We can see asharp increase in the number of ICA events for the ungrammatical condition in the time periodof 600 to 1200 after the onset of the critical word showing on the display.
This is the empirical proof that ungrammatical, casual, non-standard text causes an immediate, sharp spike in cognitive effort, validating the argument for standardization to lower cognitive costs.
This entire, extremely complex section is the technical support for the biological load.
Summary: Linguistic difficulty triggers the release of stress/arousal neurotransmitters (norepinephrine) to help the brain cope, proving Mises's concept of "uneasiness."
We report here on a total of seven experiments which testwhether the ICA reliably indexes linguistically induced cognitive load: three experiments inreading (a manipulation of grammatical gender match / mismatch, an experiment of seman-tic fit, and an experiment comparing locally ambiguous subject versus object relativeclauses, all in German), three dual-task experiments with simultaneous driving and spokenlanguage comprehension (using the same manipulations as in the single-task readingexperiments), and a visual world experiment comparing the processing of causal versusconcessive discourse markers.
Summary: This quote links "linguistic load" specifically to grammatical mismatches, providing evidence that non-standard grammar creates a burden for the reader.
unclear instructional materialsand complex information presentation add extraneous cognitive load.
Summary: Defines "extraneous load" as a result of "unclear presentation," supporting the argument that non-standard writing (code-meshing) unnecessarily taxes the reader. This also aligns with findings from Liu.
when essentialinformation is presented too rapidly, it can overload thelearner’s cognitive capacity, leading to cognitive overload.When this happens, the learner cannot process essentialinformation and learning outcomes effectively.
Summary: Provides the consequence of poor structure: "cognitive overload." This supports the argument that unstructured or non-standard writing risks overloading the reader, preventing them from understanding the core message.
Indirectly, this refutes the idea that "code-meshing" is necessary for more accurate communication.
Unable to process all this material, we let our cognitive biases decide what we should pay attention to.
In a society consumed with information overload, it is easier for our brains to allow our well evolved cognitive biases to decide not only what to pay attention to, but what to believe.
I've recently run across a few examples of a pattern that should have a name because it would appear to dramatically change the outcomes. I'm going to term it "decisions based on possibilities rather than realities". It's seen frequently in economics and politics and seems to be a form of cognitive bias. People make choices (or votes) about uncertain futures, often when there is a confluence of fear, uncertainty, and doubt, and these choices are dramatically different than when they're presented with the actual circumstances in practice.
A recent example was a story about a woman who was virulently pro-life who when presented with a situation required her to switch her position to pro-choice.
Another relates to choices that people want to make about where their children might go to school versus where they actually send them, and the damage this does to public education.
Let's start collecting examples of these quandaries at all levels of making choices in the real world.
What is the relationship to this with the mental exercise of "descending into the particular"?
Does this also potentially cause decision fatigue in cases of voting spaces when constituents are forced to vote for candidates on thousands of axes which they may or may not agree with?