This is a good example of the fuzzy sorts of boundaries created by adding probabilities to individuals and putting them into (equivalence) classes. They can provide distributions of likelihoods.

This expands on: https://hypothes.is/a/3FVi6JtXEe2Xwp_BIaCv5g

Reframing signal relationships into probability spaces may mean that signal relationships are symmetric.

How far can this be pressed? They'll also likely be reflexive and transitive (though the probability may be smaller here) and thus make an equivalence relation.

How far can we press this idea of equivalence relations here with respect to our work? Presumably it would work to the level of providing at least good general distribution?

Notation of a random process that has outcomes

The "universal set" aka "sample space" of all possible outcomes is sometimes denoted by \(U\), \(S\), or \(\Omega\): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sample_space

Probability theory & measure theory

From what I recall, the notation, \(\Omega\), was mainly used in higher-level grad courses on probability theory. ie, when trying to frame things in probability theory as a special case of measure theory things/ideas/processes. eg, a probability space, \((\cal{F}, \Omega, P)\) where \(\cal{F}\) is a \(\sigma\text{-field}\) aka \(\sigma\text{-algebra}\) and \(P\) is a probability density function on any element of \(\cal{F}\) and \(P(\Omega)=1.\)

Somehow, the definition of a sigma-field captures the notion of what we want out of something that's measurable, but it's unclear to me why so let's see where writing through this takes me.

Working through why a sigma-algebra yields a coherent notion of measureable

A sigma-algebra \(\cal{F}\) on a set \(\Omega\) is defined somewhat close to the definition of a topology \(\tau\) on some space \(X\). They're both collections of sub-collections of the set/space of reference (ie, \(\tau \sub 2^X\) and \(\cal{F} \sub 2^\Omega\)). Also, they're both defined to contain their underlying set/space (ie, \(X \in \tau\) and \(\Omega \in \cal{F}\)).

Additionally, they both contain the empty set but for (maybe) different reasons, definitionally. For a topology, it's simply defined to contain both the whole space and the empty set (ie, \(X \in \tau\) and \(\empty \in \tau\)). In a sigma-algebra's case, it's defined to be closed under complements, so since \(\Omega \in \cal{F}\) the complement must also be in \(\cal{F}\)... but the complement of the universal set \(\Omega\) is the empty set, so \(\empty \in \cal{F}\).

I think this might be where the similarity ends, since a topology need not be closed under complements (but probably has a special property when it is, although I'm not sure what; oh wait, the complement of open is closed in topology, so it'd be clopen! Not sure what this would really entail though 🤷‍♀️). Moreover, a topology is closed under arbitrary unions (which includes uncountable), but a sigma-algebra is closed under countable unions. Hmm... Maybe this restriction to countable unions is what gives a coherent notion of being measurable? I suspect it also has to do with Banach-Tarski paradox. ie, cutting a sphere into 5 pieces and rearranging in a clever way so that you get 2 sphere's that each have the volume of the original sphere; I mean, WTF, if 1 sphere's volume equals the volume of 2 sphere's, then we're definitely not able to measure stuff any more.

And now I'm starting to vaguely recall that this what sigma-fields essentially outlaw/ban from being possible. It's also related to something important in measure theory called a Lebeque measure, although I'm not really sure what that is (something about doing a Riemann integral but picking the partition on the y-axis/codomain instead of on the x-axis/domain, maybe?)

And with that, I think I've got some intuition about how fundamental sigma-algebras are to letting us handle probability and uncertainty.

Back to probability theory

So then events like \(E_1\) and \(E_2\) that are elements of the set of sub-collections, \(\cal{F}\), of the possibility space \(\Omega\). Like, maybe \(\Omega\) is the set of all possible outcomes of rolling 2 dice, but \(E_1\) could be a simple event (ie, just one outcome like rolling a 2) while \(E_2\) could be a compound(?) event (ie, more than one, like rolling an even number). Notably, \(E_1\) & \(E_2\) are NOT elements of the sample space \(\Omega\); they're elements of the powerset of our possibility space (ie, the set of all possible subsets of \(\Omega\) denoted by \(2^\Omega\)). So maybe this explains why the "closed under complements" is needed; if you roll a 2, you should also be able to NOT roll a 2. And the property that a sigma-algebra must "contain the whole space" might be what's needed to give rise to a notion of a complete measure (conjecture about complete measures: everything in the measurable space can be assigned a value where that part of the measurable space does, in fact, represent some constitutive part of the whole).

But what about these "random events"?

Ah, so that's where random variables come into play (and probably why in probability theory they prefer to use \(\Omega\) for the sample space instead of \(X\) like a base space in topology). There's a function, that is, a mapping from outcomes of this "random event" (eg, a role of 2 dice) to a space in which we can associate (ie, assign) a sense of distance (ie, our sigma-algebra). What confuses me is that we see things like "\(P(X=x)\)" which we interpret as "probability that our random variable, \(X\), ends up being some particular outcome \(x\)." But it's also said that \(X\) is a real-valued function, ie, takes some arbitrary elements (eg, events like rolling an even number) and assigns them a real number (ie, some \(x \in \mathbb{R}\)).

Aha! I think I recall the missing link: the notation "\(X=x\)" is really a shorthand for "\(X(\omega)=x\)" where \(\omega \in \cal{F}\). But something that still feels unreconciled is that our probability metric, \(P\), is just taking some real value to another real value... So which one is our sigma-algebra, the inputs of \(P\) or the inputs of \(X\)? 🤔 Hmm... Well, I guess it has the be the set of elements that \(X\) is mapping into \(\mathbb{R}\) since \(X\text{'s}\) input is a small omega \(\omega\) (which is probably an element of big omega \(\Omega\) based on the conventions of small notation being elements of big notation), so \(X\text{'s}\) domain much be the sigma-algrebra?

Let's try to generate a plausible example of this in action... Maybe something with an inequality like "\(X\ge 1\)". Okay, yeah, how about \(X\) is a random variable for the random process of how long it takes a customer to get through a grocery line. So \(X\) is mapping the elements of our sigma-algebra (ie, what customers actually end up experiencing in the real world) into a subset of the reals, namely \([0,\infty)\) because their time in line could be 0 minutes or infinite minutes (geesh, 😬 what a life that would be, huh?). Okay, so then I can ask a question like "What's the probability that \(X\) takes on a value greater than or equal to 1 minute?" which I think translates to "\(P\left(X(\omega)\ge 1\right)\)" which is really attempting to model this whole "random event" of "What's gonna happen to a particular person on average?"

So this makes me wonder... Is this fact that \(X\) can model this "random event" (at all) what people mean when they say something is a stochastic model? That there's a probability distribution it generates which affords us some way of dealing with navigating the uncertainty of the "random event"? If so, then sigma-algebras seem to serve as a kind of gateway and/or foundation into specific cognitive practices (ie, learning to think & reason probabilistically) that affords us a way out of being overwhelmed by our anxiety or fear and can help us reclaim some agency and autonomy in situations with uncertainty.

Boris Vladimirovich Gnedenko https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Vladimirovich_Gnedenko

He wrote with/worked with Khinchin and Kolmogorov.

Aleksandr Yakovlevich Khinchin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Khinchin

The entire motivation for this study.

Devriendt, K., Martin-Gutierrez, S., & Lambiotte, R. (2020). Variance and covariance of distributions on graphs. ArXiv:2008.09155 [Physics, Stat]. http://arxiv.org/abs/2008.09155

<small><cite class='h-cite via'>ᔥ <span class='p-author h-card'>hyperlink.academy</span> in The Future of Textbooks (<time class='dt-published'>03/18/2021 23:54:19</time>)</cite></small>

Hota, Ashish R., Tanya Sneh, and Kavish Gupta. ‘Impacts of Game-Theoretic Activation on Epidemic Spread over Dynamical Networks’. ArXiv:2011.00445 [Physics], 1 November 2020. http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.00445.

Too often as humans we're focused on what is immediately in front of us and not what is missing.

This same thing plagues our science in that we're only publishing positive results and not negative results.

From an information theoretic perspective, we're throwing away half (or more?) of the information we're generating. We might be able to go much farther much faster if we were keeping and publishing all of our results in better fashion.

Is there a better word for this negative information? #openquestions

Mikhael Gromov's docs at NYU

The rates here are so low as to be nearly negligible on their face. Why bother reporting it?

Technically he said it would be random among those who retweeted, but he's chose a much smaller subset of people who are BOTH following him and who retweeted it. Oops!

Far too many people luck out this way and we all perceive them as magically talented when in reality, they're no better than we, they just had better circumstances or were in the right place at the right time.