Reviewer #1 (Public review):
Summary:
Wu and colleagues aimed to explain previous findings that adolescents, compared to adults, show reduced cooperation following cooperative behaviour from a partner in several social scenarios. The authors analysed behavioural data from adolescents and adults performing a zero-sum Prisoner's Dilemma task and compared a range of social and non-social reinforcement learning models to identify potential algorithmic differences. Their findings suggest that adolescents' lower cooperation is best explained by a reduced learning rate for cooperative outcomes, rather than differences in prior expectations about the cooperativeness of a partner. The authors situate their results within the broader literature, proposing that adolescents' behaviour reflects a stronger preference for self-interest rather than a deficit in mentalising.
Strengths:
The work as a whole suggests that, in line with past work, adolescents prioritise value accumulation, and this can be, in part, explained by algorithmic differences in weighted value learning. The authors situate their work very clearly in past literature, and make it obvious the gap they are testing and trying to explain. The work also includes social contexts that move the field beyond non-social value accumulation in adolescents. The authors compare a series of formal approaches that might explain the results and establish generative and model-comparison procedures to demonstrate the validity of their winning model and individual parameters. The writing was clear, and the presentation of the results was logical and well-structured.
Weaknesses:
I also have some concerns about the methods used to fit and approximate parameters of interest. Namely, the use of maximum likelihood versus hierarchical methods to fit models on an individual level, which may reduce some of the outliers noted in the supplement, and also may improve model identifiability.
There was also little discussion given the structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the strategy of the game (that defection is always dominant), meaning that the preferences of the adolescents cannot necessarily be distinguished from the incentives of the game, i.e. they may seem less cooperative simply because they want to play the dominant strategy, rather than a lower preferences for cooperation if all else was the same.
Appraisal & Discussion:
The authors have partially achieved their aims, but I believe the manuscript would benefit from additional methodological clarification, specifically regarding the use of hierarchical model fitting and the inclusion of Bayes Factors, to more robustly support their conclusions. It would also be important to investigate the source of the model confusion observed in two of their models.
I am unconvinced by the claim that failures in mentalising have been empirically ruled out, even though I am theoretically inclined to believe that adolescents can mentalise using the same procedures as adults. While reinforcement learning models are useful for identifying biases in learning weights, they do not directly capture formal representations of others' mental states. Greater clarity on this point is needed in the discussion, or a toning down of this language.
Additionally, a more detailed discussion of the incentives embedded in the Prisoner's Dilemma task would be valuable. In particular, the authors' interpretation of reduced adolescent cooperativeness might be reconsidered in light of the zero-sum nature of the game, which differs from broader conceptualisations of cooperation in contexts where defection is not structurally incentivised.
Overall, I believe this work has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the field. Its impact would be strengthened by more rigorous modelling checks and fitting procedures, as well as by framing the findings in terms of the specific game-theoretic context, rather than general cooperation.

