14 Matching Annotations
  1. Dec 2023
    1. softness is not the kind of thing that's generated in my brain okay 00:06:36 softness is a word that describes how I am currently interacting with a sponge it's a mistake to go looking in the brain to understand why I feel it is soft rather than hard because it lies in 00:06:48 what I'm doing and the same for these other accompanying fields thinking this way about softness is a way of escaping from the explanatory Gap 00:07:01 because it it's a way of escaping from the idea that we need to find a brain mechanism that's generating the softness
      • for: hard problem of consciousness - sensory motor theory, explanatory gap
    2. there may be a little bit of a mystery is in the quality of the redness of red or in this case the quality of the felt softness and this is where 00:04:56 sensory motor theory has an original contribution
      • for: hard problem of consciousness - sensory motor theory
  2. Nov 2023
    1. Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be muchless interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless
      • for: quote - consciousness, quote - mind body problem, quote - hard problem of consciousness, quote - Thomas Nagel

      • quote

        • Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless.
      • comment

        • consciousness is primordial and
        • stable, observable patterns that emerge in our field of consciousness is also primordial
        • the primordiality of these two, awareness and stability of observable patterns WITHIN awareness itself, are the two pillars that constitute the mind-body problem
        • in particular, the pattern of "other consciousnesses" is also another pattern that arises from within consciousness itself
        • The brain is a construction, a synthesized idea that emerges out of a dynamic amalgamation of countless accumulated patterns
        • In this respect, it is no different in quality than other complex constructed ideas we humans create, it only differs by degree and by kind
        • Were we to purely sense a human brain, for instance when a surgeon opens the skull in an operation, without the vast associative network of ideas associated with it, could we even consider how brain and mind are connected except in the most naive way?
        • Language is deeply encoded in every culturally conditioned modern human. Then advanced education in a specific field of knowledge encodes even more esoteric and deeper types of language conditioning.
        • Husserl's idea of phenomenological reduction, or epoche taken to its logical conclusion results in an impossible task, for we cannot severe the deeply entangled nature of meaning that our entire lives of cultural conditioning has enculturated into us.
        • The symbolosphere is now a part of us. We cannot undo such deep conditioning easily. You cannot simply dissociate meaning from the letters and words of your native and learned languages. Indeed, it is this deep symbolic conditioning that spans the decades of our childhood and adolescence that allows us to observe a symbol and effortlessly associate meaning to it.
        • Epoche, no matter how carefully crafted cannot uncondition such deep conditioning
        • It can, however, give us insight of the unconditioned from the perspective of the conditioned consciousness
        • We cannot become feral people even if we wanted to, nor, I suspect, would we want to experience reality permanently in that state
        • This brings up the question of what the process of spiritual enlightenment is designed to achieve
        • Is it a temporary suspension, an incomplete epoche that provides us with sufficient insight to lead to some kind of permanent shift where the insight stays with us and affects our lives in a beneficial way?


  3. Sep 2023
    1. i find it very hard to imagine if we if somebody claimed to have a a good theory of consciousness and i 00:29:43 were to ask them okay well what is the prediction of your theory in this particular case i don't know what the format of the answer looks like because numbers and the typical things we get don't do the trick they you know they're sort of third person descriptions
      • comment
        • Michael does not know what the format of the answer to the hard problem would be
        • Attempting to explain the experience of consciousness begs the question
          • what is explanation?
        • The explanation often attempts to rely on measurable 3rd party observations and the scientific theories and models behind those observations
        • However, as Michel Bitbol points out, the models themselves emerge from the same awareness of consciousness
        • In spiritual teachings, it is often claimed that the observer is actually an expression of the universe that see's itself
        • Seeing itself - what does this mean in scientific terms? Could it mean resonance, like the kind used by musicians to tune string instruments like guitars?
        • Do all the patterns that we sense become sensible precisely because they are all an intrinsic part of us, and vice versa?
    2. as andy clark puts it quite succinctly is why do we spend so much time puzzling about why we are aware
      • paraphrase
        • Karl Friston takes Andy Clark's perspective
          • the real problem is a meta problem
            • why do we spend so much time trying to make sense of our sense-making?
        • Karl talks about futures and different pathways to the futures
        • Humans seem to have this unique property to plan futures, some of which are counter-factual
    3. what do you think about the so-called hard problem is there in fact a hard problem
      • for: hard problem of consciousness
    1. we were once just physics all 00:02:27 of us were not just in an evolutionary sense but really in a developmental sense and you can watch it happen in front of your eyes so from that perspective i think developmental biology is is uh you know it's why i switched from doing computation in in sort of silicon medium to computation 00:02:40 and living media but i am fundamentally interested not just in questions of cells and why they do things but in morphogenesis or or pattern formation as an example of the appearance of mind from matter that's really right to me developmental biology is the most 00:02:53 magical process there is because it literally in front of your eyes takes you from from matter to mind you can see it happen
      • for: question, question - hard problem of consciousness, question - Micheal Levin - Michel Bitbol

      • question

        • What would Michel Bitbol think of what Michael Levin claims here?
        • What does Michel Bitbol think about Michael Levin's research and the hard problem of consciousness?
    1. In order to solve this paradox, we need to explain two aspects of consciousness: How there could be natural phenomena that are private and thus independent of physical processes (or how come they seem private), and what the exact relationship between cognitive content and phenomenal consciousness is.
      • for: key question, key question - hard problem of consciousness
      • key questions
        • how could there be natural phenomena that are private and thus independent of physical processes
          • or how come they seem private?
        • what is the exact relationship between cognitive content and phenomenal consciousness?
      • for: nonduality, non-duality, duality, dualism, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, relativistic theory of consciousness, human INTERbeing, human INTERbeCOMing, Deep Humanity, DH
      • title: A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness
      • author: Nir Lahav, Zahariah A. Neemeh
      • date: May 12, 2022

      • abstract

        • In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon.
        • Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect.
        • There is an “explanatory gap” between
          • our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and
          • its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects,
        • referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness.
        • The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and
          • it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation.
        • Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness.
        • Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties.
        • We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer.
        • We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which
          • a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer.
        • Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic.
          • In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and
          • in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective).
        • These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct,
          • just as in the case of
            • an observer that claims to be at rest
            • while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity.
        • Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged,
          • as they both describe the same underlying reality.
        • Based on relativistic phenomena in physics
          • we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem.
        • Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness,
          • we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
      • comment

        • This is a promising approach to solving the hard problem of consciosness
  4. Nov 2021
  5. Oct 2021
    1. Both more fundamental than the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and more expansive in scope, the problem of integration/unification is also central to the problem of the origin(s) of life.

      Could anthropological and philosophical linguistics be included in this trans-disciplinary analysis? I think language also plays a central role, as we are already sophisticated language users by the time we consider the possibility of raising this kind of question.

    2. Granted, how a natural entity can have interiority, i.e., subjectivity, is a hard problem, but if the question of integration and unification is not identical to the “Hard Problem of Consciousness” (Chalmers 1995) it is also inseparable from it and surely a presupposition of the very possibility of interiority. Nor would even an understanding of how subjectivity could be resident to a single cell tell us how consciousness could become an integrated unity across many cells. If we assume consciousness is a physically based phenomenon, and that it draws upon the activity of various parts of the brain, let alone constituent cells, then we must face our deficits in understanding how the experience of a unified consciousness is realized at the level of an integration of some cells but not others albeit in the absence of evident, non-arbitrary, physical boundaries.

      This is a very salient point. The experience of consciousness of a (multicellular) human being is the experience of a biological superorganism. While normativity may apply to the both single and multi-cellular beings by extension, we cannot infer from that alone that our experience of consciousness has an analog at the cellular level.

    1. For Plessner, the living boundary is both a liminal zone that mediates between organism and the outer medium, itself being neither, and yet also an enactively self-defining and enforcing circumference and outer-limit. The organism moves outward in the expansion and assimilation of its liminal zone and moves inward, taking the outer within, re-establishing itself and reasserting its perimeter. The living boundary already introduces a subject-object status that prefigures for Plessner the overcoming of dualisms between inner and outer, interiority and exteriority. The living boundary is an on-going enactment of an exteriority that it defines and yet also reaches into and assimilates and of an interiority that is both sustained and transformed. The motive force of the dynamic living state is this double aspectivity of its existence and the dialectical tension which drives it forward.

      Plessner defines the interiority and exteriority condition of a living organism, giving a biological context for the hard problem of consciousness.