Private militias have provided criminal groups with greater mobility and fighting power, enabling them to engage in large-scale violence and seek control of criminal markets and territories beyond their home towns. The Mexican case highlights the need for democratic elites to reform authoritarian judicial and security institutions and to punish state agents who protected organized crime, in order to prevent the intertwining of democratic politics and the criminal underworld.

efectors from the state judicial police

The spread of subnational party alternation in states with drug trafficking routes and the proliferation of private militias led to the outbreak of intercartel wars. The development of private militias allowed cartels to contest their rivals' control over drug trafficking territories, leading to largescale criminal violence.

the state judicial police in Mexico became the main repressive force against political dissidents, and also gained the upper hand in providing informal protection to drug cartels.

In Mexico, the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy did not introduce major security-sector reforms, making the expansion of OCGs and the outbreak of large-scale criminal violence more probable. Subnational political alternation, particularly the variation in party alternation across subnational regions, can also contribute to the outbreak of criminal wars. The structure of informal networks of government protection for criminals forged during the authoritarian period is crucial in understanding this link.

political alternation and the rotation of parties in state gubernatorial power undermined the informal networks of protection that had facilitated the cartels' operations under one-party rule. Without protection, cartels created their own private militias to defend themselves from rival groups and incoming opposition authorities.

The Peña Nieto administration in Mexico proposed a government commission to spend $9 billion to combat drug violence in the most violent municipalities. The plan included longer school days, drug-addiction treatment programs, and public-works projects. The administration also focused on disrupting street gangs and criminals hired by cartels, rather than targeting top drug traffickers. However, despite initial gains, violence in rural Mexico surged again by 2017 due to Mexican cartels' increased involvement in the heroin market and the boom in methamphetamine production.

orrupt agents have been found to be in the pay of cartels, waving tons of drugs and unauthorized immigrants across the border in return for millions of dollars. By 2018, it was estimated that corrupt agents made up around 1 to 5 percent of the CBP's 60,000-strong workforce.

The US government provided funding and training to the Mexican government to fight the cartels, but the efforts were criticized for being ineffective and corrupt. The Mérida Initiative, a $2.3 billion plan, was launched to help Mexico confront threats to its national security, but much of the money went to private US contractor corporations. Corruption was a significant problem, with cartel gunmen killing over 2,200 policemen, 200 soldiers, and scores of federal officials. The cartels also infiltrated the government, with many officials being bribed or working directly for the cartels. The drug trade was linked to Mexico's incomplete transition to democracy, and the cartels took over essential local and regional administrative functions in many regions.

naloa Cartel, in particular, was successful in cooperating with the authorities, using informants to snitch on their enemies and leaking information to the US and Mexican agents.

The Mexican and US authorities employed a "divide and conquer" strategy in their drug war efforts, which involved exploiting existing divisions between trafficking groups and creating new ones. This tactic led to catastrophic consequences, including the deaths of many people who got in the way or were killed as suspected informants.

"narco-democracy" was characterized by a gradual and uneven takeover of the state by drug traffickers, with the taxed becoming the tax collectors.

In return, they received protection, with local cops blocking roads to allow cocaine-packed planes to land, federal cops lifting roadblocks to allow smugglers' trucks to pass through, and generals giving traffickers warnings about imminent raids.

Traffickers also paid off members of leading political families, including President Salinas's brother Raúl.

This "state capture" involved massive bribes, with estimates suggesting that traffickers spent nearly $500 million on corrupting state authorities per year.

nearly 80 years, the Mexican authorities had protected drug traffickers from prosecution, but this arrangement began to break down in the 1990s. The increased profits from drug trafficking and the decline of state power put the narcos in control, and they took over running the country's drug protection rackets.

elationship between drug traffickers and the Mexican authorities changed, with the power dynamics shifting in favor of the narcos.

Why you don’t see it is because it’s subtle, very sophisticated and it is a massive business.

If you were to go down Sea Point main road, or into town into Long Street or Kloof Street, all those restaurant or club owners contribute to organised crime regularly. Most of them, unwillingly, but they have no other option. And they have no other option because of the way organised crime works,” said Lincoln.

When I was really young, I had gotten accident that required surgery and I needed to get that surgery done, so when I went to the hospital and get it done there was actually a couple of people from a criminal organization that were supposed to, I guess, kill somebody in there. I remember this like it was yesterday. I had a little breathing mask on and the doctor was telling me to breathe when he counted the eight, I could just hear the gunshots.