4 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2021
    1. For Plessner, the living boundary is both a liminal zone that mediates between organism and the outer medium, itself being neither, and yet also an enactively self-defining and enforcing circumference and outer-limit. The organism moves outward in the expansion and assimilation of its liminal zone and moves inward, taking the outer within, re-establishing itself and reasserting its perimeter. The living boundary already introduces a subject-object status that prefigures for Plessner the overcoming of dualisms between inner and outer, interiority and exteriority. The living boundary is an on-going enactment of an exteriority that it defines and yet also reaches into and assimilates and of an interiority that is both sustained and transformed. The motive force of the dynamic living state is this double aspectivity of its existence and the dialectical tension which drives it forward.

      Plessner defines the interiority and exteriority condition of a living organism, giving a biological context for the hard problem of consciousness.

  2. Jan 2019
    1. The notion of agential separability is of fundamentalimportance, for in the absence of a classical ontological condition of ex-teriority between observer and observed it provides the condition for thepossibility of objectivity.

      I believe this is important, but I'm not sure I understand it. While the Cartesian cut happens before the relation, because relata are ontologically prior and independent of relations, the agential cut happens within the relation, distinguishing subject and object locally, but not ontologically.

      Oh ok ok, and because those relata are then separable, exteriority-within-phenomena happens. Essentially, because the relata can be seen as separate objects within the relation, objectivity is still possible; relativism is not a necessary result.

  3. Apr 2017
    1. a personal computer to a server or onto theInternet. File distribution is the point of conjuncture between organismand machine and marks a technology of the self that does not begin withthe individual interior subject but rather with what Doyle calls “inhumanexteriority”

      I feel like there is something to be said about the Cloud ("the Cloud is just somebody else's computer") that could be said to expand on this point and develop it a bit further, but I don't know enough about the Cloud and file sharing to articulate what that might be . . .

  4. May 2015
    1. with the

      So Aristotle is saying that the flesh of the body is not the organ that perceives touch, but like a shield which covers the body, something inside of which perceives touch. An interesting bid to fix interiority and exteriority as opposite things.