318 Matching Annotations
  1. Last 7 days
    1. 2020-03

    2. Donsimoni. J. R., Glawion. R., Plachter. B., Walde. K., (2020). Projecting the Spread of COVID-19 for Germany. Institute of labor economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13094/

    3. We model the evolution of the number of in­di­vid­u­als that are reported to be sick with COVID-19 in Germany. Our the­o­ret­i­cal framework builds on a con­tin­u­ous time Markov chain with four states: healthy without infection, sick, healthy after recovery or after infection but without symptoms and dead. Our quan­ti­ta­tive solution matches the number of sick in­di­vid­u­als up to the most recent ob­ser­va­tion and ends with a share of sick in­di­vid­u­als following from infection rates and sickness prob­a­bil­i­ties. We employ this framework to study inter alia the expected peak of the number of sick in­di­vid­u­als in a scenario without public reg­u­la­tion of social contacts. We also study the effects of public reg­u­la­tions. For all scenarios we report the expected end of the CoV-2 epidemic
    4. Pro­ject­ing the Spread of COVID-19 for Germany
    1. 2020-03

    2. Briscese. G., Lacetera. N., Macis. M., Tonin. M., (2020) Compliance with COVID-19 Social-​Distancing Measures in Italy: The Role of Expectations and Duration. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13092/

    3. We study how in­ten­tions to comply with the self-​isolation re­stric­tions enacted in Italy in response to the COVID-19 crisis respond to the length of their possible extension. Based on a survey of a rep­re­sen­ta­tive sample of Italian residents (N=894), we find that re­spon­dents who are pos­i­tively surprised by a given hy­po­thet­i­cal extension (i.e. the extension is shorter than what they expected) are more willing to increase their self-​isolation. In contrast, negative surprises (ex­ten­sions longer than expected) relate with a lower will­ing­ness to comply. In a context where in­di­vid­ual com­pli­ance has col­lec­tive benefits, but full en­force­ment is costly and con­tro­ver­sial, com­mu­ni­ca­tion and per­sua­sion have a fun­da­men­tal role. Our findings provide insights to public au­thor­i­ties on how to announce lockdown measures and manage people’s ex­pec­ta­tions.
    4. Com­pli­ance with COVID-19 Social-​Distancing Measures in Italy: The Role of Ex­pec­ta­tions and Duration
    1. 2020-06

    2. Fuchs-Schunder. N., Kuhn. M., Tertilt. M., (2020). The Short-Run Macro Implications of School and Child-​Care Closures Institute of labor Economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13353/

    3. The COVID19 crisis has hit labor markets. School and child-​care closures have put families with children in chal­leng­ing sit­u­a­tions. We look at Germany and quantify the macro­eco­nomic im­por­tance of working parents. We document that 26 percent of the German workforce have children aged 14 or younger and estimate that 11 percent of workers and 8 percent of all working hours are affected if schools and child-​care centers remain closed. In most European countries, the share of affected working hours is even higher. Policies to restart the economy have to ac­com­mo­date the concerns of these families.
    4. The Short-Run Macro Im­pli­ca­tions of School and Child-​Care Closures
    1. 2020-06

    2. Dang. H. A. H., Huynh. T. L. D., Nguyen. M. H. (2020) Does the COVID-19 Pandemic Disproportionately Affect the Poor? Evidence from a Six-​Country Survey. Institute of labor economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13352/

    3. The COVID-19 pandemic has wrought havocs on economies around the world. Yet, barely any evidence currently exists on the dis­tri­b­u­tional impacts of the pandemic. We provide the first study that offers new the­o­ret­i­cal and empirical evidence on the dis­tri­b­u­tional impacts of the pandemic on different income groups in a multi-​country setting. Analyzing rich individual-​level data from a six-​country survey, we find that while the outbreak has no impacts on household income losses, it results in a 65-percent reduction in the expected own labor income for the second-​poorest income quintile. The impacts of the pandemic are most no­tice­able in terms of savings, with all the four poorer income quintiles suffering reduced savings ranging between 5 and 7 percent compared to the richest income quintile. The poor are also less likely to change their behaviors, both in terms of immediate pre­ven­tion measures against COVID-19 and healthy ac­tiv­i­ties. We also find countries to exhibit het­ero­ge­neous impacts. The United Kingdom has the least household income loss and expected labor income loss, and the most savings. Japanese are least likely to adapt be­hav­ioral changes, but Chinese, Italians, and South Koreans wash their hands and wear a mask more often than Americans.
    4. Does the COVID-19 Pandemic Dis­pro­por­tion­ately Affect the Poor? Evidence from a Six-​Country Survey
    1. 2020-06

    2. Aksoy. C. G., Eichengreen. B., Saka. O., (2020). The Political Scar of Epidemics. Institute of labor economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13351/

    3. What will be political legacy of the Coro­n­avirus pandemic? We find that epidemic exposure in an in­di­vid­ual’s “im­pres­sion­able years” (ages 18 to 25) has a per­sis­tent negative effect on con­fi­dence in political in­sti­tu­tions and leaders. We find similar negative effects on con­fi­dence in public health systems, sug­gest­ing that the loss of con­fi­dence in political lead­er­ship and in­sti­tu­tions is as­so­ci­ated with healthcare-​related policies at the time of the epidemic. In line with this argument, our results are mostly driven by in­di­vid­u­als who ex­pe­ri­enced epidemics under weak gov­ern­ments with less capacity to act against the epidemic, dis­ap­point­ing their citizens. We provide evidence of this mechanism by showing that weak gov­ern­ments took longer to introduce policy in­ter­ven­tions in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. These results imply that the Coro­n­avirus may leave behind a long-​lasting political scar on the current young gen­er­a­tion (“Gen­er­a­tion Z”).
    4. The Political Scar of Epidemics
    1. 2020-06

    2. Lewandowski. P., Lipowska. K., Magda. I., (2020) The Gender Dimension of Occupational Exposure to Contagion in Europe Institute of labor economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13336/

    3. We study the gender dimension of oc­cu­pa­tional exposure to con­ta­gious diseases spread by the res­pi­ra­tory or close-​contact route. We show that in Europe, women are more exposed to contagion, as they are more likely than men to work in oc­cu­pa­tions that require contact with diseases, frequent contact with clients, and high levels of physical proximity at work. Women are also more likely than men to be unable to work from home, which con­tributes to their increased exposure. Gender is a more important factor in workers’ exposure to contagion than their education or age. This gender dif­fer­ence in exposure can be largely at­trib­uted to patterns of sectoral seg­re­ga­tion, and to the seg­re­ga­tion of women within sectors into oc­cu­pa­tions that require more in­ter­per­sonal in­ter­ac­tions. While workers in Southern European countries are the most exposed to contagion, the gender dif­fer­ences in exposure are greatest in the Nordic and Con­ti­nen­tal European countries.
    4. The Gender Dimension of Oc­cu­pa­tional Exposure to Contagion in Europe
    1. 2020-04

    2. Von Gaudecker. H. M., Holler. R., Janys. L., Siflinger. B., Zimpelmann. C. (2020). Labour Supply in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Empirical Evidence on Hours, Home Office, and Expectations. Institute of labor economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13158/

    3. Using a survey module ad­min­is­tered in late March 2020, we analyze how working hours change under the social dis­tanc­ing reg­u­la­tions enacted to fight the CoViD-19 pandemic. We study the Nether­lands, which are a pro­to­typ­i­cal Western European country, both in terms of its welfare system and its response to the pandemic. We show that total hours decline and more so for the self-​employed and those with lower ed­u­ca­tional degrees. The education gradient appears because workers with a tertiary degree work a much higher number of hours from home. The strength of this effect is dampened by the gov­ern­ment defining some workers to be essential for the working of the economy. Across sectors, we show that there are two clusters: One dominated by office-​type oc­cu­pa­tions with high shares of academics, home-​office hours, and low fractions of essential workers; and one where manual tasks and social in­ter­ac­tions are prevalent with low shares of academics, home office hours, and often high shares of essential workers. Short-​term ex­pec­ta­tions show that workers expect current patterns to prevail and that they expect a lot from gov­ern­ment support schemes. In par­tic­u­lar, many workers expect to keep their jobs in early June due to gov­ern­ment support and the expected un­em­ploy­ment response is far lower than in the U.S. or the U.K..
    4. Labour Supply in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Empirical Evidence on Hours, Home Office, and Ex­pec­ta­tions
    1. FitzRoy. F., Jin. J., (2020). Reforming Tax and Welfare: Social Justice and Recovery after the Pandemic. Institute of Labor Economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/pp157/

    2. Capital income subsidies, and reliance on indirect con­sump­tion taxes have created an in­creas­ingly re­gres­sive overall tax system in the UK, US and elsewhere, with pro­por­tion­ately much greater impact on the poor than on the rich, and welfare cuts under ten years of austerity have had the largest impact on the most vul­ner­a­ble and poorest, now magnified by the Covid-19 pandemic. We show how a pro­gres­sive wealth tax combined with a uniform, linear tax on all incomes and a modest basic income, with no ex­emp­tions or reliefs and no indirect taxes except excise taxes such as fuel duties, could be highly pro­gres­sive overall, as well as much fairer and simpler than the present system. Such reform would render the economy much more resilient, and po­ten­tially dev­as­tat­ing economic con­se­quences of the pandemic could be mitigated by an emergency basic income and sus­pen­sion of rental payments.
    3. Reforming Tax and Welfare: Social Justice and Recovery after the Pandemic
    1. 2020-05

    2. Oswald. A., J. Powdthavee. N., (2020). Age, Death Risk, and the Design of an Exit Strategy: A Guide for Policymakers and for Citizens Who Want to Stay Alive. Retrieved from: https://covid 19.iza.org/publications/dp13221/

    3. Age, Death Risk, and the Design of an Exit Strategy: A Guide for Pol­i­cy­mak­ers and for Citizens Who Want to Stay Alive
    4. Some com­men­ta­tors argue for a fairly general release from COVID-19 lockdown. That has a troubling flaw. It ignores the fatality risks that will then be faced by citizens in midlife and older. This paper provides in­for­ma­tion on the strong age-​pattern in the risk of death from three countries (China, Italy, the UK). If politi­cians want an imminent removal of the lockdown, the safest approach in our judgment would be a rolling age-​release strategy combined with the current principle of social dis­tanc­ing. But even if that is not the policy adopted, citizens need to be shown graphs of the kind in this paper. Honest guidance ought to be given to those in midlife and beyond. Gov­ern­ments have to allow people to un­der­stand their personal risk after any release from lockdown.
    1. 2020-05

    2. Bargain. O., Aminjonov. U., (2020) Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of COVID-19. Institute of Labor Economics. Retrieved from: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications/dp13205/

    3. While degraded trust and cohesion within a country are often shown to have large so­cioe­co­nomic impacts, they can also have dramatic con­se­quences when com­pli­ance is required for col­lec­tive survival. We il­lus­trate this point in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Policy responses all over the world aim to reduce social in­ter­ac­tion and limit contagion. Using data on human mobility and political trust at regional level in Europe, we examine whether the com­pli­ance to these con­tain­ment policies depends on the level of trust in policy makers prior to the crisis. Using a double dif­fer­ence approach around the time of lockdown an­nounce­ments, we find that high-​trust regions decrease their mobility related to non-​necessary ac­tiv­i­ties sig­nif­i­cantly more than low-trust regions. We also exploit country and time variation in treatment using the daily strict­ness of national policies. The ef­fi­ciency of policy strin­gency in terms of mobility reduction sig­nif­i­cantly increases with trust. The trust effect is nonlinear and increases with the degree of strin­gency. We assess how the impact of trust on mobility po­ten­tially trans­lates in terms of mortality growth rate.
    4. Trust and Com­pli­ance to Public Health Policies in Times of COVID-19
    1. 2020-07-30

    2. Field, S. M., Hoek, J. M., de Vries, Y. A., Linde, M., Pittelkow, M., Muradchanian, J., & van Ravenzwaaij, D. (2020, July 30). Rethinking Remdesivir for COVID-19: A Bayesian Reanalysis of Trial Findings. https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/2kam7

    3. 10.31222/osf.io/2kam7
    4. Following testing in clinical trials, the use of remdesivir for treatment of COVID-19 has been authorized for use in parts of the world, including the USA and Europe. These early authorizations were largely based on results from two clinical trials. A third study published by Wang et al. was deemed inconclusive. We demonstrate the utility of Bayesian reanalyses in the context of non-significant results like the Wang et al. trial. Results of a reanalysis of the three trials show ambiguous evidence for the primary outcome of clinical improvement and moderate evidence against efficacy of remdesivir for the secondary outcome of mortality rate. We recommend that regulatory bodies take all available evidence into account for endorsement decisions.
    5. Rethinking Remdesivir for COVID-19: A Bayesian Reanalysis of Trial Findings
    1. De Anda-Jauregui. G., Guzmán. P., Hernández-Rosales. M. (2007) The Contact Network of Mexico City. Physics and Society. Retrieved from: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14596

    2. 2020-07-29

    3. arXiv:2007.14596
    4. The most basic level of human interaction is that which happens at close proximity: conversations, physical commerce, education, sports, entertainment and transportation, are all activities that are possible through close proximity without the use of technology. The way in which people physically interact is a major component in the complexity found in human societies. Mexico City, the largest city in Mexico, is as well one of the largest cities in the world, with over 9 million inhabitants and concentrating the vast majority of government and business centers. Reconstructing the set of physical interactions between its inhabitants could lead to a better understanding of the city's complexity. Such contact network can be used for applications that range from urban planning to the spread of infectious agents. In this work, we used anonymized location data from mobile devices (cellphones) collected in the month of February 2020 to reconstruct contact networks for several days, based on physical proximity of these devices. We found that contact networks in Mexico City are very sparse, with a heavy tailed degree distribution, characterized by a largest connected component that contains between 1010 and 20%20\% of devices. We found that, while network topologies are different each day, there is no consistent difference in these between weekdays and weekends. We present this results along with the release of an anonymized network reconstructed with data from Februrary 18th, 2020, as the first description of a contact network of Mexico City
    5. The Contact Network of Mexico City
    1. /10.1037/bul0000030
    2. Weingarten. E., Chen. Q., McAdams., Yi. J., (2016). From Primed Concepts to Action: A Meta-Analysis of the BehavioralEffects of Incidentally Presented Words. Psychological Bulletin 2016 (142) pp 472-497.

    3. From Primed Concepts to Action: A Meta-Analysis of the BehavioralEffects of Incidentally Presented Words
    1. 2020-07-30

    2. Mendes, M. (2020, July 30). Coronavirus misinformation and the political scenario: the science cannot be ‘another’ barrier. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/vhkwc

    3. 10.31234/osf.io/vhkwc
    4. The sensible and conflicting scenario of the pandemic postulated many challenges to societies around the world in 2020. Part of this problem refers to how the differences between politics and science are not comprehended in their particularities. The recognition of limits and power of science and politics can not only contribute to reaching the actions and strategies facing novel coronavirus but also optimized many domains of societies post-pandemic.
    5. Coronavirus misinformation and the political scenario: the science cannot be ‘another’ barrier
    1. 2020-07-29

    2. Lees, J. M., & Cikara, M. (2020, July 29). Understanding and Combating False Polarization. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ncwez

    3. 10.31234/osf.io/ncwez
    4. By many accounts politics is becoming more polarized, yielding dire consequences for democracy and trust in government. Yet a growing body of research on “false polarization” finds that perceptions of “what the other side believes” are inaccurate–specifically, overly pessimistic–and that these inaccuracies exacerbate intergroup conflict. Through a review of existing work and a reanalysis of published data, we (i) develop a typology of the disparate phenomena that are labeled “polarization,” (ii) use that typology to understand when polarization is “false,” and (iii) identify when false polarization gives rise to true polarization (e.g., extreme issue attitudes and prejudice). We further suggest that a specific psychological domain is ideal for developing corrective interventions: meta-perception, one’s judgment of how they are perceived by others. We review evidence indicating that correcting meta-perception inaccuracies is effective at reducing intergroup conflict, and discuss methods for precisely measuring meta-perception accuracy. We argue that the reputational nature of meta-perception provides a motivational mechanism by which individuals are sensitive to the truth, even when those truths pertain to the “other side.” We conclude by discussing how these insights can be integrated into existing research across multiple disciplines seeking to understand polarization and its negative consequences.
    5. Understanding and Combating False Polarization
    1. 2020-07-24

    2. Vasconcelos. M. K., Epalza. C., Renk. H., Tagarro. A., Bielicki. J. A., (2020). Harmonisation preserves research resources. The Lancet Infectious Diseases. Retrieved from: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30585-5/fulltext

    3. 10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30585-5
    4. In their Comment, the International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC) clinical characterisation group outline how harmonisation of clinical characterisation studies is achieved through their collaborative resource-sharing and data-sharing platform.1ISARIC clinical characterisation groupGlobal outbreak research: harmony not hegemony.Lancet Infect Dis. 2020; 20: 770-772Summary Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (0) Google Scholar We fully agree with both the importance of international harmonisation and the authors' approach. Yet, in our opinion, they could have expressed more clearly how important harmonisation is to use resources in research responsibly and efficiently.
    5. Harmonisation preserves research resources
    1. 2020-07-29

    2. Bierwiaczonek, K., Kunst, J. R., & Pich, O. (2020, July 29). Belief in COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories Reduces Social Distancing over Time. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/tqfrw

    3. 10.31234/osf.io/tqfrw
    4. Background Conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 are wide-spread and have even been propagated by highly ranked state officials and politicians in the U.S. Health authorities have cautioned that such theories, although not questioning the existence of the pandemic, may increase the spread of the virus by reducing people’s efforts to socially distance. Methods We test this proposition empirically using longitudinal survey data collected at five time points during the early outbreak of the virus in the U.S. (N = 403). Results Multivariate growth curve analyses showed that, although conspiracy beliefs decreased and social distancing increased over time, people holding more conspiracy beliefs at the beginning of the pandemic showed the lowest increase in social distancing. Moreover, cross-lagged analyses demonstrated that people who reported more conspiracy beliefs at any wave tended to report less social distancing at the following wave. Conclusions Our findings show that COVID-19 conspiracy theories pose a significant threat to public health as they may reduce adherence to social distancing measures. Keywords Conspiracy theories, COVID-19, social distancing, longitudinal
    5. Belief in COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories Reduces Social Distancing over Time
    1. 2020-07-29

    2. Hoekstra, R., & Vazire, S. (2020, July 29). Hoekstra & Vazire (2020), Intellectual humility is central to science. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/edh2s

    3. 10.31234/osf.io/edh2s
    4. Transparency is indispensable for accuracy and correction in science, and is discussed frequently in the credibility revolution. A less often mentioned aspect of credibility is the need for intellectual humility: When scientific communication is overconfident or contains too many exaggerations, the field stands to lose its credibility, even if the methods and statistics underlying the research are sound. We argue that intellectual humility is given a great deal of lip service, but is too rarely valued - we may say that we as scientists ought to be intellectually humble, but our actions as a field suggest that this is not a priority. Although we acknowledge that intellectual humility is presented as a widely accepted scientific norm, we argue that current research practice does not actually incentivize intellectual humility. A promising solution could be to use our roles as reviewers to incentivize authors putting the flaws and uncertainty in their work front and center, thus giving their critics ammunition to find their errors. We describe several ways reviewers (and authors) can contribute to increasing humility in practice, instead of passively waiting for the system to change
    5. Hoekstra & Vazire (2020), Intellectual humility is central to science
  2. Jul 2020
    1. 2020-07-17

    2. Basen. R. (2020) Sports Leagues' COVID-19 Research: Who Will It Help? Medpagetoday. Retrieved from: https://www.medpagetoday.com/infectiousdisease/covid19/87604

    3. Since early in the pandemic, professional sports leagues have been sponsoring and participating in COVID-19 studies, offering large populations and needed funding to help researchers learn more about a disease threatening both public health and the leagues' operations. As new studies launch with the National Basketball Association (NBA) returning to action soon, experts are simultaneously applauding the leagues' involvement while questioning their motives and citing glaring limitations.
    4. Sports Leagues' COVID-19 Research: Who Will It Help?
    1. 2020-07-28

    2. Musaddique. S. (2020) Private tuition is booming in the UK during COVID-19. We spoke to leading tutors about why online learning is here to stay. Buisness Insider. Retrieved from: https://www.businessinsider.com/private-tuition-is-thriving-with-schools-closed-during-covid-19-2020-7?r=US&IR=T

    3. UK schools closed during the coronavirus pandemic, and parents turned to private, online tutors to help educate their children.Sign-ups to become tutors have rocketed during the COVID-19 crisis, and parents are using online tutors to plug the gaps in home teaching.Business Insider spoke to tutors to find out what it's been like to teach children online — and to discuss whether online tuition will last after lockdown.
    4. Private tuition is booming in the UK during COVID-19. We spoke to leading tutors about why online learning is here to stay.
    1. Willettes. M. (2020) 85 kids, counselors infected with coronavirus in YMCA camp outbreak, GA officials say. Retrieved: https://www.macon.com/news/coronavirus/article244158667.html

    2. A pair of YMCA camps in Georgia closed down in late June after a counselor tested positive for the coronavirus, but in the days since they were shut, the number of confirmed infections has climbed into the dozens, media outlets report. YMCA called the summer season off early for High Harbour Camp locations at Lake Burton and Lake Allatoona, but at least 30 or more camp attendees have, or have had, the virus, outlets have reported. But as of Friday, officials said the true number is much higher -- at least 85 kids and counselors have tested positive -- all stemming from their time at Lake Burton, Georgia Department of Public Health officials told McClatchy News
    3. Coronavirus
    1. 2020-07-25

    2. Pandemic science and politics

      Ball. P. (2020) Pandemic science and politics.. Retrieved from: chrome-extension://bjfhmglciegochdpefhhlphglcehbmek/pdfjs/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thelancet.com%2Faction%2FshowPdf%3Fpii%3DS0140-6736%252820%252931594-4

    3. Perspectiveswww.thelancet.comVol 396 July 25, 2020229In 2019, the Global Health Security Alliance assessed worldwide adher­ence to the International Health Regulations (2005), which supposedly commit nations to measures that prevent or control the spread of infectious diseases and mitigate their effects. The study found that no nation was fully prepared, and many countries—rich or poor—fell woefully short. This finding is only one of the many indications that we could have been ready, nationally and globally, to deal with a crisis like COVID­19, but were not. It’s far from clear that the pandemic, once started in Wuhan, China, could ever have been contained. But there are good reasons to think it need never have been so catastrophic for both lives and economies
    1. 98.6 Degrees Is a Normal Body Temperature, Right? Not Quite


    2. Marill. M. C. (2018). 98.6 Degrees Is a Normal Body Temperature, Right? Not Quite. WIRED. Retrieved from: https://www.wired.com/story/98-degrees-is-a-normal-body-temperature-right-not-quite/

    3. You wake up at 6 am feeling achy and chilled. Unsure if you’re sick or just sleep-deprived, you reach for a thermometer. It beeps at 99°F, so you groan and roll out of bed and get ready for work. Because that’s not a fever. Is it?Yes, it is. Forget everything you know about normal body temperature and fever, starting with 98.6. That’s an antiquated number based on a flawed study from 1868 (yes, 150 years ago). The facts about fever are a lot more complicated.First, there’s no single number for normal. It’s slightly higher for women than men. It’s higher for children than adults. And it is lowest in the morning.
    4. 98.6 Degrees Is a Normal Body Temperature, Right? Not Quite
    1. RT @NatureNews: Look beyond gender — if research thrives on collaboration, a book asks, why do we reward individualism? https://t.co/l9ifgN…

      The link doesn't go to the webpage.

    2. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w27451|https://www.nber.org/papers/w27451> <https://www.nber.org/papers/w27427|https://www.nber.org/papers/w27427> <https://www.nber.org/papers/w27392|https://www.nber.o

      When you click on the link it says the page is missing.

    1. 2020-7-1

    2. DeAngelis. T., (2020). Could COVID-19 change our environmental behaviour. American Psychological Association. 51(5) Retrieved from:https://www.apa.org/monitor/2020/07/environmental-behaviors

    3. A smog-free Los Angeles skyline. A pristine view of the Himalayas from northern India, not seen for decades. Clear sight of the Eiffel Tower from Paris suburbs, previously obscured by pollution. And with less travel, less burning of fossil fuels, leading to a projected 8% decrease in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere this year—the largest drop ever recorded, according to the International Energy Agency. Such striking and unexpected environmental consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are unlikely to continue once the crisis has subsided and life resumes its former pace. But psychologists are using this moment to examine how lessons from COVID-19 might spark long-term improvements in sustainability habits, inform climate change research and communication, and improve community efforts to address climate change.
    4. Could COVID-19 change our environmental behaviors?
    1. 2020-07-14

    2. Corral. A., (2020). Scientific comment on "Tail risk of contagious diseases" Cornell University Physics and Society. Retrieved from: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06876

    3. arXiv:2007.06876
    4. Cirillo and Taleb [Nature Phys. 16, 606-613 (2020)] study the size of major epidemics in human history in terms of the number of fatalities. Using the figures from 72 epidemics, from the plague of Athens (429 BC) to the COVID-19 (2019-2020), they claim that the resulting fatality distribution is ``extremely fat-tailed'', i.e., asymptotically a power law. This has important consequences for risk, as the mean value of the fatality distribution becomes infinite. Reanalyzing the same data, we find that, although the data may be compatible with a power-law tail, these results are not conclusive, and other distributions, not fat-tailed, could explain the data equally well. Simulation of a log-normally distributed random variable provides synthetic data whose statistics are undistinguishable from the statistics of the empirical data.
    5. Scientific comment on "Tail risk of contagious diseases"
    1. 2020-7-16

    2. Benedictus. L., (2020). Independent SAGE’s estimated death rate is too high. Full Fact. Retrieved from: https://fullfact.org/health/independent-sage-27000/

    3. Claim The Chief Medical Officer, Chris Whitty, plans for the current rate of Covid-19 infections and deaths to continue. Conclusion This is a misunderstanding of what Professor Whitty said. He was talking about hygiene rules continuing, not levels of infection staying the same.
    4. Independent SAGE’s estimated death rate is too high
    1. 2020-07-10

    2. Matamala-Gomez. M., Brivio E., Chirico. A., Malighetti. C., Realdon. O., Serino. S., Dakanalis. A., Corno. G., Polli. N., Cacciatore. C., Riva. Giuseppe., Mantovani. F (2020) User Experience and usability of a new virtual reality set-up to treat eating disorders: a pilot study. PsyArXiv Preprints. Retrieved from: https://psyarxiv.com/b38ym/

    3. 10.31234/osf.io/b38ym
    4. Virtual Reality (VR) has progressively emerged as an effective tool for wellbeing and health in clinical populations. VR effectiveness has been tested before in Anorexia Nervosa (AN) with full-body illusion. It consists in the embodiment of patients with AN into a different virtual body to modify their long-term memory of the body as a crucial factor for the onset and maintenance of this disorder. We extended this protocol using the autobiographical recall emotion-induction technique, in which patients recall an emotional episode of their life related to their body. In this pilot study, we aimed to test the usability and User Experience (UX) of this VR-based protocol. Five Italian women with AN were embodied in a virtual body resembling their perceived body size from an ego- and an allocentric perspective while remembering episodes of their life related to their body. High levels of embodiment were reported while embodied in a virtual body resembling their real perceived body size for ownership (p<0.0001), agency (p=0.04), and self-location (p=0.023). Negative affective state increase after session 2 (p=0.012), and positive affective state increase after session 4 (p=0.006) (PANAS). However, further iteration of the VR system is needed to improve the user experience and usability of the system.
    5. User Experience and usability of a new virtual reality set-up to treat eating disorders: a pilot study
    1. 2020-06-18

    2. Ward. J., Alleaume. C., Peretti-Watel P (2020) The French public’s attitudes to a future COVID-19 vaccine: the politicization of a public health issue. SocArXiv Papers. Retrieved from https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xphe9/

    3. 10.31235/osf.io/xphe9
    4. As Covid-19 spreads across the world, governments turn a hopeful eye towards research and development of a vaccine against this new disease. But it is one thing to make a vaccine available, and it is quite another to convince the public to take the shot, as the precedent of the 2009 H1N1 flu illustrated. In this paper, we present the results of four online surveys conducted in April 2020 in representative samples of the French population 18 years of age and over (N=5,018). These surveys were conducted during a period when the French population was on lockdown and the daily number of deaths attributed to the virus reached its peak. We found that if a vaccine against the new coronavirus became available, almost a quarter of respondents would not use it. We also found that attitudes to this vaccine were correlated significantly with political partisanship and engagement with the political system. Attitudes towards this future vaccine did not follow the traditional mapping of political attitudes along a Left-Right axis but oppose people who feel close to governing parties (Centre, Left and Right) on the one hand, and, on the other, people who feel close to Far-Left and Far-Right parties as well as people who do not feel close to any party. We draw on the French sociological literature on ordinary attitudes to politics to discuss our results as well as the cultural pathways via which political beliefs can affect perceptions of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    5. The French public’s attitudes to a future COVID-19 vaccine: the politicization of a public health issue
    1. Ljiljana Lazarevic Danka Purić Predrag Teovanovic Goran Knezevic Petar Lukic Zorana Zupan

      Lazarevic. L., Purić. D., Teovanovic, P., Knezevic, G., Lukic., P., Zupan, Z (2020) What drives us to be (ir)responsible for our health during the COVID-19 pandemic? The role of personality, thinking styles and conspiracy mentality. PsyArXiv Preprints. Retrieved from https://psyarxiv.com/cgeuv/