27 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2021
  2. Mar 2021
    1. If those problems are planetary, then trying to cohere them around the game theory dynamics of locally embedded sovereign zones called countries disables the paths that should be open.
  3. Dec 2020
    1. The settlement of the res-titution claims made by the Italian government against the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Getty Museum in Malibu, and the Cleveland Museum of Art and the return to Italy of looted antiquities raise ques-tions about the integrity of some museum directors and trustees – well-informed people whom one would expect to be the guardians and defenders of the past, not par-ticipants in the commercial processes which lead to its destruction.

      The museum directors definitely should know and have some subject area expertise here, but likely the trustees wouldn't have. While the museum directors should educate them, the financial position the trustees have will almost always tend to drown out the better angels of the museum directors who rely on those trustees' support.

      Part of the question is how to redesign the structural support underpinning the system to help ensure more ethical outcomes.



  4. Nov 2020
    1. Instead, I want to make a seemingly obvious game theoretical point. In a country with a balance of power between two or more parties, nobody but the most cavalier ideologues are going to stick their necks out for “The Resistance” when they know that there is a high probability that a Trumpist DoJ could subsequently prosecute them. (For that matter, several Chicago poll workers were convicted and went to jail in 1962). To enact large-scale fraud, you need to convince underlings to collude, but this only happens if they can be sure that they will not be put out to grass later. The GOP can’t credibly offer such guarantees, so there won’t be many people rushing to stick out their neck out for Trump. This also works in reverse, which is why back in August, I similarly dismissed Resistance fantasies that the Bad Orange Man will orchestra mass electoral fraud to keep himself in power:

      Here Anatoly Karlin makes a game theoretical argument that in a system with two or more adversarial, equally powerful parties, there's a self-preservationist incentive not to take a risk with something like voter fraud. The risk being, that the other party might find out and prosecute you.

      To be able to pull it off you need to be able to make guarantees that the colluders won't be prosecuted, and neither party can make such guarantees.

    1. Today, thanks to the GOP, compromise has gone out the window in Washington.

      Would a tit-for-tat strategy be a useful one for Biden? Perhaps leveled at individual people if not the Republican party as a whole?

    1. This reduced user friction has begun to extend the implicit threat that used to come with federated services into centralized services as well. Where as before you could switch hosts, or even decide to run your own server, now users are simply switching entire networks.

      The implicit threat of federated architectures is also emerging in centralized services. It emerges there because the core of the social network, the address book, is saved locally (i.e. federated). This makes it easy for users to switch networks, and this ease keeps the providers honest.

    2. Given that federated services always seem to coalesce around a provider that the bulk of people use, federation becomes a sort of implicit threat. Nobody really wants to run their own servers, but they know that it might be possible if their current host does something egregious enough to make it worth the effort.

      The implicit threat of federation

      In a federated architecture, most users tend to coalesce around one provider. Few actually want to run their own server, but the fact that that option exists, acts as an implicit threat which keeps the current host honest.

  5. Oct 2020
    1. It’s difficult to say that the prosperity gospel itself led to Donald Trump’s inauguration. Again, only 17 percent of American Christians identify with it explicitly. It’s far more true, however, to say that the same cultural forces that led to the prosperity gospel’s proliferation in America — individualism, an affinity for ostentatious and charismatic leaders, the Protestant work ethic, and a cultural obsession with the power of “positive thinking” — shape how we, as a nation, approach politics.

      Power of Positive Thinking is a book by Norman Vincent Peale and provides the direct link to influence on Trump here.

      Also interesting to note the 17% number which can potentially be a threshold level for splitting a community or society from a game theoretic perspective. (Note: I should dig up the reference and re-read it.)

    1. game theory

      Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among rational decision-makers.[1] It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it addressed zero-sum games, in which each participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by those of the other participants. Today, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations, and is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, and computers.

      --Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory

  6. Jul 2020
  7. May 2020
    1. In evolutionary terms, certainly, because the individuals that show these traits have a higher chance of survival in the long term.

      Not surprisingly, nature is a great teacher. Not until the 1950s and Johnny von Neumann did game theory get developed, but it was found that tit for tat with forgiveness is the optimal model. In other words, altruism or as Henry Ford called it, enlightened self-interest (https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Game_theory)

  8. Jan 2020
    1. Interactions between Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb) and human (players) are often included in the Mtb’s strategies to invade host responses, to replicate and persist within the host,

      Does the M.Tb have knowledge of the host responses or is it merely adapting bet hedging strategies (a mix of multiple strategies across population) and whatever survived is what we see.

      This will have major implications in treating the problem in a game theoretic fashion

  9. Dec 2019
    1. Nash proved that if we allow mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.

      It always has at least one Nash equilibrium (but it may only be a NE in mixed strategies).

  10. Nov 2019
  11. Aug 2018
    1. Yet, strategic games look for equilibrium in the formation and dissolution of ties in the context of the game theory advanced first by (Von Neumann et al. 2007), and later by (Nash 1950).
  12. Dec 2016
    1. If you make it so that future consequences exist in any of these various ways, it makes people more inclined to cooperate.
  13. May 2016
  14. Oct 2015
    1. In my research, we filmed an interaction between a couple and had each partner turn a rating dial as they watched their tape afterward. On this graph (at left), you can see how one couple rated their interaction. The blue dots represent the wife’s ratings over 15 minutes of conversation; the red dots represent the husband’s ratings. When you add them together, these ratings are a constant, which means that in this interaction, her gain is his loss and his gain is her loss. This is what’s called in game theory a “zero-sum game.” You’ve probably all heard of the concept. It’s the idea that in an interaction, there’s a winner and a loser. And by looking at ratings like this, I came to define a “betrayal metric”: It’s the extent to which an interaction is a zero-sum game, where your partner’s gain is your loss. On the other hand, by trust we really mean, mathematically, that our partner’s behavior is acting to increase our rating dial. Even though we’re disagreeing, my wife is thinking about my welfare, my best interests. When we scientifically tested these so-called trust and betrayal metrics, we found that a high trust metric is correlated with very positive outcomes, such as greater stability in the relationship. In a 20-year longitudinal study of couples in the San Francisco Bay Area that I recently completed with UC Berkeley psychologist Bob Levenson, we found that about 11 percent of couples had a zero-sum game pattern, like in that graph. Every six years, we would re-contact all of the couples in the study, and they would come back to Bob’s lab at Berkeley. Yet we noticed that many of the zero-sum couples weren’t coming back. I thought maybe they dropped out because they found the whole thing so unpleasant. Well, it turns out that they didn’t drop out. They died.
    2. Interestingly, the investors’ expectations about the back-transfer from the trustee did not differ between the oxytocin and placebo recipients. Oxytocin increased the participants’ willingness to trust others, but it did not make them more optimistic about another person’s trustworthiness.

      The Trust Game; however, there was no difference in groups when the trustee was a computer, showing oxytocin affects social connections but not risk-behavior itself.

    3. Conventional economic theory maintains that people will always behave in a purely self-interested manner. According to this worldview, it makes no sense to trust, whether in a trust game or in real life, as any trust will be exploited. The trustee will always keep her entire windfall for herself, so the investor would be better off not transferring any money in the first place. And yet when researchers like Joyce Berg and others have had people play the trust game with real monetary stakes, they have repeatedly found that the average investor will transfer half of her initial endowment and receive similar amounts in return. Through the trust game, researchers have also discovered a number of factors that seem to drive levels of trust. Familiarity breeds trust—players tend to trust each other more with each new game. So does introducing punishments for untrustworthy behavior, or even just reminding players of their obligations to each other.
  15. Sep 2015
    1. In a first analysis, data showed that people who took less than 10 seconds to decide how much to give gave approximately 15 percent more to the common pool than people who took longer than 10 seconds.

      Public Goods Game