37 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2019
    1. In soil, bacteria tend to live in a state of dormancy due to prevailing oligotrophic conditions, which would not be particularly favorable for the development of competence

      It can also be argued that the transformed DNA is a good resource of phosphates, nitrogen etc., so might be favoured in oligotrophic conditions?

  2. Jul 2019
    1. with their habits. Sometimes I heard four or five at once in different parts of the wood, by accident one a bar behind another, and so near me that I distinguished not only the cluck after each note, but often that singular buzzing sound like a fly in a spider’s web, only prop

      i think he compare wood to natural, Just like he heard four or five different sounds from wood, Natural is also crowded with different sounds.

  3. Apr 2019
  4. Mar 2019
    1. Crucial to understanding the workings of power is an understandingof the nature of power in the fullness of its materiality. To restrict power’sproductivity to the limited domain of the “social,” for example, or tofigure matter as merely an end product rather than an active factor infurther materializations, is to cheat matter out of the fullness of its capacity.

      The nature of power is material as well as social.

  5. Feb 2019
    1. abuse or perversion of terms from their na1ura

      Some violent wording here. What does Hume mean here by "natural?" Does he actually believe that anything is natural? How can we pervert anything when knowledge is constructed by sense data and thus not based in any objective truth? Am I totally misunderstanding Hume?

    1. But the greatest drawback of our educational methods is that we pay an excessive amount of altention to the natural sciences and not enough to ethics.

      How would society be different if we paid more attention to ethics as opposed to the natural sciences? What would an ethics-oriented society look like?

  6. Aug 2018
    1. First, I will focus in these larger groups because reviews that transcend the boundary between the social and natural sciences are rare, but I believe them to be valuable. One such review is Borgatti et al. (2009), which compares the network science of natural and social sciences arriving at a similar conclusion to the one I arrived.
    1. Nature has been incorporated into social theorizing only in as far as it either has become an object to which meaning is attributed and which hence figures as part of human reflexivity, as object met with emotions or attitudes; or, it is seen as an object of transformation by those forces which act upon it: economic forces, but foremost forces emanating from science and technology. The natural environment, including the biosphere and a multitude of environmental risks which have come to the fore today, negate clear-cut boundaries between the effects of human intervention, and hence agency, and synergistic processes which are 'natural' but still a result of human interaction with the environment. Time, it has been emphasized, is not only embedded in symbolic meaning or intersubjective social relations but also in artifacts, in natural and in culturally made ones. Likewise, the ongoing transformation and endangering of the natural environment is performed by processes which are chemical and atmospheric, biological and physical. But they all interact with social processes tied to energy production and use, modes of food production and land utilization, demographic pressures and possible interferences through use of tech-nology.

      Nowotny seems to share Adam's concern about extracting nature and natural time from social constructions of time.

      Perhaps this is a good place to embed the study's disaster event temporality as a way to further make sense of DHN social coordination and actions/reactions of disaster-affected people?

    2. The claim to the existence of a concept of 'social time', distinct from other forms of time, was thus made early in the history of social thought. It continues to focus upon the claims of the peculiar nature of the 'social constitution' or the 'social construction' of time. These claims evidently put the category of 'social time' into the wider realm of 'symbolic time', a cultural phenomenon, the constitution of which has remained the object of inquiry of more disciplines than sociology alone, but which separates it from time in nature, embedded in things and artifacts.

      Early work in social time focused on the social construction of time and symbolic/semiotic representations (see Zerubavel).

      Sociology and other disciplines see time as "embedded in things and artifacts" apart from what Adam refers to as natural time.

    1. Recognising ourselves as having evolved, and thus being the times of nature, allows for the humanly constituted aspects of time to become one expression among the others. Biologists have dispelled the idea that only humans experience time or organise their lives by it. Waiting and timing in nature presuppose knowledge of time and temporality, irrespective of their being symbolised, conceptualised, reckoned, or measured. Yet, once time is constituted symbolically, it is no longer reducible to the communication of organisms or physical signals; it is no longer a mere sensory datum. For a person to have a past and to recognise and know it entails a representational, symbolically based imagination. Endowed with it, people do not merely undergo their presents and pasts but they shape and reshape them. Symbolic meaning thus makes the past infinitely flexible. With objectified meaning we can not only look back, reflect, and contemplate but we can reinterpret, restructure, alter, and modify the past irrespective of whether this is done in the light of new knowledge in the present, to suit the present, or for purposes of legitimation.

      Still struggling a bit with this section but I think Adam is proposing that if we break down the barriers between understanding social time as symbolic and natural time as objective, that we can borrow methods of sensemaking from natural time and apply them to social time, it broadens our ways of knowing/understanding human temporal experience.

    2. In other words, the idea of time as socially constituted depends fundamentally on the meaning we impose on 'the social', whether we understand it as a prerogative of human social organisation or, following Mead, as a principle of nature.

      In a long prior passage about how time is conceptualized in nature and in social coordination, Adam argues that "time" as a social construct should be thought of holistically and not broken into dichotomies to be compared/contrasted.

    3. A brief expansion of these general social science assumptions about nature will clarify this point. Nature as distinct from social life is understood to be quantifiable, simple, and subject to invariant relations and laws that hold beyond time and space (Giddens 1976; Lessnoff 1979· ~yan 1979). This view is accompanied by an understanding of natural time as coming in fixed, divisible units that can be measured whilst quality, complexit~, ~nd mediating knowledge are preserved exclusively for the conceptuahsat10n of human social time. On the basis of a further closely related idea it is proposed that nature may be understood objectively. Natural scientists, explain Elias (1982a, b) and Giddens ( 1976), stand in a subject-object relationship to their subject matter. Natural scientists, they suggest, are able to study objects directly and apply a causal framework of analysis whilst such direct causal links no longer suffice for the study of human society where that which is investigated has to be appreciated as unintended outcomes of intended actions and where the investigators interpret a pre-interpreted world. Unlike their colleagues in the natural sciences, social scientists, it is argued, stand in a subject-subject relation to their subject matter. In a?ditio? to the differences along the quantity-quality and object-subject d1mens10ns nature is thought to be predictable because its regularities -be they causal, statistical, or probabilistic -are timeless. The laws of nature. are c?nsi~ered to be true in an absolute and timeless way, the laws of society h1stoncally developed. In contrast to nature, human societies are argued to be fundamentally historical. They are organised around :alues, goals, morals, ethics, and hopes, whilst simultaneously being mfl~enc~d by tradition, habits, and legitimised meanings.

      Critique of flawed social science perception of natural science as driven by laws, order, and quantitative attributes (subject-object) that are observable. This is contrasted with perception about social science as driven by history, culture, habit, and meanings which are socially constructed qualitative attributes (subject-subject).

    4. Since our traditional understanding of natural time e~erged as inadequate and faulty we have to recognise that the analysis of social time is flawed by implication.

      Adam states that "social time" theories should be contested since social science disciplinary understanding of "natural time" is incorrect.

    5. Past, present, and future, historical time, the qualitative experience of time, the structuring of 'undifferentiated change' i?to episodes, all are established as integral time aspects of the subJect matter of the natural sciences and clock time, the invariant measure, the closed circle, the perfect symmetry, and reversible time as our creations.

      Adam's broader definition of "natural time" which is socially constructed and not just a physical phenomena.

    6. Sorokin and Merton (1937) may be said to have provided the 'definitive' classic statement on the distinction between social and natural time. They associate the physical time of diurnal and seasonal cycles with clock time and define this time as 'purely quantitative, shorn of qualitative variation' (p. 621). 'All time systems', Sorokin and Merton suggest further, 'may be reduced to the need of providing means for synchronising and co-ordinating the activities and observations of the constituents of groups' (p. 627).

      classic definition of "social time" vs "natural time". This thinking is now contested.

    7. Whilst social theorists are no longer united in the belief that all time systems are reducible to the functional need of human synchro~is_ation and co-ordination they seem to have little doubt about the validity of Sorokin and Merton's other key point that, unlike social time, the time of nature is that of the clock, a time characterised by invariance and quantity. Despite significant shifts in the understanding of social time, the assumptions about nature, natural time, and the subject matter of the natural sciences have remained largely unchanged.

      Adam argues here that while the concept of "social time" has evolved, social scientists' ideas around "natural time" have not kept pace with new scientific research, and incorrectly continue to be described as constant and quantitative (aka clock time).

      Further, "natural time" incorrectly incorporates other temporal experiences and seems to be used as a convenient counter foil to "social time"

  7. Apr 2018
    1. That there are such things as rights anterior to the establishment of governments: for natural, as applied to rights, if it mean anything, is meant to stand in opposition to legal—to such rights as are acknowledged to owe their existence to government, and are consequently posterior in their date to the establishment of governmen

      Useful to ask students to examine this paragraph and compare it to Locke & his version of social contract or natural rights theory. Also useful in AP government when exploring elite, pluralist and super-pluralist models and of course, ask students to apply those understandings to analyze where Bentham may fit according to this passage.

  8. Mar 2017
    1. oil and gas and mineral wealth,

      The Arctic is home to a plethora of resources; it currently produces one tenth of the world’s oil and one fourth of its natural gas. Commercial extraction of oil started in the 1920s in Canada’s northwest territories. In the 1960s, large hydrocarbon fields were found in Russia, Alaska, and the Mackenzie Delta in Canada. The last several decades have produced billions of cubic meters of gas and oil in these countries in addition to Norway. The Canadian Arctic holds 49 gas and oil fields in the Mackenzie River Delta and 15 are located on the Canadian Arctic archipelago. There are also 11 offshore fossil fuel fields that were discovered in Barents Sea between Russia and Norway. North of the Arctic Circle, mostly in western Siberia, more than 400 onshore oil and gas fields have been found; roughly 60 of these fields are notably vast while a quarter of them are currently inoperable.

      In addition to fuel sources, there are also extensive deposits of minerals in the Arctic, predominantly in the most developed part of the region, the Russian Arctic. It contains copper, silver, zinc, molybdenum, gold, uranium, tungsten, tin, platinum, palladium, apatite, cobalt, titanium, rare metals, ceramic raw materials, mica, precious stones, and some of the largest known deposits of coal, gypsum, and diamonds. The North American Arctic, on the other hand, holds iron, nickel, copper, and uranium. It is important to note, however, that many of the known mineral reserves have not been extracted due to the high cost and their inaccessibility.

      "Natural Resources / Arctic." / Arctic. February 21, 2017. Accessed March 08, 2017. http://arctic.ru/resources/.

    1. The anonymous and autonomous functions of the body

      See Drew Leder's The Absent Body.

      There might be some really fascinating intersections with his phenomenological investigation of disembodiment.

    2. nature

      Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for must be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is the hardest to be done where,

      First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

      Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connection in nature; and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

      Thirdly, When the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be know.

      Fourthly, Where the signification of the world and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same.

      These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs of faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.

      In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words; which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we shall find that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter. (818)

    3. reality

      As we move into the 19th century, some women speakers challenge the notions mentioned in a previous annotation about Mary Astell, particularly Sarah Grimké. In one of her Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women, Grimké touches upon a more oppressive tradition of making women feel powerful in the private, domestic sphere in order to keep them from reaching beyond their "natural" boundaries. She attempts to break down the historical boundaries of the public and private, the domestic and the political, the masculine and the feminine that someone like Astell still seems to uphold.

    4. value the “natural” separations

      Mary Astell, another Enlightenment thinker, is really interesting to link up here. From the intro to her section in The Rhetorical Tradition,:

      For Astell, women's rhetoric should focus on the art of conversation... This is women's proper rhetorical sphere, different from but in no way inferior to the public sphere in which men use oratory. (845)

      Astell makes some interesting moves around the concept of "natural" throughout A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II. She claims that women's "natural sphere" is the private and domestic, which aligns with the social distinctions between public and private as masculine and feminine spheres. But she rejects the "natural" characteristic of the private as powerless.

  9. Dec 2016
  10. Feb 2016
    1. (Invariant local form theorem for n.d.o.). Let D(M): C?(V(M))--C?(W(M)) be a n.d.o. of order k. Then D looks the same in every coordinate system, i.e., there exists a map P: E V- W lal (k a n-tuple such that locally D(f)(x)>P(Djf(x)) under every local coordinate system.
    2. ding T9:R'--R'. Then there exists a unique n.d.o. D(M):C'(Vi(M)) -*C??(V2(M)) such that D(R n) = p. Proof. Given an n-manifold M, we construct D(M): C??(V1(M)) C ??( V2(M )) as follows: Suppose s E C ( V1(M )), and Tp: R n ->UCM is a chart. Define D(M)(s)rU=(9(-l)*P(T9*s). The assumption on P implies that this gives a well-defined n.d.o. with the required property
    3. Suppose V1(M) and V2(M) are two n.v.b. and P:C??(V,(Rn)) ->C (V2(Rn)) is a differential operator such that Tp*P= Pap* for every embed-
    4. consider the linear space C?(F(M)) of all smooth sections of F(M), and for an embedding p:M-*N there is an induced map p*:C?(F(N))*C??(F(M)) given by qg*s= F()-'osoT. Thus M-C??(F(M)) is a functor from 9ln to the category of real vector spaces. Definition 0.3. A natural differential operator (n.d.o.) from one n.v.b. F1 to another n.v.b. F2 is a family of differential operators {D(M):C??(Fi(M)) -> C?(F2(M)), M an n-manifold} such that (P*D(N)= D(M)q* for every embedding 9p: M-*N.

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  11. Dec 2015
  12. Sep 2015
    1. Excited to see hypothesis on Appropedia! We have over 300 thousand edits on thousands of pages. So terrible. For instance, this front page is fairly ugly.

  13. Feb 2014
    1. As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

      The justification for intellectual property from the social contract established by the US Constitution; it otherwise has no justification by natural right because it fails the Lockean Proviso.

    2. The Privatization of the Natural State Proponents also invoke Locke’s discussion of the making of private property from the natural state by the joining of one’s efforts to the natural state (Menell, 1999, p. 129). The argument goes that authors (ar tists, inventors, etc.) join their efforts to the natural state of undefined ideas, and through their efforts arrive at an intellectual work; and by that effort, they may make a legitimate claim on that intellectual work as their property (Menell, 1999, p. 129; Locke, 1690, Chap. V, Sect. 26).
  14. Jan 2014
    1. And JSTOR really was in an impossible bargaining position. Important scientific papers do not have cheaper alternatives. If someone wants to read Watson and Crick's paper on DNA or Einstein's paper on the photoelectric effect, it is not as if there is a paper by John Doe that is just as good and available for less. Academic publishers are, in effect, natural monopolies that can demand as much money as we can afford, and possibly more.
  15. Oct 2013
    1. As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding; hence the origin of the mind is thought to be from heaven. 2. But dull and unteachable persons are no more produced in the course of nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformities, such are certainly but few.

      As I was reading this, I thought another syllogism was coming, then he threw a curve-ball. I can dig this. Reasoning doesn't come naturally, and many people think it is.

    2. As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding

      Uses metaphor to make it seem natural and inborn

  16. Sep 2013
    1. We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially.

      consider the audience and mask rhetoric, make it seem spontaneous

    1. for this, the student must not only have the requisite aptitude but he must learn the different kinds of discourse and practice himself in their use

      Claim that good rhetoricians must not only have instruction and practice, but must also have the aptitude for it. This makes for an interesting discussion point: can most people excel at discourse (if one studied hard enough) or must one have a natural ability for it?