- Sep 2021
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fullfact.org fullfact.org
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Screenshot of website about Covid-19 vaccine side effects is fake. (16:10:41.471968+00:00). Full Fact. https://fullfact.org/health/yellow-card-fake-website/
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- May 2021
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curia.europa.eu curia.europa.eu
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On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, for the purposes laid down in Article 15(1), provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. By contrast, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that:– allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an Internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;– allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which requires providers of electronic communications services to have recourse, first, to the automated analysis and real-time collection, inter alia, of traffic and location data and, second, to the real-time collection of technical data concerning the location of the terminal equipment used, where:– recourse to automated analysis is limited to situations in which a Member State is facing a serious threat to national security which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, and where recourse to such analysis may be the subject of an effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that a situation justifying that measure exists and that the conditions and safeguards that must be laid down are observed; and where– recourse to the real-time collection of traffic and location data is limited to persons in respect of whom there is a valid reason to suspect that they are involved in one way or another in terrorist activities and is subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding in order to ensure that such real-time collection is authorised only within the limits of what is strictly necessary. In cases of duly justified urgency, the review must take place within a short time.3. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), must be interpreted as not being applicable in the field of the protection of the confidentiality of communications and of natural persons as regards the processing of personal data in the context of information society services, such protection being governed by Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, or by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, as appropriate. Article 23(1) of Regulation 2016/679, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires that providers of access to online public communication services and hosting service providers retain, generally and indiscriminately, inter alia, personal data relating to those services.4. A national court may not apply a provision of national law empowering it to limit the temporal effects of a declaration of illegality, which it is bound to make under that law, in respect of national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services – with a view to, inter alia, safeguarding national security and combating crime – an obligation requiring the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data that is incompatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 15(1), interpreted in the light of the principle of effectiveness, requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence and they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.
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curia.europa.eu curia.europa.eu
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On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime or prevent serious threats to public security, and that is so regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period.2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor’s office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.
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curia.europa.eu curia.europa.eu
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On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:Article 5 of Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services must be interpreted as meaning that:– it does not preclude, as such, in the light of the objective of the proper administration of justice, a lawyer, provider of representation services in respect of his or her client, from being required to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question and who would be responsible, if necessary, towards that judicial authority, under a system placing lawyers under ethical and procedural obligations such as that of submitting to the judicial authority in question any legal element, whether legislative or case-law-based, for the purposes of the proper course of the procedure, from which the litigant is exempt if he or she decides to conduct his or her own defence;– the obligation for a visiting lawyer to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question, in a system in which the latter have the possibility of defining their respective roles, the sole purpose of the lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question being, as a general rule, to assist the visiting lawyer to ensure the proper representation of their client and the proper fulfilment of his or her duties to that judicial authority is not disproportionate, in the light of the objective of the proper administration of justice;– a general obligation to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question not allowing account to be taken of the experience of the visiting lawyer would go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective of the proper administration of justice.
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eur-lex.europa.eu eur-lex.europa.eu
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Point 14 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) must be interpreted as allowing a commercial practice to be classified as a ‘pyramid promotional scheme’ even if there is only an indirect link between the contributions paid by new members of the scheme and the compensation paid to existing members.
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eur-lex.europa.eu eur-lex.europa.eu
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Article 6(1)(c) and Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, read in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national provisions which authorise the installation of a video surveillance system, such as the system at issue in the main proceedings, installed in the common parts of a residential building, for the purposes of pursuing legitimate interests of ensuring the safety and protection of individuals and property, without the consent of the data subjects, if the processing of personal data carried out by means of the video surveillance system at issue fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 7(f), which it is for the referring court to determine.
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eur-lex.europa.eu eur-lex.europa.eu
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Article 8(2)(d) and Article 15(1) of Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but established in another Member State, as amended by Council Directive 2010/66/EU of 14 October 2010, must be interpreted as meaning that, where an application for a refund of value added tax does not contain a sequential number of the invoice, but does contain another number which allows that invoice, and thus the good or service in question, to be identified, the tax authority of the Member State of refund must consider that application ‘submitted’ within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Directive 2008/9, as amended by Directive 2010/66, and proceed with its assessment. In making that assessment, and save where that authority already has available to it the original invoice or a copy thereof, it may request that the applicant produce a sequential number which uniquely identifies the invoice and, if that request is not satisfied within the deadline of one month laid down in Article 20(2) of that directive, as amended by Directive 2010/66, it is entitled to reject the application for a refund.
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- Jun 2020
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www.theguardian.com www.theguardian.com
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Henley, J. (2020, June 6). Merkel among winners as Europeans give verdict on anti-Covid battles. The Observer. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/no-european-leader-is-safe-as-public-lose-faith-in-coronavirus-responses
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- Apr 2016
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newrepublic.com newrepublic.com
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Is War Civilized?
Along side the Dawn of the Golden Age this is a must read 2wice and annotate work. It begs the question of international law and aggression and the spilling over of armed pretext aggression unto the majority non-fanatical civilian population. I'm Half way through and it can only lead to a critical browsing of contemporary works in history and theory during my life time to catch up with the situation after my stupid drug bum phase is over.
Very well stated
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