15 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2019
    1. I forward the notion that blackness comprises a “cathectic and world-making” apparatus that is indispensable to understanding the cultural politics of African American popular texts.1 By offering an orientation to the discourses of desire that inform Black Panther’s fabulations, I will illustrate how black and queer critical idioms might speak to one another’s respective and mutual interests in the construction of identity, space, and modernity, as well as gender and sexuality.


  2. watermark.silverchair.com watermark.silverchair.com
    1. In the interpretation ofBlack Panthercomics thatfollows, I forward the notion that blackness comprises a“cathectic andworld-making”apparatus that is indispensable to understanding thecultural politics of African American popular texts.1By offering an ori-entation to the discourses of desire that informBlack Panther’s fabula-tions, I will illustrate how black and queer critical idioms might speakto one another’s respective and mutual interests in the construction ofidentity, space, and modernity, as well as gender and sexuality.


  3. Mar 2019
    1. . This essay investigates the production of female virtue in a different but related textual site: vernacular religious drama. My particular focus is the late medieval English dramatic vita of Mary Magd


  4. Feb 2019
    1. Rhetorically,theDigbyplayofTheConversionofSaintPaulmovesfromanemphasisonthevisualattheoutsettoanemphasisontheverbalatitsclimax.Suchamovementcoincideswithitshistory:straddlingtheborderoftheEnglishReformation,theplaydisplaysanuneasybalancebetweenatraditionalreligionoftheimageandanewerreligionoftheword.Thematically,however,theplayconcentratesonissuescommontobothpre-Reformationandpost-ReformationEnglishsociety:theperennialsinofprideandthetensionbetweenclasses.Alloftheseconcernscanbeseenexemplifiedinthegroom'shoodandtheapostle'sbasket


    1. nglian art. The narrator figure, processions, and recapitu- lation of contrasting scenes act as framing devices which mediate between the audience and the Conversion's devotional center. The juxtaposition of sacred and profane space on separate loca necessarily places the audience in a type of liminal territory in or adjacent to the platea. From such a perspective - which is an accurate representation of the audience's status as fallen men and women - they inevitably follow the progress of the action from the secular to the sacred; in the interim they internalize the devotional and didactic content of the play in such a way that they, like St. Paul, can bring the divine word and spirit with them


    2. The devotional frame provided by the Poeta, the processions, and the recapitulatory scenes foreground the internal and spiritual nature of Paul's action and demand a proper devotional and ethical response from the play's audience


    3. h priests. In most respects the English play resembles its continental analogues, but the Digby Conversion notably is the only one repeatedly and insistently to signal its tripartite struc- ture through the use of a Poeta, the explicit setting of the action at different "stacyons," the addition of scenes, and the curtailing of action at the play's conclusion. Such explicit framing tech- niques highlight t


    4. nd time"^ In the Digby Conversion dramatic structure functions as a frame which, by defining the spiritual significance of the central devo- tional scene, allows the audience to internalize the play's spir- itual message.


    5. ramas from the region.9 The dramatist of The Con- version of St. Paul exploits the dramatic potential inherent in a frame structure in order to create, in Gail McMurray Gibson's phrase, a "concrete image of devotion."10 He carefully balances his action around the symmetrical center of Paul's conversion by means of the speeches of the Poeta, audience movement, and recapitulatory scenes. These devices in effect mediate between the moment of St. Paul's mystic experience and the audience in order to exp


  5. Apr 2018
    1. Is the problem on the ëhardí side of the ledger sufficiently well-defined to sustain thedivision as a fundamental empirical principle? Although it is easy enough to agree aboutthe presence of qualia in certain prototypical cases, such as the pain felt after a brick hasfallen on a bare foot, or the blueness of the sky on a sunny summer afternoon, things areless clear-cut once we move beyond the favoured prototypes. Some of our perceptualcapacities are rather subtle, as, for example, positional sense is often claimed to be. Somephilosophers, e.g. Elizabeth Anscombe, have actually opined that we can know theposition of our limbs without any ëlimb-positioní qualia. As for me, I am inclined to sayI do have qualitative experiences of where my limbs are ó it feels different to have myfingers clenched than unclenched, even when they are not visible. The disagreementitself, however, betokens the lack of consensus once cases are at some remove from thecentral prototypes. Vestibular system qualia are yet another non-prototypical case. Is there somethingëvestibular-yí it feels like to have my head moving? To know which way is up? Whateverthe answer here, at least the answer is not glaringly obvious. Do eye movements haveeye-movement qualia? Some maybe do, and some maybe do not. Are there ëintrospectivequaliaí, or is introspection just paying attention to perceptual qualia and talking toyourself? Ditto, plus or minus a bit, for self-awareness. Thoughts are also a bit problem-atic in the qualia department. Some of my thoughts seem to me to be a bit like talking tomyself and hence like auditory imagery but some just come out of my mouth as I amtalking to someone or affect decisions without ever surfacing as a bit of inner dialogue.None of this is to deny the pizzazz of qualia in the prototypical cases. Rather, the point isjust that prototypical cases give us only a startingpoint for further investigation, andnothing like a full characterization of the class to which they belong. My suspicion with respect to The Hard Problem strategy is that it seems to take theclass of conscious experiences to be much better defined than it is. The point is, if youare careful to restrict your focus to the prototypical cases, you can easily be hornswoggledinto assuming the class is well-defined. As soon as you broaden your horizons, trouble-some questions about fuzzy boundaries, about the connections between attention, shortterm memory and awareness, are present in full, what-do-we-do-with-that glory.

      Passage 1

    2. In general, what substantive conclusions can be drawn when science has not advancedvery far on a problem? Not much. One of the basic skills we teach our philosophy studentsis how to recognize and diagnose the range of nonformal fallacies that can undermine anostensibly appealing argument: what it is to beg the question, what a non sequitur is, andso on. A prominent item in the fallacy roster is argumentum ad ignorantiam ó argumentfrom ignorance. The canonical version of this fallacy uses ignorance as the key premisefrom which a substantive conclusion is drawn. The canonical version looks like this: We really do not understand much about a phenomenon P. (Science is largelyignorant about the nature of P.)Therefore: we do know that:(1) P can never be explained, or(2) Nothing science could ever discover would deepen our understanding of P, or(3) P can never be explained in terms of properties of kind S. In its canonical version, the argument is obviously a fallacy: none of the tenderedconclusions follow, not even a little bit. Surrounded with rhetorical flourish, much browfurrowing and hand-wringing, however, versions of this argument can hornswoggle theunwary.

      Passage 2

  6. Jan 2018
    1. llowed by specification of typical stimuli for, or responses to, the ex- perience.

      So could you say that the causes/effects actually constitute the missing "similarity" between two experiences that Smart had to say did not exist/could not be articulated because it was a quality? If so, oh man, that's cool. Not sure if that's where this is heading, but it's what jumped out to me.

    2. So it does not discriminate between the two.

      The initial objection raised here (against identity theory) seems to be similar to one that Smart considered in Monday's reading, the idea that you cannot ascribe the same property to a brain state that you can to an experience. Instead of relying on the distinction between language and metaphysics that Smart used, Lewis provides a new argument about the fact that experiences have the particular property of being unlocated is not "analytically necessary."

    3. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences be- long in fact to certain physical states.

      What is the significance of saying that the causal roles "belong by analytic necessity" to our experiences? In terms of language, an analytic statement is (loosely) one where the truth of the statement can be known merely by knowing the meaning of all of its parts; it is not necessary to have any additional knowledge of the way the world actually is. That's the only definition with which I'm familiar. In this context, does "analytic necessity" maybe mean that the cause of an experience is logically integral to its definition?

  7. Feb 2017
    1. ost philosophers of language, and recently even by some linguists,

      What's the difference between the fields of philosophy of language and linguistics? This is a really interesting potential distinction.