tion of Slavs, and the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Fascism is associated with the death of Slavs, not Jews.
The term fascism remains mostly associated with Nazi Germany(74 percent), followed by Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Poland—those countrieswith which Russia is currently waging memory wars.87
Fascists are other people, the Nazis, the Ukrainians etc, not us.
Russian citizens don't seem to see fascism as an ideology.
The war is interpreted primarily as a struggle for survival rather than a worldconflict against a genocidal ideology.
The war was a struggle for survival, not part of a global conflict against genocide.
The extent of the casualties is no longer attributed to Soviet mismanagementand Stalin’s lack of military preparation (a popular interpretation during pere-stroika) but rather it is now explained by duplicitous German aggression.
The role of Soviet mismanagement in the massive number of casualties is downplayed and instead explained by German aggression. Russia as a victim. Affects how the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is seen.
According to the Levada Center sociologists Lev Gudkov and the late Boris Du-bin, Russian public opinion has increasingly come to describe the Great PatrioticWar in national terms: it is a Rus sian victory more than a Soviet victory.
Public opinion of the GPW has become more national, war's international context losing awareness, large Soviet losses creates link between war and suffering... this paragraph explains different changes in opinion of the GPW.
Lets people view it as their own victory, not the state's--not everyone likes the state or state insitutions.