2 Matching Annotations
- Sep 2023
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www.frontiersin.org www.frontiersin.org
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- for: nonduality, non-duality, duality, dualism, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, relativistic theory of consciousness, human INTERbeing, human INTERbeCOMing, Deep Humanity, DH
- title: A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness
- author: Nir Lahav, Zahariah A. Neemeh
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date: May 12, 2022
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abstract
- In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon.
- Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect.
- There is an “explanatory gap” between
- our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and
- its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects,
- referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness.
- The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and
- it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation.
- Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness.
- Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties.
- We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer.
- We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which
- a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer.
- Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic.
- In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and
- in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective).
- These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct,
- just as in the case of
- an observer that claims to be at rest
- while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity.
- just as in the case of
- Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged,
- as they both describe the same underlying reality.
- Based on relativistic phenomena in physics
- we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem.
- Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness,
- we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
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comment
- This is a promising approach to solving the hard problem of consciosness
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Phenomenal consciousness is only seemingly private because in order to measure it one needs to be in the appropriate cognitive frame of reference. It is not a simple transformation to change from a third-person cognitive frame of reference to the first-person frame, but in principle it can be done, and hence phenomenal consciousness isn’t private anymore.
- for: relativistic theory of consciousness, question, question - shifting cognitive frames
- question
- How is this transformation done?
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