45 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2019
    1. if the argument goes to infinity then the log also goes to infinity in the limit.

      doing this section of the practice problems proved to be a fun challenge.

    1. We won’t need these facts much over the next couple of sections but they will be required on occasion

      Nonetheless, they should be thought as an important method of mathematics.

    1. Last, we were after something that was happening at x=1x=1x = 1 and we couldn’t actually plug x=1x=1x = 1 into our formula for the slope. Despite this limitation we were able to determine some information about what was happening at x=1x=1x = 1 simply by looking at what was happening around x=1x=1x = 1. This is more important than you might at first realize and we will be discussing this point in detail in later sections.

      This reminds me of the exercise we had this morning in class.

    2. Likewise, at the second point shown, the line does just touch the graph at that point, but it is not “parallel” to the graph at that point and so it’s not a tangent line to the graph at that point.

      A visual representation of a Tangent Line is very useful, I honestly wasn’t visualizing what a Tangent Line was, in my head.

    1. We will be seeing limits in a variety of places once we move out of this chapter.

      Will the L’Hospital method be explained in this chapter?

  2. Feb 2019
    1. great man

      lol. This guy really loves locke.

    2. And as this is '� �Lw,..., _chiefly done by an agreement in the use of certain � qN-'­signs, it is no mailer what those signs are; there -�� being little or no naturnl connection, beLween any ' _ v verbal signs and our ideas, which is sufficiently \� evinced, by the variety of languages that are spo• ken, in the different countries of the world.

      Locke would agree, yeah?

    3. con.�idering it, a

      So while Sheridan praises Locke for his step in the right direction, he also names him as complicit in the problem because it is tempting to stop with the progress Locke made, rather than carrying out the project to its end.

    4. consists of the signs of internal emotions,

      Sheridan wants to apply Locke's findings on the language of "philosophical discourse" to all language.

    5. fix, the precise meaning

      In the style of Locke and Plato's Socrates, let us start....with definition!

    1. naturally attracted them to these qualities when they were en­countered in the world. Additionally. innate human reason

      Would the belief in innate, natural qualities be contrary to John Locke's idea of the tabula rasa? I don't know enough of Locke to know whether innate qualities would be part of what's swept off the slate.

    1. 34

      Kinda got real cranky and pedantic at the end. Calm down, Locke.

    2. a perverse use of those signs which we make use of to convey truth to one another.

      Plato: "You can't give long answers or talk funny. Just give it to me straight, without all the obfuscation."

    3. Vico, Sheridan, and Campbell, as well as a number of philosophers, pursued Locke's suggestive but incomplete account of the relation-ship of language and knowledge, though never far enough to link rhetoric explicitly with the process of creating "true" knowledge. T

      We stand on the shoulders of academics who have come before us. Although Locke's work may have been "incomplete" or a starting point, his work initiated this pursuit and paved the way for future scholars.

    4. hough not a rhetorical 1hcoris1, John Locke powerfully aflccted the direction of rhetoric, and every other intellectual endeavor a~ well. in the eighteenth century.

      Seems as though the author is justifying Locke's influence and place within rhetoric.

    5. and the pre!.umption lhal direcl knowledge is available through revelation or perception.

      Because it states knowledge is available through perception, do we all having differing knowledge because individuals have their own perceptions? It seems as though individuals can not have a sense of shared knowledge unless we all have the same perceptions.

    6. who had noth-ing in his study but the bare titles of books, with-out possessing the contents of them

      ouch -- I've been Locke-slammed

    7. seven

    8. no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold

      I'm struck through here (and the liquor example) how prescient Locke's inquiries are for our own investigations into rhetoric and the question of "what is human?" It feels like he's anticipating Barad's argument that each definition of gold -- its color, its weight, its malleableness, etc. -- creates a cut, a boundary around what gold means for each person that cares to define it. Barad sees these "local determinations" not as final but as fluid, even while being exclusionary (821). Locke is keying in on these exclusionary definitions and the problems they might pose to an empirical approach.

    9. for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language.

      I like Locke's notion that "the right use and perfection of language" is to have "meaning understood" (817). This still seems to be a notion we hold onto (CLARITY -- it's certainly one I strive for anyway), though we'd probably differ on his assertion that our words are just transcriptive/descriptive tools. See Barad's critique of representationalism.

    1. they must acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist somewhere, to wit, real existence and mat� ter of fact

      Hume and Locke seem to agree here -- they both feel that there exists some kind of external, fixed reality (observed in nature), and if we all just practiced enough we could see it

  3. Apr 2018
    1. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

      Useful passage to point out the tension between "Civic virtue and the responsibility to the greater good (see end of passage) vs. individual property rights. Useful to frame discussions re: natural parks, utilitarian vs. preservationist perspectives on environmental policies, taxation policies & burdens, entitlements etc etc.

    1. Lastly, Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane [53] Society, can have no hold upon an Atheist.138 The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their Atheism undermine and destroy all Religion, can have no pretence of Religion whereupon to challenge the Privilege of a Toleration. As for other Practical Opinions, though not absolutely free from all Error, yet if they do not tend to establish Domination over others, or Civil Impunity to the Church in which they are taught, there can be no Reason why they should not be tolerated.
  4. Mar 2017
    1. It was Aristotle who said that there can be no natural connection between the sound of any language and the things signi-fied, and, if we set the problem right side up and remember the other words before examining it, we shall have to agree with him.
    2. Between the symbol and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which com,ists in it~ being used by someone to ~land for a referent.
    3. Words, as every one now knows, "mean" nothing by them-selves, although the belief that they did, as we shall see in the next chapter, was once equally universal.
    4. Meaning does not reside in the words or signs themselves; to believe that it does is to fall victim to the "proper meaning su-perstition," the belief that words have inherent meaning.
  5. Feb 2017
    1. Truth must be seen similarly us a convention of dis~ course, for there is no way to convert things directly into language.
    2. One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensation of sound: and music.

      Locke identifies a similar problem in his own writing, but unlike Nietzsche, refuses to address it further: "Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for must be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others...Those [words] which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs of faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man need not here be mentioned...for if we examine them, we shall find that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection."

      Although Locke doesn't delve much deeper into this, I do like how he notes that some words are used to describe "mixed modes" like music and color. Nietzsche addresses this concept below, saying that although a man might be deaf, he can still "feel" music (via vibrations) and therefore might understand sound in a way that is divergent from the conventional manner. I'm also reminded of Rickert's piece, in which he noted that Homer could never identify the color "blue" as we understand it today, instead calling the color of the sea "purple" or "wine red."

    1. that, there-fore, a writer who increases this power by stimulat-ing mental action arrives, by a different road, at the same destination which is reached by another writer who by a wise economy prevents unnecessary waste.

      It is useless to assume anything about an audience's mental processes, mostly because you're going to say what you want to say anyway and you're still not going to ensure an audience's understanding.

      I think Locke would wholeheartedly agree with this.

    1. Of Rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers;

      For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no im-perfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language (Locke, 817).

      Makes me think back to the subjectivity of what rhetoric and language can be; as long as one person believes it to be true, then it must be true

    1. The propositions, "Twelve arc a dozen," "twenty are a score," unless considered as explications of the words dozen and score, arc equally insignificant with the former. But when the thing, though in effect coinciding, is consid-ered under a different aspect; when what is single in the subject is divided in the predicate, and con-versely; or when what is a whole in the one is re-garded as a part of something else in the other; such propositions lead to the discovery of innu-merable and apparently remote relations. One added to four may be accounted no other than a definition of the word Jive, as was remarked above. But when I say, "Two added to three arc equal lo five," I advance a truth, which, though equally clear, is quite distinct from the preceding.

      A bit of a mix between Locke's simple knowledge and the idea that "sounds have no natural connection with our ideas." (817 near the bottom right)

      EDIT: cue Locke's Three Minute Philosophy

    2. To prevent mistakes, it will not be beside my purpose further lo remark, that several of the cerms above explained arc sometimes used by rhetoricians and critics in a much larger and more vague signification, than has been given them here.

      Would this paragraph be enough clarification for Locke?

    3. In propriety there cannot be such a thing as an universal grammar, unless there were such a thing as an universal language.

      Even if there was a universal language, would it avoid the problem of humans applying disparaging meanings to words, as suggested by Locke? Locke suggests that even those who speak the same tongue do not fully comprehend one another because individuals apply different meanings to the same word based on feelings, background, culture, etc.

    1. this is { ~~­chiefly done by an agreement in the use of certain ~ signs, it is no matter what those signs are; there -~~ being little or no naturnl connection, between any ' , V verbal signs and our ideas,
    2. But as there are other things which pass in the mind of man, beside ideas; as he is not wholly made up of intellect, but on the contr.iry, the pas-sions, and the fancy, compose great part of his complicated frame; as the operations of tl,tese are attended with an infinite variety of emotions in the mind, both in kind and degree; it is clear, that unless there be some means found, of manifest-ing those emotions, all that passes in the mind of one man can not be communicated to another. Now, as in order to know what another knows, and in the same manner that he knows it, an exact transcript of the ideas which pass in the mind of one man, must be made by sensible marks, in the mind of another; so in order to feel what another feels, the emotions which are in the mind of one man, must also be communicated to that of an-other, by sensible marks.

      This is reminiscent of Locke's thoughts on simple and complex ideas: the only way language truly work is if both parties have the same understanding of the words being used. Sheridan seems to take it a bit further, though, possibly drawing upon Hume's decanting of subjectivity.

  6. Jan 2017
    1. To seek the real beauty, or real defor-mity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitte

      Locke pg. 823: "White and sweet . . . carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends." So for Locke, the word sweetness is not a mixed mode, but a word likely understood by the listener/reader. But Hume is talking about sweetness as a subjective sense perception, not a simple idea, and perhaps this suggests that the word sweetness, and other so-called simple ideas, is not necessarily obvious? But I am curious when Locke discusses simple modes and simple ideas if he would still agree that something like sweetness is understood clearly in civil usage, but perhaps not in philosophical usage? In that case, the word sweetness would not be used as a term to express an "undoubted truth" and perhaps that makes it a little bit closer to what Hume is saying here.

    2. An explanation of the tenns commonly ends the controversy; and , the disputants are surprized to find, that they had been quarrelling, while at bottom they agreed in their judgment.

      "...upon ex-amination found that the signification of that word was not so settled or certain as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them per-ceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions concerning some fluid and subtle matter, passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called liquor or no, a thing, which, when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about." -Locke pg. 822

  7. Sep 2015
    1. Nuestro objeto no es conocer todas las cosas, sino aquellas que convienen a nuestra conducta. Si podemos encontrar las medidas por las que una criatura racional, colocada en la situación en que está el hombre en este mundo, puede y debe gobernar sus acciones y opiniones, no tenemos que preocup3.111os porque otras cosas esca­pen a nuestro conocimiento.

      El tema y propósito de este ensayo es encontrar los temas que son aptos para nuestro conducta (vida práctica y social), e identificar los que no lo son y dejar en paz de preocuparnos por ellos.

    2. Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano

      Locke, John (1690) Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano

  8. Aug 2015
  9. classicliberal.tripod.com classicliberal.tripod.com
    1. Chapter 9

      This is a difficult reading. Try your best.

      Study Questions:

      According to Locke, why is “man” willing to give up the natural condition of freedom?

      Why does “man” enter into a condition of society and law?

  10. Feb 2014
    1. these traditional property rights, as suggested by Locke, depend on the scarcity of that property (1995, n. pag.). I f ‘Joe’ owns property and ‘Sue’ acquires it, then Joe no longer has it, and Sue has harmed Joe (by stealing). Joe’s property is scarce.