5 Matching Annotations
  1. Jan 2018
    1. Es importante destacar que ninguno de los autores que estoy revisando está llamando a un rechazo total de la racionalidad cartesiana ni de la razón centrada en el sujeto, tan discutidas por los filósofos intramodernos de la modernidad (e.g., Habermas 1987); más bien, piden el debilitamiento de su posición dominante y el desplazamiento de su centralidad en el diseño del mundo y nuestras vidas. Est

      [...] la práctica de la transformación realmente tiene lugar en el proceso de enactuar otros mundos/prácticas —es decir, en un cambio radical de las formas como encontramos cosas y personas (e.g., Spinosa et al. 1997)—, no sólo en teorizarlos. Además, en estas críticas encontramos pistas hacia este camino, ya sea que la práctica renovada sea budista, ecológica, política, decolonial o desde un enfoque reimaginado del diseño.

      Seguramente los detractores encontrarán que no ocupar el centro es casi una forma de negación. Este trozo aclara que de eso no que se trata.

      Por otro lado, las materialidades nuevas, pero cercanas a lo logocéntrico, pueden facilitar la transición hacia la repolitización y lo enactivo como formas de reflexión. Ver: https://hyp.is/mpjAWgXgEeitIDstH5w0ew/maestriadesarrollo.com/sites/default/files/publicaciones/autonomia-y-diseno-arturo-escobar-ok.pdf

  2. Nov 2017
    1. Remarkably,thepublicimageofhackershasaninverserelationshiptotheiracts.

      Remarkably, the public image of hackers has an inverse relationship to their acts. When hackers were more intent on ‘we do because we can’ politics, their public image was mysterious, revered, and appreciated. Yet once hackers turned into hacktivists with political subjectivity, their public image suffered, and it became tainted with criminality.

    2. Itisalsotemptingtointerpretthem

      It is also tempting to interpret them as hacktivists. But when we interpret their digital acts through the Internet, they embody all the characteristics of citizen subjects: they enact citizenship as subjects of power with responsibility in ways that are instantly recognizable and yet cannot be bounded by their identity as military or security personnel. If the performative force of their code is louder than their words, the imaginary force of their words is not so weak, either.

    3. Twodecadeslater,CAE’sviewon‘electroniccivildisobedience’seemsbothprescientandnaïve

      It seems prescient in face of the emergence and transformation of hacktivist groups such as Anonymous, Demand Progress, and WikiLeaks, which have developed new political subjectivities. Also, it can hardly be said that such hacking remains the domain of ‘teenagers’, let alone American teenagers.[14] CAE’s idea that a technocratic avant-garde may emerge as a political subject has also been borne out in some ways. Their idea of small cells of subjects of politics can also be said to anticipate the emergence of hacktivist groups,[15] composed of ‘activist, theorist, artist, hacker, and even a lawyer . . . knowledge and practice should mix’. Yet it seems naïve at the same time for its rigid turn away from streets and squares as sites of dissent. Time and again, contemporary events have shown us the importance of streets and squares for enacting dissent, and even simply mentioning Tahrir Square, Taksim Square, Maidan Square, Occupy Wall Street, or Puerta del Sol immediately emphasizes this point without belabouring it. Moreover, as we have argued throughout this book, to imagine cyberspace as separate and independent from an ostensible physical space is both empirically questionable and theoretically indefensible.

    4. Atanyrate,thisbringsustothesecondgroupwementionedearlier:hacktivists.Thetermisnotanelegantone,andithashadalimitedtraction,probablyforthatreason.Butitintroducesavitaldistinctionintermsofunderstandingtheeffectsofwhathackersdoinorbysayingsomethingandthusdoingsomethingwithcode.JordanandTaylorcapturedthisvitaldifferencebydesignatinghacktivistsasrebelswithacauseandyetposingthisstatementwithaquestionmarktoindicatethattheeffectsarenotstraightforwardtointerpret.

      For example, they admit that although hacktivism arises from hackers, it is difficult to draw the line between the two: ‘[B]ecause hacktivism uses computer techniques borrowed from the pre-existing hacker community, it is difficult to identify definitively where hacking ends and hacktivism begins.’[55] They understand hacktivism as ‘the emergence of popular political action, of the selfactivity of groups of people, in cyberspace. It is a combination of grassroots political protest with computer hacking. Jordan and Taylor also provide a historical overview of dissent and civil disobedience as repertoires of politics, which we would call ‘acts of digital citizens’. They discuss how, for example, electronic civil disobedience by Zapatistas, the Mexican dissident group, changed the terms of policies by engaging incipient Internet technologies in the 1990s to argue that Zapatismo—the convention combined of grassroots and electronic activism—was in many ways the birthplace of hacktivism as a disruptive convention. [...] At this point in time it is difficult to know how much of a disturbance these acts of electronic civil disobedience specifically make. What we do know is that neoliberal power is extremely concerned by these acts.’

      En el caso de La Gobernatón, lo que hicimos fue auditar los términos de la contratación pública usando técnicas de verificación de integridad de software, basadas en firmas de integridad criptográfica (una combinación alfanúmérica única asociada a un archivo, que se modifica bastante, si el archivo cambia en lo más mínimo, por ejemplo, agregando un espacio). Fue el hecho de aunar técnicas computacionales clásicas, como seas las que activaron la idea de la Gobernatón y luego del Data Week. Esto ocurrió localmente, al margen de las prácticas anteriores y paralelas que hacían los zapatistas, o los peiordistas de datos. Era una idea cuyo tiempo había llegado y se empezaba a originar e distintos lugares, con las variaciones propias de cada contexto).