18 Matching Annotations
  1. Dec 2018
  2. Sep 2018
    1. evolutionary methods

      What does evolutionary methods mean in terms of tracing origins of diseases? What does this look like? Does this mean they're testing diseases on animals or are they extracting viral DNA to do analysis and comparing to other viral DNA? Confuzzed.

    2. ff the tails of mice for many generations and showed that this mutilation had no effect on the tail length of their descendan

      Felt like this paragraph didn't fully explain what Neo-Lamarckism is.

      Found online that neo-lamarckists thought that Lamarckian mechanisms (inheritance of acquired characteristics) were more likely to be the chief cause of evolution than natural selection (Darwinism).

    3. but that a feature such as body size gradually evolves to become more and more different because new, slightly more extreme, advantageous variants continue to arise.

      Not understanding how these more extreme variants have to do with body size evolving to become more different within a population.

      Are these new, extreme variants unrelated to body size?

  3. Aug 2018
    1. Motoo Kimura was right! They didn't know about genetic drift and just thought that species adapted in ways that were negative towards their chance at survival.

      Difficulty- I had to reread this because I thought they were still mentioning scientists who had the wrong ideas of evolution.

      How did he find out about genetic drift? Doesn't this usually occur in very small populations.

      --I will look into this further.

  4. Jan 2018
    1. Or if there is, after all, a way in which it is analytic that experiences are unlocated, that way is irrelevant: perhaps in our presystematic thought we regard only concreta as located in a primary sense, and abstracta as located in a merely derivative sense by their inherence in located conereta.

      Is there a way in which it is analytic that experiences are unlocated? How is this possibility prejudiced? To say it is irrelevant is not to conclude it could be something else non-physically. If there is a location, it would seem there is an analytic necessity. The word abstract almost seems misleading, as if their is some source or derivative (such as a location) for the conclusion of effect. What if these experiences are phenomena with no definitive characteristics and cannot be known based on being "together with the sense of expressions by which they are referred to as things of that kind" (19). That would leave unlocated phenomena that is potentially unique to each first-person experience, subjective and indescribable.

    2. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences be- long in fact to certain physical states.

      What is the significance of saying that the causal roles "belong by analytic necessity" to our experiences? In terms of language, an analytic statement is (loosely) one where the truth of the statement can be known merely by knowing the meaning of all of its parts; it is not necessary to have any additional knowledge of the way the world actually is. That's the only definition with which I'm familiar. In this context, does "analytic necessity" maybe mean that the cause of an experience is logically integral to its definition?

    1. w. I say that "This is red" means something roughly like "A normal percipient would not easily pick this out of a clump of geranium petals though he would pick it out of a clump of lettuce leave

      I struggle with this. The idea seems clear: Smart wants to analyze colors as abilities (or powers, as he notes below) to make discriminations. To say that something is red is to say that a "normal percipient" would not be able to distinguish it from another red thing (geraniums), but would from non-red things (lettuce leaves). This is clever, but seems to miss important features of how we talk about color, namely that there is a what-it-is-likeness of it. Seeing red has a certain phenomenology above and beyond my ability to categorize objects similar to it.

  5. Mar 2017
    1. Marcin and Laura joined me on Thursday to talk about translating CLAVIER into their local cultures. They helped me, we are helping each other attempt to make that translation.

      translation respect of context finding common ground difficulty

  6. Jan 2017
    1. substitute “the present King of France” for “x,” and then deny theresult, the occurrence of “the present King of France” is secondaryand our proposition is true; but if we are to take “xis not bald” andsubstitute “the present King of France” for “x,” then “the presentKing of France” has a primary occurrence and the proposition is false

      I'm not clear on this. Does the designation of a description as primary or secondary depend on the truth of the proposition of which it is a part?

    2. which we could not doif “Homer” were a name

      Must a name refer to a thing that exists? If so, what is the name of a fictional character? Is Homer a description?

    3. . It is false that the present Kingof France is the present King of France, or that the round squareis the round square. When we substitute a description for a name,propositional functions which are “always true” may become false,if the description describes nothing. There is no mystery in this assoon as we realise (what was proved in the preceding paragraph)that when we substitute a description the result is not a value of thepropositional function in question

      So, "the present King of France is the present King of France" is logically sound, however it has potential to be false if there is no present King of France?

    4. If, as may bethe case, whateverseemsto be an “individual” is really capable offurther analysis, we shall have to content ourselves with what may becalled “relative individuals,” which will be terms that, throughout thecontext in question, are never analysed and never occu

      Is Russell here saying that "relative individual" refers to "what can be considered an individual for our purposes"? unsure on this.

    5. proposition “Socrates is a man” is no doubtequivalentto “Socrates ishuman,” but it is not the very same proposition. Theisof “Socratesis human” expresses the relation of subject and predicate; theisof“Socrates is a man” expresses identity.

      I'm not sure I'm parsing this claim correctly. I think Russell is saying that "human" in "Socrates is human" subtly differs from "a man" in "Socrates is a man" in that "human" is an adjective attributing the quality of "human" to "Socrates" while the second sentence is making the proposition that Socrates is an instance of humanness.

      In other words the difference between (Hs) and (There is sometimes h such that h=s) with H being human as a predicate, h being human as a constant (a man) and s being Socrates as a constant.

      Is this how others interpreted this?

    6. Now theproposition that “a so-and-so” has the propertyisnota propositionof the form “ x.” If it were, “a so-and-so” would have to be identicalwithxfor a suitablex; and although (in a sense) this may be true insome cases, it is certainly not true in such a case as “a unicorn.”

      I don't quite follow his reasoning here.

    7. but is always significant andsometimes true

      So to clarify, "x is unreal" and "x does not exist" are significant as propositions but "an x" or "some x" cannot be significant as parts of a proposition if x does not refer to something that actually exists? Is this right?

    8. “The function ‘I metxandxis human’ is sometimes true.”

      It seems to me that the statement "I met Jones" isn't really any different in form, as Russell says it is. Doesn't it "make explicit" "the function 'I met x and x is Jones' is sometimes true," just as "I met a man" makes explicit "the function ‘I met x and x is human’ is sometimes true”? I'm not clear on the difference

    9. In the case of “unicorn,” for example,there is only the concept: there is not also, somewhere among theshades, something unreal which may be called “a unicorn.” Therefore,since it is significant (though false) to say “I met a unicorn,” it is clearthat this proposition, rightly analysed, does not contain a constituent“a unicorn,” though it does contain the concept “unicorn.

      I'm having some trouble with this passage. By concept, I presume, Russell means the 'idea' of thing or the the set of characteristics that qualify something as that thing, independent of any actual instance of the thing. Preceding with this definition I'm not sure what he means by "...there is not also, somewhere among the shades, something unreal which may be called “a unicorn.”" What I think he might mean is that because the statement is false (assuming that unicorns do not exist and that it is therefore impossible to meet one) it can be seen as containing the abstract idea, or concept, of "unicorn" but, by virtue of its falsity, not positing any actual instance of "a unicorn" in the way that a statement like "I met a man" does. Not quite sure about this though. Is knowing the truth or falsity of a statement required for determining the "constituents" it contains?