On 2015 Dec 28, Lydia Maniatis commented:
Part 2. THE HYPOTHESIS IS LAMARCKIAN The hypothesis does not appear consistent with the principles of evolution on the basis of natural selection. Unless I misunderstand, it seems to require not only that stimulus frequency information be accumulated throughout the lifetime of each organism, but also that this knowledge be passed on genetically - which is a form of Lamarckism. Natural selection doesn't work that way – mutations are random, lucky shots in the dark, not the result of accumulated, recorded luminance or responses to luminance – experience only comes into play after the fact, in the sense that if they happen to be adaptive, they undergo positive selection.
In addition, the hypothesis would seem to predict that populations living in highly different environments - one living, for example, in the arctic, the other in the dark jungle – would have different lightness codes. But even fish, for example, appear to possess color perception mechanisms similar to that of humans.
There is also a more subtle problem with the proposal; it purports to explain the production of particular qualia (light, dark) but doesn't actually doesn't touch on this problem at all. The luminance/lightness connection proposed is physically arbitrary, an accident of experience. Why should there be adaptive pressure to code physical conditions on the basis of the chance frequency with which they are encountered, rather than on the basis of features and factors directly relevant to survival and reproduction (a rare event might have more powerful effects)?
THE HYPOTHESIS IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT AND LEAVES MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED The hypothesis proposes to explain why two surfaces of equal luminance, in a very limited number and type of displays, produce slightly different percepts; it does not try to explain the quite regular, in many contexts, relationship between luminance and lightness, specifically that the latter rises of falls with the other under certain describable conditions (when the structure of the pattern indicates an area under homogeneous illumination). In other words, although it is the case that the two equal target luminances in the simultaneous contrast demo differ in appearance, it is also the case that continuously increasing the luminance of either one will cause a continuous increase in its lightness. Thus, the hypothesis implies that, for any given context, the frequency of the target/context combination increases with increasing luminance of the target.
The authors seem to realize this when they state that: “by definition, the percentile of target luminance for the lowest luminance value within any contextual light pattern is 0% and corresponds to the perception of maximum darkness, the percentile for the highest luminance ...is 100% [?] and corresponds to the maximum perceivable brightness.” But they seem to be confusing prediction, definition and fact. We know as a matter of FACT – from empirical experience, not definition, not hypothesis - that increasing luminance of a patch in any given setting tends to increase its lightness. But this is not a logical implication of the frequency hypothesis (and certainly not an a priori “definition.”) Even assuming it is possible, methodologically, to show that the “percentiles” coincide with this straightforward luminance/lightness relationship, the “frequency hypothesis,” lacking any discernible rationale, would not seem to possess a logical advantage over the hypothesis that there is simply an adaptive value to a regular coding of lightness and relative luminance, i.e. to coding higher luminance with higher lightness values, with corrections for the sake of accurately separating perception of surfaces and perception of apparent illumination. The authors seem to imply that their proposal is superior to such accounts because it does not require a direct relationship between luminance and lightness – but no serious alternative could require any such thing.
Given that the fairly straightforward within -context luminance/lightness relationship, the hypothesis reduces to the idea that a change in the luminance of the background of a target can change the range of the target lightness values arising in perception. Why should this be? If the entire range for a “context” is shifted upwards, for example, should we assume that that context has a higher percentile than the lower-range-producing context, and that, again, the correspondingly regular luminance/lightness relationship within that range is a coincidence of frequency? And, finally, why does the frequency argument not apply to the apparent lightness of the background? Or does it? In this case, what happens if a low-frequency target/context combination occurs on a high-frequency context? Would the frequency of a single-luminance context equal the frequency of that luminance? Do some luminances occur more frequently than others? Or would we have to evaluate the frequency of each “context” given its own various possible contexts? And what about the fact that a more global changes are known to be able to affect local lightness (rendering any particular cut-off of “context” arbitrary and uninformative).
WHAT DOES IT MEAN THAT THE PROJECTION HAS “HIGHLY-STRUCTURED STATISTICS?” The authors make a mystifying claim about the nature of the retinal projection. We are told that it consists of 2D patterns of light intensity with “highly structured statistics.” What does this mean? How can one collect and evaluate the “structured statistics” in the pattern?
One thing is certain – the pattern of light intensities in the projection is wholly unpredictable, as is the pattern of light intensities in the environment. The light reflected to the eye depends on both the characteristics of surfaces and on the light falling on them. Both change from location to location, but the latter is also unstable within locales, shadows depending on chance locations and orientations of objects, on their shapes and relative locations, the location of the sun, the presence of clouds, etc. Given that the order of the shapes, and the shapes appearing with any given glance, is also unpredictable, it is difficult to see what the authors are talking about when they refer to “highly structured statistics.” They need to explain what they mean.
Methodological problems LACK OF TESTABILITY Even if we ignore the logical, practical and theoretical problems with the hypothesis, it seems impossible to test. Even if our sole interest were the classic simultaneous contrast illusion, and even if such configurations appeared as such in nature (which they do not), how could we develop a database for which frequencies of any target luminance on any background luminance (let alone all of them) falling on the retinas of all of the individuals forming the lineage of our species (until the process is supposed to have stopped (see above)), across all of the days and environments traversed, morning, noon and night, in the sea and on the land? The hypothesis does not entail any principled relationship between luminance and lightness, unless this relationship were in turn entailed by the luminance/frequency relationship for all possible contexts; thus, it is not clear what the criteria might be for obtaining a valid sample for testing. As it is, the notion has not been properly tested even for the narrow framing of this article, because the methods for choosing samples (the details of which are relegated to supplementary, online material) is too vague, arbitrary and opaque at key points to allow any attempts at replication.
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