48 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2021
    1. This observation extends to tables, chairs, scritoires, chimneys, coaches, sadles, ploughs, and indeed to every work of art; it being an universal rule, that their beauty is chiefly deriv’d from their utility, and from their fitness for that purpose, to which they are destin’d.

      «Design» anachronically

    1. Un fondement très profond dans la culture occidentale

      C’est sans doute le grand écueil de Hume, qui s’exprime toujours en dualités: orgueil et humilité; amour et haine; estime et mépris; etc.


    2. Et voilà finalement la première définition de l’amour.

      «Il est tout à fait impossible de donner une définition des passions de l’amour et de la haine ; et cela parce qu’elles ne font que procurer une impression simple, sans aucun mélange ni composition.» — David Hume


  2. Jan 2020
    1. Or global warming. I can’t see or touch it. What I can see and touch are these raindrops, this snow, that sunburn patch on the back of my neck. I can touch the weather. But I can’t touch climate. So someone can declare: “See! It snowed in Boise, Idaho, this week. That means there’s no global warming!” We can’t directly see global warming, because it’s not only really widespread and really really long-lasting (100,000 years); it’s also super high-dimensional. It’s not just 3-D. It’s an incredibly complex entity that you have to map in what they call a high-dimensional- phase space: a space that plots all the states of a system. In so doing, we are only following the strictures of modern science, laid down by David Hume and underwritten by Immanuel Kant. Science can’t directly point to causes and effects: That would be metaphysical, equivalent to religious dogma. It can only see correlations in data. This is because, argues Kant, there is a gap between what a thing is and how it appears (its “phenomena”) that can’t be reduced, no matter how hard we try. We can’t locate this gap anywhere on or inside a thing. It’s a transcendental gap. Hyperobjects force us to confront this truth of modern science and philosophy.

      A short, and very cogent argument here.

  3. Feb 2019
    1. prejudices

      Prejudices come back again--Hume, Vico, Astell...those are three that in recent memory have used this word (or the intros to them did).

      Is it possible to have the situation that Sheridan refers to here, one without prejudice entirely? Even in a new subject, couldn't one jump to conclusions or make assumptions about (to pre-judge) it?

    1. abuse or perversion of terms from their na1ura

      Some violent wording here. What does Hume mean here by "natural?" Does he actually believe that anything is natural? How can we pervert anything when knowledge is constructed by sense data and thus not based in any objective truth? Am I totally misunderstanding Hume?

    2. Of the Standard of Taste"

      This reminds me of C.S. Lewis "The Taste of the Other" https://www.amazon.com/Taste-Other-Social-Ethical-Thought/dp/1573832685

    3. We may ob­serve, that every work of art, in order lo produce its due effect on the mind, must be surveyed in a certain point of view, and cannot be fully relished by persons, whose situation, real or imaginary, is not conformable to that which is required by lhe performance. An orator addresses himself to a particular audience

      Again, there is a theme of performance and the need to please viewers and audiences.

    4. each mind perceives a differentbeauty.

      I believe this goes back to Locke's idea of knowledge and perception.

    5. they must acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist somewhere, to wit, real existence and mat� ter of fact

      Hume and Locke seem to agree here -- they both feel that there exists some kind of external, fixed reality (observed in nature), and if we all just practiced enough we could see it

    6. eauty

      This is a great little summary of what he's outlined so far.

    7. must place 1,Jl>'u.,<I himself in lhe same situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment of the oration.

      Me: But Hume, why can't I write about Las Meninas without mentioning Foucault?

      Hume: My child, "before [you] enter upon the subject, [you] must endeavor to conciliate [the peer reviewer's] affection, and acquire their good graces."

      Me: But why can't we just move on?!?!

      Hume: My child, you "must place [yourself] in the same situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment."

      Me: Yeah I'm just gonna cut the reference.

      I mean, you guys might have read that differently.

    1. Defect

      Language similar to that of Hume, here and in the "General Orations" remark below (where generalities are more likely to be universally true than particulars)

    2. Skil nor Art to Form

      According to Hume, genius is another type of knowing (though he still calls genius a way by which to know the 'rules').

  4. Apr 2017
    1. If “humans”refers to phenomena, not independent entities with inherent propertiesbut rather beings in their differential becoming, particular material(re)configurings of the world with shifting boundaries and properties thatstabilize and destabilize along with specific material changes in what itmeans to be human

      This concept stands much more in line with Hume's take on human consciousness as another bundle of sensory impressions instead of Descartes' cogito (with this video as a refresher). If a "human" is the phenomena of collision and configuring of boundaries, there isn't a core "you" that exists outside these interactions between the human and nonhuman.

  5. Mar 2017
    1. The whole problem is reduced, as Hume said, to determining who are the quali-fied judges.

      Hume would say the qualified judges are those with good taste, who have experiences that have influenced them to have a refined sense about the world, and therefore are qualified with a better judgment of all things.

    1. properties

      Hey there Hume

    2. Burke's rhetoric, bound up in communities, communal ideas, social rela-tions, religion, magic, and psychological effects, in both verbal and nonverbal com-munication, seems to encompass almost everything.

      This harkens back to both Muckelbauer and Rickert for me, also thinking about Burke's rhetoric as a kind of social and historical "bundle" à la Hume.

    1. I 5~ is behaving or·thinking with a concept-not, of course, of one. Its act is abstractive and general; disregards in some respects the fonner situations and so is abstractive, and applies in some re-spects not to one single thing but to any of a sort and so is general. The theorem settles the Eighteenth-Century problem by standing it on its head. That problem was, How do we manage, from this particular concrete thing and that particular concrete thing and the other particular concrete thing, to arrive at the general abstract anything? The theorem holds that we begin with the general abstract any-thing, split it, as the world makes us, into sorts and then arrive at concrete particulars by the overlapping or common membership of these sorts. This bit of paper here now in my hand is a concrete particular to us so far as we think of it as paperish, hereish, nowish, and in my hand; it is the more concrete as we t

      Bundle Theory

    2. natural symbol-ism

      What makes it natural?

      Bundle Theory?

    3. reference

      Bundle Theory

  6. Feb 2017
    1. Finally, he concludes that knowl-edge itself is based upon argument, and that there is considerable ethical and ideo-logical danger in the tendency or most arguments lo claim that they rest on im-mutable truth.
    1. Words arc signs of our im-pulses and do not represent "u many-sided, respectable knowledge of things.
    2. nothing but metaphors for things.

      Anybody else reminded of Hume's bundles here?

    3. "the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!

      This seems reminiscent of the problem of induction that Hume was particular about. To state that something will forever be (or mean) the same thing, is foolish.

    1. where there is a deficient verbal memory, or an inadequale sense of logical depen-dence, or but little perception of order, or a Jack of constructive ingenuity; no amount of instruc-tion will remedy the defect. Nevertheless, some practical result may be expected from a familiar-ity with the principles of style. The endeavour to conform to Jaws may tell, though slowly. And if in no other way, yet, as facilitating revision, a knowledge of the thing to be achieved-a clear idea of what constitutes a beauty, and what a blemish-cannot fail to be of service.

      Hume suggests a similar idea in Of the Standard of Taste There are standards we should adhere to, and we should try to learn them the best we can (although sometimes we just can't, and that's our fault).:

      It appears then, that, amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, !here are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ.

    1. Most com-mentators, having their minds preoccupied with the prejudices of education, afford little aid; they rnthcr tend 10 darken the text by the multitude of words

      I thought this was interesting in connection with Hume and taste. For Hume, it's important to approach things in an unbiased way in order to properly judge the quality of something. But education is also important for Hume in being able to judge something. Grimke here is pointing out that education itself is biased, as it has privileged white men, meaning that texts will be read through a sexist lens.

    1. Conspiracy theorists have argued that the AIDS virus was deliberately created as part of a plot to kill black or gay people

      "Those who found morality on sentiment, more than on reason, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former observation, and to maintain, that, in all questions, which regard conduct and manners, the difference among men is really greater than at first sight it appears." - Hume

    1. But allow him more experience in works of this kind, and his taste becomes by degrees more exact and enlightened. He begins to perceive not only the character of the whole, but the beauties and de-f eels of each part; and i~ able to describe the pe-culiar qualities which he praises or blames. The mist is dissipalcd which seemed formerly to hang over the object; and he can at length pronounce firmly, and without hesitation, concerning it. Thus, in taste, considered as mere sensibility, ex-ercise opens a great source of improvement.

      This reminds me of Hume: "A good palate is not tried by strong flavors; but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest" (835).

      Anyone can praise or blame based on the most obvious and strongest characteristics of something. Taste is only at play when one is able to praise or blame based on the subtle and intricate details of the thing under review.

    2. no principle of the human mind is, in its operations, more fluctu-ating and capricious than taste.

      That puts an interesting wrench into Blair's approach. He has a restriction in his writing, because he has an answer he has to build to. No matter what, Blair's goal is to uphold and confirm the polite taste, and as a second to that, try to identify how taste works. Hume, I think, comes off stronger because he doesn't have this restriction.

    1. lt so very considerable, as s apt to imagine; that this, operation of the intellect, :akness incident to all our insepamblc from our na-. take an opportunity par-:111d Origin of Experience ,i<.lcr the principal tribes 1e general name of moral !ry difficulty may be re-·etard our progress in the will be necessary, in the ! more accurately those ·hich give being to experi-, to all those attainments, that are derived from it. • sense and memory. The 1d internal, are the original ,cy inform the mind of the escnt instant are situated !ir activity, and no sooner in any particular instance rmation exhibited by them emory. Remembrance in-1tion, insomuch that the sole repository of the form sense; knowledge pository, would be as in-is gotten, and could be of Our sensations would be ing pictures of a moving cura, which leave not the :m. Memory, therefore, is er extant of those past re• ad once the evidence of 1s it were, the prints that ,le impression~. But from Jnsidered in themselves, 1owledge only of individ-1ch facts as either hereto-·esent do come, under the :Jer this knowledge useful :! nature of things, and in a further process of the h deserves to be carefully e thus illustrated. I have ohscrved :1 stone fall to the ground when nothing intervened to impede its motion. This single fact produce:; little or no effect on the mind beyond a bare remembrance. At another time, I observe the fall of a tile, at another of an apple, and so of al-most every kind of body in the like situation. Thus my sense first, and then my memory, fur-nish me with numerous examples, which, though different in every other particular, arc similar in this, that they present a body moving down-ward!>, till obstructed either by the ground or by some intcrvcnient object. Hence by first notion of gravitation. For, with regard to the similar cir· cumstam:cs of different facts, as by the repetition such circumstances arc more deeply imprinted, the mind acquires a habit of retaining them, omit-ting those circumstances peculiar to each wherein their differences consiM. Hence, if ob-jects of any kind, in a particular manner circum-stanced, arc remembered to have been usually, and still more if uniformly, succeeded by certain particular consequences, the idea of the former, in the supposed circumstance introduced into the mind, immediately associates the idea of the lat-ter; aml if the object itself, so circumstanced, be presented to the senses, the mind instantly antici-pates the appearnncc of the customary conse-quence.

      Aha! But then we come across the Inductions Fallacy once again. Assuming that an object will fall to the ground based upon memory is presumptive and has the potential to halt further progress in the area.

    1. But as there are other things which pass in the mind of man, beside ideas; as he is not wholly made up of intellect, but on the contr.iry, the pas-sions, and the fancy, compose great part of his complicated frame; as the operations of tl,tese are attended with an infinite variety of emotions in the mind, both in kind and degree; it is clear, that unless there be some means found, of manifest-ing those emotions, all that passes in the mind of one man can not be communicated to another. Now, as in order to know what another knows, and in the same manner that he knows it, an exact transcript of the ideas which pass in the mind of one man, must be made by sensible marks, in the mind of another; so in order to feel what another feels, the emotions which are in the mind of one man, must also be communicated to that of an-other, by sensible marks.

      This is reminiscent of Locke's thoughts on simple and complex ideas: the only way language truly work is if both parties have the same understanding of the words being used. Sheridan seems to take it a bit further, though, possibly drawing upon Hume's decanting of subjectivity.

    1. But all deter-minations of the understanding are not right

      Reminds me of the Stoics, such as Epictetus, who said that humans more often than not make false judgments in a certain situation based on their "sentiments," (he didn't use this word but I think it works) which then causes individuals to experience a "passion," such as grief, anxiety, despair, or anger. Stoics argued that people should indeed attempt to judge a situation correctly in order to avoid being overcome by passions and instead find true happiness (which for them was probably more equivalent to our American culture's version of "okay-ness").

    2. that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expressions.

      Reflects Locke's annoyance with the inconsistency in meaning applied to language

    3. Moreover, Blair enacts Hume's argument that good taste, based as it is on experience, can be learned.

      Again, this begs the question, "What is good taste, really?"

    4. Such people can provide us with the standards for criticism.

      But who determines those who have a superior taste? I assume knowledge has much to do with it, but diverse cultural backgrounds lead to different views of what is considered "tasteful." Two individuals could be equally educated in the same field and have wildly different standards of what is tasteful based solely on their background, culture, etc. Interesting to note that their rhetorical environment influences the way in which they think, albeit not actively, about societal standards and values.

  7. Jan 2017
  8. Jun 2015
    1. While colors are brighter and give more immediate plea- sure in new paintings than old, in excess these can cause satiety, causing us to turn back to the faded austerity of older paintings.

      Later, Hume also describes color in similar terms while referencing taste: Taste is a “productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” (Enquiry ... Principle Morals)

  9. May 2015
    1. “ that we feel more through the public exposure to others ’ emotions than through an interior circuit of sensation.