Interesting. I prefer to use emergent "categories" rather than a predetermined set. Similar to how Luhmann did it originally. Most of my top-level cats are pertaining to my Grand Theory of Optimal Education but this is not a rule. Additionally, I do indeed get away from the topical content the further down I go naturally. 7 = Lifelong Learning 71 (or 7.1 for readability) = Reading 71/1e2 = Intellectualism vs. Learning with regards to critical analysis and thinking 71/1e2a = Original Thought I could've created original thought as its own branch but I found it related enough to a card on reading I made (particularly with regards to intellectualism) to insert it there. Warm regards, Mr. Hoorn

“Cells may not know civilization is possible.

Emergent Strategy, Adrienne Maree Brown

But in reality, what we witness is the emergent patterns from each individual starling simply doing it darndest not to collide with the starlings nearby.

Biologists, physicists, ecologists and other scientists use the term “emergent” to describe self-organizing, collective behaviors that appear when a large collection of things acts as one. Combinations of lifeless atoms give rise to living cells; water molecules create waves; murmurations of starlings swoop through the sky in changing but identifiable patterns; cells make muscles move and hearts beat. Critically, emergent abilities show up in systems that involve lots of individual parts. But researchers have only recently been able to document these abilities in LLMs as those models have grown to enormous sizes.

An emergent behavior or emergent property can appear when a number of simple entities (agents) operate in an environment, forming more complex behaviors as a collective.

Emergent abilities are not present in small models but can be observed in large models.

This creates what is essentially an evolution process for the program, causing it to depart from the original engineered design. As a consequence of this and a changing environment, assumptions made by the original designers may be invalidated, introducing bugs.

However, after solving this problem a few times, a pattern appeared.

They don't need to add a prop for every action. The action itself can be passed in as a prop. <script> export let action; </script> <div use:action>whatever</div> The argument for the action can be another prop or can be part of the same prop.

This game is more complicated and, at least at first glance, a bit more obtuse.  But in the good sense of obtuse. The strategies are not clearly evident from the rules read and certainly not through the first play(s).

General surgeons in communities without emergency neurosurgical coverage should have a working knowledge of burr hole placement in the event that emergent evacuation is required for a life-threatening epidural hematoma

5.2 Metformin[edit] Reduced serum levels of vitamin B12 occur in up to 30% of people taking long-term anti-diabetic metformin.[71][72][73] Deficiency does not develop if dietary intake of vitamin B12 is adequate or prophylactic B12 supplementation is given. If the deficiency is detected, metformin can be continued while the deficiency is corrected with B12 supplements.[74]

Empirical research on historical disaster events shows response efforts taking four different organizational forms: established, extending, expanding, and emerging [3

Our extensions also have implications for theories ontrust.

Therefore, training should focus on learning how toquickly recognize volunteers’ volition in participating inan emergent group, the tasks they might engage in, andthe support they might need to carry out those tasks.Such training could also help people to recognize thebenefits and dangers of generalized trust. It could alsohelp people to quickly evolve a coordination mecha-nism that does not rely on what people know, but oncompiling and communicating a narrative of the actionsthat volunteers take, so that others are able to assess forthemselves what actions they could take to help.

ur examination suggests that by expandingthe context in which TMS theory is applied to includeemergent response groups, insights can be gained intotheir internal dynamics. The three indicators of the levelof development of a TMS provide a useful frameworkfor organizing these insights in the exhibit.

The urgency of time may make it too onerous forthe extra effort of articulating actions as they are beingperformed, yet most emergency response requires somecommunication.

Explicitly articulated narratives mayalso make clearer that multiple sequences of actions maybe occurring simultaneously, thus resolving role conflictsby allowing multiple ways to accomplish a task

Emergent response groups may also use a mechanismof creating a community narrative (Boland and Tenkasi1995), which is a running narrative of the actions takenand not taken, the decisions made, and the theories inuse. Narratives do not represent a single shared under-standing of a domain; rather they represent the mul-tiplicity of events and actions a community is taking,as members are taking them. Narratives may be articu-lated explicitly or understood implicitly.

Whenemergent response groups first come together, membersare likely not to ask one another about who knows what;instead, they are likely to ask about what is knownabout the situation and about the actions taken thus far(Dyer and Shafer 2003, Hale et al. 2005). The cogni-tive structure that they develop for the group centersnot around people, but on action-based scenarios thateither have been or might be carried out. These scenariosinclude decisions, actions, knowledge, events, and feed-back (Vera and Crossan 2005).

On the surface, the lack of sta-ble membership suggests that a shared mental modelmay not be viable or even desired in emergent responsegroups. Time may be too precious to seek consensus onevents and actions, and agreements may make the groupless flexible to accommodate to changing inputs.

hus, we believe challenges occur in all three indica-tors of the level of development of a TMS—expertisespecialization, credibility, and expertise coordination—requiring a need to consider extending theorizing abouteach indicator for emergent response groups.

Moreland and Argote(2003) suggest that the dynamic conditions under whichthese groups form and work together are likely to havenegative effects on the development of transactive mem-ory.

Research on TMS has identified three indicators of thelevel of development of a TMS (Lewis 2003, Morelandand Argote 2003):1.Memory (or expertise) specialization:the tendencyfor groups to delegate responsibility and to specialize indifferent aspects of the task;2.Credibility:beliefs about the reliability of mem-bers’ expertise; and3.Task (or expertise) coordination:the ability of teammembers to coordinate their work efficiently based ontheir knowledge of who knows what in the group.The greater the presence of each indicator, the more de-veloped the TMS and the more valuable the TMS is forefficiently coordinating the actions of group members.

A TMS can be thoughtof as a network of interconnected individual memorysystems and the transfer of knowledge among them(Wegner 1995). Individuals who are part of a TMSassume responsibility for different knowledge domains,and rely on one another to access each other’s expertiseacross domains. Expertise is defined in the TMS litera-ture to broadly include the know-what, know-how, andknow-why of a knowledge domain (Quinn et al. 1996),what Blackler (1995) refers to as embodied competen-cies. Expertise specialization, then, reduces the cognitiveload of each individual and the amount of redundantknowledge in the group, while collectively providingthe dyad or group access to a larger pool of knowl-edge. What makes transactive memory transactive arethe communications (called transactions) among individ-uals that make possible the codifying, storing, retrieving,and updating of information from individual memorysystems. For transactive memory to function effectively,individuals must have a shared conceptualization of whoknows what in the group.

TMS theory, a theoryof group-level cognition, explains how people in collec-tives learn, store, use, and coordinate their knowledge toaccomplish individual, group, and organizational goals.It is a theory about how people in relationships, groups,and organizations learn who knows what, and use thatknowledge to decide who will do what, resulting in moreefficient and effective individual and collective perfor-mance.

The urgency of the situation meansthat the objective of coordination is to achieve minimallyacceptable and timely action, even when more effec-tive responses may be feasible—but would take longerand use more resources.

hese characteristics require thatemergent response groups adopt specific approaches forknowledge coordination. One such approach commonlydocumented in studies of such groups is their use ofa learn-by-doing (versus decision making) action-basedmodel of coordinated problem solving, in which sensemaking and improvisation are the norm rather than theexception

isaster researchers havedefinedemergent response groupsas collectives of indi-viduals who use nonroutine resources and activities toapply to nonroutine domains and tasks, using nonroutineorganizational arrangements (Bigley and Roberts 2001,Drabek et al. 1981, Drabek 1986, Drabek and McEntire2003, Kreps 1984, Tierney et al. 2001).

Disasters have wideimplications for expertise coordination because the pre-conditions known to facilitate expertise coordination arelimited or nonexistent in disaster response. Such precon-ditions include but are not limited to, a shared goal; aclear reward structure; known group membership, exper-tise, and skills to accomplish the task; and time to sharewho knows what.

Although the con-ventional indicators of efficient coordination—expertisespecialization, credibility in expertise, and coordinationof expertise—are relevant in disaster response, disasterspresent a unique operational environment. Disasters are“events, observable in time and space, in which societiesor their subunits (e.g., communities, regions) incur phys-ical damages and losses and/or disruption of their routine

In summary, the ECGs study from DRC showed me that the use of disaster periods created analytical problems. The categories often over­lapped, different groups perceived and experienced the disaster phases differently, and individuals or groups defined differently the actual or potential event

emergent citizen groups (ECGs) in disasters (e.g., Neal I 984, Quarantelli 1985)

Enhancing PhonologicalAwareness, Print Awareness, and Oral Language Skills inPreschool Children

la causeformelle est la causalité des propriétés émergentes

Annie Sauter says: May 28, 2016 at 9:28 am