nstead, itshould initiate discussions with the Russian military to calm their anxiety and demonstrate ourwillingness to cooperate in this area much as wedid in the nuclear area during the cold war
guess we had to see how all these new toys worked before you can get to the deterrence stage.
Reflexive controlinvolves creating a pattern or providing partialinformation that causes an enemy to react in apredetermined fashion without the enemy realizing that he is being manipulated
The outrage campaigns we saw after 2016 are a form of reflexive control. activities.
The authorities in Moscow recognize this and are trying to gain controlover a most dangerous situation in their view
Intersting concepts that the instability of the narrative was seen as a threat in 1996 and a need to have control.
China at this time started the Great Firewall. Maybe given the competing needs and lack of earlier same push?
nformation/psychologicalandinformation/technicalinfluence on a nation’s decision-making system, onthe nation’s populous
Influencing the populous of belligerents as key aim to resolve a conflict
formatsionnoyeprotivoborstb
early Russian definition
Control over information and the systems that produce it is not centralized;neither is it the near-complete monopoly of government that defined the systems of deterrence during the nuclear age.Therefore the means to detect, control, and respond to such intrusions need to be developed far beyond those requiredby the nuclear threat.
How deterrence has to work differently in digital versus nuclear threats.
The ability through international law,specific applications of information technologies, or the monitoring of "perception management" to deter aninformation assault on the territory of a sovereign state.
Early definition of deterrence .
initial phase of a conflict toweaken the command and control ability of the opponent and then, in theform of an information campaign during the actual battle, to create a positiveview within the international community
Multi tiered step of battle bot not really focusing on international opinion before the conflict.
The risk of the two latter occurring is considered as low.
Similar to Chinese doctrine of localized conflict under informationized conditions
The term ‘information warfare’ was first used by the USA and NATO within its C2W framework,on 2 December 1992, by the US Department of Defense.
Interesting to note changing taxonomy under US and NATO. Should check how defined in latest public guidance
Russia notes the importance of information warfare duringthe initial phase of a conflict to weaken the command and control ability of theopponent and in the form of an information campaign during the actual battle tocreate a positive view within the international community
Two tactics 1. The first harkens back to Electronic Warfare 2. The second is during th ecampaign as seen in Estonia and then Crimea
per se a valuable asset, which it needs to protect in times of peace andwar.
Protection in the sense of active deterrence in peace time
Russia is developing capabilities for information warfare(IW) and information operations (IO)
You can see a delineation here and early definitions of both IW and IO given
To really deal with this crisis we need to recognize centralization — of social media, of ad networks, of media ownership, of power over our daily communication, and in many other areas related to news publishing — and poor media literacy among the public as crucial underlying causes that need to be tackled.
Dealing with 'fake news' is not about counteracting every piece of it with debunking. It is about addressing: - centralisation of socmed-adtech-media (Vgl DMA, DSA, GDPR, AIR, and on the other end of the spectrum [[Algo amplification of hate speech normalises it 201801113123304]]) - media literacy of the public (Vgl 'Finnish model' and [[Crap detection is civic duty 2018010073052]])
McKew, M. (2020, May 13) Disinformation Starts at Home. Stand Up Republic. https://standuprepublic.com/disinformation-starts-at-home/
Yesterday I noted that the intelligence report on Russian hacking devoted an awful lot of space to RT America, the Kremlin-funded cable TV network. That struck me as odd since I don't think RT had much influence on the election. Shortly after I wrote that, I got this tweet: And this email: I think you underestimate the influence of RT on the Jill Stein and "Never Hillary" crowd among Bernie supporters. This is only one aspect of delegitimizing the center. A leftist progressive friend who works on Syrian refugee issues was really disturbed by how many on that part of the spectrum think Putin is just dandy. And this from Vox's Zack Beauchamp:Ads by ZINC3 The ODNI report focuses, to an almost surprising degree, on RT — the Kremlin’s international, English-language propaganda media outlet. The report contains several striking observations about RT’s reach, message, and proximity to the Russian government.
Yesterday I noted that the intelligence report on Russian hacking devoted an awful lot of space to RT America, the Kremlin-funded cable TV network. That struck me as odd since I don't think RT had much influence on the election. Shortly after I wrote that, I got this tweet: