7 Matching Annotations
  1. Sep 2023
  2. Apr 2023
    1. Practical reasoning is a goal-directed sequence of linked practical inferencesthat seeks out a prudent line of conduct for an agent in a set of particular circumstances known by the agent. Where a is an agent, A is an action, and G a goal, thetwo basic types of practical inferences are respectively, the necessary conditionscheme and the sufficient condition scheme (Walton, Pract. Reas., 1 990; see alsoSchellens, 1 987).G is a goal for aDoing A is necessary for a to carry out GTherefore, a ought to do AG is a goal for aDoing A is sufficient for a to carry out GTherefore, a ought to do A
      • Goal Directed sequence
      • Agent Awareness
      • Act may be sufficient or necessary for Goal. *Therefore, Agent carries Act out
      • Required to Understand the Qualification Weight of Act is it necessary or sufficient?
    2. Clearly this type of reasoning has an argumentation scheme. One premisedefines or describes a goal. The other premise describes a means of achieving thegoal. The conclusion directs the agent towards action to carry out the means.6But this type of reasoning is so common and distinctive, having manyvariants and subspecies of argumentation, that it is misleading to call it anargumentation scheme. Better to call it a type of reasoning that can be used inargumentation in different types of dialogue (as in Walton, What Reas., 1990).
      • Agential Network
      • Case and Inferential Qualifications
      • Conclusions and Goal Relations
      • Normative Framework
  3. Feb 2019
    1. Wise men induce this condition in themselves by an act of volition.

      So Vico's definition and practice of rhetoric allows for one's self to be both the agent and subject of eloquence. Interesting.

  4. Jan 2019
    1. summary,

      super helpful summary. Commenting just to tag it.

    2. The notion of agential separability is of fundamentalimportance, for in the absence of a classical ontological condition of ex-teriority between observer and observed it provides the condition for thepossibility of objectivity.

      I believe this is important, but I'm not sure I understand it. While the Cartesian cut happens before the relation, because relata are ontologically prior and independent of relations, the agential cut happens within the relation, distinguishing subject and object locally, but not ontologically.

      Oh ok ok, and because those relata are then separable, exteriority-within-phenomena happens. Essentially, because the relata can be seen as separate objects within the relation, objectivity is still possible; relativism is not a necessary result.