Here, as before, the notion of competence can stand in the way of productive engagement: instead of aiming for (individual) mastery of these disciplines as traditionally conceived, we might instead aim at collaborating with those in these other fields for the benefit of all rather than attempting to either poach from or instruct and correct those in these other fields.

Photographs are no different. We look at them. They are nothing more than silver halide crystals arranged on paper or with digital photography, nothing more than a concatenation of 1’s and 0’s resident on a hard-drive. Yet we believe they have captured something of our essence – something of the stuff that is in our heads. I, too, look at the two Fenton photographs and try to imagine what Fenton’s intentions might have been. It’s unavoidable. We have been programmed to do so by natural selection – to project ourselves into the world – and to imagine his world as we imagine ours. I try to figure out which photograph was taken first and to develop theories about Fenton’s motivations, but these are just theories, nothing more.

discipline, built, as Foucault tells us: by groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools: all these constitut[ing] a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being any question of their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them.

material chronotope—a spatio-temporal user orientation produced and stabilized through users' routinized and embodied performances.

I have decided not to use up the greater part of my discourse against these by teaching that they are stupid and false

Yet at this point Quintilian has proposed that he should give instructions about one certain art and virtue, not about perfection in every art and vir-tue. He thinks rhetoric is one of the liberal arts, not in fact a common art, and yet at the same time he deems rhetoric to be an art, a science, and a virtue.

And so, all you dialecticians - that is, whoever can form a judgment about this question with truth and constancy - come here, pay at-tention, sharpen your wits, drive far away from you (in case passions of this kind have been ready to seize your minds), drive far away, I say, love, hate, prejudice, levity, fickleness, and rashness

I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

Yet I add the observation that if they had applied as many months as I have years to judg-ing these precepts accurately and to arranging them in order, I certainly do not doubt that they would have left us arts that are far truer and more distinct.

Such then were the qualities of Aristo-tle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and such was their stature.

we shall rely on the supreme help of unwavering reason in our attempt to establish the true description and practice of the arts

Such is undoubtedly the case unless we suppose, perchance, that a regular structure and smooth combination of words is requisite only in poems and songs, and is superfluous in making a speech; or that composition and modulation are not to be varied in speaking, as in music, according to the nature of the subject.

In oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or other inflection of the voice tends to move the feelings of the bearers. We try to excite the indignation of the judges in one modulation of phrase and voice (that I may again use the same term), and their pity in another, for we see that minds are affected in different ways even by musical instruments, though no words cannot be uttered by them.

this part of learning, which, after being neglected by orators, has been taken up by the philosophers, was a portion of our business,

music is united with the knowledge of divine things

"People have been eloquent," some one may say, "without these arts"; but I want a perfect orator. "They contribute little assistance," another may observe, but that to which even little shall be wanting will not be a whole, and it will be agreed that perfection is a whole

We see an antidote, for example, and other medicines to heal diseases and wounds, compounded of many and sometimes opposite ingredients, from the various qualities of which results that single compound, which resembles none of them, yet takes its peculiar virtues from them all.

For when the philosophers would form their wise man, who is to be perfect in every respect, and, as they say, a kind of mortal god, they not only believe that he should be instructed in a general knowledge of divine and human things, but conduct him through a course of questions which are certainly little, if you consider them merely in themselves (as, sometimes, through studied subtleties of argument) not because questions about horns or crocodiles can form a wise man, but because a wise man ought never to be in error even in the least matters.

2

why may we not divide the hours of the day among different kinds of study, especially as variety itself refreshes and recruits the mind, while on the contrary, nothing is more annoying than to continue at one uniform labor? Accordingly writing is relieved by reading, and the tedium of reading itself is relieved by changes of subject.

Do not players on the harp, for example, exert their memory and attend to the sound of their voice and the various inflections of it, while at the same time they strike part of the strings with their right hand and pull, stop, or let loose others with their left, while not even their foot is idle, but beats time to their playing, all these acts being done simultaneously

IT is a common question whether, supposing all these things are to be learned, they can all be taught and acquired at the same time, for some deny that this is possible, as the mind must be confused and wearied by so many studies of different tendency for which neither the understanding, nor the body, nor time itself, can suffice

Nor is it sufficient to have read the poets only; every class of writers must be studied, not simply for matter, but for words, which often receive their authority from writers. Nor can grammar be complete without a knowledge of music, since the grammarian has to speak of meter and rhythm; nor, if he is ignorant of astronomy, can he understand the poets, who, to say nothing of other matters, so often allude to the rising and setting of the stars in marking the seasons; nor must he be unacquainted with philosophy, both on account of numbers of passages, in almost all poems, drawn from the most abstruse subtleties of physical investigation, and also on account of Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro and Lucretius among the Latins, who have committed the precepts of philosophy to verse

first, because it is a disgrace and a punishment for slaves, and in reality (as will be evident if you imagine the age changed) an affront; secondly, because, if a boy's disposition be so abject as not to be amended by reproof, he will be hardened, like the worst of slaves, even to stripes; and lastly, because, if one who regularly exacts his tasks be with him, there will not be the least need of any such chastisement.

Let the boy be given to me whom praise stimulates, whom honor delights, who weeps when he is unsuccessful. His powers must be cultivated under the influence of ambition; reproach will sting him to the quick; honor will incite him; and in such a boy I shall never be apprehensive of indifference.

When a tutor has observed these indications, let him next consider how the mind of his pupil is to be managed. Some boys are indolent unless you stimulate them; some are indignant at being commanded; fear restrains some and unnerves others; continued labor forms some; with others, hasty efforts succeed better

Such a pupil as I would have will easily learn what is taught him and will ask questions about some things, but will still rather follow than run on before. That precocious sort of talent scarcely ever comes to good fruit

19. Besides, when his acquirements are to be displayed in public, he is blinded at the light of the sun and stumbles at every new object, as having learned in solitude that which is to be done in public. 20. I say nothing of friendships formed at school, which remain in full force even to old age, as if cemented with a certain religious obligation, for to have been initiated in the same studies is a not less sacred bond than to have been initiated in the same sacred rites. That sense, too, which is called common sense, where shall a young man learn when he has separated himself from society, which is natural not to men only, but even to dumb animals?

since he who compares himself to no one else will necessarily attribute too much to his own powers

People think that morals are corrupted in schools; indeed they are at times corrupted, but such may be the case even at home. Many proofs of this fact may be adduced; proofs of character having been vitiated, as well as preserved, with the utmost purity under both modes of education. It is the disposition of the individual pupil, and the care taken of him, that make the whole difference

I am convinced that no one can be an orator who is not a good man

It is incredible how much retardation is caused to reading by haste; for hence arise hesitation, interruption, and repetition, as children attempt more than they can manage; and then, after making mistakes, they become distrustful even of what they know

if he is unwilling to learn, let another be taught before him, of whom he may be envious.

For it will be necessary, above all things, to take care lest the child should conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love, and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted, even beyond the years of infancy

For certainly, small as may be the proficiency which an earlier age exhibits, the child will yet learn something greater during the very year in which he would have been learning something less.

I prefer that a boy should begin with the Greek language, because he will acquire the Latin in general use, even though we tried to prevent him, and because, at the same time, he ought first to be instructed in Greek learning, from which ours is derived

If, however, it should not be the good fortune of children to have such nurses as I should wish, let them at least have one attentive paedagogus, not unskilled in language, who, if anything is spoken incorrectly by the nurse in the presence of his pupil, may at once correct it and not let it settle in his mind. But let it be understood that what I prescribed at first is the right course, and this only a remedy

We are by nature most tenacious of what we have imbibed in our infant years, as the flavor with which you scent vessels when new remains in them, nor can the colors of wool, for which its plain whiteness has been exchanged, be effaced. Those very habits, which are of a more objectionable nature, adhere with the greater tenacity, for good ones are easily changed for the worse, but when will you change bad ones into good? Let the child not be accustomed, therefore, even while he is yet an infant, to phraseology which must be unlearned.

there is no one who has not gained something by study.

As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding

On the contrary, you will find the greater number of men both ready in conceiving and quick in learning, since such quickness is natural to man.

Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls "old age a withered stalk," he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of bloom, which is common to both things

but in a speech we need dignity and the power of taking the hearer out of his ordinary self.

The metrical form destroys the hearer's trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same time it diverts his attention

Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in hand because their predictions are thus, as a rule, less likely to be falsified. We are more likely to be right, in the game of "odd and even," if we simply guess "even" or "odd" than if we guess at the actual number; and the oracle-monger is more likely to be right if he simply says that a thing will happen than if he says when it will happen, and therefore he refuses to add a definite date

The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse only. This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown.

The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts

Besides, delivery is -- very properly -- not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. [1404a] Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it

A third would be the proper method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first poets acted their tragedies themselves. It is plain that delivery has just as much to do with oratory as with poetry

three things -- volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm

various rhythms that suit various subjects

For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech.

In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech.

Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been described; the next subject is their Refutation.

Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that, besides genuine enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not

or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there not being a dog about, there is honour in being a dog. Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say "shares all round" except of him. Or that speech is a very excellent thing, since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem -- the phrase "worthy of esteem" also having the meaning of "worth speech."

One variety of this is when -- as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process

It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument

Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance and so on in other cases. We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question.

mind about forty-nine.

In regard to each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt.

when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated.

enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion,

The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

The Epideictic speaker is concerned with virtue and vice, praising the one and censuring the other. The forms of virtue. Which are the greatest virtues? Some rhetoric devices used by the epideictic speaker: "amplification," especially. Amplification is particularly appropriate to epideictic oratory; examples, to political; enthymemes, to forensic.

The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."

In urging his hearers to take or to avoid a course of action, the political orator must show that he has an eye to their happiness.

The persuasive arguments are (a) the example, corresponding to induction in dialectic; (b) the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism; (c) the apparent enthymeme, corresponding to the apparent syllogism. The enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.

it must adapt itself to an audience of untrained thinkers who cannot follow a long train of reasoning.

while the teachers of philosophy impart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself. Then, when they have made them familiar and thoroughly conversant with these lessons, they set them at exercises, habituate them to work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them

physical training for the body, of which gymnastics is a part, and, for the mind, philosophy, which I am going to explain. These are twin arts—parallel and complementary—by which their masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable, not separating sharply the two kinds of education, but using similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline.

I were to agree with my accuser and concede his claim that I am the “cleverest” of men and that I have never had an equal as a writer of the kind of speeches which are offensive to you, it would be much more just to give me credit for being an honest man than to punish me;

for if any man had been wronged by me, even though he might have held his tongue up till now, he would not have neglected the present opportunity, but would have come forward to denounce me or bear witness against me

while my alleged activities in the law-courts would stir up your anger and hate

charging that I corrupt young men

if you will only hear me with good will, I am very confident that those who have been misled as to my pursuits and have been won over by my would-be slanderers will promptly change their views, while those who think of me as I really am will be still more confirmed in their opinion.

I who have lived to this advanced age without complaint from anyone could not be in greater jeopardy if I had wronged all the world.

while we take our solemn oath at the beginning of each year that we will hear impartially both accusers and accused, we depart so far from this in practice, that when the accuser makes his charges we give ear to whatever he may say; but when the accused endeavors to refute them, we sometimes do not endure even to hear his voice.2

ou should remember this and not trust too hastily the assertions of the accuser nor hear the defendant in uproar and anger.19 Ours is a shameful state of inconsistency; for while it is acknowledged that in our life in general we are the most merciful20 and gentle of all the Hellenes, yet in the conduct of our trials here we manifestly give the lie to this reputation

it smothers truth, and pouring false ideas into our ears, it leaves no man among our citizens secure from an unjust death

I beg you, then, neither to credit nor to discredit what has been said to you until you have heard to the end what I also have to say

lastly, not to seek to run through the whole of it at the first sitting, but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience.

For this informer, himself delivering a composed speech, has said more in complaint of my compositions than upon all other points

But I urge all who intend to acquaint themselves with my speech, first, to make allowance, as they listen to it, for the fact that it is a mixed discourse, composed with an eye to all these subjects; next, to fix their attention even more on what is about to be said than on what has been said before; and, lastly, not to seek to run through the whole of it at the first sitting, but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience.

It is, at any rate, written with devotion to the truth

being frank discussions about philosophy and expositions of its power.

nevertheless I have never deigned to defend myself against their attempts to belittle me, because I considered that their foolish babble had no influence whatever and that I had, myself, made it manifest to all that I had elected to speak and write, not on petty disputes, but on subjects so important and so elevated9 that no one would attempt them except those who had studied with me, and their would-be imitators.

and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general

I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows?

GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another.

Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame

SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? GORGIAS: True.

Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth

SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.

GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things?

GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric

By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers

Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time

Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible

you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

And let no one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught;(25) for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures

Now as for the sophists who have lately sprung up and have very recently embraced these pretensions,(20) even though they flourish at the moment, they will all, I am sure, come round to this position

he must in himself set such an example of oratorythat the students who have taken form under his instruction and are able to pattern after him will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm which is not found in others.

for this, the student must not only have the requisite aptitude but he must learn the different kinds of discourse and practice himself in their use

However, if it is my duty not only to rebuke others, but also to set forth my own views

For, excepting these teachers, who does not know that the art of using letters remains fixed and unchanged, so that we continually and invariably use the same letters for the same purposes, while exactly the reverse is true of the art of discourse?

oblivious of the fact that the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords.

More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet,

most ridiculous of all is that they distrust those from whom they are to get this money--they distrust, that is to say, the very men to whom they are about to deliver the science of just dealing--and they require that the fees advanced by their students be entrusted for safe keeping

although they say that they do not want money and speak contemptuously of wealth as filthy lucre, they hold their hands out for a trifling gain and promise to make their disciples all but immortal!

And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate

Accordingly the barbarian assailant deserves to meet with barbarous assault, by speech and custom and deed--deserves to be blamed in speech, dishonored by custom, and penalized indeed. She who was forced and bereft of fatherland and orphaned of friends--how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.

Now in the first case, the responsible party deserves the responsibility. For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought. For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.

Having now finished the first section, I shall advance to the beginning of the next section, and I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about.

The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder. And the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse and work and city-state and deed one must honor with praise, while one must assign blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

Some of the popular orators say that offices should be assigned by lot

Therefore things both are and are not.

But there is another argument which says that the good is one thing and the bad another, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named

but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person. (2) I myself side with those who hold the latter opinion

But to this too an opposite argument is put forward: that the just and the unjust are different things, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named

And some say that the just is one thing and the unjust another, and others that the just and the unjust are the same. And I shall try to support this latter view

(And)

To sum up, everything done at the right time is seemly and everything done at the wrong time is disgraceful. What have I then worked out?