The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining any happiness for himself from these abstractions.

That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.

After all, what is a law of nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature-which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their essence. All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them-time and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number.

We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual

Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things.

It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things--metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.

The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.

What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus.

And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?

to wit, that which shall count as "truth" from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the wo rds, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real.

Given this situation, where in the world could the drive for truth have come from?

What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case?

But we are not to suppose that it is against rule to mingle these various styles: taste. For when we keep monotonously to one style, we fail to retain the hearer's attention; but when we pass from one style to another, the discourse goes off more gracefully, even though it extend to greater length.

Therefore there are only two parts of rhetoric, style and delivery.

Since rhetoric and di-alectic are general arts, they should therefore be explained in a general fashion, the one in respect to style and delivery, the other in respect to in-vention and arrangement.

invention is a process which supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which organizes arguments.

dialectic, that is to the natural use of reason

From the development of language and speech only two proper parts will be left for rhetoric, style, and delivery; rhetoric will possess nothing proper and of its own beyond these.

The whole of dialectic concerns the mind and reason, whereas rhetoric and grammar concern language and speech. Therefore dialectic comprises, as proper to it, the arts of invention, arrangement, and memory

Quintilian decrees that there are five parts to the art of rhetoric - I shall talk about these afterwards - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.

There are two universal, general gifts be-stowed by nature upon man, Reason and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter.

Because a definition of any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective. For the artist must be defined according to the rules of his art, so that only as much of the art as the true, proper principles cover - this much is attributed to the artist, and nothing further.

Mine are truthful and distinct, as both the art and its practice prove when they have been thoroughly investigated. This is the first, the mid-dle, and the final support of my argument. I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

But the writings of these scholars reveal that while they indeed collected a lot of material, they did not evaluate it sufficiently, for in some places I look in vain for a syllogism. And they did not arrange it in a sufficiently fitting order, for else-where I find a lack of method. I confidently state that I have truly judged and correctly organized this same material in my teachings.

I need not go over all the other things that can be done by powerful eloquence to move the minds of the hearers, not telling them what they ought to do, but urging them to do what they already know ought to be done.

But as there is a certain analogy between learning and eating, the very food without which it is impossible to live must be flavored to meet the tastes of the majority.

the rules which are laid down in the art of oratory could not have been observed, and noted, and reduced to system, if they had not first had their birth in the genius of orators

wisdom not aiming at eloquence, yet eloquence not shrinking from wisdom

For there are who read and yet neglect them; they read to remember the words, but are careless about knowing the meaning. It is plain we must set far above these the men who are not so retentive of the words, but see with the eyes of the heart into the heart of Scripture. Better than either of these, however, is the man who, when he wishes, can repeat the words, and at the same time correctly apprehends their meaning.

the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed.

For it is because they are eloquent that they exemplify these rules; it is not that they use them in order to be eloquent.

For even the art of grammar, which teaches correctness of speech, need not be learnt by boys, if they have the advantage of growing up and living among men who speak correctly.

For men of quick intellect and glowing temperament find it easier to become eloquent by reading and listening to eloquent speakers than by following rules for eloquence.

The fact is that anger makes us confident

while my alleged activities in the law-courts would stir up your anger and hate; and when judges are affected by these very passions, they are most severe upon those who are on trial.

For the mind of Persuasion was able ... and even if necessity ... the form will have ... it has the same power. For discourse was the persuader of the soul, which it persuaded and compelled to believe the things that were said and to agree to the things that were done.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion.

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.

No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially.

irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts

The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials.

these precepts of oratory, though necessary to know, are yet insufficient to produce the full power of eloquence unless they are united with a certain efficient readiness that among the Greeks is called hexis, " habit."

A habit of thinking must then be gradually gained by embracing in our minds a few particulars at first, in such a way that they may be faithfully repeated.

I believe that the greatest facility in composition is acquired by exercise in the simplest subjects, for in treating a multiplicity of persons, causes, occasions, places, sayings, and actions, our real weakness in style may readily escape notice amidst so many subjects which present themselves on all sides, and any one of which we may readily take up. 11. But the great proof of power is to expand what is naturally contracted, to amplify what is little, to give variety to things that are similar and attraction to such as are obvious, and to say with effect much on a little.

Undoubtedly, also, the best method for correction is to lay by for a time what we have written, so that we may return to it, after an interval, as if it were something new to us and written by another, lest our writings, like new-born infants, compel us to fix our affections on them.

In consequence, many students, when they have selected certain words or acquired a certain rhythm of composition from any orator's speeches, think that what they have read is admirably represented in their own sentences. Words come into use or fall into disuse according to the fashion of the day, as the most certain rule for their use is found in custom. They are not in their own nature either good or bad (for in themselves they are only sounds), but just as they are suitably and properly applied or otherwise. When our composition is best adapted to our subject, it becomes most pleasing from its variety.

As there are two kinds of speech, therefore, the continuous, which is called oratory, and the concise, which is termed logic (which Zeno thought so nearly connected that he compared the one to an open hand and the other to a clenched fist), if the art of disputation be a virtue, there will be no doubt of the virtue of that which is of so much more noble and expansive a nature.

In a word, nature is the material for learning; the one forms, and the other is formed. Art can do nothing without material, which has its value even independent of art; but perfection of art is of more consequence than perfection of material.

Some common sarcasms against oratory are drawn from the charge that orators speak on both sides of a question, hence the remarks that "no art contradicts itself, but that oratory contradicts itself"; that "no art destroys what it has itself done, but that this is the ease with what oratory does"; that "it teaches either what we ought to say or what we ought not to say, and that in the one ease, it cannot be an art because it teaches what is not to be said, and in the other, it cannot be an art because when it has taught what is to be said, it teaches also what is directly opposed to it."

But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of speaking well (the definition which I adopt), so that a true orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be acknowledged that it is a useful art.

oratory is the art of speaking well

Aristotle seems to have put everything in the power of oratory when he says that it is the power of saying on every subject whatever can be found to persuade

In Plato too, Gorgias, in the dialogue inscribed with his name, says almost the same thing, but Plato wishes it to be received as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in several passages of his writings, has said that the duty of an orator is to speak in a way adapted to persuade.

The most common definition therefore is that oratory is the power of persuading. What I call a power, some call a faculty and others a talent, but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity, I mean by "power" δύναμις (dynamis).

Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that which ought to be attained by study and is the knowledge how to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired the art, that is, the orator, whose business is to speak well. The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads, but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what is to be said on the first general head.

Still it must be allowed that learning does take away something, as the file takes something from rough metal, the whetstone from blunt instruments, and age from wine; but it takes away what is faulty, and that which learning has polished is less only because it is better.

For nature has not condemned us to stupidity, but we ourselves have changed our mode of speaking and have indulged our fancies more than we ought; and thus the ancients did not excel us so much in genius as in severity of manner. It will be possible, therefore, to select from the moderns many qualities for imitation, but care must be taken that they be not contaminated with other qualities with which they are mixed. Yet that there have been recently, and are now, many writers whom we may imitate entirely, I would not only allow (for why should I not?) but even affirm. 26. But who they are it is not for everybody to decide. We may even err with greater safety in regard to the ancients, and I would therefore defer the reading of the moderns, that imitation may not go before judgment.

If this method be followed, there will remain a question not very difficult to answer, which is, what authors ought to be read by beginners?

But let masters, also, desire to be heard themselves with attention and modesty, for the master ought not to speak to suit the taste of his pupils, but the pupils to suit that of the master.

This instruction he will give with the best effect, if he select particular passages from plays, such as are most adapted for this object, that is, such as most resemble pleadings. 13. The repetition of these passages will not only be most beneficial to pronunciation, but also highly efficient in fostering eloquence.

Yet we must make attempts; for, as Cicero says, even words which have seemed harsh at first, become softened by use.

Therefore, a child is to be admonished, as early as possible, that he must do nothing too eagerly, nothing dishonestly, nothing without self-control, and we must always keep in mind the maxim of Virgil, Adeo in teneris consuescere multum est, "of so much importance is the acquirement of habit in the young."

To these observations I shall add that masters themselves, when they have but one pupil at a time with them, cannot feel the same degree of energy and spirit in addressing him as when they are excited by a large number of hearers. 30. Eloquence depends in a great degree on the state of the mind, which must conceive images of objects and transform itself, so to speak, to the nature of the things of which we discourse. Besides, the more noble and lofty a mind is, by the more powerful springs, as it were, is it moved. Accordingly, it is both strengthened by praise and enlarged by effort, and filled with joy at achieving something great. 31. But a certain secret disdain is felt at lowering the power of eloquence, acquired by so much labor, to one auditor, and the teacher is ashamed to raise his style above the level of ordinary conversation. Let anyone imagine, indeed, the air of a man haranguing, or the voice of one entreating, the gesture, the pronunciation, the agitation of mind and body, the exertion, and, to mention nothing else, the fatigue, while he has but one auditor. Would not he seem to be affected with something like madness? There would be no eloquence in the world if we were to speak only with one person at a time.

The remembrance of such admonitions will attend him to old age and will be of use even for the formation of his character. It is possible for him, also, to learn the sayings of eminent men, and select passages, chiefly from the poets (for the reading of poets is more pleasing to the young), in his play-time. Memory (as I shall show in its proper place) is most necessary to an orator and is eminently strengthened and nourished by exercise; and, at the age of which we are now speaking, and which cannot, as yet, produce anything of itself, it is almost the only faculty that can be improved by the aid of teachers.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs

The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it

The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so.

Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause.

Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.

the significance of contrasted ideas is easily felt, especially when they are thus put side by side, and also because it has the effect of a logical argument; it is by putting two opposing conclusions side by side that you prove one of them false. Such, then, is the nature of antithesis. Parisosis is making the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis is making the extreme words of both members like each other.

It is possible for the same sentence to have all these features together [1410b] -- antithesis, parison, and homoeoteleuton. (The possible beginnings of periods have been pretty fully enumerated in the Theodectea.) There are also spurious antitheses, like that of Epicharmus

a short syllable can give no effect of finality, and therefore makes the rhythm appear truncated. A sentence should break off with the long syllable: the fact that it is over should be indicated not by the scribe, or by his period-mark in the margin, but by the rhythm itself.

Prose, then, is to be rhythmical, but not metrical, or it will become not prose but verse.

This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story

Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject.

Describe a thing instead of naming it: do not say "circle," but "that surface which extends equally from the middle every way."

Smart and popular sayings.

Periodic style.

The best rhythm for prose is the paean, since from this alone no definite metre arises.

Appropriateness.

Impressiveness of style.

correctness of language

The proportional (as definined in the Poetics) metaphor must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms.

Some discussion of metaphor

Style, to be good, must be clear

Four faults of prose style

Through the influence of the poets, the language of the oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, as in the case of Gorgias. But the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry

express plurality, fewness, and unity

distinctions also must be correctly given

avoid ambiguities

calling things by their own special names

the proper use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them

But the proportional metaphor must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms.

Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate.

the use of long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets.

the employment of strange words.

The misuse of compound words.

metaphor is of great value both in poetry and in prose. Prose-writers must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side.

We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary

the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry.

Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through their fine language when their thoughts were simple enough, that the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, e.g. that of Gorgias.

It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions -- of speaking loudly, softly, or between the two; of high, low, or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms that suit various subjects.

The law may be (a) special, i.e. the law of a particular State, or (b) universal, i.e. the law of Nature.

Law is either (a) special, viz. that written law which regulates the life of a particular community, or (b) general, viz. all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.

of a popular kind: as usual in the Rhetoric, and some fourteen constituents,

The premisses from which enthymemes are formed are "probabilities" and "signs"

it has three divisions -- (1) the speaker's power of evincing a personal character which will make his speech credible (ethos ); (2) his power of stirring the emotions of his hearers (pathos ); (3) his power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments (logos ).

Argumentative persuasion is a sort of demonstration, and the rhetorical form of demonstration is the enthymeme.

By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.

the crime is worse which breaks the written laws

The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant.

The forms of government are four -- democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy.

that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger

Things are "practicable" in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them.

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents.

ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use

have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results.

in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

There are two kinds of enthymemes: (a) the demonstrative, formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; (b) the refutative, formed by the conjuction of incompatible propositions.

An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.

A maxim is a general statement about questions of practical conduct.

Examples are either (a) historical parallels, or (b) invented parallels, viz. either (a) illustrations or (b) fables, such as those of Aesop.

The various types of human character are next considered,

Calmness

Anger

In regard to each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt.

he should make his audience feel that he possesses prudence, virtue, and goodwill.

Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs.

These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

They characterize men who ignore our practical needs and delight in the mental juggling of the ancient sophists as “students of philosophy,” but refuse this name to whose who pursue and practise those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth—which should be the objects of our toil, of our study, and of our every act.

For men who have been gifted with eloquence by nature and by fortune, are governed in what they say by chance, and not by any standard of what is best, whereas those who have gained this power by the study of philosophy and by the exercise of reason never speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action. Therefore, it behoves all men to want to have many of their youth engaged in training to become speakers

the power to speak well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honor

the stronger a man's desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honorable and to have the esteem of his fellow-citizens

we gain the power, after being exercised and sharpened on these disciplines, of grasping and learning more easily and more quickly those subjects which are of more importance and of greater value.

We ought, therefore, to think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,125 we are in no respect superior to other living creatures

I should answer that natural ability is paramount and comes before all else

first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practised in the use and application of their art

It is the ability to collect an army which is adequate to the war in hand, and to organize and to employ it to good advantage.

First of all is the ability to know against whom and with whose help to make war; for this is the first requisite of good strategy, and if one makes any mistake about this, the result is inevitably a war which is disadvantageous, difficult, and to no purpose.

I maintain also that if you compare me with those who profess54 to turn men to a life of temperance and justice, you will find that my teaching is more true and more profitable than theirs.

what discourse could have a nobler or a greater theme than one which summons the Hellenes to make an expedition against the barbarians and counsels them to be of one mind among themselves? Well, then, in the first speech I have discoursed upon these themes, and in those later quoted upon matters which, though less lofty, are by no means less fruitful or less advantageous to our city. And you will appreciate the power of these discourses if you will read them side by side with others written by orators of recognized ability and service to mankind

I detach one part from another, and breaking up the discourse, as it were, into what we call general heads, I strive to express in a few words each bit of counsel which I have to offer.48 But my reason for writing upon this subject was that I thought my advice would be the best means of aiding his understanding and at the same time the readiest means of publishing my own principles

while still others have occupied themselves with dialogue,40 and are called dialecticians

I shall never be found to have had anything to do with speeches for the courts.33 You can judge this from my habits of life, from which, indeed, you can get at the truth much better than from the lips of my accusers

no citizen has ever been harmed either by my “cleverness” or by my writings

For I have schooled myself to avoid giving any offense to others, and, when I have been wronged by others, not to seek revenge in court but to adjust the matter in dispute by conferring with their friends.

show to them and to posterity the truth about my character, my life, and the education to which I am devoted

the best and fairest defense, in my opinion, is that which enables the judges to know the facts, so far as this is possible, in regard to the issues on which they are to vote, and which leaves no room for them to go astray in their judgement or to be in doubt as to which party speaks the truth

believing that those who excel in this field are wiser and better and of more use to the world than men who speak well in court

people do not study under me what my accuser says they do

For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those who are well endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical experience.

in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures. Nevertheless, I do think that the study of political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate and form such qualities of character

But it cannot fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers, although it is capable of leading them on to self-improvement and to a greater degree of intelligence on many subjects

For what has been said by one speaker is not equally useful for the speaker who comes after him

the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords

but consider that they are masters of an art if they can attract great numbers of students by the smallness of their charges and the magnitude of their professions and get something out of them.

Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew? CALLICLES: Very true. SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions? CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul? CALLICLES: Quite true. SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible?

And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly.

At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip?

may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong

where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?

great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power

it is not an art at all, in my opinion

Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.

Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.

the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference? GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers

he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!

Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion

rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust

is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect?

if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him

How then is it necessary to regard as just the blame of Helen, who either passionately in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted by force or constrained by divine constraints did the things she did, escaping responsibility every way?

If Love, <being> a god, <has> the divine power of gods, how could the weaker being have the power to reject this and to ward it off?

if she was persuaded by discourse, she did no wrong but rather was unfortunate

if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy

I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about

Therefore it must be that he knows everything.

I think it belongs to (the same man) and to the same art to be able to discourse in the brief style and to understand (the) truth of things and to know how to give a right judgment in the law courts and to be able to make public speeches and to understand the art of rhetoric and to teach concerning the nature of all things, their state and how they came to be.

even if a particular man did not teach, this would not prove anything, but if a single man did teach, this would be evidence that teaching is possible.

I think this statement is very simple-minded

"Does he exist with respect to some particular thing, or just in general?" Then if someone denies that the man exists, he is mistaken, because he is treating (the particular and) universal senses as being the same. Because everything exists in some sense.

the wise speak at the right moment and the demented at the wrong one. (10) And in saying this, they appear to be making a small addition, "(the) right moment" or "the wrong one," so that the situation is no longer the same.

Therefore things both are and are not.

And the same man is both alive and not alive

As a result of the argument they say that if a thing comes to pass, the statement they make is true, but if it does not, then the statement is false. If so, it isn't the name that differs in these cases but the thing named.

suppose one's father or mother ought to drink or eat a remedy and is unwilling to do so, isn't it just to give the remedy in a gruel or drink and to deny that it is in it ? (3) Therefore from this one example it is just to tell lies and to deceive one's parents.

Do they then take away seemly things in exchange for disgraceful ones ? Now really, if anyone had brought an ugly (man), would he take him away handsome?

nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful, but the right occasion takes the same things and makes them disgraceful and then alters them and makes them seemly.

I am not saying what the good is, but I am trying to explain that the bad and the good are not the same but that each is distinct from the other.