Reviewer #2 (Public Review):
In this manuscript, Ruesseler and colleagues use a continuous task to examine how neural correlates of decision-making change when subjects face conditions with different durations and frequencies of occurrence of signals embedded in noise. The authors develop a novel task where subjects must report the direction of relatively sustained (3 or 5 s) signal changes in average coherence of a random dot kinetogram that are intermittent among relatively transient noise fluctuations (<1 s) of motion coherence that is continuous. Subjects adjust their behavior to changes in the duration of signal events and the frequency of their occurrence. The authors estimate a decay time constant of leaky integration of evidence based on the average coherence leading up to decision responses. Interestingly, there is considerable inter-subject variability in decay time constants even under identical conditions. In addition, the average time constants are shorter when signal periods occur more frequently as opposed to when they are more rare. The authors use EEG to find that a component of the Centroparietal Positivity (CPP) regressed to the magnitude of changes in the noise coherence is larger in conditions when the signal periods occur less frequently. Using a control condition, the authors show that this component of the CPP is not simply based on surprise because it is smaller for changes in motion coherence in irrelevant directions with matched statistics as the changes in relevant directions. The authors also find that a different component of the CPP related to the magnitude of the motion coherence co-varies with the inter-subject variability in decay time constants estimated from behavior.
Overall, the authors use a clever experimental design and approach to tackle an important set of questions in the field of decision-making. The manuscript is easy to follow with clear writing. The analyses are well thought-out and generally appropriate for the questions at hand. From these analyses, the authors have a number of intriguing results. So, there is considerable potential and merit in this work. That said, I have a number of important questions and concerns that largely revolve around putting all the pieces together. I describe these below.
1) Quite sensibly, the authors hypothesize that "decay time constant" for past evidence and "decision threshold" would be altered between the different task conditions. They find clear and compelling evidence of behavioral alterations with the conditions. They also have a method to estimate the decay time constant. However, it is unclear to what extent the decision threshold is changing between subjects and conditions, how that might affect the empirical integration kernel, and how well these two factors can together explain the overall changes in behavior.
To be more specific, the authors state that the lower false alarm rates and slower reaction times for the LONG condition are consistent with a more cautious response threshold for LONG. The empirical integration kernels lead to the suggestion that the decay time constant is not changing between SHORT and LONG, while it is changing between FREQUENT and RARE. Does the lack of change in false alarm rate between FREQUENT and RARE imply no change in the decision threshold? Is this consistent with the behavior shown in Figure 2? I would expect that less decay in RARE would have led to more false alarms, higher detection rates, and faster RTs unless the decision threshold also increased (or there was some other additional change to the decision process). The CPP for motor preparatory activity reported in Fig. 5 is also potentially consistent with a change in the decision threshold between RARE and FREQUENT. If the decision threshold is changing, how would that affect the empirical integration kernel? These are important questions on their own and also for interpreting the EEG changes.
2) The authors find an interesting difference in the CPP for the FREQUENT vs RARE conditions where they also show differences in the decay time constant from the empirical integration kernel. As mentioned above, I'm wondering what else may be different between these conditions. Do the authors have any leverage in addressing whether the decision threshold differs? What about other factors that could be important for explaining the CPP difference between conditions? Big picture, the change in CPP becomes increasingly interesting the more tightly it can be tied to a particular change in the decision process.
I'll note that I'm also somewhat skeptical of the statements by the authors that large shifts in evidence are less frequent in the RARE compared to FREQUENT conditions (despite the names) - a central part of their interpretation of the associated CPP change. The FREQUENT condition obviously has more frequent deviations from the baseline, but this is countered to some extent by the experimental design that has reduced the standard deviation of the coherence for these response periods. I think a calculation of overall across-time standard deviation of motion coherence between the RARE and FREQUENT conditions is needed to support these statements, and I couldn't find that calculation reported. The authors could easily do this, so I encourage them to check and report it.
3) The wide range of decay time constants between subjects and the correlation of this with another component of the CPP is also interesting. However, in trying to interpret this change in CPP, I'm wondering what else might be changing in the inter-subject behavior. For instance, it looks like there could be up to 4 fold changes in false alarm rates. Are there other changes as well? Do these correlate with the CPP? Similar to my point above, the changes in CPP across subjects become increasingly interesting the more tightly it can be tied to a particular difference in subject behavior. So, I would encourage the authors to examine this in more depth.