- Jul 2024
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arxiv.org arxiv.org
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Tao, Terence. “What Is Good Mathematics?,” February 13, 2007. http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702396.
Variations of this can also be applied to other fields, like history. What makes good history, good historians, good history teachers, etc.?
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- Jan 2024
- Jan 2023
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bactra.org bactra.org
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An interesting raw html-based website that also serves the functions of notebook and to some extent a digital commonplace.
Cosma Shalizi is a professor in the statistics department at CMU.
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- Sep 2022
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Local file Local file
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B. V. Gnf.di.xko
Boris Vladimirovich Gnedenko https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Vladimirovich_Gnedenko
He wrote with/worked with Khinchin and Kolmogorov.
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A . Y A . K H I N C H I N
Aleksandr Yakovlevich Khinchin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Khinchin
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- Nov 2016
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www.youtube.com www.youtube.com
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This guy raises the stupid Liar Paradox multiple times, in different contexts, while making his explanations, and every time he states that "philosophers have worried about this for thousands of years".
Well, I've never seen a true philosopher dedicate a long time to this question, or even to consider it a question or a problem or an inconsistency in the world we must solve -- I can only see this guy and his fellow mathematicians do that.
Nor it is true that Gödel's theorem is a form of Liar Paradox, it is not. The fact that these mathematicians keep bringing the Liar Paradox to explain Gödel's theorem to the public makes it seem like they are terrified by it, and actually attribute an enormous value to it.
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www.scottaaronson.com www.scottaaronson.com
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The obvious followup question|and what if a programdiddo all those things?|is often leftunasked, or else answered by listing more things that a computer program could self-evidentlynever do. Because of this, I suspect that many people whosaythey consider AI a metaphysicalimpossibility, really consider it only a practical impossibility: they simply have not carried therequisite thought experiment far enough to see the di erence between the two.
This man cannot understand that if something is a metaphysical impossibility, then a sane person must not try to imagine it, or what should happen if that thing is true. That's idleness and represents a real danger to one's intelligence.
For example; imagine if you were not only you, but all other people; imagine that you had no other choice, but only to kill your father or your mother; imagine that you had no sense of self-responsibility.
Of course if it happens that this thing is not a metaphysical impossibility, then all these people he is considering would be wrong, but at least they were consistent.
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If you accept this, thenit seems fair to say that untilPversusNPis solved, the story of Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem|itsrise, its fall, and the consequences for philosophy|is not yet over.
If you accept this bizarre interpretation, then you can suspend the belief in the fact, known to everybody, that \(P \ne NP\), because it hasn't been mathematically proved, and say the question isn't solved yet. Wow, how interesting!
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