he who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — to climb up over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it)

not only do comparisons disagree about how we should interpret Wittgenstein’s philosophy but also about which Wittgenstein too.

Der er et mønster i menneskelig eksistens, som de store sprogmodeller er begyndt at mestre. Jeg har altid fornemmet dette – i mit arbejde med praktiske applikationer af AI i danske virksomheder, har en del af min succes været at jeg opfattede al historisk data som aflejringer af menneskelig adfærd, som kunne afsløre handlemønstre. Men dette har altid været i et meget smalt, domæne – som for eks. churn prediction i grossistbranchen for et bestemt markedssegment. Nu ser vi store sprogmodeller mestre det generelle mønster i at være menneske, og det er dybt fascinerende. Noget af den adfærd som GPT-4 udviser understøtter også denne konklusion. ”Emergent Behavior” er en term defineret som det der dækker over den adfærd GPT-4 udviser, men som man ikke havde forudset/forventet.

several varieties of blind spots.

WB publish here a collection of fragments made by Wittgensteinhimself and left by him in a box-file

the illusion of subject object duality 01:21:14 because the moment i think of myself as a self then i think that there's me a subject and then there's my objects there's the i and there's its visual field and they're totally different from one 01:21:26 another and that the basic structure of experience is there's me the subject who's always a subject and never an object and then all of those objects and i take that to be primordially given to 01:21:39 be the way experience just is instead of being a construction or superimposition so that's one illusion

now i want to talk about that serpent and really focus um firmly on what the 01:18:05 self illusion is this will be the last part of this little section that self is supposed to be something that stands outside of the world not something embedded in the world 01:18:17 it's the wittgenstein um the austrian philosopher of the first half of the 20th century um expressed this beautifully in his book the trektatus he said that the self stands to the world 01:18:30 like the eye stands to the visual field we don't see the eye but the fact that we have a visual field lets us know that there is an eye behind it but not in the field 01:18:42 the self he said is just like that we see a world we experience a world we act on a world and that tells us that there has to be a subject that stands outside of that world and experiences it just like the 01:18:56 eye stands outside of the visual field that's one of the worst things about the self-illusion is the illusion that we're not even in the world that we're totally transcendent to it that's really weird right i mean when you realize that 01:19:09 that's what you believe in your gut um that is it's like the eye and the visual field um that the self is continuous it doesn't stop as hume said talking about descartes 01:19:22 that it's always present to us that it's conscious it's the thing that's aware of everything else that it's free from causation that we can act freely on our motives without being caused so when you go to the 01:19:34 notary public to have a document notarized and she asks you those beautiful questions is this your free act and deed and if you said no i'm being caused to 01:19:46 do this she wouldn't notarize it would you so you say yes this is my free act indeed and i always just have my fingers crossed behind my back i don't believe in free acts and deeds but 01:19:59 we do take have this ideology about ourselves that we're with our free actions aren't cause we just do them as can't put it spontaneously that we are independent not 01:20:11 interdependent that when your mom tells you you've got to learn to stand on your own two feet that somehow that makes sense that ourselves can stand on our own two feet as independent objects 01:20:24 and mostly the self is what i am i am not my body my body is constantly changing my body was once young and fast now it's old and has a new knee um i'm 01:20:36 not my mind my mind was once sharp now it's dulled and beaten into submission by years of overwork but that i the jay who was once young is still here in this old man's body 01:20:49 so when we think about that self-illusion the self-illusion is partly bad because it's only a root illusion that leads to a whole cascade 01:21:01 of terrible illusions so now i want to really dump on the self-illusion by showing you just how dangerous it is

this is not to say that our inner life has some kind of a second grade um existence conventional reality is not 00:25:14 second level reality um because as the guardian and chandra kirti also emphasized we must remember that conventional reality dependent 00:25:26 origination is exactly the same as emptiness which is ultimate reality the only kind of reality anything that we ever encounter is going to have is conventional reality so when i'm talking 00:25:38 here about cognitive illusion i'm not arguing that the existence of our interstates um is illusory i'm arguing that the illusion is that we have immediate access to them as they are and 00:25:51 that their mode of existence um is um intrinsic existence so this allows us to understand the majority analysis of the most fundamental cognitive illusion 00:26:04 of all the illusion of the immediacy of our knowledge of our own minds and the givenness of our own interstates and processes our direct knowledge of them as the kinds of things they are independent of 00:26:18 any concepts that's the illusion that wittgenstein quine and sellers each in there worked so hard in the 20th century to diagnose and to cure but we can put this just as easily and maybe more 00:26:31 easily in the terms of second century indian madhyamaka the fundamental cognitive illusion is to take our mental states to exist intrinsically rather than conventionally and to take our knowledge of them to be 00:26:45 immediate independent of conventions this illusion is pervasive it is instinctive and it is profoundly self-alienating because it obscures the deeply conventional character of our own 00:26:57 existence and of our self-knowledge and this illusion is what according to buddhist philosophers lies at the root of our grasping of our attraction and diversion and hence at the root of the 00:27:09 pervasive suffering of existence

Wittgenstein makes a similar observation, pointing out that “the aspects ofthings that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity andfamiliarity (one is unable to notice something – because it is always beforeone’s eyes).” 3

Lader756 · 1 day agoFascinating. Thanks for sharing.Given this post may attract others interested in Zettelkasten workflow by esteemed authors, I'll take the opportunity to ask: does anyone know of a description of Wittgenstein's?

Famously, Luswig Wittgenstein organized his thoughts this way. Also famously, he never completed his 'big book' - almost all of his books (On Certainty, Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, etc.) were compiled by his students in the years after his death.

Such radical compositional approaches arecontemporaneous with the Surrealist use of montage, but predateBurrough’s cut-up-fold-in technique, and ‘put[...] the avant-gardeclaims of hyperfiction to shame’ (Krapp, 2006: 362).

Wittgenstein from his ‘Zettel’, a box containing over 700 textfragments (or ‘scraps’) and other loose pages (Krapp, 2006: 362).

In the caseof Wittgenstein, he worked with typescripts and would often cut upthe typed text into fragments so he could rearrange the order of theremarks jotted on them (Krapp, 2006: 362; von Wright, 1969).

In a remarkable essay on precursors to hypertext, Peter Krapp(2006) provides a useful overview of the development of the indexcard and its use by various thinkers, including Locke, Leibniz, Hegel,and Wittgenstein, as well as by those known to Barthes and part of asimilar intellectual milieu, including Michel Leiris, Georges Perec,and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Krapp, 2006: 360-362; Sieburth, 2005).1

you can't see the beetle in my box nor I the one in yours ludwig wittgenstein use the beetle in the Box analogy to suggest that the meaning of sensation words such as pain isn't given 00:01:10 by referring to some private inner introspected something a sensation to which you alone have access in his view there can't be more to the public meaning of our language than we are capable of teaching each other and the 00:01:23 private something the beetle can't have a role in that teaching because we can't get at

Any communication between people about the same thing isa common revelatory experience about informational models of that thing.Each model is a conceptual structure of abstractions formulated initially inthe mind of one of the persons who would communicate, and if the conceptsin the mind of one would-be communicator are very different from those inthe mind of another, there is no common model and no communication

the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!

According to Stemler, consistency estimates of interrater reliability assume that it is not necessary for judges to share a common meaning of the rating scale, so long as each judge is consistent in their classifications.