13 Matching Annotations
  1. Last 7 days
  2. Oct 2020
  3. Jan 2020
    1. the phenomenal form

      In Fowkes, the 'form of appearance' or the Erscheinungsform.

      Exchange value is the 'form of appearance' of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it--this 'third thing' will turn out to be 'socially necessary labor time'.

      Book Two of Hegel's Science of Logic, the Doctrine of Essence, begins with a chapter on 'Der Schein,' which appears in A.V. Miller's translation as "Illusory Being" (Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. by A.V. Miller, pp. 393-408).

      Here, Hegel describes "schein" as "reflected immediacy, that is immediacy which is only by means of its negation and which when contrasted with its mediation is nothing but the empty determination of the immediacy of negated determinate being," (p. 396).

      Hegel goes on to remark that "Schein" is "the phenomenon [Phänomen] of skepticism, and the Appearance [Erscheinung] of idealism," (p. 396).

      In describing exchange value as the 'Erscheinungsform' of 'something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it'--which will be labor--Marx is clearly flirting with the terminology surrounding "Illusory Being" in the Science of Logic, which suggests labor as the 'thing-in-itself' of the exchange value. Exchange-value is the reflected immediacy that conceals the congealed labor that it is its essence.

      The passage as a whole is suggestive of how exchange value will wend its way through Marx's demonstration, unfolding from itself determinations of itself.

      Before presenting a long, difficult quotation from Hegel, I think the most straightforward way to present this reference to Hegel is to say present the argument as follows:

      In Kantian idealism, we find that the 'thing-in-itself' cannot become an object of knowledge; consciousness only ever has immediate access to the form of appearance, the 'sensible form' of a 'thing-in-itself' which never presents itself to consciousness. In referring to the value form as the 'form of appearance' of something else which does not appear, Marx is saying that just as idealism subordinates the objectivity of the world to its appearance for consciousness, exchange-value represents immediately an essence that it suppresses, and implicitly, denies the possibility of knowledge of this essence.

      Hegel writes, "Skepticism did not permit itself to say 'It is'; modern idealism did not permit itself to regard knowledge as a knowing of the thing-in-itself; the illusory being of skepticism was supposed to lack any foundation of being, and in idealism the thing-in-itself was not supposed to enter into knowledge. But at the same time, skepticism admitted a multitude of determinations of its illusory being, or rather its illusory being had for content the entire manifold wealth of the world. In idealism, too, Appearance [Erscheinung] embraces within itself the range of these manifold determinateness. This illusory being and this Appearance are immediately thus manifoldly determined. This content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing or thing-in-itself at its base; it remains on its own account as it is; the content has only been transferred from being into an illusory being, so that the latter has within itself those manifold determinateness, which are immediate, simply affirmative, and mutually related as others. Illusory being is, therefore, itself immediately determinate. It can have this or that content; whatever content it has, illusory being does not posit this itself but has it immediately. The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian, Kantian, Fichtean, and others, have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than skepticism did. Skepticism permits the content of its illusory being to be given to it; whatever content it is supposed to have, for skepticism it is immediate. The monad of Leibniz evolves its ideas and representations out of itself; but it is not the power that generates and binds them together, rather do they arise in the monad like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate over against one another and the same in relation to the monad itself. Similarly, the Kantian Appearance [Erscheinung] is a given content of perception; it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject, which are immediately relatively to themselves and to the subject. It may well be that the infinite obstacle of Fichte's idealism has no underlying thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the ego; but for the ego, this determinateness which it appropriates and whose externality it sublates is at the same time immediate, a limitation of the ego, which it can transcend but which has in it an element of indifference, so that although the limitation is in the ego, it contains an immediate non-being of the ego." (p. 396-397).

      In Lenin's notebooks on Hegel's Science of Logic, these sections provoke a considerable degree of excitement. Lenin's 'Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic' can be accessed via Marxists.org here:

      https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch02.htm

  4. Feb 2019
  5. Oct 2018
    1. Notes

      The original, plundered by Napoleon in 1797 so it is no surprise the reproduction is seen as better than the original which is in the Louvre. When the reproduction was hung in its original setting — Palladio’s Refectory on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore — on 11 September 2007, the critic Dario Gamboni wrote: ‘It seems that many are still wedded to a fixed idea of originality… I would like you to consider that originality is rooted in the trajectory or career of the object — it is not a fixed state of being but a process which changes and deepens with time.’ For Gamboni, the reproduction in the Refectory was a more complete and authentic experience than the painting hanging in the Louvre. Taken from https://www.christies.com/features/Master-of-reproduction-Adam-Lowe-and-Factum-Arte-6776-1.aspx

    2. ethereal design that could be lifted out of its materiality and downloaded into any reproduction without any loss of substance.

      The movability of the 'aura' from the original and how it can move from one material manifestation to another. The 'copy' is its own and should be valued.

    3. Some revivals-the good ones-seem to extract from the original latent traits that can now (or again) be made vivid in the minds of the spectators.

      Very true, some artworks that have become destroyed by the ageing process etc, and now that they have a digitally enhanced counterpart, gives us a chance to appreciate at another level. The quality of the digital reproduction is paramount so it is as close a representation of the original

    4. unlimited fecundity of the original.

      Does the several translations of Chaucer's work from Medieval to English mean we cannot consider the translations? If so many of us would have never learnt of his great stories in the Canterbury Tales

    5. To stamp a piece with the mark of originality requires the huge pressure that only a great number of reproductions can provide.

      So can a painting be judged by the value of its originality, and/or more valued because of the potential value of it through purchasing of its reproductions?

    6. No description can replace seeing this original … oops, I mean, is this not the very definition of `aura’?”

      The term 'aura' was coined by Walter Benjamin in his 1936 essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Aura is a quality integral to an artwork that cannot be communicated through mechanical reproduction techniques – such as photography

  6. Jun 2016
    1. Title: Is Polite Philosophical Discussion Possible? (guest post by Nomy Arpaly) - Daily Nous

      Keywords: implicit bias, philosophical discussion, war crimes, moral inhibitions—

      Summary: For brevity’s sake, let’s just say it’s a big part of politeness or civility not to correct people.<br>A soldier who is fighting, even for a just cause, is in a precarious situation, with regard to morality, because he has lost, of necessity, the basic moral inhibition against killing people.<br>A philosopher who is arguing with another, even in pursuit of truth, is in a precarious situation with regard to politeness, because she has lost, of necessity, the basic civil inhibition against correcting people.<br>Having lost, of necessity, the inhibition against killing people, some soldiers find themselves shedding other moral inhibitions—and committing war crimes.<br>Having lost, of necessity, the inhibition against correcting people, some philosophers find themselves shedding other social inhibitions—and being terribly, terribly rude.<br>That’s just the nature of inhibition loss.<br>You need the real thing.<br>Being compelled to break the rule of thumb against telling people that they are mistaken in the understanding of an important thing is no excuse for also yelling at them, repeatedly interrupting them and talking over them, responding to their painstakingly prepared talks with a sneering “why should I be interested in any of this”?<br>Furthermore, I will argue against the philosophical Henry Kissinger within many of us who worries that whatever might be true about war and war crimes, realistically speaking philosophical rigor just requires rudeness.<br>It’s clearly a vice, virtue ethicists would say.<br>I would like to add the following.<br>First, if everyone is rude, women are judged unfairly (as potential colleagues, for example) because rude women are treated more harshly than rude men, by everyone, due to implicit bias.<br>Again, changing behavior is much easier than changing implicit bias.<br>Some think philosophy should change here—either through what I called “pacifism” earlier or through changing the way we evaluate people, or otherwise.<br>It won’t solve everything, but if we reduce rudeness, I solemnly promise that more women will want to do philosophy.<br>It is shown most emphatically by downright quiet, mild-mannered philosophers whose objections, expressed in a nice tone of voice, are nonetheless absolutely lethal.<br>They say revenge is best served cold.<br>Philosophical discussion can legitimately feel like a very tiring game of squash.<br>(Vincent Van Gogh, detail of “Four Cut Sunflowers”)<br>

    1. As Katzen (1980, p. 191) notes in heranalysis of early volumes of thePhilosophical Transac-tions:. . . no attempt is made to give prominence to the author ofthe article . . . there is generally no reference at all to theauthor in the heading that signals a new communication. Ifthe author is referred to in the title, it is likely to be in anoblique form . . . we are at the threshold between anony-mous and eponymous authorship

      Study of authorship in Philosophical transactions

  7. Feb 2014
    1. You're as bad as that character in Moliere who didn't know he was talking prose! You've b een committing philosophical nonsense with your \rigorous pro ofs of existence". Don't you know that what exists has to b e observed, or at least observable?