- Nov 2020
On the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have content that is first-personal.
Is it implied here that,
(0) Concept is like a box which holds Representational Content (A) Experiences can have First Person Representation Content (B) Thoughts can have First Person Representational Content (C) Thoughts are conceptual. (D) Experiences are non-conceptual (E) Having Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious
Therefore (F) Having Non-Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious as well?
After all, self-consciousness is presumably a form of consciousness
Does Self-Consciousness then imply consciousness of ones own thoughts, and consciousness of one's own sensory and non-sensory experiences?
On this account, every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and so, arguably, is an instance of self-consciousness
If you say, "I believe P", it may imply you are conscious that "you believe 'that P'"
But can you believe something that you're not conscious of? Does saying 'I believe P' imply, you're actually conscious of P?
for example, If I say "I believe that "All Cats have 5 legs" could it mean that I am conscious that "All Cats have 5 Legs" or does it mean that I am conscious that I believe "All Cats have 5 Legs". If the later is acceptable, then it is probably valid to say that beliefs, even visibly wrong ones, have self-ascription (self-indicating) property. That is, they indicate I am aware of 'What I believe'.
first-personal thought and language is irreducible to non-first-personal thought and language, and is essential to the explanation of action
Is the author implying that, on a 'Referent' and 'Thought and Language' Grid, 'Referent" ("I" as Subject) as a content of the 'Thought and Language' ("My pants are on fire") calls for action enablement. Whereas 'Referent' ("Smith" as Subject) as content of the 'Thought and Language' ("Smith's pants are on fire") is not self-locating, for being non-first personal thought?
== Two Lines of Thinking == (1) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. (2) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. I am Smith. Therefore, my pants are on fire. Therefore, I should put it out.
== unless, I come to believe 'I = Smith', only then it calls for action. Unless and until, 'Smith' becomes first-personal in the mind, it is unable to self-locate.
Smart had to say that if sensation X is identical to brain process Y then if Y is between my ears and is straight or circular (absurdly to oversimplify) then the sensation X is between my ears and is straight or circular.
If, X = my mind
and, B= my brain
and X == B
then, if my mind X is in brain state B1 at t1 (i.e. acute pain) and your mind, Y is in brain state B2 at t1 (i.e. acute pain) then, B1 = X == Y = B2
then, it follows that B1 == B2 at t1
is it possible for two human being to have exact brain state at say t1?