Reviewer #3 (Public review):
Summary:
This narrative review provides a clear, well-structured, and comprehensive synthesis of intracerebral recording work on the neural correlates of consciousness. It is written in an accessible manner that will be useful to a broad community of researchers, from those new to iEEG to specialists in the field.
Strengths:
The manuscript successfully integrates methodological and theoretical perspectives and offers a balanced overview of current sometimes contradicting evidence. As such, the manuscript is important as call for a concernted better exploration of NCCs using iEEG in the future.
Weaknesses:
The manuscript discusses extensively the use of "report" as a criterion for identifying conscious perception and its limitations for separating between correlates of consciousness and post consciousness processes, yet the term is not defined at the outset. The authors should specify what they mean by "report" (e.g., verbal report, nonverbal self-report, or any meta-cognitive indication of experience). Importantly, this definition should be explicitly linked to the theoretical landscape: whether the authors adopt an access-consciousness perspective in which (self) reportability is central, or whether the review also aims to address phenomenal consciousness. Making this conceptual grounding explicit at the beginning will help readers interpret the empirical work surveyed throughout the review.
In addition, the review would benefit from an earlier introduction of the distinction between states and contents of consciousness. This distinction becomes important in the later section on anesthesia, sleep, and epileptic seizures, where the focus shifts from content-specific NCCs to alterations in global states. Presenting these definitions upfront, and briefly explaining how states and contents interact, would strengthen the coherence of the manuscript.
Overall, this is an excellent and timely review. With clearer initial theoretical definitions of consciousness, the manuscript will offer an even stronger conceptual framework for interpreting intracerebral studies of consciousness.
Comments on revised version:
The current version of the manuscript is clear and complete. Kudos to the authors for their thorough revisions.
My only remaining point concerns the definition of "report": "We define a report as any explicit behavioral response (whether verbal, manual, or otherwise) that communicates a participant's subjective state."
It would be helpful to clarify whether this definition is intended to exclude purely internal, explicit self-reports that are not externally expressed. As currently formulated, the definition appears to require overt behavioral communication. However, this raises a conceptual issue in relation to the no-report paradigm literature, where the distinction between report, metacognitive access, and overt motor/verbal expression is precisely at stake.
Could the authors specify whether "report" is meant to (i) be restricted to externally observable, behaviorally expressed reports, or (ii) extend to internally generated, explicit metacognitive judgments even when they are not communicated? Clarifying this point would help situate the manuscript more precisely within ongoing debates on the role of report in identifying neural correlates of consciousness.