date: May 12, 2022

abstract

• In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon.
• Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect.
• There is an “explanatory gap” between
  • our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and
  • its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects,
• referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness.
• The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and
  • it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation.
• Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness.
• Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties.
• We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer.
• We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which
  • a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer.
• Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic.
  • In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and
  • in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective).
• These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct,
  • just as in the case of
    • an observer that claims to be at rest
    • while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity.
• Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged,
  • as they both describe the same underlying reality.
• Based on relativistic phenomena in physics
  • we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem.
• Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness,
  • we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.

comment

• This is a promising approach to solving the hard problem of consciosness