socrates understanding of justice. so is justice subjective?

is the metaphor here: those who are capable of injustices are also capable of ensuring justice? what does that look like? are those not antithetical unless the agent of injustice was very aware of their transgressions?

typical of it being difficult to define things in philosophy... how do you define a just person, how do you define when justice is necessary, etc

medicinal skills and owing

how do you determined what is owed (especially when it comes to things that are intangible?)

creates the situation in which maybe your perception of justice is skewed

• for: follow up - Gadamer

• of interest

  • Gadamer was the father of philosophical hermeneutics and sought to integrate progress of science and thought by means of language. Since I feel language is a critical intertwingled variable in such deep questions, his approach will be of interest

How do historical method and philosophical method compare? contrast?

Were they tied to similar traditions? co-evolve? evolve separately?

Quote - Let us remember that - our knowledge of the world begins - not with matter - but with perceptions. - I know for sure that - my pain exists, - my ‘green’ exists, - and my ‘sweet’ exists - … everything else is a theory. - Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, <br /> - which can be most conveniently formulated - if we assume that there is some underlying reality - beyond our perceptions. - This model of the material world obeying laws of physics - is so successful - that soon we forget about our starting point and say - that matter is the only reality, - and perceptions are only helpful for its description.

Author Andrei Linde - https://www.scienceandnonduality.com/article/universe-life-consciousness-by-andrei-linde

Quote - Our argument for a mental world does not entail or imply - that the world is merely one’s own personal hallucination or act of imagination. - Our view is entirely naturalistic: - the mind that underlies the world - is a transpersonal mind behaving according to natural laws. - It comprises but far transcends any individual psyche…. - The claim is thus that the dynamics of all inanimate matter in the universe - correspond to transpersonal mentation, - just as an individual’s brain activity - which is also made of matter - corresponds to personal mentation.

Author - Henry Stapp - Bernardo Kastrup - Menas C. Kafatos - https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/coming-to-grips-with-the-implications-of-quantum-mechanics/

Definition - philosophical Idealism - the view that reality is fundamentally a mental process (consciousness) rather than a physical thing

Two traditions within the humanities: - Continental tradition: continuity with the sciences. - American tradition: reflection and interpretation

!- Tsongkapa : Innate vs philosophical self grasping - philosophical self-grasping is intellectual and can be mitigated by better philosophical argument - innate self-grasping is very difficult and comes from deep conditioning that wires our way of behaving in the world a certain habitual way - it takes great effort to rewire ourselves from innate self grasping

Ross, L. (2020). How Intellectual Communities Progress. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/k6yux

In Fowkes, the 'form of appearance' or the Erscheinungsform.

Exchange value is the 'form of appearance' of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it--this 'third thing' will turn out to be 'socially necessary labor time'.

Book Two of Hegel's Science of Logic, the Doctrine of Essence, begins with a chapter on 'Der Schein,' which appears in A.V. Miller's translation as "Illusory Being" (Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. by A.V. Miller, pp. 393-408).

Here, Hegel describes "schein" as "reflected immediacy, that is immediacy which is only by means of its negation and which when contrasted with its mediation is nothing but the empty determination of the immediacy of negated determinate being," (p. 396).

Hegel goes on to remark that "Schein" is "the phenomenon [Phänomen] of skepticism, and the Appearance [Erscheinung] of idealism," (p. 396).

In describing exchange value as the 'Erscheinungsform' of 'something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it'--which will be labor--Marx is clearly flirting with the terminology surrounding "Illusory Being" in the Science of Logic, which suggests labor as the 'thing-in-itself' of the exchange value. Exchange-value is the reflected immediacy that conceals the congealed labor that it is its essence.

The passage as a whole is suggestive of how exchange value will wend its way through Marx's demonstration, unfolding from itself determinations of itself.

Before presenting a long, difficult quotation from Hegel, I think the most straightforward way to present this reference to Hegel is to say present the argument as follows:

In Kantian idealism, we find that the 'thing-in-itself' cannot become an object of knowledge; consciousness only ever has immediate access to the form of appearance, the 'sensible form' of a 'thing-in-itself' which never presents itself to consciousness. In referring to the value form as the 'form of appearance' of something else which does not appear, Marx is saying that just as idealism subordinates the objectivity of the world to its appearance for consciousness, exchange-value represents immediately an essence that it suppresses, and implicitly, denies the possibility of knowledge of this essence.

Hegel writes, "Skepticism did not permit itself to say 'It is'; modern idealism did not permit itself to regard knowledge as a knowing of the thing-in-itself; the illusory being of skepticism was supposed to lack any foundation of being, and in idealism the thing-in-itself was not supposed to enter into knowledge. But at the same time, skepticism admitted a multitude of determinations of its illusory being, or rather its illusory being had for content the entire manifold wealth of the world. In idealism, too, Appearance [Erscheinung] embraces within itself the range of these manifold determinateness. This illusory being and this Appearance are immediately thus manifoldly determined. This content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing or thing-in-itself at its base; it remains on its own account as it is; the content has only been transferred from being into an illusory being, so that the latter has within itself those manifold determinateness, which are immediate, simply affirmative, and mutually related as others. Illusory being is, therefore, itself immediately determinate. It can have this or that content; whatever content it has, illusory being does not posit this itself but has it immediately. The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian, Kantian, Fichtean, and others, have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than skepticism did. Skepticism permits the content of its illusory being to be given to it; whatever content it is supposed to have, for skepticism it is immediate. The monad of Leibniz evolves its ideas and representations out of itself; but it is not the power that generates and binds them together, rather do they arise in the monad like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate over against one another and the same in relation to the monad itself. Similarly, the Kantian Appearance [Erscheinung] is a given content of perception; it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject, which are immediately relatively to themselves and to the subject. It may well be that the infinite obstacle of Fichte's idealism has no underlying thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the ego; but for the ego, this determinateness which it appropriates and whose externality it sublates is at the same time immediate, a limitation of the ego, which it can transcend but which has in it an element of indifference, so that although the limitation is in the ego, it contains an immediate non-being of the ego." (p. 396-397).

In Lenin's notebooks on Hegel's Science of Logic, these sections provoke a considerable degree of excitement. Lenin's 'Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic' can be accessed via Marxists.org here:

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch02.htm

Sheridan wants to apply Locke's findings on the language of "philosophical discourse" to all language.

The original, plundered by Napoleon in 1797 so it is no surprise the reproduction is seen as better than the original which is in the Louvre. When the reproduction was hung in its original setting — Palladio’s Refectory on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore — on 11 September 2007, the critic Dario Gamboni wrote: ‘It seems that many are still wedded to a fixed idea of originality… I would like you to consider that originality is rooted in the trajectory or career of the object — it is not a fixed state of being but a process which changes and deepens with time.’ For Gamboni, the reproduction in the Refectory was a more complete and authentic experience than the painting hanging in the Louvre. Taken from https://www.christies.com/features/Master-of-reproduction-Adam-Lowe-and-Factum-Arte-6776-1.aspx

The movability of the 'aura' from the original and how it can move from one material manifestation to another. The 'copy' is its own and should be valued.

Very true, some artworks that have become destroyed by the ageing process etc, and now that they have a digitally enhanced counterpart, gives us a chance to appreciate at another level. The quality of the digital reproduction is paramount so it is as close a representation of the original

Does the several translations of Chaucer's work from Medieval to English mean we cannot consider the translations? If so many of us would have never learnt of his great stories in the Canterbury Tales

So can a painting be judged by the value of its originality, and/or more valued because of the potential value of it through purchasing of its reproductions?

The term 'aura' was coined by Walter Benjamin in his 1936 essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Aura is a quality integral to an artwork that cannot be communicated through mechanical reproduction techniques – such as photography

Title: Is Polite Philosophical Discussion Possible? (guest post by Nomy Arpaly) - Daily Nous

Keywords: implicit bias, philosophical discussion, war crimes, moral inhibitions—

Summary: For brevity’s sake, let’s just say it’s a big part of politeness or civility not to correct people.<br>A soldier who is fighting, even for a just cause, is in a precarious situation, with regard to morality, because he has lost, of necessity, the basic moral inhibition against killing people.<br>A philosopher who is arguing with another, even in pursuit of truth, is in a precarious situation with regard to politeness, because she has lost, of necessity, the basic civil inhibition against correcting people.<br>Having lost, of necessity, the inhibition against killing people, some soldiers find themselves shedding other moral inhibitions—and committing war crimes.<br>Having lost, of necessity, the inhibition against correcting people, some philosophers find themselves shedding other social inhibitions—and being terribly, terribly rude.<br>That’s just the nature of inhibition loss.<br>You need the real thing.<br>Being compelled to break the rule of thumb against telling people that they are mistaken in the understanding of an important thing is no excuse for also yelling at them, repeatedly interrupting them and talking over them, responding to their painstakingly prepared talks with a sneering “why should I be interested in any of this”?<br>Furthermore, I will argue against the philosophical Henry Kissinger within many of us who worries that whatever might be true about war and war crimes, realistically speaking philosophical rigor just requires rudeness.<br>It’s clearly a vice, virtue ethicists would say.<br>I would like to add the following.<br>First, if everyone is rude, women are judged unfairly (as potential colleagues, for example) because rude women are treated more harshly than rude men, by everyone, due to implicit bias.<br>Again, changing behavior is much easier than changing implicit bias.<br>Some think philosophy should change here—either through what I called “pacifism” earlier or through changing the way we evaluate people, or otherwise.<br>It won’t solve everything, but if we reduce rudeness, I solemnly promise that more women will want to do philosophy.<br>It is shown most emphatically by downright quiet, mild-mannered philosophers whose objections, expressed in a nice tone of voice, are nonetheless absolutely lethal.<br>They say revenge is best served cold.<br>Philosophical discussion can legitimately feel like a very tiring game of squash.<br>(Vincent Van Gogh, detail of “Four Cut Sunflowers”)<br>

Study of authorship in Philosophical transactions