Countering represents a writer attempting to “suggest a different way ofthinking” as opposed to attempting to “nullify” a writing (p. 57).

The need for students to participate in the larger conversations around subject mattershelps writers creating more intellectual prose, but this becomes difficult in a “culture

Summarization of Methods for Smart Contract Vulnerabilities Detection

The ideas expressed in Creative Experience continueto have an impact. Follett’s process of integration, for example, forms the basisof what is now commonly referred to as a ‘‘win-win’’ approach to conflictresolution; and her distinction between ‘‘power-with’’ and ‘‘power-over’’ hasbeen used by so many distinguished thinkers that it has become a part of ourpopular vocabulary. ≤

In game theory, a focal point (or Schelling point) is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication. The concept was introduced by the American economist Thomas Schelling in his book The Strategy of Conflict (1960).[1] Schelling states that "(p)eople can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same" in a cooperative situation (at page 57), so their action would converge on a focal point which has some kind of prominence compared with the environment. However, the conspicuousness of the focal point depends on time, place and people themselves. It may not be a definite solution.

the underprivileged are priced out of the dental-treatment system yet perversely held responsible for their dental condition.

Elinor Ostrom

C Thi Nguyen@add_hawk

or Jonas, one of the questions we must face is this“What force shall represent the future in the present?”

‘Don’t get fooled by those mangled teeth she sports on camera!’ says the ABC News host introducing the woman who plays Pennsatucky. ‘Taryn Manning is one beautiful and talented actress.’ This suggestion that bad teeth and talent, in particular, are mutually exclusive betrays our broad, unexamined bigotry toward those long known, tellingly, as ‘white trash.’ It’s become less acceptable in recent decades to make racist or sexist statements, but blatant classism generally goes unchecked. See the hugely successful blog People of Walmart that, through submitted photographs, viciously ridicules people who look like contemporary US poverty: the elastic waistbands and jutting stomachs of diabetic obesity, the wheelchairs and oxygen tanks of gout and emphysema. Upper-class supremacy is nothing new. A hundred years ago, the US Eugenics Records Office not only targeted racial minorities but ‘sought to demonstrate scientifically that large numbers of rural poor whites were genetic defectives,’ as the sociologist Matt Wray explains in his book Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness (2006). The historian and civil rights activist W E B du Bois, an African American, wrote in his autobiography Dusk of Dawn (1940) that, growing up in Massachusetts in the 1870s, ‘the racial angle was more clearly defined against the Irish than against me. It was a matter of income and ancestry more than colour.’ Martin Luther King, Jr made similar observations and was organising a poor-people’s march on Washington at the time of his murder in 1968.

But a better path forward is one of true global cooperation based on mutual benefit and reciprocity.

This leads us to Markovits’s second critique of the aspirational view: The cycle that produces meritocratic inequality severely harms not only the middle class but the very elite who seem to benefit most from it.

130 years on, privacy is still largely conceived of as an individual thing, wherein we get to make solo decisions about when we want to be left alone and when we’re comfortable being trespassed upon.

If those problems are planetary, then trying to cohere them around the game theory dynamics of locally embedded sovereign zones called countries disables the paths that should be open.

The settlement of the res-titution claims made by the Italian government against the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Getty Museum in Malibu, and the Cleveland Museum of Art and the return to Italy of looted antiquities raise ques-tions about the integrity of some museum directors and trustees – well-informed people whom one would expect to be the guardians and defenders of the past, not par-ticipants in the commercial processes which lead to its destruction.

Instead, I want to make a seemingly obvious game theoretical point. In a country with a balance of power between two or more parties, nobody but the most cavalier ideologues are going to stick their necks out for “The Resistance” when they know that there is a high probability that a Trumpist DoJ could subsequently prosecute them. (For that matter, several Chicago poll workers were convicted and went to jail in 1962). To enact large-scale fraud, you need to convince underlings to collude, but this only happens if they can be sure that they will not be put out to grass later. The GOP can’t credibly offer such guarantees, so there won’t be many people rushing to stick out their neck out for Trump. This also works in reverse, which is why back in August, I similarly dismissed Resistance fantasies that the Bad Orange Man will orchestra mass electoral fraud to keep himself in power:

Today, thanks to the GOP, compromise has gone out the window in Washington.

This reduced user friction has begun to extend the implicit threat that used to come with federated services into centralized services as well. Where as before you could switch hosts, or even decide to run your own server, now users are simply switching entire networks.

Given that federated services always seem to coalesce around a provider that the bulk of people use, federation becomes a sort of implicit threat. Nobody really wants to run their own servers, but they know that it might be possible if their current host does something egregious enough to make it worth the effort.

It’s difficult to say that the prosperity gospel itself led to Donald Trump’s inauguration. Again, only 17 percent of American Christians identify with it explicitly. It’s far more true, however, to say that the same cultural forces that led to the prosperity gospel’s proliferation in America — individualism, an affinity for ostentatious and charismatic leaders, the Protestant work ethic, and a cultural obsession with the power of “positive thinking” — shape how we, as a nation, approach politics.

game theory

From a game theoretic standpoint, we’ve already lost. Too many of our civil society adversaries have too much of our data, and we have so little of theirs.

In evolutionary terms, certainly, because the individuals that show these traits have a higher chance of survival in the long term.

Interactions between Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb) and human (players) are often included in the Mtb’s strategies to invade host responses, to replicate and persist within the host,

Losing face

Nash proved that if we allow mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.

we define the physiological and environmental parameters that mediate the transition from cooperation to competition

Yet, strategic games look for equilibrium in the formation and dissolution of ties in the context of the game theory advanced first by (Von Neumann et al. 2007), and later by (Nash 1950).

If you make it so that future consequences exist in any of these various ways, it makes people more inclined to cooperate.

unfamiliar game

In my research, we filmed an interaction between a couple and had each partner turn a rating dial as they watched their tape afterward. On this graph (at left), you can see how one couple rated their interaction. The blue dots represent the wife’s ratings over 15 minutes of conversation; the red dots represent the husband’s ratings. When you add them together, these ratings are a constant, which means that in this interaction, her gain is his loss and his gain is her loss. This is what’s called in game theory a “zero-sum game.” You’ve probably all heard of the concept. It’s the idea that in an interaction, there’s a winner and a loser. And by looking at ratings like this, I came to define a “betrayal metric”: It’s the extent to which an interaction is a zero-sum game, where your partner’s gain is your loss. On the other hand, by trust we really mean, mathematically, that our partner’s behavior is acting to increase our rating dial. Even though we’re disagreeing, my wife is thinking about my welfare, my best interests. When we scientifically tested these so-called trust and betrayal metrics, we found that a high trust metric is correlated with very positive outcomes, such as greater stability in the relationship. In a 20-year longitudinal study of couples in the San Francisco Bay Area that I recently completed with UC Berkeley psychologist Bob Levenson, we found that about 11 percent of couples had a zero-sum game pattern, like in that graph. Every six years, we would re-contact all of the couples in the study, and they would come back to Bob’s lab at Berkeley. Yet we noticed that many of the zero-sum couples weren’t coming back. I thought maybe they dropped out because they found the whole thing so unpleasant. Well, it turns out that they didn’t drop out. They died.

Interestingly, the investors’ expectations about the back-transfer from the trustee did not differ between the oxytocin and placebo recipients. Oxytocin increased the participants’ willingness to trust others, but it did not make them more optimistic about another person’s trustworthiness.

Conventional economic theory maintains that people will always behave in a purely self-interested manner. According to this worldview, it makes no sense to trust, whether in a trust game or in real life, as any trust will be exploited. The trustee will always keep her entire windfall for herself, so the investor would be better off not transferring any money in the first place. And yet when researchers like Joyce Berg and others have had people play the trust game with real monetary stakes, they have repeatedly found that the average investor will transfer half of her initial endowment and receive similar amounts in return. Through the trust game, researchers have also discovered a number of factors that seem to drive levels of trust. Familiarity breeds trust—players tend to trust each other more with each new game. So does introducing punishments for untrustworthy behavior, or even just reminding players of their obligations to each other.

In a first analysis, data showed that people who took less than 10 seconds to decide how much to give gave approximately 15 percent more to the common pool than people who took longer than 10 seconds.