the main reason for this lack of 00:11:50 awareness is that our attention is almost completely absorbed into the content the what or object of our experience to the detriment of the experience itself

the illusion of subject object duality 01:21:14 because the moment i think of myself as a self then i think that there's me a subject and then there's my objects there's the i and there's its visual field and they're totally different from one 01:21:26 another and that the basic structure of experience is there's me the subject who's always a subject and never an object and then all of those objects and i take that to be primordially given to 01:21:39 be the way experience just is instead of being a construction or superimposition so that's one illusion

i want to begin by talking about the imagine nature which is the first of those three natures um it's really tempting when i look at a flower like a rose um a nice red rose 00:35:22 to think that the color the redness is right on the rose unless you are extremely accomplished when you look at a red rose you see the color right out there in the rose and 00:35:34 you assume that your eyes are simply detecting color that is in the rose actually that can't possibly be true color is something that emerges um as 00:35:45 john pointed out this morning through the interaction of our sense faculties and whatever is happening outside of them and the color emerges in our minds but we imagine things to exist outside of consciousness just as we perceive 00:35:58 them and that nature that we ascribe to the objects of our experience is their imagined nature it's an imagined nature because we project it out there even though on reflection we each know 00:36:11 that the redness can't possibly be painted out there in the rose footnote it's uh equally stupid to think that when we detect the redness we're detecting in inner red paint that 00:36:23 somehow um is just detected by an inner eye i assure you that when you look inside your brain you will find no such inner red paint

likeness

subjectivism, which, as far as values are concerned, leads to skepticism for lack of an intersubjective criterion; or an abso-lutism founded on intuitionism.

and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available. But in any case it seems to me that "the correct perception"-which would mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject"-is a contradictory impossibility.