A well-de- veloped color, then, appears to partake of the "body" metaphor more than of the "painting" metaphor, for it is an integrated, unitary, natural- seeming part of the argument that persuades by its appearance of truth (lnst. 11.1.58-59), while a speech whose co/ores are discernibly "added-on" and not integrated fails to persuade

A well-de- veloped color, then, appears to partake of the "body" metaphor more than of the "painting" metaphor, for it is an integrated, unitary, natural- seeming part of the argument that persuades by its appearance of truth (lnst. 11.1.58-59), while a speech whose co/ores are discernibly "added-on" and not integrated fails to persuade

A common color for one side makes the brothers enemies

color as overtly added on, artificial, and ornamental, while the body metaphor usu- ally presents it as (seemingly) inherent, natural, and essential-sometimes in contrast to fucus, "dye" or "makeup," that is applied on the surface

While colors are brighter and give more immediate plea- sure in new paintings than old, in excess these can cause satiety, causing us to turn back to the faded austerity of older paintings.

for Engl is h ‘ sen se ’ (like Old Fren ch sen s ) is used for the w h ole h u m a n com plex o f tho ug ht, feeli ng, a nd perception, that kind of k no w ledge w h ich i s based in se nsor y e xperience

all the senses can be reduced to touch because of the atomic films touching the eye.

The snail's vein was removed, mixed with salt, and boiled until most of the flesh had been deposited. Varying the mixtures and boiling times produced different shades of colour.

flag up associations with flowers and femininity

exposed the limitations of assuming that colour is straightfor- wardly a visual phenomenon

the ancients were sensitive primarily to such things as luminosity, saturation and texture, or even less obvious variables such as smell, agitation and liquidity.

effeminate Roman noblemen in Ciceronian invective

We can conceive a colour as something detached from the people, objects and landscapes it coloured: we can picture "yellow" in our minds and transfer it straightforwardly

Russian has two distinct terms for our colour blue;

giant synaesthetic experience mobilizing sight, sounds, smells and touch in order to gain a full and complete appreciation of the spectacle

colour as an object-centred

moments because they invite occasions and actions for reconfiguring our associationallives. My ambition in these pages is to examine the forces of interruption and reconfiguration that, I argue, comprise the aesthetico-political dimensions of democratic life.

In short, our ability to generate story lines determines our representational skills as well as our specific capacities for making sense of the heterology of political life.

The aesthetic and political concerns that motivate my inquiries stem from what I take to be a notable fact of pluralist democratic societies: namely, that individuals or groups in these societies attend to one another at the level of appearances.

what I will variously call disarticulation or disfiguration

At first, then, let us speak s if being affected, being moved and being active are the same thing.

here is then a way in which things are affected by their like and a way in which they are affected by their unlike, as we said. 5 3

oo would be spoken of in two ways, both as in potentiality and as in activity. And in the same way the sense-object too .., will be s17ken of both as being in pote~ and as being ~y.

But it is clear that the perceptive faculty is not in activity, but only in potentiality and for that reason does not perceive on its own, just as the combustible thing is not burnt in itself without the thing that burns

glancing, glimpsing, scanning, surveying, and other forms of casual or disinterested looking, staring

we will all be- come disabled if we live long enough

To look at the way we look at disability, this essay proposes a taxonomy of four primary visual rhetorics of disability: the wondrous, the sentimental, the exotic, and the realistic

Modernity, as many scholars have shown, is ocularcentric. 8 The very devel- opment of photography in 1839 and its rapid flourishing thereafter testify to this urgent primacy of the visual. As Roland Barthes claims despairingly in his meditation on photography, "One of the marks of our world is [that] we live according to a generalized image repertoire." 9 In modernity, the image mediates not only our desires but who we imagine ourselves to be. In- deed, Alan Trachtenberg argues that photography has made us see ourselves as images. 10 Among the myriad, often conflicting and never disinterested im- ages modernity offers us, the picture of ourselves as disabled is an image fraught with a tangle of anxiety, distance, and identification.

Imagining disability as ordinary, as the typical rather the atypical human experience,

Rather, what concerns me is the symbolism by which populations and individuals are established as need- ing help, as being inferior, and the role played by disability in that sym- bolism, because it has a long history of being placed in the service of dis- crimination, inequality, and violence. What I am calling the aesthetics of human disqualification focuses on how ideas about appearance contrib- ute to these and other forms of oppression. My claim is that this symbol- ism depends on aesthetic representations that require further clarification

the act of proposing that communities forget select aspects of their institutional memory directs public attention to the question of what those communities have remem- bered, according to which rhetorical forms and limitations, and in accord with whose interests

digital memory systems radically augment the scope and dura- tion of personal ritemory far beyond the lifespan of the person in question

monument

Forgetting allows such monstrous crimes to exist in the absence of moral response and thereby compounds their destruction

Forgetting is psychologically unhealthy: it leads to repression,

Things like how you don't pick your passions, they pick you

How has culture developed technologies to extend and enhance the senses, cre- ating an “exosomatic” array of devices that compensate for the limits of our crea- turely nature?

armor

However much a boundary, it is always a permeable membrane between self and other.

warns us against equating changes in scientific understanding of a sense such as smell, what is called “osmology,” with experiential transformations. Attending to the history of smell, he tells us, is also valuable in undermining simple binary oppositions between boundaried individuals and their englobing environ- ment, the basis of Cartesian subject/object dualisms. Instead, it helps situate us in a more fluid, immersive context, where such stark oppositions are understood as themselves contingent rather than necessary

our lack of hardwired patterns of behavior

Indeed, we have come to acknowledge the mediation of the two in such a way that it has become increasingly difficult to isolate one entirely from the other. Meaning comes to a great extent through the senses, while the senses filter the world through the prior cultural meanings in which we are immersed. It is not for nothing that the Greeks could employ “common sense” ( koina aisthe
tika , which in Latin became sensus communis ) as a synonym both for doxa , or common opinion, and for the faculty that allows the different senses to subsume a singular object under universal categories

too highly developed olfactory sensibility, then perceived as a symptom of hysterical hyperesthesia

the sailor had essentially lost the sharpness of his senses; he had become an insensitive being

frequently attracted people who felt frustrated, suffocated by their family, and lacking other means of self-expression than private writing. This explains the over representation of women and homosexuals within the ranks of the diarists

just when the outlines of the social order were becoming blurred. Smell, in particular, the sense of transitions (Howes 1987), of thresholds and margins, which reveals the processes by which beings and things are transformed, fascinated at this period of confusion, whilst the sense of sight was no longer able to read the hierarchies with the same assurance

There is no better source for anyone who seeks to understand the historicity of the affective mechanisms, to discover the configuration and functioning of the systems of emotions, or discern the ways in which the senses were educated and employed

The member of the mob, right at the heart of the confusion, who participates in the killing, in its acts and its cries, and who receives its sounds and smells in the liberation of the Dionysiac impulses of the crowd, does not visually analyse the picture; unlike the spectator, he experiences the events through the senses 'of proximity' -touch and smell - but he could not describe the spoliation of bodies and scenes of horror, which he does not experience in this way (Corbin [1990] 1992). The pathetic, so common at the end of the eighteenth century, like the picturesque, implies a mechanics of the gaze and the use of a socially restricted sensory hierarchy

to research ‘sensory perception and reception’ requires methods that ‘are capable of grasping “the most profound type of knowledge [which] is not spoken of at all and thus inaccessible to ethnographic observation or interview” (Bloch 1998: 46)’ (Bendix 2000: 41). Thus sensory ethnography discussed in the book does not privilege any one type of data or research method. Rather, it is open to multiple ways of knowing and to the exploration of and reflection on new routes to knowledge.

iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing on a family of methods,

The models criticized earlier do not need to be trashed. They are not just plain wrong. It's just that their sphere of applicability must be recognized as limited to a particular mode of exis­ tence, or a particular dimension of the real (the degree to which things coincide with their own arrest).

Thus it allows academics to harness the sensory knowing of ethnographic experience to contribute to existing scholarship.

By a ‘sensory ethnography’ I mean a process of doing ethnography that accounts for how this multisensoriality is integral both to the lives of people who participate in our research and to how we ethnographers practise our craft

This piece has been taken up in scholarship treating a range of popular culture phenomena, and interesting is how their version of “ feminine style ” depends on Keillor ’ s enlisting of multiple senses, which, Foss and Foss argue, collapses distance and creates a nearness

generally thrown into violent action

is there a useful distinction between sensation and affect?

capacity of words to activate the senses

idea of the sensorium refuses to separate the senses, to cordon them off into a “ subfield ” (e.g., visual studies or sound studies

Does the listener remember the smell of new-mown hay at daybreak? Can he recapture the fragrance of the lilac hedge past which he trudged when as a youngster he attended grade school

Pain, too, might be called a movement of the soul, but instead of collecting and trganizing perceptions, thus inducing a feeling of well-being, it disrupts and distracts or focuses all sensation on what is alien to the natural state of the organism

they compel us to relinquish our at- tachments and acknowledge that our subjectivities are inconsistent and open to repetitions of articulation

Starers gawk with abandon at the prosthetic hook, the empty sleeve, the scarred flesh, the unfocused eye, the twitching limb,

A visible signifier of disability-that is, the physical impairment-is always apparent in photographic images. In representing disability, the visu- alization of impairment, never the functional experience of it, defines the category of disability. In this sense, disability exists for the viewer to recog- nize and contemplate, not to express the effect it has on the person with a disability.

e stories cross generational, regional, class and gender lines to convey the larger meaning of racism so that the interviewer would get some sense of how it fe

pleasure and pain

Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening.

microperception

The feeling of having a feeling is what Lcibniz called thc " perccption of perception."

The emptiness or in-betweenness filled by experience is the incorporeal dimension of the body referred to earlier.

It is necessary to theorize a l/aturc-clIllllre COI/­ li llllll lll

Conditions of emergence arc one with becoming.

Far from regaining a concreteness, to think the body in movement thus means ac(;epting the paradox that there is an incorporeal dimension of the body.

The focus on the systemic had 10 be brought back down to earth in order 10 be able to integrate into the account the local cultural diff erences and the practices of resistance they may harbor.

'rbe concepts appear and reappellT like II revolving cast of characters, joining forces or interfer ing with each other in a tumble of abstract intrigues-at rimes (I admit) barely controlled

repression docs not apply

Rather, it is a question of dosage

Critical thinking disavows its own inventiveness as much as possible.

Habit is an acquired automatic self-r egulation. It resides in the flesh

without qualitatively changing enough to warrant a new name

The concept of nature concerns modification not essence

We arc looking at only one dimension of reality

it hits the target.

Gridlock

sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by the feeling of having a fe eling. It is self-refere ntial. This is not necessarily the same as "sc1f-reAexive.

possible endpoints. The Rigln of the arrow is not immobilized as Zeno would have it. We stop it in thought when we construe its movement lO be divisible into positions

movement as qualitative transformation

grid

But since all likeness and relationship is IJieasurable to an individual, necessarily all are more or less lovers of themselves

habits [are pleasurable]; for the habitual has already become, as it were, natural; for habit is something like nature

with the

plants

harking', the second 'sounding

Other attachments matter for rhetoric

a feminine speaking style

Sensation alone is meaningless

stirred air stirs meaning

the language of electricity — stimulant, reactor, and voltage

expression

The term rarely appears in the plural, it just seems to expand from individual to collective, like breath

The orator has little use for an imaginative world three inches in diameter. His world must be twenty feet in diameter and must include every atom of his own

Aesth ē sis

“ An aesthetic rhetoric counts on, attends to, and takes into account the body and its senses; an epistemic rhetoric tries to bypass them but cannot.

be disseminated digitally

peripatetic video

extradiegetic sense experience

might represent olfactory experiences, let alone reproduce them

n the head and the body, in the way of listening

rising steam or smoke evokes smells of fire, incense, or cooking

Reading experiences are themselves sensorial

descriptively captioned video stills

There are good reasons for writing.

pain and illness (e.g. 1997, 2007

‘it is through catching a whiff of oneself, and being able to distinguish that scent from all the other odours that surround one, that one arrives at a sense of one's own identity

‘ skilled visions [which] are embedded in multi-sensory practices, where look is coordinated with skilled movement, with rapidly changing points of view, or with other senses such as touch’

in motion

it is necessary to take account of the habitus that determines the frontier between the perceived and the unperceived, and, even more, of the norms which decree what is spoken and what left unspoken. We need, in fact, to be careful not to confuse what is not said with what is not experienced

a disadvantage compared with the anthropologist, the historian, let us repeat, has access to hardly any other sources than those that involve language

I would urge contemporary ethnographers of the senses to be more explicit about the ways of experiencing and knowing that become central to their ethnographies, to share with others the senses of place they felt as they sought to occupy similar places to those of their research participants, and to acknowledge the processes through which their sensory knowing has become academic knowledge