Technique is necessary to the art of thought—to thought in the act—but it is not art in itself. Elsewhere, I have proposed that technicity may be one way to talk about what art can do in its outdoing of technique (Manning, 2013).

but fi rst a kind of hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to know what it feels like to believe in his [or her] theories, and only then a revival of the critical attitude, which should resemble, as far as possible, the state of mind of a person abandoning opinions which he has hitherto held”

art—defi ned as “the way,” “the manner”—locating art not at the level of the fi nished object but in its trajectory (s

agenc

The virtual is never the opposite of the actual—it is how the actual resonates beyond the limits of its actualization. It is the red-ness and warmth in the foregoing example.

as-yet-unthought within thought itself.

defi nition of process for Whitehead: the nuanced interplay between potential and activity, between the in-act of the occasion of experience and the fl ow of its relational interplay.

defi nition of process for Whitehead: the nuanced interplay between potential and activity, between the in-act of the occasion of experience and the fl ow of its relational interplay.

To reorient the question of knowledge away from the idea of subject/object is to rethink the place of matter within experience. It is to challenge the idea that what is not known as such is not knowable, emphasizing that knowability may take us off the path of the methodological disciplinary account of experience, propelling us into the midst.

To reorient the question of knowledge away from the idea of subject/object is to rethink the place of matter within experience. It is to challenge the idea that what is not known as such is not knowable, emphasizing that knowability may take us off the path of the methodological disciplinary account of experience, propelling us into the midst.

In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real” (1996, p. 160). To

The challenge of radical empiricism is that it begins in the midst, in the mess of relations not yet organized into terms such as “subject” and “object.” James calls this fi eld of relations “pure experience,” pure under-stood not in the sense of “purity” but in the sense of immanent to actual relations.

This will mean opening thought beyond its articulation in language towards “the movement of thought,” 4engaging it at the immanent limit where it is still fully in the act.

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