198 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2021
  2. Mar 2021
    1. ReconfigBehSci. (2020, November 3). As debate on ‘saving the economy versus saving lives’ marches on, it’s worth noting that this type of contrast actually has a name in fallacy research: Https://t.co/N8U4ABWTuh it’s also worth noting that there is now a substantial number of research articles on the topic. 1/n [Tweet]. @SciBeh. https://twitter.com/SciBeh/status/1323603017179013130

    1. It is perhaps predictable that, instead of presenting a bulwark against stratification, technology outcomes have tracked society's growing inequality. A yawning chasm of disparities is playing out in our phones at the same time it has come to shape our economic and political lives.
    1. Preliminary results from the first year are tantalizing for anyone interested in solutions to address rising inequality in the United States, especially as they manifest along racial and gender lines. Within the first year, the study’s participants obtained jobs at twice the rate of the control group. At the beginning of the study, 28 percent of the participants had full-time employment, and after the first year, that number rose to 40 percent.

      This is what happened when 125 participants were given $500/month over two years to see what would happen.

  3. Feb 2021
    1. “In the last decade, especially with the pioneering work of Thomas Piketty and his co-authors, there has been a growing consensus that tax cuts for the rich lead to higher income inequality,” Hope and Limberg said.
    1. Even worse, Shadow Stat's numbers show so much inflation the past 25 years that, as Jim Pethokoukis points out, it implies the economy hasn't grown at all during that time.

      Important Point

      Real economic numbers validate a 25 year period (or more) of manipulated inflation and low growth economy. INCOME INEQUALITY statistics and recent studies ALL validate fuzzy math, rosy picture for the 1% and stagnant dismal picture for average Americans. Trump based his entire campaign and Presidency on Making America Great Again

      Supporting Link

    2. So which seems likelier: that we're no better off than we were a quarter century ago, or that Shadow Stats is total bunk?

      Great Question

      This is an easy question to answer from my perspective. For me (age 62) and most of my peers, their kids and their peers, we are NO better off than we were a quarter century ago! A large part is the change from Industrial/Manufacturing to Technology and the outsourced labor and manufacturing. America has changed, this is FACT

  4. Jan 2021
    1. Johnson: Earlier I interviewed you about patrilocal residence patterns and how that alters women’s sexual choices. In contrast, matrilocal societies are more likely to be egalitarian. What are the factors that lead to the differences between these two systems?Hrdy: I think in societies where women have more say, and that does tend to be in societies that are matrilocal and with matrilineal descent or where, as it is among many small scale hunter-gatherers, you have porous social boundaries and flexible residence patterns. If I had to say what kind of residence patterns our ancestors had it would have been very flexible, what Frank Marlowe calls multilocal.

      Matrilocality, matrilinearity and egailitarianism.

  5. Dec 2020
    1. The effort of confronting that machine, day in and day out, compounded over a lifetime, leads to stress so corrosive that it physically changes bodies

      How does this highlight questions of power? Is it hard or soft power in evidence?

    1. Highlights erroneously posted to a group:

       We allocate national consumption emissions to individuals within each country based on a functional relationship between income and emissions, drawing on new income distribution dataset 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      inequalityOxfam and SEI's approach to estimating how global carbon emissions can be attributed to individuals based on their consumption builds on Oxfam's 2015 report 'Extreme Carbon Inequality,'23 which gave a snapshot of the global distribution of emissions in a single year, and that of Chancel and Piketty24 among others. It is explained in detail in the accompanying research report.25 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      nequal growth has another cost: it means that the global carbon budget is being rapidly depleted, not for the purpose of lifting all of humanity to a decent standard of living, but to a large extent to expand the consumption of a minority of the world's very richest people 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      The World Bank recently concluded that continued unequal growth will barely make a dent in the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day by 2030; only a reduction in income inequality will help 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      S. Kartha, E. Kempt-Benedict, E. Ghosh, A. Nazareth and T. Gore. (2020). The Carbon Inequality Era: An assessment of the global distribution of consumption emissions among individuals from 1990 to 2015 and beyond. Oxfam and SEI. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/handle/10546/621049The dataset is available at https://www.sei.org/projects-and-tools/tools/emissions-inequality-dashboard 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      The poorest 50% barely increased their consumption emissions at all. 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      t is striking that the shares of emissions across income groups have remained essentially unchanged across the period 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      the total emissions added to the atmosphere since the mid-1800s approximately doubled.2Global GDP doubled in this period too, a 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      juncture – prioritizing yet more grossly unequal, carbon intensive economic growth to the benefit of the rich minority 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      in the service of increasing the consumption of the already affluent, rather than lifting people out of poverty. 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      It took about 140 years to use 750Gt of the global carbon budget, and just 25 years from 1990 to 2015 to use about the same again 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      Oxfamand SEI's research estimates how global carbon emissions are attributed to individuals who are the end consumers of goods and services for which the emissions were generated. See Box 2. 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      while the total growth in emissions of the richest 1% was three times that of the poorest 50% 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      The richest 1% (c.63 million people) alone were responsible for15% of cumulative emissions, and 9% of the carbon budget –twice as much as the poorest half of the world’s population 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      he richest 10% of the world’s population (c.630 million people) were responsible for 52% of the cumulative carbon emissions – depleting the global carbon budget by nearly a third (31%) in those 25 years alone 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      From 1990 to 2015, a 
      

      HeinzWittenbrink 26 Dec 2020 in COS-OER

      This briefing describes new research that shows how extreme carbon inequality in recent decades has brought the world to the climate brink. 
      
    1. American exceptionalism was founded on cooperation — between the rich and the poor, between the governors and the governed. From the birth of the nation, the unity across economic classes and different regions was a marvel for European observers, such as St. John de Crèvecoeur and Alexis de Tocqueville. This cooperative spirit unraveled in the mid-nineteenth century, leading to the first “Age of Discord” in American history. It was reforged during the New Deal as an unwritten but very real social contract between government, business and workers, leading to another age of prosperity and cooperation in postwar America. But since the 1970s, that contract has unraveled, in favor of a contract between government and business that has underfunded public services but generously rewarded capital gains and corporate profits.

      This misses some of the underlying factors which also drove 19th century, specifically the information revolution which combined with IP monopoly rights is the core driver of growing inequality. That could be addressed, as with 19th c robber baron capitalism, by nationalisation or serious regulation but that is yet to happen.

    1. Third, i n contrast to the equivocal ideo-logical-polarization trends among the pub-lic, politici ans and other political elites have unambiguously polarized recently on ideo-logical grounds, with Republican politicians moving further to the right than Democratic politicians have moved to the left (SM). This ide ological divergence is driven in part by ex-treme economic inequality in America today, especially in conjunction with candidates be-coming increasingly reliant on ideologically extreme donors. As polit icians chase cam-paign dollars, these extreme voices garner disproportionate influence (SM).

      Yes, the economic "substructure" matters too! Inequality is a big driver both at the level of the party "base" and the "elite" donor level.

    1. wealth persist across racial groups.

      EXAMINE THE SYSTEMS WHICH HELP TO ENFORCE THIS RACIAL INCOME DIVIDE! Most relate. Fixing these systems could help to bridge the income gap between racial groups. Even laws so ingrained in us.

    1. cradle-to-career youth programming

      This becomes where equal opportunity must start - at the beginning of a child's career - at 18, the age we otherwise use to mark the end of childhood and the beginning of childhood.

  6. Nov 2020
    1. crowd out, smaller individual contributions."

      Argument foe limits: we regulate monopolies, and think monoploies in the conomic sense are bad. By allowing unlimited money/power to flow into politics, are we allowing for monopolies on discourse? i.e. extreme or disproportionate influence in agenda setting that may crowd out smaller interests?

    2. An equality-based justification for campaign finance regulation must recognize that the modern regulatory framework can only superficially reduce the impact of economic inequality.
    1. On the other hand, donating and spending on a large scale are taxed at an everincreasing rate, which is beneficial as well. Because of this property, the rich would face arising marginal cost as they tried to exert more financial influence.

      Inequality of political voice is a bad property of a political system. But, limiting freedom of speech may violate charter rights.

    2. However, only the square root of the amount that they donate or spend, multiplied byan amount set to make the system as a whole budget-neutral, would actually be deployed.The rest of the money would enter the public Treasury. Assume, for example, that amultiplier of 10 would make the system budget-neutral. Then if a person donated $1 toBernie Sanders, his campaign would receive $10 (($1^.5)910). Similarly, if a personwanted to independently spend $10,000 to back Donald Trump (or if Trump wanted tospend $10,000 on his own candidacy), $1000 could be used on commercials, mailers, andthe like (($10,000^.5)910), and the other $9000 would go to the government.

      This is fair because it taxes political voice of larger proportional to the size of their spend and amplifies smaller donors. Equalizing the playing field.

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    Annotators

    1. Examining inequality across provinces and time has many advantages.2 Canadian provinces possess considerable comparable autonomy in administering social policy and research shows that inequality shifts are predominantly owing to provincial rather than federal transfers

      Some evidence for rolling out the program on a provincial instead of a federal level.

    1. hat effect, if any, does the extent of economic inequality in a country have upon the political engagement of its citizens?
  7. Oct 2020
    1. These changes are not, on the whole, the fault of globalisation, that scapegoat of the populist insurgency, but of technology-driven changes combined with policies that have reinforced the underlying forces of divergence.

      +1 this is precisely argument of open revolution.

    1. James Bronterre O’Brien, told the people:‘Knaves will tell you that it is because you have no property, you are unrepresented. I tell you on the contrary, it is because you are unrepresented that you have no property …’16

      great quote

    2. A thousand years ago, the world was flat, economically speaking.

      I don't think we have to go back even this far. If I recall correctly, even 150 years ago the vast majority of the world's population were subsistence farmers. It's only been since the 20th century and the increasing spread of the industrial revolution that the situation has changed:

      Even England remained primarily an agrarian country like all tributary societies for the previous 4,000 years, with ca. 50 percent of its population employed in agriculture as late as 1759.

      --David Christian, Maps of Time (pp 401) quoting from Crafts, British Economic Growth, pp. 13–14. (See also Fig 13.1 Global Industrial Potential from the same, for a graphical indicator.

    1. This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions.
    1. Piketty, however, sees inequality as a social phenomenon, driven by human institutions. Institutional change, in turn, reflects the ideology that dominates society: “Inequality is neither economic nor technological; it is ideological and political.”
    2. For Piketty, rising inequality is at root a political phenomenon. The social-democratic framework that made Western societies relatively equal for a couple of generations after World War II, he argues, was dismantled, not out of necessity, but because of the rise of a “neo-proprietarian” ideology. Indeed, this is a view shared by many, though not all, economists. These days, attributing inequality mainly to the ineluctable forces of technology and globalization is out of fashion, and there is much more emphasis on factors like the decline of unions, which has a lot to do with political decisions.
    1. Long, H., correspondentEmailEmailBioEmailFollowEmail, H. L., Dam, rew V., Fowers, rew V. D. focusing on economic dataEmailEmailBioEmailFollowEmailAlyssa, visualization, A. F. reporter focusing on data, data, analysisEmailEmailBioEmailFollowEmailLeslie S. S. reporter focusing on, & storytellingEmailEmailBioEmailFollowEmail, multimedia. (n.d.). The covid-19 recession is the most unequal in modern U.S. history. Washington Post. Retrieved October 2, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/coronavirus-recession-equality/

  8. Sep 2020
  9. Aug 2020
  10. Jul 2020
    1. A new paper by Atif Mian of Princeton University, Ludwig Straub of Harvard University and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago expands on the idea that inequality saps demand from the economy. Just as inequality creates a need for stimulus, they argue, stimulus eventually creates more inequality. This is because it leaves economies more indebted, either because low interest rates encourage households or firms to borrow, or because the government has run deficits. Both public and private indebtedness transfer income to rich investors who own the debt, thereby depressing demand and interest rates still further.