LYNCH: Well, I could say that Dino De Laurentiis cutmy salary and cut the budget, and then gave mefinal cut. So he was into cutting! (

Bollinger bands are just a simple visualization/analysis technique that creates two bands, one "roof" and one "floor" of some "support" for a given time series. The reasoning is that, if the time series is "below" the "floor", it's a historic low, and if it's "above" the "roof", it's a historic high. In terms of stock prices and other financial instruments, when the price crosses a band, it's said to be too cheap or too expensive.

For now, we haven’t included emissions relating to loans and investments in our Scope 3 carbon footprint breakdown as these are worked out separately with the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF). We were the first UK digital bank to join PCAF, which asks members to calculate emissions from loans and investments by following industry best practice

BP faces a green rebellion at its annual shareholder meeting on Thursday as some of Britain’s biggest pension funds prepare to demand the company toughens its plans to reduce its emissions by 2030.

年底回国，春节后新冠疫情就暴发了，澳洲宣布关闭国境。回不去澳洲，我没有了收入，也不敢和父母说这笔贷款，只好拆东墙补西墙。眼见贷款的数字滚到了 20 万，快崩盘的时候，我才和父母坦白了。

To determine the impact that this nonproductive time has on the staffing demand, divide the average number of nonproductive hours per FTE by 2,080 hours (number of hours one FTE would work in 1 year without taking any time off). The resulting number is the Figure 4: Add percentage of nonproductive time

As director of special projects for Francis Ford Coppola’s company American Zoetrope, he produced movies like Paul Schrader’s “Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters” (1985), a complicated film about Yukio Mishima, the eccentric Japanese author who killed himself publicly in 1970 — a passion project that Mr. Schrader has described as “the definition of an unfinanceable project.” Mr. Luddy was its tireless booster and supporter, funding it early on with his American Express card.

Unlike a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, the digital yuan is issued directly by China’s central bank and does not depend on a blockchain. The currency has the same value as its analog equivalent, the yuan or RMB, and for consumers the experience of using the digital yuan is not that different from any other mobile payment system or credit card. But on the back end, payments are not routed through a bank and can sometimes move without transaction fees, jumping from one e-wallet to another as easily as cash changes hands.

He outspent Bass by very wide margins, largely using his own money (see below).

The processing systems fee is generally fairly low, around one 10th of a percent of the total purchase. There's a large market the merchant can choose from, which can keep this cost down. Then there's the credit card's network fee, around a quarter of a percent. And the largest fee of the system also happens here. The interchange fee, it's usually around two to 3%.

Re-allocating money in your TSP

Retirement Income Replacement Rate

Cede, as part of DTCC, is the actual owner of pretty much all publicly issued stock in the US. This arrangement was put into place so that stockbrokers didn’t have to send around paper certificates all the time just to trade. The stocks stay at Cede, and brokers exchange rights to those stocks held at Cede. When you buy shares in a stock, you hold an entitlement, to part of an entitlement held by your broker, to stock held by Cede. Cede owns the actual stock, but you have beneficial ownership of your shares — you are the shareholder who can vote at general meetings and receive dividends on the shares.

over the past decade and change a dynamic ecosystem has developed around cryptocurrencies and blockchains. And it’s constantly getting more complicated. We’ve now got non-fungible tokens, or NFTs, unique digital bits purchased with crypto that have mostly been associated with weird pieces of digital art and are an arena that looks very much like a bubble. There are stablecoins, cryptocurrencies that are supposed to be less volatile, pegged to something like the US dollar. There’s also the burgeoning world of decentralized finance, or DeFi, which tries to replicate a lot of the financial system but without intermediaries, and there are decentralized autonomous organizations, or DAOs, essentially internet collectives. Now, much of this is falling under the still-nascent umbrella of Web3, a relatively fuzzy reimagining of the internet on blockchains.

Poison pillsHere are some things you could do 1 : Buy 51% of the stock of a public company in the open market over time, just buying whenever anyone sells, looking for any blocks of stock that come loose, paying the market price for each trade, etc. To put numbers on it, let’s say you start buying at around $40 per share and finish at around $50 per share. (Your buying, and the legally required disclosure of your ownership, will push up the price.) Once you have 51%, you take control, vote out the board, vote in your buddies, elect a new chief executive officer and run the company however you want. Buy 51% of the stock of a public company in a tender offer. A tender offer is just a big coordinated public offer to buy stock, open to all shareholders at the same price. You announce to all shareholders, “I want to buy 51% of this company and I’ll pay $50 per share in cash, but I won’t buy more than 51%.” More than 51% tender, you prorate the offer (not buying all the shares that are tendered), you get to exactly 51%, paying $50 per share. You proceed as above, taking control of the board etc. You acquire 51% of the company and take control of the board, as in either Thing 1 or Thing 2. Then you propose a merger at $30 per share. The new board — your buddies — agrees, and submits it to a shareholder vote. You vote your 51% of the shares in favor, and the merger happens; you acquire the remaining 49% of the stock at $30 per share. The holders of that 49% — who did not sell to you at $50 in the first step — are forced to sell to you at $30 in the second step. (That’s how mergers work: When the merger happens, the stock is automatically converted into whatever the merger consideration is, here $30 in cash.) Same as Thing 1, but instead of buying 51% you buy, I don’t know, 30%. At 30% you just need to convince a few other shareholders to vote with you to kick out the board, etc. As the biggest shareholder, you might have effective control even without a majority. Offer to buy 100% of the stock of the company in a tender offer. Announce to all shareholders, “I want to buy 100% of this company and I’ll pay $50 per share in cash. But let me warn you. If I get above 51%, but not to 100%, I will definitely do a second-step merger (as in Thing 3), and I’ll do it at $30 per share. So if you want $50, you better tender now, because if you don’t you’re getting $30.” Shareholders might think that $50 is too low, and might not want to tender. But they can’t be sure that 51% of the stock won’t tender, and they don’t want to be left out. So they tender for $50 to avoid getting stuck with $30. (This is called a “two-tier tender offer.”) Same as Thing 5 but you don’t make the threat explicit. “I want to buy 100% of this company and I’ll pay $50 per share in cash,” you say. But you have a reputation for being tough, and a history of treating minority shareholders poorly. The threat is implicit, so shareholders tender at $50 to avoid ending up in the minority of a company that you control.These are the things, the classic things. They are “coercive takeover tactics,” in the lingo. They are ways for someone — a “corporate raider,” in the lingo — to take over a company without paying a fair price for it, or without offering every shareholder the same price. Or, I mean, arguably without paying a fair price; you might think that some of these things are fine. (If you can get 51% of the shareholders of a company to sell you their stock in market transactions, what’s the problem?) But boards of directors of public companies generally take a dim view of these things. They think of themselves as fiduciaries for all of the shareholders, and they do not like the idea of someone buying the company out from under them.  window.__bloomberg__.ads.enqueue("outstream-video-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"); {"contentId":"RAJT3KDWLU6A01","position":"outstream","dimensions":{"large_desktop":[[300,250],[1,8]],"small_desktop":[[300,250],[1,8]],"tablet":[[300,250],[1,8]]},"strategy":"viewable","type":"Outstream Video Native Ad","targeting":{"position":"outstream","url":"/opinion/articles/2022-04-18/twitter-has-a-poison-pill-now"},"containerId":"outstream-video-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"} window.__bloomberg__.ads.enqueue("outstream-video-2-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"); {"contentId":"RAJT3KDWLU6A01","position":"outstream","dimensions":{"mobile":[[300,250],[1,8]]},"strategy":"viewable","type":"Outstream Video Native Ad","targeting":{"position":"outstream","url":"/opinion/articles/2022-04-18/twitter-has-a-poison-pill-now"},"containerId":"outstream-video-2-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"} Instead, the board of directors will prefer a nice tidy negotiation between the buyer and the board. The buyer comes to the board and offers a merger, and they negotiate the terms with each other. If the board agrees to a deal, it will generally involve the buyer paying the same price to every shareholder, and it will be a price that the board thinks reflects the full value of the company. Once the buyer has an agreement with the board, they will go out together, buyer and board, and seek shareholder approval. (Either by signing a merger agreement and submitting it to a shareholder vote, or by doing a tender offer in which the buyer asks to buy all the shares from shareholders directly, but on terms approved by the board.) If the board does not agree to the deal, the buyer goes away peacefully and does not cause trouble by buying more stock, launching a tender offer to shareholders without board approval, or running a proxy fight in which the buyer tries to replace the board with its own nominees. That is the dignified, controlled way that corporate boards generally prefer to do mergers-and-acquisitions negotiations. window.__bloomberg__.ads.enqueue("box-usSmgiD"); {"contentId":"RAJT3KDWLU6A01","position":"box","dimensions":{"mobile":[[300,250],[3,3],[1,1],"fluid"]},"type":"Mobile Body Box Ad","positionIncrement":1,"targeting":{"position":"box1","positionIncrement":1,"url":"/opinion/articles/2022-04-18/twitter-has-a-poison-pill-now"},"containerId":"box-usSmgiD"} Many buyers like to do M&A this way too. (If you are taking over a company, it helps to be friendly with the people running the company! You’ll need them to help you run the company!) But some buyers — the corporate raiders, etc. — like to retain the ability to go hostile, to do unsolicited tender offers or proxy fights if the board rejects their offers. For one thing, sometimes boards are unreasonable, and going directly to the shareholders is the only way to get a deal done. For another thing, the threat of going hostile can be helpful in negotiations with the board.In the U.S., the board has a powerful tool in this fight. It is the poison pill. (Everyone calls it that, though its technical legal name is a “shareholder rights plan.”) The board of directors of a company, feeling threatened by a big acquirer of its stock or a corporate raider proposing to buy the company, will adopt a “shareholder rights plan.” The gist of the plan is that if anyone — meaning, basically, the buyer — acquires more than X% of the company’s stock (often X is 15 or 20), then that person’s shares go poof. You can’t actually do that — you can’t make one shareholder’s shares go poof — but you can get arbitrarily close by allowing all of the other shareholders of the company to buy many more shares at a discount, or by giving them more shares for free. So you say “if anyone goes above 15% of the stock, then we will distribute one free share of stock for each existing share, except that the person who went above 15% doesn’t get any of the free stock.” So if someone gets 15%, then everyone else’s shares get doubled, taking the acquirer down to about 8%. 2 (In theory you could do this repeatedly, so that the acquirer could never get a controlling stake.) window.__bloomberg__.ads.enqueue("desktop-in-article-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"); {"contentId":"RAJT3KDWLU6A01","position":"desktop-in-article1","dimensions":{"large_desktop":[[300,250],[5,4]],"small_desktop":[[300,250],[5,4]]},"type":"Desktop in article Native Ad","targeting":{"position":"desktop-in-article1","url":"/opinion/articles/2022-04-18/twitter-has-a-poison-pill-now"},"containerId":"desktop-in-article-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"} The actual mechanics are a bit more complicated than that, but not worth worrying about 3 ; even the summary in the previous paragraph is not worth worrying about. The point is that the pill makes it very bad for anyone to get above 15% of the stock — it basically makes their stock go poof — so nobody does. For a long time it was common to say that a poison pill had never been triggered; that is not quite true anymore, but it is still close enough. When a board adopts a poison pill, for all practical purposes that prevents a buyer from buying more than 15% of the stock, either in the open market or in a tender offer. So it forces the buyer to negotiate with the board. If the buyer wants to buy the company, it has to strike a deal with the board (which will then get rid of the pill); it can’t just go directly to the shareholders to buy stock, because the pill will make its shares go poof.(Some disclosure: The poison pill was invented by the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, where I worked briefly in the mid-2000s. In my discussion of takeover defenses and tactics, I am drawing on Wachtell’s “Takeover Law and Practice” guide, which is worth reading if you want more detail on how this all works. But I worked there a long time ago and any errors or oversimplifications here are not the firm’s fault.)The poison pill is a bizarre and drastic thing for a board to do — to make one shareholder’s stock go poof! — and when it was invented in the 1980s there was some skepticism that it was legal. But the Delaware Supreme Court approved it, in a 1985 decision, noting that the board’s reason for “the adoption of the Rights Plan was in reaction to what it perceived to be the threat in the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers” (my Thing 5 above). Basically the idea was that (1) corporate raiders sometimes do bad coercive things to take over companies, (2) boards have a fiduciary duty to stop them and (3) drastic measures, like the poison pill, are justified to stop coercive takeover tactics. window.__bloomberg__.ads.enqueue("in-article-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"); {"contentId":"RAJT3KDWLU6A01","position":"in-article1","dimensions":{"mobile":[[5,19],[300,250],[3,3],[1,1],"fluid"],"tablet":[[5,11],[728,90],[1,1]]},"type":"In Article Flex Native Ad","positionIncrement":1,"targeting":{"position":"in-article1","positionIncrement":1,"url":"/opinion/articles/2022-04-18/twitter-has-a-poison-pill-now"},"containerId":"in-article-1-RAJT3KDWLU6A01"} But the pill quickly became a standard feature of corporate defense even against not-very-coercive actions. Boards of directors have successfully used poison pills to block non-coercive, all-shares-at-the-same-price tender offers, and to put limits on activists’ ability to run proxy fights. The broad general rule is that the board gets to decide on takeovers, and that if it acts in good faith to prevent a change of control, it can, even if shareholders would prefer to take the money.

Builds on previous research Robust spreadsheet modelling techniques • design principles • modularity • quality controls and diagnostics • version control • formulae conventions • format conventions • logical thought. This list is complemented by additional skills including: • understanding and applying complex financial principles to models and demonstrating that experience • understanding the implications of risk and can model for this • ability to communicate and work with people from various business functions • ability to manage a project • capable of interpreting the results of the models and presenting them to a wide audience that includes bank, investors, senior staff and the public, and • bound by some code of ethics, which does not mean the modeller must have an accounting background but has followed some professional training route in the past. (Avon 2013, p. 447)

Ngân hàng Nhà nước đẩy mạnh kiểm soát, phòng ngừa và ngăn chặn các giao dịch thẻ quốc tế không phù hợp

Với các kênh chuyển tiền qua sàn giao dịch tiền ảo, do Việt Nam chưa công nhận nên vẫn chưa có hành lang pháp lý để quản lý. Song dù có công nhận loại tiền này thì việc quản lý khá phức tạp, đòi hỏi sự vào cuộc và liên kết của nhiều bộ, ngành. 

In a fiat currency system, neither money nor government debt are real. They are illusions, mass delusions. This allows politicians to periodically bring the nation to the imaginary brink, point the cameras into a fictitious abyss, and then rescue us from a crisis of their own creation – all with the stroke of a pen.

She gave about $12 million to a pair of political committees, the Reform America Fund and the Freedom Partners Action Fund, that bought ads attacking Feingold.

Swensen argues against corporate bonds (they “serve no valuable portfolio role”). Hedge funds, venture capital and leveraged buyouts “belong only in the portfolios of the handful of investors with the resources and fortitude to pursue and maintain a high-quality active management programme”. Many investors will disagree on some points (they may want to hold gold, they may think active funds can play a role), but the warning to avoid the temptation of alternative investments is one to heed.

That’s why Swensen recommends the opposite for private investors in his book Unconventional Success. This was published in 2005 and the investment business has moved on in a few respects, but the message remains relevant. Investors should build a portfolio around six core asset classes that have distinctively different properties: domestic shares, international shares, emerging market shares, real estate investment trusts, government bonds and index-linked government bonds. And they should implement this through cheap index funds. 

Some investors will assume that even if they can’t earn the 60% of outperformance that came from top managers, they can still get the 40% that comes from more exotic asset allocation. But in alternative assets, it rarely works that way. Performance is highly skewed: a small number of managers do very well, while a large number do rather poorly. The underperformance from a pool of inferior managers will often wipe out all the theoretical outperformance you’d expect from the asset class, leaving you worse off than if you’d kept it simple.

Plenty of endowments, pension funds and other institutions have failed in their attempt to emulate the Yale model, and most private investors are likely to do even worse if they try to copy Swensen’s approach.Advertisement - Article continues belowThe main reason hides in plain sight in Yale’s own analysis of its returns. Only 40% of its outperformance is due to asset allocation; the rest is due to the manager’s selection. Yale has a skilled team and a rigorous process dedicated to finding the best managers – an edge that is much harder to duplicate than simply copying its current asset allocation (see chart). What’s more, Yale’s clout and network gives it access to high-performing funds that aren’t available to many institutions, let alone individuals.

The board is expected to maintain a viable level for the core fund account (e.g. minimum of 12 months of fixed expenses)

He was telling me it was 3,500, but the landlord was keeping 2,500 and giving him 1,000 of it. And I had found out, because the own landlord lady told me, and I had to move and I had to lose my job.

We didn't know what to do. There was no... Just got to go back to the old things that we were doing. But luckily, I was able to cut hair and do tattoos, and I was able to get by.

So sometimes I would have to miss school, sometimes I wouldn't go to school. So then it was chaos.

Reclaim Finance and Urgewald, two non-profit environmental campaigning groups, analysed a sample of 29 leading asset managers between February and March this year, which together oversee $41tn (€34tn) in both passive and active investments globally, and found just a quarter of these were covered by coal exclusion policies.The failure to tackle coal investments was even more stark for the largest passive managers for which data was readily available: BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, Invesco, JPMorgan, UBS, Legal & General Investment Management, Amundi and DWS.