I’ve argued you need something new in the story and the kind of view I’ve been drawn towards are views that take consciousness as something sort of fundamental and irreducible in our picture of the natural world in the same way that we take space and time and mass and charge as fundamental. We’re used to the idea that some things are fundamental. If you can’t explain electromagnetic phenomena in terms of your old laws, your old properties and laws, spacetime, mass, Newtonian dynamics, you bring in something else. Electric charge, Maxwell’s laws.Likewise, I think for consciousness. So I’ve been drawn towards views that take consciousness as fundamental and what that comes to in practice in philosophy is either you’ve got the choice between either a dualist view where you’ve got. You’ve got the physical world, which is one thing, and then you’ve got say the mind, you’ve got consciousness, which is another thing.They’re both fundamental properties distinct from each other. And then there are laws that connect them. That’s one view. And the other view is panpsychism, which says consciousness is somehow present at the very basis of the physical world and maybe the physics that we know and love basically somehow fundamentally involves consciousness somehow.

think the most interesting of which is that this whole idea of consciousness is an illusion. A pathology built up by our cognitive systems to believe we have these special properties of consciousness introspectively, even though we don’t.

David Chalmers: Yeah, but I also think there are these sociological effects where most people think… we got this on the PhilPapers survey that most people think that most people think a certain thing, even though most people think the opposite.

I’m sure that many of them are among listeners potentially. It seems like there’s a bit of a stream of this among rationalists and I often find natural scientists, I just can’t get them to accept that there’s like anything strange about consciousness existing.

David Chalmers: Well, the big obvious thing that can be said in defense of philosophy here is the thing that I said already. Which is philosophy by its nature is the field where there’s disagreement, because once we obtain methods for producing an agreement on questions and reasonably decisive ways, we spin it off and it’s no longer philosophy.So from that perspective, philosophy has been this incredibly effective incubator of disciplines. Physics span out of philosophy. Psychology span out of philosophy. Arguably to some extent, economics and linguistics span out of philosophy. So what usually happens is not that we entirely solve a whole of a philosophical problem, but we come up with some methods of say, making progress experimentally or formally on a certain subquestion or aspects of that question and then that gets spun off. The part that we haven’t figured out how to think about well enough that remains philosophy.

the highest correlation coefficient in this survey was 0.56 which is kind of only moderate and it was between moral realism and cognitivism which obviously have a lot to do with one another directly

Robert Wiblin: Yeah. I guess in politics it seems that that brings out people’s tribal instincts, so they tend to group together for practical reasons, if not intellectual reasons, like kind of all sharing the same views or like wanting to fall into line and are particularly incentivized to do that. An interesting thing, I’ll provide a link to a study looking at how ideologically tightly grouped are people in politics, which found that uneducated people just like have views all over the place. Their views on one question don’t really predict their views on another.

David Chalmers: I don’t know. Where I come from, 0.56 is a pretty high correlation coefficient. So I don’t know. Maybe it depends on the area.

And I think at that point, wherein something like in a verbal dispute, which can happen in these cases where you have different people mean different things by free will and well, I think that diagnosis is more apt for some of these questions than for others, but like this is the case again where your average philosopher uses free will, well the thing tied to moral responsibility. Many people outside philosophy may still think, ah, why use free will for that? I want to use free will for this other thing. This ability to fundamentally go against the laws of nature. And then we just have a difference about which one is worth caring about.

Now someone interested in free will could say, well, that wasn’t what I cared about (moral responsibility).

What is it like to be you right now? You’re seeing this text on the screen, you smell the coffee next to you, feel the warmth of the cup, and hear your housemates arguing about whether Home Alone was better than Home Alone 2: Lost in New York. There’s a lot going on in your head — your conscious experiences

Also see slides 1-7 of the powerpoint HERE

Update: Free online access to this text may be available through your university/library (this works at Exeter) via www.vlebooks.com

1.2 Readings and resources

. (2018: but this won’t be focal on the exam.)

Losing face PDF

Losing face

David Chalmers on the nature and ethics of consciousness

Prior exams with answers and ‘mock exams’

Bee2024 finishing insurance problem from sixth problem set

Shorter 'rooftop' video going through 3 cases of 'two-person Public goods' via powerpoint

Power rule

Asymmetric information (Moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling) Separate notes/handouts, to be integrated in Readings tbd Behavioural economics – first lecture (limits to cognition, willpower, self-interest), second lecture (applications) [11] NS: Ch 17, plus supplements T1:11 Further readings tbd Eighth problem set: Behavioural economics Overall each reading is optional, but to do well on the exam you need to do at least some of these readings, and/or cover some of the more advanced material. Supplementary reading: theory Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” (Seminal) Supplementary reading: applications and empirical work DellaVigna, Stefano. “Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field.” Journal of Economic literature 47.2 (2009): 315-372. Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R.H., 2007. Heuristics and biases in retirement savings behavior. The journal of economic perspectives, pp.81-104. Farber, H., 2008. Reference-dependent preferences and labor supply: The case of New York City taxi drivers. The American Economic Review. Available at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/aea/aer/2008/00000098/00000003/art00021 [Accessed November 19, 2015]. (Behavioural insights team) EAST: Four simple ways to apply behavioural insight Kellner, Reinstein and Riener, 2016. Conditional generosity and uncertain income: Field and lab evidence Material linked at giveifyouwin.org

The payoff from staying Silent (cooperating) in each period is: −2×(1+g+g2+g3+...)−2×(1+g+g2+g3+...)-2 \times (1 + g + g^2 + g^3 + ... ) Here I get -2 in each period, starting today. Discounting this, we add up -2 (today), −2g−2g-2g (next period), −2g2−2g2-2g^2 (the period after next), etc, as represented above. The payoff from Confessing right away (after which both players Confess always) is: −1−3×(g+g2+g3+...)−1−3×(g+g2+g3+...) -1 -3 \times (g + g^2 + g^3 + ... ) Formula for a geometric series (where 0<g<10<g<10<g<1): g+g2+g3+g4...=g/(1−g)g+g2+g3+g4...=g/(1−g)g + g^2 + g^3 + g^4 ... = g/(1-g) Note on Maths: The standard derivation of this, which is pretty neat, is in the text. This formula is an important one in economics (and beyond), particularly for discounting a constant stream of payoffs, e.g., stock dividends Thus cooperation in a single period is ‘weakly preferred’ (at least as good) if (−2)×(1+g+g2+g3+...)≥(−1)+−3×(g+g2+g3+...)(−2)×(1+g+g2+g3+...)≥(−1)+−3×(g+g2+g3+...)(-2) \times (1 + g + g^2 + g^3 + ... ) \geq (-1) + -3 \times (g + g^2 + g^3 + ...) g+g2+g3+...≥1g+g2+g3+...≥1g + g^2 + g^3 + ... \geq 1 Note on the intuition for the second formula: the left side is loss of future payoffs (-3 vs -2 forever from next period, so a loss of 1 per period starting tomorrow). The right side is gain in ‘the present’ period (getting -1 rather than -2), so it is un-discounted. g/(1−g)≥1g/(1−g)≥1g/(1-g) \geq 1 g≥12

Individual optimisation solved problem

Nash proved that if we allow mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.

More volatile underlying assets will translate to higher options premiums, because with volatility there is a greater probability that the options will end up in-the-money at expiration.

The option is European and can only be exercised at expiration.No dividends are paid out during the life of the option.Markets are efficient (i.e., market movements cannot be predicted).There are no transaction costs in buying the option.The risk-free rate and volatility of the underlying are known and constant.The returns on the underlying are normally distributed.

In low-income countries the vast majority are unwilling to pay for effective drugs simply because they are unable to pay. Low-income nations need more price discrimination—and vastly lower prices—if they are ever to afford the world's most effective medicines.

She found a German seller offering packs of the same nappies she buys in Luxembourg for the same price she normally pays. Looking more closely at the unit price, however, Nadine realised that the German packs contained 140 nappies, whereas the packs in Luxembourg had only 90, making them much more expensive. She switched straight away to buying all her nappies from the German shop.

Channel Tunnel

map_dbl(df, mean)

out[i] <- fun(df[[i]])

Holt, C., and S. Laury (2002), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, American Economic Review, v. 92 (5): 1644-1655. Crosetto, Paolo, and Antonio Filippin. “A theoretical and experimental appraisal of four risk elicitation methods.” Experimental Economics 19, no. 3 (2016): 613-641. Pedroni, Andreas, Renato Frey, Adrian Bruhin, Gilles Dutilh, Ralph Hertwig, and Jörg Rieskamp. “The risk elicitation puzzle.” Nature Human Behaviour 1, no. 11 (2017): 803.

11.11 Who benefits from 3DPD?

University strikes: Students demand tuition fee refunds for planned walkouts

Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium or equilibria

3. Now draw the farmers’ ‘best response functions’ in a diagram.

Do parts A and B; part C is optional enrichment

ero marginal cost for one more user.

This second assumption, called diminishing marginal utility, will imply ‘risk aversion’!

Two statistics about reducing your risk of an early death made headlines around the world recently. The first seems to be a great reason to add a four-legged friend to your life. It suggests that owning a dog is tied to lowering your chance of dying early by nearly a quarter. The second statistic claims that even a minimal amount of running is linked to reducing your risk of premature death by up to 30%. Ruth Alexander finds out what’s behind these numbers and we hear from epidemiologist, Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz.

2018 final exam with suggested answer guidelines

Should we help companies tailor prices to your wage packet?

writing

LaTeX is a high-quality system equipped with special features for technical and scientific documentation. A great tool for thesis help due to its user-friendly interface and dozens of helpful features. For example, the tool automatically generates bibliographies and indexes.

NS: Ch 16 – public goods section only (skip Lindahl equiliibrium; sections on median voter and single-peaked preferences are optional)

Ans: B and D

No, because if it were at such a point, it could raise its price and its revenue would increase and costs would decline.

Paying the vertical distance between B and D (sacrificing this amount of ‘other goods’) to obtain the second ticket will leave her at point D. This is on the same indifference curve aas point B so this leaves her equally well off. Thus this is the most she would be willing to pay for the second ticket.

No, because if it were at such a point, it could raise its price and its revenue would increase and costs would decline.

Mock mid-term exam

Individual optimisation solved problem

Individual optimisation solved problem

‘people buy less when the price rises, all else equal’.

MRT(K,L)MRT(K,L)MRT(K,L) equal

MRT(K,L)MRT(K,L)MRT(K,L)

Sugden, Robert. “Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.” Social Theory and Practice 41, no. 4 (2015): 579-98.. ‘Predicting Hunger: The Effects of Appetite and Delay on Choice’; Read and van Leeuwen, 1998 … and related work… worth getting a sense of this, particularly in the context of the Sugden (2015) reading, such as Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler. 2006. “Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (1): 221-234

Waldfogel, Joel. “The deadweight loss of Christmas.” The American Economic Review 83.5 (1993): 1328-1336. Reinstein, David. “The Economics of the Gift.” (2014; working paper and chapter in Gift Giving and the’embedded’Economy in the Ancient World, F Carlà, M Gori - 2014). D. Colander \Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2007: 215-225. Sugden, Robert. “Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.” Social Theory and Practice 41, no. 4 (2015): 579-98..

Friedman, Milton. “The methodology of positive economics.” (1953): 259. Classic but perhaps outdated Sugden, Robert. “Credible worlds: the status of theoretical models in economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology 7.1 (2000): 1-31. Sugden, Robert; Sitzia, Stefania. “Implementing theoretical models in the laboratory, and what this can and cannot achieve.” Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 18, 2011, p. 323-343.

AUT: Lecture 3 - Axioms of Consumer Preference and the Theory of Choice (note, slightly different notation)

Waldfogel, Joel. “The deadweight loss of Christmas.” The American Economic Review 83.5 (1993): 1328-1336. Reinstein, David. “The Economics of the Gift.” (2014). D. Colander \Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2007: 215-225.

Loomes, Graham, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden, 1991.“Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods”. jstor link Choi, Syngjoo, et al. “Who is (more) rational?.” The American Economic Review 104.6 (2014): 1518-1550.a.

For maths, see also Mathematical methods for economic theory … also free online!

Here Y has a diminishing MU, but for X MU is constant

(Left) when goods are perfect substitutes, there is no Substitution effect of a price change. For prices lll and l′l′l', the minimum-cost consumption that attains U1U1U_1 is the same point (A,B)

common measure of the burden: ‘amount a person would be willing to pay to avoid tax’, for a given revenue raised *A step-by-step illu

2. That is, at this consumption plan he or she would be willing to give up 3 beer

f*h'(r)

Goals of this problem set: Re-acquaintance with mathematical approaches to Economics (e.g., simultaneous equations, graphing functions) Revising the supply and demand model and its implications, applying this to real-world problems, considering empirical approaches Understanding the logic of ‘difficult’ multiple choice questions (assessment tips) Discussing and writing a coherent response to applied Economics questions

Note: The lecturing ‘slides’ are posted contemporaneously to each lecture, but there is no need to look at them – this web-book (‘handout’ is king). OK, fine… the link to the slides is HERE, but don’t look at them. (If you do you will need to press ‘o’ to see the navigation map.

3 Math tools and empirical analysis - – coverage outline

4 Utility and Choice (L2)

2 Economic Models (L1-2)

Alfred Marshall argued that a good’s price must equal both the cost to produce and the value (to consumers) of the last unit produced and consumed.

With ‘single crossing’ (a fancy condition you can ignore in this module) there is a unique price where Qs(p)=Qd(p)Qs(p)=Qd(p)Q^s(p)=Q^d(p), and a unique quantity where the last unit’s value to the consumer equals its cost to produce.

1∗1

GTA’s: Ten minutes, i.e., minutes 5-15 of of tutorial, perhaps (after introducing yourself etc).

Goals of this problem set:

Not ‘output’ – ‘nets provided’ nor ‘paintings purchased’ (Total or marginal) impact per dollar = output per dollar ××\times impact per output

Little giving to the most effective charities ‘Innumerate empathy’: key barrier to promoting effective giving?

When Pandoc converts Markdown to another output format, it uses a template under the hood. The template is a plain-text file that contains some variables of the form $variable$. These variables will be replaced by their values generated by Pandoc. Below is a very brief template for HTML output:

When used locally, this feature requires that reveal.js runs from a local web server.

Vague questions

4.9 …Stating empirical results

“Has the legacy of British institutions increased or decrease the level of GDP in former colonies?”

“how do risk-averse individuals choose among a set of uncertain gambles?

Fields

3.4 Theoretical vs. Applied (focus)

The book is written in RMarkdown with bookdown. It is automatically rebuilt from source by travis. R4DS is a collaborative effort and many people have contributed fixes and improvements via pull request.

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This tool is designed to help you inform your marketing, improve retention of your donors and ultimately increase your income. It means you can target your donors in a really timely way, when you are most at risk of losing them and when they are most likely to donate, maximising your impact whilst still adhering to The Fundraising Regulations.

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A scatter plot represents two dimensional data