- Sep 2024
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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How does the State know or how can it control without then controlling on the -- on the basis of belief and viewpoint? How could they control against that involvement?
Dissent: Again, very early on, but one of the main points in this case where it is clear that Justice Sonia Sotomayor has hesitations against the funding to the playground on Church property. With an unclear distinction of whether or not religious practices can take place on the playground, she seems to believe that if unable to prevent said practices, then the funding should not be given to the playground given the fact that they cannot prevent any sort of religious practice from taking place on the playground.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
Dissent: While fairly early on, I think this really represent Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburgs overall opinion of the case. She draws the line that the Framers didn't want tax money paying for building/maintaining things on Church property, and while it is a matter of the safety of the playground, it is also a matter of money going towards the maintenance of said playground which is on Church property.
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- Feb 2022
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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and still get the public money.
Ruth could be one of the justices that dissented in the argument or majority opinion because the church could be affiliated to a certain religious group that will deny some members but would still get public money.
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So I'm not sure how this is a free-exercise question, because there is no effect on the religious beliefs.
I believe Sonia is making a case here, that I have stated in a student's answer... that the state simply does not want to give the church the money no matter what, they just simply do not want to give tax payer money to an affiliation that serves religion.
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- Jan 2022
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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And doesn't that fit this case? And if so, is Everson passé?
Ginsburg seems like a dissenter as well. She is likening this case to Everson in which the court said, no, churches should not benefit from public money in maintaining their property
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what are we going to end up with when secular people say religious people are being discriminated in favor of and against us? If status should not be an effect on free exercise, what are we going to do with tax benefits?
Sotomayor appears to be the strongest dissenting voice. She seems worried that secular people would be able to claim discrimination in that tax exempt religious institutions are getting public money that they don't contribute to
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We don't want to be in a position where we are making a visible, physical improvement on church property.
Judge James Layton seems as if he is dissenting because of his statement of not wanting to make improvements on church property.
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So how is the building separate from the religious exercise therein? I believe that this playground is part of the ministry of this church.
Judge Sonia Sotomayor is very strong on her opinion that the play ground would be part of the religious exercise of the church which would make it acceptable that they were not allowed to be apart of the program.
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- Sep 2021
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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do you see value in the other side in having some flexibility here for States to make these sorts of choices?
I believe that this statement implies that J. Kagan may have sided with the state, in that many states have their own clauses and amendments on the issue of free exercise. This would seem to indicate her dissent.
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Sonia Sotomayor
I also believe that J. Sonia Sotomayer is one of the dissenting justices in this case. There are several cases which Mr. Cortman uses as comparative cases, and Sotomayer is unrelenting in her examination of why these cases are relevant. Her word choice is also tonally negative.
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Elena Kagan
I believe Justice Kagan is the second dissenter. She seems to side against Cortman as she argues that the States should have some flexibility in their choices. She questions what would happen if one church received benefits while a different church didn't. Cortman goes on to say that the program is religion blind, but its seemed to me that she was not agreeing with anything he said.
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They're just saying we don't want to be involved with the church.
I now believe that Justice Sotomayor is one of the dissenters. I noticed that she did not ask Cortman any questions pertaining to his case, but instead stated her argument that the country should not be involved with the church. She also referred to other state constitutions with similar amendments that allow the refusal of benefits to be given to religious organizations.
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So I'm not sure how this is a free-exercise question, because there is no effect on the religious beliefs.
With these statements hear, it is clear that Justice Sontomayor is on the dissent side of the case. Her argument here and what she is trying to get across is that this decision is in no way inhibiting the churches exercise of religion. The church is just not a candidate for this public money because they are a place of worship, not a public place that is open to all and every type of religion.
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They want the paving of their playground. Could -- could this -- could they demand as a matter of Federal constitutional right that that playground be funded, even though they have an -- an admissions policy that favors members of their church?
With this question, I think it's clear the Justice Ginesburg is on the dissent side. Hearing the questions com before, specifically in regards to the Establishment Clause, she does not agree with Cortman's answers, and is trying to find more clarity in his argument.
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Well, how about if the school does a prayer before the children start playing?
This makes me think that she dissented from this decision. She sees how it could be hard to draw the line between a religious activity funding area and religious activity.
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Had prayer services there, for example.
Again, I think that Elena may have been a dissenting justice. She sees the blurry lines between the money and the religious practices.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg
I think RBG is the second dissenting opinion. Her questioning here focuses on the selection of children at the church and how- if it were to be in favor of the church would they still be able to narrow down admissions policy, like which religious children they'll accept, and still receive government funding?
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So how is the building separate from the religious exercise therein?
I think Justice Sotomayor if going to be one of the two dissenting opinions. this feel obvious in the way she questioning Cortman back and fourth. Also because her questioning includes asking about how you would separate its secular function from its religious function? The church isn't going o stop operation because of the playground initially.
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no uncertain terms
Justice Ginsburg in this statement articulates that she is standing agents the majority on the grounds that the state is not suppose to interact with religions.
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in no uncertain terms
Although Justice Ginsburg does not speak nearly as much Justice Sotomayor or show her skepticism of Mr. Cortman's arguments quite as explicitly, it would seem from this question, especially as compared to every other justice's questions (of course Thomas is typically mute, but it's quite obvious how he would decide this case), that Justice Ginsburg is the second justice who signed on to the dissenting opinion. She does not follow up to challenge Mr. Cortman's answer, but Justice Sotomayor does.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg is the only other Justice I can see that had any real concern on Cortman's presentation. With her questioning to Cortman and relative silence during Layton's presentation, I have to make her as my guess for 2nd dissent.
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There are 39 States with constitutional amendments like the one Missouri has.
Invoking the legal weight of 39 state constitutions that have similar amendments and offering a far different interpretation of the essence of Locke makes it clear that Sotomayor was a dissenting justice. In fact, there is not a question in this whole section of her comments. It's as if she is tired of hearing the arguments Cortman is making and that several justices are responding favorably to, and she wants to plant a flag in the ground for the other side to rally to, if there are others who share her opinion (one that I'm entirely sympathetic to as I read this short monologue).
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May I take you back to the substance, Mr. Cortman, unless anybody -- it's -- let's talk a little bit about federalism, and here's what I would like to know.
Justice Kagan, to this point, seems to take a negative stance in regards to how Cortman is presenting this case. Her questioning seems to be unimpressed with Cortman's presentation. She is my first guess as a dissenter.
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we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.
I also read this as a sign of a dissenting justice. I believe Sotomayor is a dissenting justice because she strictly says the state does not fund places of worship. She goes on to say that if the state is free from places of worship, then funding it would affect free exercise.
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We seem to be confusing money with religious practice. I don't think the two are tied.
I think this shows that Justice Sotomayor dissented to this argument. This is because she is using multiple state constitutions and the federal constitution to prove that refusing to found religious institutions, even if it is a religious educational institution, is agents the constitution.
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Everson passé?
For those who were unfamiliar with the phrase, as I was, Oxford defines "passé" as "no-longer fashionable; out of date." By asking Cortman whether he believes the precedent set by Everson holds, and subtly confirming that she believes it does, I think Justice Ginsberg is signaling her intention to Dissent, eventually becoming one of the two Justices in the minority of the final decision.
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That's a history that's even longer than the Locke history.
Although I wasn't feeling sure beforehand, this moment from Justice Sotomayor fortified my notion that she was the second dissenting Justice in this case. Just as Ginsberg did, she chose to utilize the Stare Decisis method of decision making, and asserts here that the older a legal precedent that has been set is, the more firmly it holds as an establishment of proper interpretation of law. This solififies her argument that follows, that as a country we should not fund religious places of worship.
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we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.
Dissent #2 - I think is the second dissenting opinion from Justice Sonia Sotomayor. She's pointing out the history of how the constitution has been applied to matters that are similar to the case being argued. She also re establishes that they do not and do not want to give funding to religious exercise of any sort.
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And that's the way you briefed the case. I hear you making a different argument, or a broader argument now, that extends into a State's decision to deny some uses -- to deny funding to some uses at the same time as it gives funding to other uses, and a State's decision to say, look, we really just don't want to fund religious exercise.
(#1) I think this shows Justice Kagan is dissenting. She's stating that the state can and does deny funding to religious uses and stating that they do not want to fund religious exercise.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Just from this line of questioning from Justice Ginsberg, I can tell she is one of the two dissenting opinions. In this question she is imposing on Cortman, she is bringing up a stare decisis line of thinking, in which she brings up the Emerson case of 1947 where the justices had decided that the Framers did not want tax money being used to build or maintain churches. Additionally, Justice Ginsberg challenges Cortman by bringing in the hypothetical situation of which a church is selective in its members. She is rebutting his point that explains how if there is no establishment clause issue, can the states force people to choose between religion and receiving public benefit.
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Sonia Sotomayor
I think that the second dissenting opinion in this case is Justice Sotomayer. For starters, in this question stated at about 3:15, she is questioning Cortman on how the playground is considered secular and not religious. She states that, after looking into the churches bylaws and advertisements, she believes the church conducts play on the playground in a religious manner. This connects back to Justice Ginsburg's claim of how the Everson case was decided that tax money cannot be used to build or maintain churches unless secular activity is proven. Additionally, at around 15:38, Justice Sotomayor is basically stating that this case has nothing to do with the free-exercise clause because the church will not close or stop practice without the new playground. She continues to argue and question Cortman for a few minutes, shooting down every rebuttal he makes, eventually getting into a matter of respecting the history of an amendment.
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there's something attractive about having some play in the joints where States can go their own way and make their own choices.
Justice Kagan is the other justice besides Sotomayor who makes some comments that are more favorable toward the dissenting view. Here, she is essentially asking, "Why NOT allow states to make their own choices in regards to whether or not they will give funds to religious institutions? How is that unconstitutional if it doesn't violate the Establishment clause?" She seems to be hinting that a ruling in favor of Trinity Lutheran would be an infringement on states' rights.
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No one is asking the church to change its beliefs. In fact, no one is asking the church as a condition of saying don't use what we give you for religious purposes; they're not even doing that. They're just saying we don't want to be involved with the church.
Justice Sotomayor makes some of the strongest comments that would seem to favor the dissenting view. Essentially, she is arguing here that nothing is being forced upon the church in regards to changing their religious views or practices and they are not being deprived of anything they already have. The state is simply declining to give the church these new funds for the playground because the state does not want to be financially involved with a church.
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Sonia Sotomayor
I think Sotomayor is one of the dissenting opinions. She seems very adverse to the idea of letting the church win this case. Not to mention that she actively argues against a comparison made earlier. It seems obvious to me that Sotomayor believes that there is no precedent and that the case is in favor of the state. Not to mention that she also rejects the idea that it is a free exercise issue.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg
I think that maybe Ginsburg is the other dissenting opinion? It's harder to tell but the others seem pretty on track with giving the case to the church after having listened to the whole thing. She argues here that, if they were to give the case to the favor of the church, then perhaps future church schools who have less open of admission policies would abuse that, which is entirely fair.
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- Jun 2020
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www.thelancet.com www.thelancet.com
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Nay, Olivier, Marie-Paule Kieny, Lelio Marmora, and Michel Kazatchkine. ‘The WHO We Want’. The Lancet 0, no. 0 (5 June 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31298-8.
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- Jan 2020
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case? And if so, is Everson passé?
I believe that Ruth was another person that chose to dissent on this cause, because she mentions that she doesn't agree that the framers envisioned tax payers money being spent on church organizations.
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the beginning of the line of questioning that Justice Sotomayor just finished, she began with the suggestion that perhaps this amendment reflects an admirable historical tradition that should be respected. Do you think that that is the proper way to analyze this question?
I think that Samuel Justice was suggesting that Justie Sotomayor believes that these old traditions suggest that the people shouldn't get the playground , money because of the way things use to be and should still e.
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And if so, is Everson passé?
I think Ginsburg may have been one to dissent because her statements here show precedent and that the court did not give tax money in the Everson case so why should they in this one.
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I hear you making a different argument, or a broader argument now,
Kagan, in this question, makes be believe she was one to dissent because she questions how he is changing and altering his brief. She also makes a point to say the state can say we really don't want to fund religious exercise but they can do religious exercise.
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I believe that this playground is part of the ministry of this church. And, in fact, I look at its bylaws, I look at its advertisements, and it includes play and conducted in a religiously valuable way.
Justice Sotomayor is very clear in her belief that the church should not receive funding for the playground. She admits and strongly support that what she sees, reads and observes is everything religious inside and outside of the church building ( including the preschool).
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Here, there's nothing being taken away from.
I think Sotomayor is one of the justices that dissents from the overall result of this case because she is strictly arguing that the religious school is not having anything taken away from them and they are not being kept from receiving public benefit.
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In that case, why, just -- just like you and the other side to spend a minute on this, just a minute, why isn't the case moot? That is, we have a governor.
This seems to me that Breyer is not thrilled about arguing this case any further and believes that there is no need for further action, therefore, I think he dissents from the final decision.
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this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
I believe that this quote shows that Ruth Bader Ginsburg was one of the justices who dissented. Right from the beginning of the oral argument she brings up a previous case that set a precedent that church and state should remain separate, no matter what the funding is going towards.
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They're just saying we don't want to be involved with the church
I think this discussion and questions that Sonia Sotomayor is having/asking shows that she is one of the justices who dissented. She is making the point that nobody is trying to take away their religious beliefs or practices, just that the state should not be involved with the funding and to keep the church and state separate. They are free to have their school and practice their religion, but should do so without public funding.
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hat are we going to end up with when secular people say religious people are being discriminated in favor of and against us? If status should not be an effect on free exercise, what are we going to do with tax benefits?
It seems Sotomayor is very cautious and being strategic about what would happen if Cortman won his case. She's explaining that if the public funding is granted, then how will secular organizations react?
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Elena Kagan
I'm quite sure she dissented. She's very legalistic in the way she separates the Foundation clause. She mentions, that religious institutions can exercise religious activities, and the state simply doesn't fund them.
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And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship
This points to Justice Sotomayor as one who dissented. Along the same lines as Justice Ginsburg she believes there is a long history of keeping State funds away from houses of worship.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case?
I believe Justice Ginsburg was one who dissented. She points out that that there is precedent in the Everson case and given the language of the Constitution no tax money should go to maintaining church property.
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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I believe that this playground is part of the ministry of this church. And, in fact, I look at its bylaws, I look at its advertisements, and it includes play and conducted in a religiously valuable way.
Sotomayor is very clear in her beliefs against the church receiving the funding for a playground. She admits and strongly supports that what she sees, reads and observes is everything religious inside or outside of the church building.
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guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
Ginsburg did not seem to budge on her predetermined decision against the church receiving any government money. I think she was one who dissented from the beginning.
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- Sep 2019
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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How does the State know or how can it control without then controlling on the -- on the basis of belief and viewpoint? How could they control against that involvement?
Justice Sotomayor seems to lay out a valid argument for what many would look at as the main issue in this case, that the State of Missouri would be paying out funds directly to a church to spread its religious message.
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in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case?
Justice Ginsburg, very early in this case, seemed to lay out her case for dissenting from what she believes will be the ultimate outcome of this case by using the example of a case in 1947 that said that tax money collected should not be used to improve any sort of religious property.
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And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.
I believe this section of Sotomayor's questioning suggests that she was one of the justices who dissented. I have that take away from this section because in it, she appears to greatly defend the state for not wanting to get involved with the church financially, and even goes on to say that the church will not shut down its religious practices without the funding, therefore implying that it is not necessary.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case? And if so, is Everson passé?
This section of Ginsburg's commentary leads me to believe that she was one of the dissenters, because as she asks Cortman if the case of Everson in 1947 is applicable to their present case and he replies that it is not, she almost directly distinguishes that they are on opposing sides.
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They want the paving of their playground. Could -- could this -- could they demand as a matter of Federal constitutional right that that playground be funded, even though they have an -- an admissions policy that favors members of their church?
I believe this hypothetical situation identifies Justice Ginsburg as the 2nd dissenting Justice. In this hypothetical she is proposing that they can demand the playground be funded and have an admissions policy, which would not be allowed, as it would violate the Establishment Clause in favor of the members that church over others with different political views. I believe by discussing these hypotheticals Justice Ginsburg was trying to showcase the fine line of church and state and why we must tread very carefully in these situations.
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I think that's the materials that you're -- that the church is advertising. How do you separate out its secular function from its religious function?
I believe this statement by Justice Sotomayor identifies her was one of two dissenting Justices because she asks the question of how the religious function of the church will be used on the playground, previously stating that she believes the playground is a ministry of the church and with the notion that play can be conducted in a religious valuable way, how can you separate secular and religious functions of the playground.
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Or how about if it chooses on a sunny day to do its religious instruction outside. How does the State know or how can it control without then controlling on the -- on the basis of belief and viewpoint? How could they control against that involvement
I think that Justice Sotomayor is a dissenter because of the way she is forming these questions. She is trying to get the underlining ideas behind why Cortman is arguing in favor of the church receiving funding. She is very particular in the way she is asking these questions.
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Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
Due to Ginsburg talking about what the framers had intended, I would assume that she is one of the dissenters. She claims that the Framers did not want to use tax money to pay for maintaining churches, or their property. This shows that she is in favor of what the framers had originally stated and intended.
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They're just saying we don't want to be involved with the church.
This would point towards being dissent because Justice Sotomayor is saying that money is being confused with religious practice and that the church isn't going to drop everything because of the playground. It doesn't seem like she thinks anything should change.
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Okay. Okay. Fine.
I believe that Judge Breyer would be one of the judges to dissent because first of all, he sounds a little annoyed towards the reason of this case. Also, he doesn't seem like he thinks there should be any change because the states have decided about this matter.
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They want the paving of their playground. Could -- could this -- could they demand as a matter of Federal constitutional right that that playground be funded, even though they have an -- an admissions policy that favors members of their church?
Justice Ginsburg seems to be sowing us that both the religious and the non-religious have perks that come with being what they are. Here she uses an example of admission policy that positively impact other church members
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I see that. What case would you cite?
Throughout this section Justice Breyer doesn't seem convinced that this case needs the Court's input since the states have already ruled on the matter. He's looking for more than just a fear of change in political opinions to justify taking action.
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But you can have a playground here.
As Justice Sotomayer points out a few times there is still a playground at the church, it just can't be financed by this grant due to the ruling in the lower courts. That said, nothing is stopping the playground from existing, and nothing is stopping the church from putting money into the playground either. This makes it different than the clerk McDaniel example because he was stopped from doing both.
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I'm thinking that Elena Kagan might be a dissent because she seems to be in favor of the state making the decision and the state didn't decide in favor of funding the safer playground.
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor I believe is one of the dissent who were against Trinity Lutheran, she has a very strong view on keeping the church and state separate and believes the playground to be strictly there for religious purposes.
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-- not under -- not under Locke, right? Locke drew a distinction between assistance for devotional, theological education and scholarship and others.
I think justice Roberts also voted against the church. This statement to me makes it seem like the government has the right to deny funding for the church.
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They can do religious exercise. We don't want to fund religious exercise.
I feel like Justice Kagan is a dissenting vote. I feel like this statement makes it seem like her opinion is that the state should not fund any religious activities.
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get the public money.
I think this segment clues in to Ginsburg being one of the dissenters. I think she is cautious about the idea of religious institutions being funded in some way by a general public.
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You have a playground. No one is taking the playground away from you.
I think this points toward Sotomayor being one of the dissenters. In this passage, I think it is clear that she believes that the government is not technically taking anything away from the church, or in this case, not allowing the playground to open.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
I think that Justice Ginsburg is dissenting on this case because she brings up an earlier case that states that no tax money should be imposed to improve a church property.
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And, in fact, I look at its bylaws, I look at its advertisements, and it includes play and conducted in a religiously valuable way.
Justice Sotomayor is asking how its secular functions differ from its religious functions. I think by asking this question Sotomayor is dissenting against the church because she knows that the playground can be used in a religious way.
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They want the paving of their playground. Could -- could this -- could they demand as a matter of Federal constitutional right that that playground be funded, even though they have an -- an admissions policy that favors members of their church?
I think this is a time where Ginsburg is attempting to relate a situation where funding would be more obviously denied by the state in an attempt to link that to this case. I believe that Ginsburg is the other dissenting in this case.
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We seem to be confusing money with religious practice.
I think this is a great point in which it seems Sotomayor is one of the dissenting votes in this case. She seems to be taking the side of the state very heavily here and pointing out things that would disprove Mr. Cortman's points
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So how is the building separate from the religious exercise therein? I believe that this playground is part of the ministry of this church.
I think here Sonia Sotomayor is expressing that the building being part of the church should not include it in state funding. I think based off of her stating that she does not see a difference, she is one of the two that voted against the church.
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e did say in this case -- well, I think you stipulated that this school has a nondiscriminatory admissions policy. But suppose it didn't. Suppose its policy was we prefer Lutheran children, and then if we have any space left over after that, we'll take other Christians. And then after that, maybe Jews, and then everyone else. Everything else is the same.
I think Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the other judge that had a dissenting vote based off her questions she is looking at how a church has the right pick and choose where public schools do not and she has an issue funding the private idea of this.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case? And if so, is Everson passé?
I think Justice Ginsburg was one of the two dissenters. Right from the beginning I thought it was clear that she was never going to agree with the church in this case. She strongly believes that this is violating the seperation of church and state and was not going to change her mind about that, no matter what Cortman said.
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We seem to be confusing money with religious practice. I don't think the two are tied. This church is not going to close its religious practices or its doors because its playground doesn't have these tires. So I'm not sure how this is a free-exercise question, because there is no effect on the religious beliefs.
I believe that Sotomayor is a dissenter in this case. By reading this and hearing her tone of voice, I do not think that she believes this case should even be here based on the precedents set before this and does not vote in favor of the church in the end. I think she believes that religion and state funding should stay completely seperate.
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They want the paving of their playground. Could -- could this -- could they demand as a matter of Federal constitutional right that that playground be funded, even though they have an -- an admissions policy that favors members of their church?
DISSENT When reading Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg thinking with her hypothetical of acceptance policy it seems as if the way she is trying to push Cortmans argument towards being all about the religion and acceptance of only religious children is to stage the thinking that the church would go behind the governments back.
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One would think that if there's play in the joints, that that would include the concept that States are free to say we don't want to spend money from the public FIs on houses of worship. Now, you say this affects free exercise. We seem to be confusing money with religious practice.
Justice Sotomayor would be my second guess for the two justices that dissented themselves from the decision. I think this statement here validates her thoughts by saying "we". Now this may just be her generalizing who believes this, but to me it came across as part of her duties do not include the concepts of funding houses of worship.
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Or how about if it chooses on a sunny day to do its religious instruction outside. How does the State know or how can it control without then controlling on the -- on the basis of belief and viewpoint? How could they control against that involvement?
DISSENT I believe Sonia is one of the Justices that will dissent because in her many questions you can understand that she is against any connection of the government to a religious organization considering they can't completely know or have controller how the church uses that space.
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Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property.
I think this for sure makes it obvious that Justice Ginsburg is not for the church. She states right from the beginning that the framers said that money cannot go toward church property and she includes a previous case where that was decided.
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So how is the building separate from the religious exercise therein? I believe that this playground is part of the ministry of this church. And, in fact, I look at its bylaws, I look at its advertisements, and it includes play and conducted in a religiously valuable way. I think that's the materials that you're -- that the church is advertising. How do you separate out its secular function from its religious function?
I think by this statement you can tell that Sonia Sotomayor is not for the church. She actually states "I believe" which means to actually thinks this. She thinks that because the playground is apart of the church it cannot be funded by the state. She even goes into looking at the rules of the playground and how it is connected to the church.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property
I believe that what Justice Ginsburg is stating here is that that, because the Framers did not want tax money from a program implemented by a government institution to go towards a church. Which makes me believe that she was one of the dissenters.
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And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.
Well from the statement Justice Sotomayor made, it is clear that she does not agree with funds from this government program to fund a church
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- Sep 2017
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supremecourtofindia.nic.in supremecourtofindia.nic.in
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the fundamental rights are not isolated and separate but protect a common thread of liberty and freedom
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Preventive detention, which is dealt with an Article 22, also amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in Article 21, and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in Article 19(1)(d)
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- Mar 2017
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netzfueralle.blog.rosalux.de netzfueralle.blog.rosalux.de
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for illegal uses houses by using Big
Aha: Big Data based community policing. Da werden sich die Rechten freuen, wenn ihnen die Linken dafür die Grundlagen und die Akzeptanz für die Einführung schaffen. Das einmal etablierte System auf allgemeines Fehlverhalten ausweiten schaffen sie dann demnächst selbst...
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Public services must be "digital by default
Warum? Dort wo es einen Gebrauchswertgewinn in der Bereitstellung des Dienstes gibt, dort: ja. Aber generell? Warum muss alles digitalisiert werden? Und was ist mit Öffentlichen Angeboten, die per se nicht digitalisierbar sind (z.B. ein Park)? Fallen die aus dem Blick (und aus dem Angebot)?
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appropriate public policies and instruments
Krasser Techno-Optimismus, der mit "angemessenen" Mitteln durchzusetzen ist. Das aus der Feder einer sich als progressiv verstehenden Stadtverwaltungs-Strategin. Da krieg ich irgendwie Angst.
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None of this is to say that, somehow, the maker movement or 3D printers cannot be repurposed to serve a different
Hinter der doppelten Verneinung in diesem Satz ist eine Aussage versteckt, die mehrere Jahrzehnte kritische Technologietheorie einfach so vom Tisch wischt: Technologie ist nicht neutral. Die Zwecke sind ihr eingeschrieben, nur ein sozialer und politischer Prozess der den Zweck der gesellschaftlichen Produktion adressiert kann auch Zweck und damit Charakter von Technologie verändern. Einfach "rumdrehen" lässt sich der Zweck von Technologie nicht.
S. 24 heißt es übrigens m.E. schon sehr viel näher dran an einer angemessenen Sichtweise: "building hi-tech socialism using neoliberal infrastructure might very well be impossible."
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degree of non-‐ideological
Das Versprechen des Nicht-Ideologischen ist unter den gegebenen Bedingungen immer schon gleich Ideologie. Da gibts nichts abzuwarten ("remains to be seen"), außer man bezieht selbst den Standpunkt des "nicht-ideologischen" und also bürgerlichen Ideologen.
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The idea was that technology would provide easy fixes to complex social problems while too often forgettingthe ultimate reason for the application of these technologies, which is serving the citizens and deliver better public services.
Die Idee war also gut, nur bei der Umsetzung wurde was vergessen??! Das fällt ja nochmal meilenweit hinter die kritischen Bestimmungen des ersten Teils zurück. Bzw. zeigt, dass die beiden Teile wenig miteinander zu tun haben im Sinne einer kritisch-analytischen Textgenese, wie ich sie von einer Fallstudie mit vorangestelltem Theorieteil erwarten würde.
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for ordinary u
"ordinary users" von airbnb sind also ok? da hätte ich ja auch noch mal diskussionsbedarf. und außerdem widerspricht es den schlussfolgerungen des eigenen papiers an anderer stelle (aufbau eigener infrastruktur).
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