9 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2020
    1. On the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have content that is first-personal.

      Is it implied here that,

      (0) Concept is like a box which holds Representational Content (A) Experiences can have First Person Representation Content (B) Thoughts can have First Person Representational Content (C) Thoughts are conceptual. (D) Experiences are non-conceptual (E) Having Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious

      Therefore (F) Having Non-Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious as well?

    2. After all, self-consciousness is presumably a form of consciousness

      Does Self-Consciousness then imply consciousness of ones own thoughts, and consciousness of one's own sensory and non-sensory experiences?

    3. On this account, every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and so, arguably, is an instance of self-consciousness

      If you say, "I believe P", it may imply you are conscious that "you believe 'that P'"

      But can you believe something that you're not conscious of? Does saying 'I believe P' imply, you're actually conscious of P?

      for example, If I say "I believe that "All Cats have 5 legs" could it mean that I am conscious that "All Cats have 5 Legs" or does it mean that I am conscious that I believe "All Cats have 5 Legs". If the later is acceptable, then it is probably valid to say that beliefs, even visibly wrong ones, have self-ascription (self-indicating) property. That is, they indicate I am aware of 'What I believe'.

    4. first-personal thought and language is irreducible to non-first-personal thought and language, and is essential to the explanation of action

      Is the author implying that, on a 'Referent' and 'Thought and Language' Grid, 'Referent" ("I" as Subject) as a content of the 'Thought and Language' ("My pants are on fire") calls for action enablement. Whereas 'Referent' ("Smith" as Subject) as content of the 'Thought and Language' ("Smith's pants are on fire") is not self-locating, for being non-first personal thought?

      == Two Lines of Thinking == (1) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. (2) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. I am Smith. Therefore, my pants are on fire. Therefore, I should put it out.

      == unless, I come to believe 'I = Smith', only then it calls for action. Unless and until, 'Smith' becomes first-personal in the mind, it is unable to self-locate.

  2. Oct 2019
    1. “I”, “me”, and “my”

      English terms for self

    2. and increasingly so since the seventeenth century

      focus on self-consciousness increased since 17th century

    3. for the related Hegelian view that various forms of self-consciousness depend on intersubjective recognition

      intersubjective recognition and self-consciousness

  3. May 2019
    1. Flora Hogman conducted a case study of Second and Third-Generation, and in her sample of the grandchildren of Holocaust survivors she noticed that they feel a sense of pride and awe of the survivors. This awareness of the suffering is part of the fabric of their lives, but is channeled into empathy, political activism, greater consciousness of others suffering, and a reluctance to intermarry.
  4. Nov 2015
    1. your focus of attention remains at the point of your Consciousness. This is why you are finding yourself successful.

      When we focus on our Self, our true beingness, it will flow.