I shall not object to your opinion that moral virtue is undoubtedly useful and suitable for the use of all arts, but in no way shall I admit that any art is a moral virtue.

I con-sider the subject matters of the arts to be distinct and separate.

We shall distinguish the art of rhetoric from the other arts, and make it a single one of the liberal arts, not a confused mixture of all art

But this material of oratory, as we define it, that is, the subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized as indefinite, at another as not belonging to oratory, and have called it, as thus characterized, an ars circumcurrens, an infinitely discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject.

But the other sort of speakers call that force which ought rather to be called violence.

But this talent requires maintenance with no less practice than it is acquired. An art, indeed, once thoroughly learned, is never wholly lost.

But that it is an art may be proved in a very few words, for whether, as Cleanthes maintained, an art is a power working its effects by a course, that is by method, no man will doubt that there is a certain course and method in oratory; or whether that definition, approved by almost everybody, that an art consists of perception consenting and cooperating to some end useful to life, be adopted also by us, we have already shown that everything to which this definition applies is to be found in oratory

be called an active or a practical art, for the one term is of the same signification as the other.

Others consist of action, the object of which lies in the act and is fulfilled in it, leaving nothing produced from it, a sort of art which is called πρακτική (praktikē), as dancing.

Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work.

Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health.

The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory.

Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not.

the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords

For, excepting these teachers, who does not know that the art of using letters remains fixed and unchanged, so that we continually and invariably use the same letters for the same purposes, while exactly the reverse is true of the art of discourse?

But I marvel when I observe these men setting themselves up as instructors of youth who cannot see that they are applying the analogy of an art with hard and fast rules to a creative process.

Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches

Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustic