y Freud’s reckoning, psy-choanalysis is the third in this series of wounds. No matter howmuch Darwin forced humanity to fundamentally recast its viewsof its origins, this did not stop it from believing that it coincideswith itself as self-consciousness. The Freudian revolution putsan end to this naive belief. For Freud teaches us that man “isnot master in his own house.” The subject is not to be under-stood as essentially self-consciousness; instead, it is deliveredover to unconscious forces that elude its grasp.

Ultimately,psychoanalysis reaffirms the lesson one might draw from the mostserious and celebrated novels: that identity is a failure;

And a theory of "multilayered social worlds", when fully developed, can be a helpful tool in understanding why, in modern Europe, certain phenomena became common enough to catch the attention of physicians, scientists, artists and philosophers. In a current unpublished work, STP suggests that, if the logic of affinity is properly conceptualized, both in terms of its essentially paraconsistent properties as a social logic and in terms of its historical presentation throughout very different societies, one arrives at the conclusion that modern families – in the sense of nuclear familiar units composed of heterossexual parents and their children – do not logically form a basic "atom of kinship" in Levi-Strauss' sense. That is, in modern capitalist societies, the logic of affinity is not composed in such a way as to form a world of its own, it has little synthetic power. In fact, the logic of affinity is most consistent within capitalist worlds at the points where it is tasked with "stitching together" dynamics dominated by property and value – at the point of contact between family and the production of independent adult workers, or at the intersection between affinity and the State, where the nation-form is born, etc. Because capitalist structures do not respect the internal logic of kinship – which would allow people to socially map not only those that are part of their families and those who are not, but also those that occupy strangely indeterminate positions in this social fabric – it is up to individuals themselves, as they grow up, to develop ways to supplement to this fractured logic. This is what Lacan called the "individual myth of the neurotic": how, in order to become persons  , we must supplement our social existence before other people with an invisible partnership with an "Other", a figure that helps us determine how to distinguish these indeterminate elements of affinity logic and that capitalist sociality does not help to propagate in a consistent and shared way.

The notion of social identity highlights aspectswhich are descriptive of a person’s most stable links with some larger constructs within society [20 ,21 ].The Lacanian subject synthesizes how Hegel, Sartre and psychoanalysis situate the social person’sunique subjectivity within systems of relationships, which are psycholinguistically forged [22], just likethe whole of identity is.

he mouth of which is spacious and wide, but full of thorn and wild-fig bushes and brambles and briars, so thick and matted that they completely close it up and cover it over.

Psychotic, hysteric, obsessive, pervert ― which are we?

patriarchal or phallocentric order

Not only do they bear the ar-chitecture of our social world but, as computers and robots, they have bod-ies, “characteristics,” personality, and style.

These Pixar films challenge adult viewers to closely consider their relationship to “friendly,” “soulful” objects.