16 Matching Annotations
  1. Jan 2022
    1. Simone de Beauvoir said that when she became an atheist, it felt like the world had fallen silent.

      source?

      Is there a link to religion and the connection and potential conversation provided by it that provides an evolutionary advantage? Is there a psychological change in attention or self-consciousness?

  2. Dec 2021
    1. But Wanberg sees no contradiction in fighting gadgets with gadgets. “Can you sit down for three hours and just think about one thing deeply?” he asked me. “Because I can’t. And this device helps me.”

      This feels like it relates to the ideas of extending self-consciousness in dialogue and dialectic from the other day: https://hyp.is/bBIVHmFPEeyvFMtzXQYYWA/docdrop.org/video/EvUzdJSK4x8/

      Is being in dialogue with oneself via their writing or notes an innovation that has moved humanity forward.

    1. the really insidious part about it is not the idea of the noble savage actually there is no noble savage in Russo's 00:54:51 discourse because his state of nature involves creatures which are like humans but actually lack any sort of philosophy at all because what they call do is project their own lives into the 00:55:05 future and imagine themselves in other states they're constantly inventing things and chasing their own tails or rushing headlong for their own chains as he puts it they invent agriculture but 00:55:18 they can't see the consequences they invent cities but they can't see the consequences so we're talking about no imagination

      Rousseau was perfectly describing the intelligence and politics of Donald J. Trump when he described creatures which are like humans, but are "rushing headlong for their own chains". Trump was able to govern, but completely lacked the ability to imagine the consequences of any of his actions.


      Not sure what name Rousseau gave these creatures. Which book was this in? Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men?

    2. there's an exception ah yes indeed there is an exception to that which is largely 00:08:28 when you're talking to someone else so in conversation and in dialogue you're actually can maintain consciousness for very long periods of time well which is why you need to imagine you're talking 00:08:41 to someone else to really be able to think out a problem

      Humans in general have a seven second window of self-consciousness. (What is the reference for this? Double check it.) The exception is when one is in conversation with someone else, and then people have much longer spans of self-consciousness.

      I'm left to wonder if this is a useful fact for writing in the margins in books or into one's notebook, commonplace book, or zettelkasten? By having a conversation with yourself, or more specifically with the imaginary author you're annotating or if you prefer to frame it as a conversation with your zettelkasten, one expands their self-consciousness for much longer periods of time? What benefit does this have for the individual? What benefit for humanity in aggregate?

      Is it this fact or just coincidence that much early philosophy was done as dialectic?

      From an orality perspective, this makes it much more useful to talk to one's surroundings or objects like rocks. Did mnemonic techniques help give rise to our ability to be more self-conscious as a species? Is it like a muscle that we've been slowly and evolutionarily exercising for 250,000 years?

  3. Nov 2021
    1. We report the first neural recording during ecstatic meditations called jhanas and test whether a brain reward system plays a rolein the joy reported. Jhanas are Altered States of Consciousness (ASC) that imply major brain changes based on subjective reports:(1) external awareness dims, (2) internal verbalizations fade, (3) the sense of personal boundaries is altered, (4) attention is highlyfocused on the object of meditation, and (5) joy increases to high levels. The fMRI and EEG results from an experienced meditatorshow changes in brain activity in 11 regions shown to be associated with the subjective reports, and these changes occur promptlyafter jhana is entered. In particular, the extreme joy is associated not only with activation of cortical processes but also with activationof the nucleus accumbens (NAc) in the dopamine/opioid reward system. We test three mechanisms by which the subject mightstimulate his own reward system by external means and reject all three. Taken together, these results demonstrate an apparentlynovel method of self-stimulating a brain reward system using only internal mental processes in a highly trained subject.

      I can find no other research on this particular matter. It would be helpful to have other studies to validate or invalidate this one. This method of reward requires a highly-trained participant and involves no external means.

  4. Oct 2021
    1. Its life out of its center enters into a relationship to it; the reflexive character of the centrally represented body is given to itself. Although the living being on this level is also absorbed in the here/now, lives out of the center, it has become conscious of the centrality of its existence. It has itself; it knows of itself; it notices itself -- and this makes it an I. (pp. 269-70)

      The "I" is born when the living being has become conscious of the centrality of its existence. It notices itself.

    2. The human sphere is defined by a jump from centric positionality to that further level of detachment that uniquely allows for that purchase upon its center that Plessner calls "excentric positionality." The human "I" which is the unique result of excentric positionality becomes the constant companion of human positional positing. It preserves, and inhabits its centered lived body, while also constituting its excentric detachment from its center by way of its reflexive awareness of its posited center.

      Plessner introduces the next level up, the being with excentric positionality, essentially the self-conscious human being.

  5. Nov 2020
    1. On the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have content that is first-personal.

      Is it implied here that,

      (0) Concept is like a box which holds Representational Content (A) Experiences can have First Person Representation Content (B) Thoughts can have First Person Representational Content (C) Thoughts are conceptual. (D) Experiences are non-conceptual (E) Having Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious

      Therefore (F) Having Non-Conceptual First Person Representational Concept implies the subject is self-conscious as well?

    2. After all, self-consciousness is presumably a form of consciousness

      Does Self-Consciousness then imply consciousness of ones own thoughts, and consciousness of one's own sensory and non-sensory experiences?

    3. On this account, every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and so, arguably, is an instance of self-consciousness

      If you say, "I believe P", it may imply you are conscious that "you believe 'that P'"

      But can you believe something that you're not conscious of? Does saying 'I believe P' imply, you're actually conscious of P?

      for example, If I say "I believe that "All Cats have 5 legs" could it mean that I am conscious that "All Cats have 5 Legs" or does it mean that I am conscious that I believe "All Cats have 5 Legs". If the later is acceptable, then it is probably valid to say that beliefs, even visibly wrong ones, have self-ascription (self-indicating) property. That is, they indicate I am aware of 'What I believe'.

    4. first-personal thought and language is irreducible to non-first-personal thought and language, and is essential to the explanation of action

      Is the author implying that, on a 'Referent' and 'Thought and Language' Grid, 'Referent" ("I" as Subject) as a content of the 'Thought and Language' ("My pants are on fire") calls for action enablement. Whereas 'Referent' ("Smith" as Subject) as content of the 'Thought and Language' ("Smith's pants are on fire") is not self-locating, for being non-first personal thought?

      == Two Lines of Thinking == (1) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. (2) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. I am Smith. Therefore, my pants are on fire. Therefore, I should put it out.

      == unless, I come to believe 'I = Smith', only then it calls for action. Unless and until, 'Smith' becomes first-personal in the mind, it is unable to self-locate.

  6. Oct 2019
    1. “I”, “me”, and “my”

      English terms for self

    2. and increasingly so since the seventeenth century

      focus on self-consciousness increased since 17th century

    3. for the related Hegelian view that various forms of self-consciousness depend on intersubjective recognition

      intersubjective recognition and self-consciousness

  7. May 2019
    1. Flora Hogman conducted a case study of Second and Third-Generation, and in her sample of the grandchildren of Holocaust survivors she noticed that they feel a sense of pride and awe of the survivors. This awareness of the suffering is part of the fabric of their lives, but is channeled into empathy, political activism, greater consciousness of others suffering, and a reluctance to intermarry.
  8. Nov 2015
    1. your focus of attention remains at the point of your Consciousness. This is why you are finding yourself successful.

      When we focus on our Self, our true beingness, it will flow.