Evolution has previously met these challenges successfully by implementing systems of constraint. These constraints punish or restrain members from free-riding, cheating, or thieving. They also can reward actions that benefit the organization but are not part of reciprocal exchanges (e.g. the provision of public goods). In human societies, these constraints are our systems of governance. They align the interests of individuals with those of the society. In order to be effective, these systems of constraint need to be more powerful than the members of the organization. If they are not, members will be able to escape their control, and act contrary to the interests of the organization (e.g. corruption in human societies). However cooperation can be undermined if these powerful processes are used by some members to advance their interests at the expense of the organization. Because of this possibility, a major challenge for evolution at all levels of organization has been to prevent power from being used to further the interests of a minority at the expense of the organization. For these reasons, much of the history of evolution at all levels of organization has been about what humans describe as exploitation, the abuse of power and class struggle. But past evolution has dealt with these challenges by constraining the interests of the powerful so that they are aligned with the interests of the organization as a whole.
OK, so he acknowledges some of the major issues of governance (structural) solutions:
- You need strong constraints to align incentives of members with the group
- But once you have that you have a risk of abuse whether of the majority of the minority or a minority of the majority (corruption, authoritarianism etc)
This is a tough problem to solve.
Furthermore, I think it misattributes the major driver of greater cooperative scale which has been onto-cultural rather than structural (though of course the two resonate and reinforce each other).