there remains one glaring difference between the US Congress and the European Parliament: in the former there is a powerful “electoral connection” between citizens and elected legislators, whereas in the latter this connection is extremely weak.
Explicitly compares EP to U.S. Congress -> but ELECTORAL CONNECTION to electorate is "remarkably weak" unlike in US -> therefore cannot directly apply theories of what influences Congressional actions to EP, because can't take into consideration the effect of voter punishment / needing to please one's constituents.
" there remains one glaring difference between the US Congress and the European Parliament: in the former there is a powerful “electoral connection” between citizens and elected legislators, whereas in the latter this connection is extremely weak." Actually "almost nonesixtent!"
Aha -> not low voter turnout, but because they only vote for MEPs based on NATIONAL performance of the parties they belong to (think of RN in France -> French voted en masse for them in EP elections because EM government was doing so poorly IN FRANCE -> has nothing to do w/ how EM government is acting in the PARLIAMENT itself.
"Specifically, the election and reelection prospects of almost all MEPs have more to do with the position of the MEPs' national party in the domestic arena—such as the party's governing status, the timing of the European Parliament election in the national electoral cycle, and the performance of the national government—than with how the MEP has behaved or what the MEP has done inside the European Parliament"
Means that in order to win EP seats, domestic parties must please voters DOMESTICALLY instead of specifically in regards to the EP -> unlike in US where parties at House and executive levels are the same / impact same electoral issues.
"The lack of an electoral connection is mainly due to the incentives of national parties to treat European Parliament elections as midterm polls on the policies and performance of the current domestic government. These incentives mean that most national parties would rather campaign on their policies and candidates for domestic office rather than on the record of their politicians, or the behavior of the political group to which they belong, in the European Parliament."
One issue is voting system - Preferrential ballots mean tyhat voters get to choose more directly their candidate for MEP as opposed to just following domestic trends -> some countries have this, others don't. - "Although all member states use a system of proportional representation (PR), about half of the member states use a preferential system, i.e., “open” list PR or single transferable vote. In these countries, voters can choose between candidates from the same party as well as between parties. In contrast, the “closed” list operating for the European Parliament elections in the other half of the member states only offers voters the chance to choose between preordered lists of candidates from each of the parties. For example, MEPs elected under preferential systems tend to spend more time campaigning directly to voters and representing the interests of their constituencies in the Parliament than MEPs elected under closed-list systems (Farrell & Scully 2007). Furthermore, voters are more likely to be contacted by candidates and be better informed about the elections under open-list electoral rules (Hix & Hagemann 2009). Inside the Parliament, MEPs elected under preferential electoral systems tend to be more independent from their national parties and more responsive to the instructions from their European political groups (Hix 2004)." - idk but dw about it
Actions we must explain with alternative means (i.e., not voter pressure): - "the voting behavior of MEPs, the assignments and activities of MEPs in committees, the formation of political parties in the Parliament and coalitions between these parties, and the way the Parliament and MEPs behave in legislative bargains with the EU Council and Commission must be explained by other political motivations, such as the policy objectives or career incentives of MEPs."
- MEPs are MORE ABLE TO ORGANIZE INTO BLOCS OF ALIGNMENT ON SIMILAR ISSUES -> NOT ALONG PARTY LINES -> On healthcare, for instance, might be pro-MAID and anti-MAID factions that cross party llines.
- "internal politics in the European Parliament. We now know that the Parliament, like almost all other democratic legislatures, is dominated by political parties, both as organizations and as political coalitions of like-minded legislators. We also know that majority coalitions in the Parliament tend to be policy specific, with a center-left majority forming on some issues and a center-right majority forming on other issues. How and why this occurs has not been thoroughly investigated yet." "Regarding policy objectives, MEPs are motivated to secure policy outcomes in the Parliament as close as possible to their personal preferences. This helps explain the development of the political groups, for example. The political groups in the Parliament do not help MEPs get reelected but do enable them to organize with politicians with similar preferences across a range of policy issues to influence the policy agenda and policy outcomes in the Parliament. From this perspective, the political groups in the European Parliament are rather like the parliamentary factions that formed in many national parliaments in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century, prior to mass democratic elections, which emerged to promote their members' policy positions rather than to fight election campaigns "
- Lastly, CAREER OF MEP MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN ANALYSING THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN EP -> some MEPs see this as "retirement home" / golden parachute or being put out to pasture -> much lower stakes, probably more likely to vote however they want -> OTHERS see this as STEPPING STONE to electoral politics nationally -> therefore might play it safer or appeal way more to voters in their domestic constituency.
- "Regarding career incentives, in an early study of MEP careers, Scarrow (1997) identifies three main roles of the European Parliament in career trajectories: (a) as a stepping stone and training ground for a career in national politics; (b) as a reward after a career in national politics; and (c) as a long-term career in EU politics. Whether an MEP is trying to return to national politics, regards the Parliament as a “retirement home,” or sees it as a permanent career should have a significant influence on both how active that MEP is likely to be in the Parliament and which types of activities the MEP is likely to prioritize. The career path of an MEP is also likely to influence how he or she campaigns in European Parliament elections. For example, Hobolt & Høyland (2011) find that MEPs who have already pursued a career in domestic politics tend to be more successful in European Parliament elections, in that they receive a higher share of votes than do inexperienced national politicians or Brussels-based careerists."
- Likewise, MEP's w/ established representation are voted for more often. (as in any elecoral system?)