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Jackson Laboratory Cat_031834

Jackson Laboratory Cat_028020

Jackson Laboratory Cat_024278

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Jackson Laboratory Cat_000664

RRID:AB_2534046

BullMQ (Redis)

17.5. Justifying Harassment# So let’s look at how harassment gets justified. One research paper (Morally Motivated Networked Harassment as Normative Reinforcement) suggests a process that often happens with online harassment, where the harassers feel their actions are justified. They say these play out as follows: A target is identified as breaking the norm of a community (often not their own community, so this is a case of context collapse). This provides a justification for people to harass the target. A key social media account (the amplifier), promotes the accusation in their community (again, often not the one the target is in). The amplifier’s audience then harasses the target. The target experiences negative emotions (stress, depression, etc.), and self-censors and withdraws. The targets’ speech (and others who might have said something similar) is therefore silenced. The amplifier’s network found a common enemy and cause, and this reinforces their values and norms. Does this sound bad? Let’s look at some more specific examples and see what you think. 17.5.1. Examples Attempts at Justifying Harassment# Doxing Racist Organization Members# We’ll start in a time before the Internet: The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is an American white-supremacist terrorist organization known to harass and murder Black people and others. Members of the KKK keep their identity secret by wearing white robes and hoods over their faces. Often influential and powerful members of society were part of the KKK, such as police officers and government officials. In the 1920s, a magazine colled Tolerance published lists of members of the KKK and their addresses, what we would now call “doxing.” They hoped to end the hateful and violent KKK organization. Fig. 17.1 Tolerance magazine from 1923.# Fig. 17.2 Part of the East St. Louis list of KKK members.# As a more recent event on internet-based social media, we find Twitter users trying to identify participants at a white supremacist rally: Fig. 17.3 Results of the modern doxing campaign# Related: Is it ethical to punch a Nazi? The Lion-Killing Dentist# In 2015, a US dentist named Walter Palmer went to Zimbabwe, lured a lion out of a protected area, and killed it. Many people were upset about this, and that there seemed to be no legal consequences for Dr. Palmer. Angry people sent a surge of traffic to Dr. Palmer’s website, which was taken offline. Vitriolic reviews flooded his Yelp page. A Facebook page titled “Shame Lion Killer Dr. Walter Palmer and River Bluff Dental” drew thousands of users. Dr. Palmer’s face was scrubbed from industry websites. Killer of Cecil the Lion Finds Out That He Is a Target Now, of Internet Vigilantism Dr. Palmer later apologized for killing the lion, but then in 2020, he went to Mongolia and killed a protected wild ram. Billionaires# One phrase that became popular on Twitter in 2022, especially as Elon Musk was in the process of buying Twitter, was: “It is always morally correct to bully billionaires.” (Note: We could not find the exact origins of this phrase or its variations). This is related to the concept in comedy of “punching up,” that is, making fun of people in positions of relatively more power. Trolling# We already mentioned this in the trolling chapter, but we thought we’d copy it here again, but this is one troll’s justification for trolling: The purpose of the community … I guess is to exchange ideas and techniques, and to plan co-ordinated trolling. The underlying philosophical purpose or shared goal, anyway, would be to disrupt people’s rosy vision of the internet as their own personal emotional safe place that serves as a proxy for real-life interactions they are lacking (i.e. going online to demonstrate one’s grief over a public disaster like Japan [2011 Tsunami] with total strangers who have no real connection to the event). From Interview with a troll Gamergate# Gamergate was a harassment campaign in 2014-2015 that targeted non-men in gaming: Zoë Quinn, Brianna Wu, and Anita Sarkeesian. The harassment was justified by various false claims (e.g., journalistic malpractice), but mostly motivated by either outright misogyny or feeling threatened by critiques of games/gaming culture from a not straight-white-male viewpoint. The video below talks about how two factions within gamergate fed off each other (you can watch the whole gamergate series here) 17.5.2. Reflection Questions# When do you think crowd harassment is justified (or do you think it is never justified)? Do you feel differently about crowd harassment if the target is rich, famous, or powerful (e.g., a politician)? Do you feel differently about crowd harassment depending on what the target has been doing or saying?

I've been using mineral spirits for years with none of the effects you mention. Maybe you are thinking of a different solution?

Mineral spirits with a splash of auto transmission fluid to combat corrosion. This formula was given me by Clark Hinson

Mineral spirits are perfectly safe for key buttons. It's critical to make sure the solvent you're using really IS true mineral spirits, though.Other solvents, such as those billed as "laquer thinner" are NOT safe for plastics. That includes acetone, xylene, and any solvents containing them. I have heard that Selectric III keys are resistat to laquer thinner, but I still wouldn't use it even on a III. Laquer thinner may be applied VERY carefully after the full mineral-spirits bath using a syringe or small squeeze bottle for specific metal pivot points such as interposer pawls that tend to get extra-stuck from dried-out lubricants.

17.1. Individual harassment# Individual harassment (one individual harassing another individual) has always been part of human cultures, bur social media provides new methods of doing so. There are many methods by which through social media. This can be done privately through things like: Bullying: like sending mean messages through DMs Cyberstalking: Continually finding the account of someone, and creating new accounts to continue following them. Or possibly researching the person’s physical location. Hacking: Hacking into an account or device to discover secrets, or make threats. Tracking: An abuser might track the social media use of their partner or child to prevent them from making outside friends. They may even install spy software on their victim’s phone. Death threats / rape threats Etc. Individual harassment can also be done publicly before an audience (such as classmates or family). For example: Bullying: like posting public mean messages Impersonation: Making an account that appears to be from someone and having that account say things to embarrass or endanger the victim. Doxing: Publicly posting identifying information about someone (e.g., full name, address, phone number, etc.). Revenge porn / deep-fake porn Etc.

16.4. Power Users and Lurkers# When looking at who contributes in crowdsourcing systems, or with social media in generally, we almost always find that we can split the users into a small group of power users who do the majority of the contributions, and a very large group of lurkers who contribute little to nothing. For example, Nearly All of Wikipedia Is Written By Just 1 Percent of Its Editors, and on StackOverflow “A 2013 study has found that 75% of users only ask one question, 65% only answer one question, and only 8% of users answer more than 5 questions..” We see the same phenomenon on Twitter: Fig. 16.3 Summary of Twitter use by Pew Research Center# This small percentage of people doing most of the work in some areas is not a new phenomenon. In many aspects of our lives, some tasks have been done by a small group of people with specialization or resources. Their work is then shared with others. This goes back many thousands of years with activities such as collecting obsidian and making jewelry, to more modern activities like writing books, building cars, reporting on news, and making movies.

16.1. Crowdsourcing Definition# When tasks are done through large groups of people making relatively small contributions, this is called crowdsourcing. The people making the contributions generally come from a crowd of people that aren’t necessarily tied to the task (e.g., all internet users can edit Wikipedia), but then people from the crowd either get chosen to participate, or volunteer themselves. When a crowd is providing financial contributions, that is called crowdfunding (e.g., patreon, kickstarter, gofundme). Humans have always collaborated on tasks, and crowds have been enlisted in performing tasks long before the internet existed. What social media (and other internet systems) have done is expand the options for how people can collaborate on tasks. 16.1.1. Different Ways of Collaborating and Communicating# There have been many efforts to use computers to replicate the experience of communicating with someone in person, through things like video chats, or even telepresence robots]. But there are ways that attempts to recreate in-person interactions inevitably fall short and don’t feel the same. Instead though, we can look at different characteristics that computer systems can provide, and find places where computer-based communication works better, and is Beyond Being There (pdf here). Some of the different characteristics that means of communication can have include (but are not limited to): Location: Some forms of communication require you to be physically close, some allow you to be located anywhere with an internet signal. Time delay: Some forms of communication are almost instantaneous, some have small delays (you might see this on a video chat system), or have significant delays (like shipping a package). Synchronicity: Some forms of communication require both participants to communicate at the same time (e.g., video chat), while others allow the person to respond when convenient (like a mailed physical letter). Archiving: Some forms of communication automatically produce an archive of the communication (like a chat message history), while others do not (like an in-person conversation) Anonymity: Some forms of communication make anonymity nearly impossible (like an in-person conversation), while others make it easy to remain anonymous. -Audience: Communication could be private or public, and they could be one-way (no ability to reply), or two+-way where others can respond. Because of these (and other) differences, different forms of communication might be preferable for different tasks. For example, you might send an email to the person sitting next at work to you if you want to keep an archive of the communication (which is also conveniently grouped into email threads). Or you might send a text message to the person sitting next to you if you are criticizing the teacher, but want to do so discretely, so the teacher doesn’t notice. These different forms of communication can then support different methods of crowdsourcing.

15.1.6. Automated Moderators (bots)# Another strategy for content moderation is using bots, that is computer programs that look through posts or other content and try to automatically detect problems. These bots might remove content, or they might flag things for human moderators to review.

Volunteer Moderation

15.1. Types of Content Moderator Set-Ups# There are a number of different types of content moderators and ways of organizing them, such as: 15.1.1. No Moderators# Some systems have no moderators. For example, a personal website that can only be edited by the owner of the website doesn’t need any moderator set up (besides the person who makes their website). If a website does let others contribute in some way, and is small, no one may be checking and moderating it. But as soon as the wrong people (or spam bots) discover it, it can get flooded with spam, or have illegal content put up (which could put the owner of the site in legal jeopardy).

节点详解

外部 Agent 接入社区需要实现一套 Skill 协议：

开放生态 — 外部 Agent 接入

用户不定义"搜什么"，而是定义"我是谁" — 狗自己决定嗅什么、聊什么、发什么。

可能触发狗做新的动作(级联)

14.4. Government Censorship# Governments might also have rules about content moderation and censorship, such as laws in the US against Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM). China additionally censors various news stories in their country, like stories about protests. In addition to banning news on their platforms, in late 2022 China took advantage of Elon Musk having fired almost all Twitter content moderators to hide news of protests by flooding Twitter with spam and porn.

Capability 详情页（含 Command 选择 + 云端执行）

署指南

凭证托管（零信任安全模型）

沙箱网络配置

自动化准入机制

CLI │ │IDE (MCP)

安装器（capability install）只做两件事：下载/clone 能力包到约定目录（如 .codebuddy/capabilities/summarize-comments/）在 settings 中记录引用所有 command 注册都是运行时扫描自动完成的——没有显式注册 API。

# 触发方式支持 triggers: - manual # 手动触发 - scheduled # 定时触发 - webhook # Webhook 触发

commands 与 skills 的关键区别

Capability 目录结构

capability.yaml # ★ 能力包清单（元数据 + 平台配置）

云端沙箱直接执行

As films like Bonnie and Clyde and Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1966) tested the limits on violence and language, it became clear that the Production Code was in need of replacement. In 1968, the MPAA adopted a ratings sytem to identify films in terms of potentially objectionable content. By providing officially designated categories for films that would not have passed Production Code standards of the past, the MPAA opened a way for films to deal openly with mature content. The ratings system originally included four categories: G (suitable for general audiences), M (equivalent to the PG rating of today), R (restricted to adults over age 16), and X (equivalent to today’s NC-17). The MPAA rating systems, with some modifications, is still in place today. Before release in theaters, films are submitted to the MPAA board for a screening, during which advisers decide on the most apropriate rating based on the film’s content. However, studios are not required to have the MPAA screen releases ahead of time—some studios release films without the MPAA rating at all. Commercially, less restrictive ratings are generally more beneficial, particularly in the case of adult-themed films that have the potential to earn the most restrictive rating, the NC-17. Some movie theaters will not screen a movie that is rated NC-17. When filmmakers get a more restrictive rating than they were hoping for, they may resubmit the film for review after editing out objectionable scenes.Kirby Dick, interview by Terry Gross, Fresh Air, NPR, September 13, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6068009.

Many Americans joined the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in denouncing the film, and the National Board of Review eventually cut a number of the film’s racist sections.Lary May, “Apocalyptic Cinema: D. W. Griffith and the Aesthetics of Reform,” in Movies and Mass Culture, ed. John Belton (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 46. However, it’s important to keep in mind the attitudes of the early 1900s. At the time the nation was divided, and Jim Crow laws and segregation were enforced. Nonetheless, The Birth of a Nation was the highest grossing movie of its era. In 1992, the film was classified by the Library of Congress among the “culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant films” in U.S. history.

antiestablishment

land mourns and wastes away not only because of the things thathumanity has done but the things it has not done, such as our lackof care for those who suffer

This story repeatsitself across the United States and Canada: Indigenous peoples ban-ished from what conservationists saw as pristine wilderness. Theseparks were seen by settlers, in the words of David Treuer, as “nat-ural cathedrals: protected landscapes where people could worshipthe sublime . . . an Eden untouched by humans and devoid of sin.”But, he goes on to point out, these places were never untouched.

Land is our first relationship, and it is the first relationship thatwe need to restore. We are used to standing on it, planting in it, andmarveling at it, but our relationship with it is complicated and colo-nial. We buy and sell it, extract resources from much of it, and thenidealize parts of it

Or, if you lean to the right politically and are familiar with right-wing rhetoric on immigration, you may have the opposite reaction: you disagree with the protester and react negatively, something like, “this is BS!”

Quakers thought that capital pun-ishment, particularly as it existed in the late eighteenth century, wasinhumane. So in 1790, they created prisons as a reform

Wherever you notice our absence, think about how you might beable to assert our presence

How to sink roots deep into the earth, roots that would findtheir way home and connect us in ways that are unseen and yet felt

The Science

This is more than a routine.

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Jade & Tina, Founders of AWARE

characters are sometimes known as dynamic

writers must force us to react in some way to their characters, whether it is to identify, empathise, or sympathise with them; to dislike or disapprove of them; or to pass judgement on their actions, behaviour and values.

In one point I fully agree with the gentlemen to whose general views I am opposed. I feel with them, that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.

MORAL OBLIGATION 217has an obligation to do x can be raised andanswered. The only "objective" point that can beestablished is whether a person's case comes undera rule, and whether he will go on to say that he hasan obligation, but not whether he is right or wrongin going on the way he does.Hart's account of obligation is thus a sophis?ticated Attitudinal (Emotive) Theory. He explainsthe peculiarities of obligation claims as a combina?tion of two quite different ingredients. The first isa fairly straightforward empirical, sociological one,namely, the ascertainable fact that a person's casecomes under a rule of obligation which is actually"accepted" by a significant portion of his group,regardless of the nature and cogency of theirreasons for accepting it.16 The second is tied to thespeaker's "acceptance" of the rule, from the"internal point of view."My objection to Hart's theory can be put in theform of a dilemma: Can "outsiders" have obliga?tions or can they not ? If we say they cannot, wehave plainly failed to give a correct account ofobligation claims. For such claims involve direc?tives purporting to be "unconditionally" applicableand sound, and possessing a peculiarly strongbinding force. But if "outsiders" cannot haveobligations, then the applicability of obligationclaims is conditional on a person's actually "accep?ting" a given rule.17If we wished to convince an "outsider" that he isobligated to do a certain thing, we should have toargue, not that he actually had this obligation but,absurdly, that he ought to accept the obligationrules of the group so that he can have obligations. Infact, of course, it is sufficient to provide adequatereasons in support of the obligation rule. For whensuch reasons are available, nonacceptance of therule is irrelevant since in that case it has beenshown that the rule ought to be accepted.Embracing the other horn of the dilemma, say?ing that "outsiders" also have obligations, reducesHart's position to that of J. Austin.18 For then,since the directives embodied in these obligationrules are not regarded as requiring justification butmerely as being widely accepted, they are brutecompulsions for those who do not happen toaccept them.One last point. Hart's main concern in giving a"content-independent account" of legal obligationis to avoid landing in the camp of the Natural Lawtheorists and so having to maintain that iniquitoussocial rules cannot be law.19 No such consequenceneed follow from the rejection of Hart's view thatobligation-claims (apart from drawing attention tothe fact that a person comes under a rule ofobligation) merely express a certain attitude of"acceptance" toward these rules. To show this, letus consider argument (C) :(i) One has a (moral) obligation to obey thelaw as such.(2) R ("Do x") is a valid law in society S.(3) So there is a presumption that people living in Shave a (legal) obligation to obey R.(4) But Jones lives in S and his case comes underR.(5) So there is a presumption that Jones has a (legal)obligation to obey R.(6) So, other things being equal, Jones (morally)ought to obey R.We avoid the consequence to which Natural Lawtheory is committed by insisting on the presumptivenature of the steps from (2) to (3) and from (4) to(5). Laws with a certain content may not give riseto obligations. But provided the content of R is notobjectionable on moral grounds, the presumptionthat Jones has a (legal) obligation to obey R holdsgood. Hence there is no incompatibility betweenthe claim (A), which Natural Law theorists rightlyinsist on, that unless (1) is sound, no valid law cangive rise to obligations, (B), which I insist on, thatsome valid laws do not give rise to (genetic) legal,hence not to (binding) moral obligations, and (C),which positivistically inclined philosophers, likeHart, insist on, that we are justified in assertingthat, unless the contrary is proved, the fact thatsince a certain valid law enjoins the doing of x,those whose case comes under it may be thoughtand said to have a (genetic) legal obligation to do x.Perhaps the most plausible version of the Will16 Hart's explanation of "acceptance" is in terms of how people regard deviations from the rule. In The Concept of Law hespeaks indifferently of their regarding it as a signal (p. 87), or a reason (p. 88), or a justification (pp. 54-55) for a hostile reaction tothe rule-deviants, yet surely whereas a signal does not purport to have any cogency, a justification purports to have a very highdegree. The second and characteristic ingredient (pp. 86, 88) is an attitudinal one, namely, that only "insiders," only those who"accept" the rule in question, will actually use obligation language (thereby expressing their acceptance of the rule), though theymay apply it equally to "outsiders."17 For further details on this point, see Pt. Ill, sect. 3 below.18 Cf. Pt. II above.19 Cf. Hart, op. cit., pp. 206-207.2l8 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYTheory is that which employs as its obligationcreating device The Promise. Here, the giver andthe addressee of the directive are one and the sameperson. The person to whom the promise (not thedirective) is given, thereby receives the right to setin motion, if necessary, whatever machinery thereis for exacting fulfillment of the promise. The in?ference from the nonmoral premiss, that someonein certain circumstances uttered certain words con?stituting a direction to himself, to the conclusionthat he morally ought to follow the directive,seems wholly licensed by what is necessarily in?volved in a promise, and so to be analytic. All thesame, the validity of the inference plainly dependson two sorts of assumptions, assumptions concerningthe inferences licensed by the social institutionitself, and assumptions concerning the power of asocial institution to license such steps. If the movefrom "Jones promised to do x" to "Jones has anobligation to do x" is defeasible, and if the defeatingcondition is itself moral in nature, say, "Immoralpromises do not give rise to obligations," then thesocial institution of promising is an obligationcreating device which rests on moral convictions.Hence in the case of some social institutions, say,child-marriage vows or slave labor contracts, whichrest on no moral convictions, these "promises" donot give rise to genuine obligations. We shouldtherefore admit that what gives rise to moral obli?gations in the case of promises is not saying, accord?ing to the rules of the institution, "I promise," butthe fact, where it is fact, that it is wrong to breakour promises.In view of the extensive discussions this topic hasrecently received, it would be tedious to go over theground once more. I therefore simply assume thatthe Will Theory fails even in the case of the mostpromising candidate, The Promise.20I conclude that even the most persuasive versionsof the Will Theory are untenable. Their chiefweakness lies in their attempt to derive obligationsanalytically from the expression of some will. Theconclusions so derived have inevitably been shornof all normative content. Hence, there is a tendencyto smuggle in surreptitiously a supplementary prin?ciple such as that a will so expressed (promise,accepted social rule, law) should be regarded asbinding, or that a will so expressing directives hasauthority to bind, or that the will of such a personis certain to give directives which have a claim tobe regarded as binding. But in the absence of suchsupplementary principles, the will models em?ployed produce at best directives which it may beexcusable, perhaps wise (but not obligatory), tofollow.IllAnother group of theories, which I call ideolo?gical theories, attempt to derive obligation-claimsfrom the conclusions of some form of practicalreasoning. Consider a simple case. Jones is anadipose man with a certain heart condition whichrequires that he lose weight. Someone offers thefollowing piece of advice : stop eating bread andsalami. He might back up his advice as follows inargument (D) :( i ) If anyone with a certain sort of heart con?dition and suffering from adiposity is tominimize the risk of a heart attack, he mustlose weight.(2) If anyone who suffers from this condition andalso regularly eats bread and salami is tolose weight, he must stop eating bread andsalami.(3) But you have a heart condition of this sort,you suffer from adiposity, and you regularlyeat things, and it is your end to minimize therisk of a heart attack.(4) So, other things being equal, you must stopeating bread and salami.Such arguments are closely parallel to those wenoted above, in connection with obligationcreating social devices, such as commands andrules. Here, too, we find general directives statingor implying applicability conditions [i.e., (1) and(2)]; assertions to the effect that these conditionsof applicability are satisfied in the case of a parti?cular person [i.e., (3)]; and a conclusion whichapplies the directive, that is, the consequent of ( 1 )and (2), to that particular person. We must, how?ever, note five important points of difference.(a) The major premisses contain not only adirective, but also a statement of a "connection in?0 For a fuller discussion of both the assumptions I called in question, cf., John Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is',"The Philosophical Review, vol. 73 (1964), pp. 43-58; Roger Montague, " 'Ought' From 'Is','' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.43 (*965)> PP- I44_I67; Evan K. Jobe, "On Deriving 'Ought' From 'Is'," Analysis, vol. 25 (1965), pp. 179-181 ; W. D. Hudson,"The 'Is-Ought' Controversy," Analysis, vol. 25 (1965), pp. 191-195; Antony Flew, "On Not Deriving 'Ought' From *Is',"Analysis, vol. 24 (1964), pp. 25-32; James E. McGlellan and B. Paul Komisar, "On Deriving 'Ought' From 'Is'," Analysis,vol. 24 (1964), pp. 32-37 ; James and Judith Thomson, "How Not to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'," The Philosophical Review, vol. 7361964), pp. 512-516.MORAL OBLIGATION 219nature." This connection may be of various kinds,and assertions to the effect that it holds can betrue or false. Thus, if a heart attack is bound tooccur unless the agent loses weight or remains com?pletely motionless and if the latter is impracticable,then his losing weight is a necessary condition of thenon-occurrence of a heart attack. In that case, wecan say that to avoid a heart attack the agent mustlose weight. If it is possible for him to remainmotionless, then losing weight is not a necessarybut at best a sufficient condition of the nonoccurrence of a heart attack. If it is at any ratea sufficient condition of reducing the chances of aheart attack, then we can say that to avoid (orreduce the risk of) a heart attack, he can lose weight.If losing weight is thought greatly preferable tolying still, this can be indicated by saying that hewould be well-advised or that he should lose weight.This sort of argument is designed to support anend-promoting directive which is asked for andgiven when a person has a certain end and does notknow how to attain it. It is assumed that when thedirective is given, so is a solution to the ques?tioner's problem. Hence, the conclusion which canbe formulated either in terms of an imperative or interms of words such as "can," "must," "should,"or "ought," is felt to be a directive even when it isnot in imperative form. Conversely, even when for?mulated in the imperative, the conclusion is feltto be capable of being true or false, for it impliesthat there is a connection in nature between thebehavior delineated in the conclusion, and the endattributed to the agent in the minor premiss. Theonly difference between the imperative and theother formulations is that the former says nothingwhatever about the nature of this connection, andso indicates nothing about the merits of the solu?tion or the chances of success in following it.(c) The conclusion must therefore be read intwo ways, as an end-promoting directive to some?one seeking the solution of a problem, and asdescriptive of a certain sort of connection in nature,namely, a possible means-end connection. Ourconclusion, "Stop eating . . ." or "You must stopeating . . ." is interpreted as a directive if, sup?posing there to be a discrepancy between the direc?tive and Jones's behavior ; it is he or his behavior thatis criticized on that ground. It is read as descriptiveif supposing there to be no such discrepancy andJones still does not attain his end, namely, to loseweight, it is the conclusion which is criticized on thatground. Of course, just how soon he must loseweight and how much and under what conditionsDdepends on the degree of explicitnethe means-end connection is stated ision. The fact that the conclusiondescriptively at all shows that the cnature, asserted in the major premtaken as the ground of the conclusiona directive, and that the merit of ttherefore based on whether or not tholds.The main conclusions I wish to derive from thisare two : (i) that the reason why it is right to inter?pret the remarks "Stop eating . . ." or "You must(should) stop . . ." as directives is that they areoffered in a context in which the person addressedis assumed to have a certain end to which theaction delineated is implied to be a means. Neitherthe grammatical form nor the occurrence of thewords "must," "should," or "ought" are the rea?sons for it, since the substitution for these words ofthe word "can," which clearly has no directiveforce by itself, does not eliminate the directiveforce of the remark as a whole, (ii) That the func?tion of the words "can," "must," and "should" insuch remarks is rather to indicate the precisenature of the connection between the actionrecommended and the end of the person addressed.(d) We can now state one important differencebetween two ways of interpreting a directive suchas, "If you cannot stay in bed, stop eating breadand salami." Taken as an order or command, it isan end-setting directive : the if-clause specifying thecondition under which the directive is to befollowed. In that case, the question of its soundnesscannot arise, but that of its authorization can.But taken as a piece of advice, it is an endpromoting directive, the if-clause stating theapplicability-condition. In that case the questionof its authorization cannot arise, but that of itssoundness can. Of course, a remark may have to betaken in both ways, e.g., a doctor's order by anarmy doctor to a sick recruit.(e) As in the case of commands and rules, we donot find the word "obligation" in the conclusionsof practical arguments of this form. To deriveobligation-claims, we should therefore have tointroduce an additional premiss, such as (5) or (6)in argument (D) :(5) One has an obligation to do what one must,can, and should do in order to attain one'send.(6) One has an obligation to do what someone(soundly) advises one to do in order to attainone's end.220 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYPlainly it would be even harder to establish such ageneral proposition than it would be to establishthe corresponding (A-4), (B-6), or (C-6).21However, at least the words "must" and "ought"naturally occur in the conclusions of such argu?ments. It is therefore tempting to identify the con?clusions of such practical arguments with obliga?tion-claims. Thus von Wright says, "To show whysomething is an obligation founded on interest, isnot to show that it is something we ("really,""innermost") want to do, but that it is something wehave to do for the sake of that which we want (to be,to do, to have, to happen)."22 Von Wright thusimplies that when we have to do something for thesake of some end, we have some kind of obligationto do that thing. It is the fact that we have to dosomething for the sake of that which we want (tobe, to do, to have, to happen) which makes this anobligation; not, as Hume wrongly thought, thefact that there is something we really, innermostwant to do. However, this fact simply does notmake a line of action obligatory. It does not evennecessarily make it something we ought to do. AsHart points out,23 in this sort of situation we maybe obliged to do this thing, but we are not obligatedto do it.24To return to our argument (D), even the word"ought" in the conclusion introduces an importantnew element. For to say, in a context such as wehave examined, that Jones ought to stop eatingbread and salami, is to imply not merely that theaction recommended is the best way of attaining acertain possible end, but also that it is an endwhich the agent would be well advised to adopt.If the agent, realizing that unless he runs he willmiss the train, says to himself, "I must run," heleaves open the question of whether or not he iswell advised to pursue the end he has, namely, tocatch that train. If he says, "I ought to run," heimplies that he would be well-advised to pursuethat end.Thus, whereas the occurrence of words such as"can," "must" and even "should," does not implyanything about the advisability of the pursuit ofalternative courses of action to alternative ends,the occurrence of the word "ought" does have suchimplications. But even claims made by means of"ought" do not necessarily ascribe obligations. Themain task for Teleological Theories is therefore toprovide support for propositions such as (D) (5)and (6). I briefly examine three popular theoriesto expose the essential weaknesses of this model.(III-i) Rational Egoism, interpreted as atheory of obligation, maintains that one has anobligation to do whatever and only what one oughtto do, and that there is only one thing one oughtto do, namely, to pursue those ends the attainmentof which would be in one's best interest. Althoughthis theory has not been held by any great philos?opher, a brief discussion of it will help to makeclearer the strengths and weaknesses of the moresophisticated theories in this group. All theories ofthis group make two important moves. The first isto distinguish between those ends or goals which aperson finds himself having and those which heacquired as a result of deliberation. Standing backfrom our own past actions, noting the circum?stances under which we have come to have, andthen to pursue and sometimes to reach certain ends,we find that quite frequently we afterwardsregretted having pursued and reached some ofthese ends, because of their bad consequences orthe loss of the better things we might have hadinstead. Egoism recommends that we work out forourselves in the light of our knowledge, our predi?lections, preferences, likes and dislikes, our capa?cities, talents, energies, and skills, our opportunitiesand resources, a life plan whose realization wouldmake our life as rich and worthwhile as possible,and that we then plan the steps necessary for itsrealization. Of course, as we grow older and wiser,we may have to modify this plan in the light of ourchanged insights or the changed circumstances.But at any given time we should, with the aid ofsuch a plan, be able to judge not only what will bethe best means to an end we then find ourselves21 Cf. n. 3 above.22 Varieties of Goodness, op. cit., p. 170.23 Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., pp. 80-81.24 In his interesting book, Practical Reasoning (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), chap. XII, David P. Gauthier, after showing insome detail, and in my opinion quite correctly, what it is to be obliged to do something then, wrongly, explains having anobligation as a special case of being obliged, namely, being obliged to someone by some "obliging factor" (p. 184). I suspectthat Gauthier was misled by a failure to distinguish between "being obliged by someone to do something," which is not a case ofhaving an obligation to do it, and "being obliged to somone for something" which is such a case. Because of this failure, he didnot see that not only is having an obligation not a special case of being obliged (by someone to do something), but beingobliged (to someone for something) is a very special case of having an obligation. Hence being obliged cannot be used to explainhaving an obligation.MORAL OBLIGATION 221having, but also whether the pursuit and attain?ment of such an end fits best into our life plan, orwhether instead we should refrain from pursuingthat end and pursue another more suitable endinstead. At any given time what we ought to do iswhat is the best way of attaining those ends, theattainment of which best realizes a life plan whoserealization will make our life as rewarding andmeaningful as possible.The second move is to offer an account of whatmakes a fact a reason for doing a certain thing. Inany system of practical reasoning it is importantthat we be told not only how to reason with whatfacts, but also why we should reason in just that way,which will often require us to resist inclination.Such a method of reasoning must have some appealto, or attraction for, the reasoner or else it will notbe used. Rational Egoism offers a very attractivemethod, so attractive that it is never challenged,but serves rather as a paradigm, perhaps the onlyparadigm of practical reasoning. On this model, thecriterion of a reason for doing something is thatfollowing it is in the agent's own best interest or forhis own greatest good. Thus, a fact, F, is properly areason for JV to do x, if N, on being apprized of Fand therefore doing x, is thereby promoting his bestinterest. Spelled out, this means, as we have seen,that in acting because of F, he is promoting an end,the attainment of which helps to realize a life planwhich will make his life as rewarding and meaning?ful as possible. The model thus provides an ex?tremely strong justification for this type of practicalreasoning, resting on the acknowledged superiorityof this mode of action over action on impulse. Itmay be virtually impossible to establish whether agiven fact is a good reason for doing something, inthis system, but it is hardly possible to challengethe framework. Insofar as we are willing to curbour impulses at all, are ready at all to refrain frompursuing ends we find ourselves having, we shallbe open to the consideration that the pursuit ofother goals would make for a richer, more reward?ing, more worthwhile life. We should regard aperson as worse than quaint if he seriously askedwhy he should do what is in his best interest.It must be granted that Rational Egoism cangive a plausible answer to questions of the form,"What ought I to do"? For it can answer notmerely questions about what is a possible, the onlypossible, or the best way of attaining an end someone happens to have, but also to the questionwhich of the many ends he might pursue wouldthe best one to pursue. When we say "You oughthave been there, it was unbelievable" or "yoought to invest in Fixed Trusts" or "You ougnot to take on any more speaking engagementswe may support these claims in just the wayRational Egoism indicates. Yet clearly these anot cases of someone's having an obligation. Forsomeone has an obligation to do something, thenfollows that it would be wrong for him not to do ibut that does not seem to follow from thesremarks.(III-2) Utilitarianism25 is similar to RationalEgoism, for it uses the same ingredients, but itserves them up in a different mixture. Act-Utili?tarians say that one ought to pursue those endswhose attainment would be for the greatest good ofthe greatest number. An individual, therefore, hasto consider not only his own life plan and what isnecessary to realize it, but also the life plan ofeveryone else. Reasoning under this sytem, thus,also requires him not to pursue those of his endswhose attainment, though for his own greatestgood, is not for the greatest good of the greatestnumber. Act Utilitarianism can claim to be muchcloser to our everyday moral convictions thanRational Egoism. We believe that moralityrequires us often to do things which are not in ourbest interest and to refrain from doing thingswhich would be in our best interest. RationalEgoism flies in the face of this deep-seated convic?tion. Egoism is moreover necessarily useless as away of deciding which of two people ought torefrain from pursuing an end which is his interest,in circumstances in which it is impossible for bothof them to attain their ends. In these cases, ActUtilitarianism can sometimes yield a decision.However, Act Utilitarianism has a much weakeranswer to the question why we should use itsmethod of reasoning. For to the question why theyshould prefer the greatest good of the greatestnumber to their own greatest good, Act Utili?tarians must reply either that people ought to aimat the greatest good of the greatest number or thatthey in fact do. The former falls wholly outside theirown conceptual framework and reduces Utilitari?anism to Intuitionism, i.e., to the absence of anytheory of obligation. The latter is often false, andso reduces the applicability of obligation-claims to25 Cf., e.g., J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1961) ; R. B.Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism" in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. Hector Neri Casta?eda andGeorge Nakhnikian (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1963).D*222 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYthose who are psychologically so made that theydo in fact pursue these ends. Like Hart's "insiders,"Utilitarians must admit that those with a differentpsychological make-up need not, perhaps ought notto use its system of practical reasoning. On thisview, too, morality is the system of reasoning usedby and applicable to only those "insiders" who infact have the utilitarian end. On this theory, amorality is much like the code of some coterie orreligion.From our point of view, the only differencebetween Act and Rule Utilitarianism is that insteadof the pursuit of ends, the latter speaks of acting inaccordance with rules. Its formula for determiningone's obligations is: One ought to enter on thatcourse which, if made a general rule, would pro?mote at least as great a good of at least as great anumber as any other course open to him, if madeuniversal. This modification of Utilitarianism maywell yield results still closer to our every-day moralconvictions, but it is otherwise open to the sameobjections as Act-Utilitarianism.(III-3) The Basic Weakness of All Teleological Theories Well Formulated by Kant.As he points out, all such practical reasoning isbased on "hypothetical imperatives" and so lacksthe peculiar force of obligation-claims which arecategorical. Following Kant, one might try toexplain the force of obligation-claims as a certainproperty of some imperatives, namely, being ina certain sense unconditional, such that "we can?not be free from the precept if we give up thepurpose." The precepts which apply to a persondo so irrespective of whether or not he has theend to whose attainment the precept is a means.But though important, possession of this featureis only a necessary, not a sufficient condition.There are directives which satisfy it withoutbeing obligations, such as the doctor's order to ouradipose man. That order may well be shown to beapplicable to Jones under the conditions outlined ;its applicability is not conditional upon his in factwanting to reduce: he ought to have this endwhether or not he in fact has it; and it may besound. Jones cannot be "free from" the precept ifhe gives up the end. Nevertheless, this is not anobligation. For surely despite all this, Jones isentitled, has a right, to go on eating bread andsalami if he wants to. But he cannot have both anobligation to stop eating bread and salami and alsoa right to go on doing so if he wants to.We need to distinguish two types of universalapplicability and soundness : (i) where it is the caseeither in fact or of logical necessity, that all personshave the end, e.g., "You ought to do this if youvalue your happiness"; (ii) where the end inquestion is one which some persons sometimes donot have, but which any person always ought tohave, e.g., "You ought to do this if you value yourhealth." In case (i) a person would be free from theprecept by ceasing to have the purpose and soKant's unconditionally criterion rightly disposes inthis case. But in case (ii) he cannot be free byceasing to have the purpose and so that criterionby itself would, wrongly, uphold this case as anobligation.We can represent the argument (E) of such acrude "Kantian" theory in this way:(i) One has an obligation to act in accordancewith certain precepts, namely, those deline?ating actions which are means to ends oneought to have, whether or not one actuallyhas them;(2) that is, ends from which one cannot be freeeven if one could give up the purpose whichthey serve ;(3) that is, ends which are unconditional, and ina certain sense universally applicable andsound.(4) But health is such an end, "an ought throughand through."26(5) S? precepts delineating actions which aremeans to the preservation of one's healthgive rise to obligations to follow them.Now, a strong case can really be made for (4) :because there is no single end or combination ofends (except perhaps their totality) whose aban?donment would make the maintenance of one'shealth unnecessary or useless. There is thus a per?fectly good sense (though not the sense which Kanthas in mind), in which the maxim "preserve yourhealth" is always applicable and sound, hence un?conditional, hence categorical. All the same, the factthat an argument for doing what preserves one'shealth is conclusive, does not make doing itobligatory.IVOur brief review of some theories of obligationexposes their failure to explain and justify, in manycases even to attend to, the peculiar and seeminglyobnoxious binding force attaching to obligation26 To use Falk's useful term. Cf. W. D. Falk, "Morality, Self, and Others" in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ibMORAL OBLIGATION 223claims. This conceals the justifiability of challeng?ing those who make obligation claims until theycan demonstrate their bindingness. But thereceived theories cannot meet such challenges. Inanswer to the claim that a directive issuing fromsome Authorized Will could not amount to anobligation unless it were wrong not to follow direc?tives from such a source, the Will Theory can atmost say that such a claim is meaningless withinthe Will Theory. But this derives directives withseemingly obnoxious binding force from a theorywhich has deprived itself of all possibilities ofjustification. And much the same is true, mutatismutandis, for Teleological Theories. For a directivebased on a certain type of practical argumentcould not have moral binding force and so couldnot be obligatory unless it were wrong not tofollow directives arrived at by such a type of prac?tical argument. The recived theories distract atten?tion from these questions by stressing the emotiveappeal of such a method for generating obligationclaims ("its rationality," "its autonomy," "its dig?nity") or the appeal to individuals of the particularobligations generated by such methods (thatsuicide is wrong, idleness is wrong, etc.).How, then, can we avoid this epistemologicalcircularity? Clearly, the procedure must be this.We must first show wherein the peculiar bindingforce implied in obligation claims consists. We mustthen demonstrate the need for claims with such abinding force. And lastly we must indicate a methodfor generating directives with such a binding force.(IV?i) The Binding Force of ObligationClaims. As argued earlier, the binding force ofobligation claims is moral. We must now ask whatthis means. My answer is: "A directive has moralbinding force" means, "It is not solely the addres?see's business to decide whether or not to follow thedirective." What, on my theory, gives directivesmoral binding force is not that they are sufficientlyspecific to permit us to establish them conclusivelyor unconditionally; not even that when they con?flict with others, they are, or are rightly, regardedas overriding; it is, rather the fact that they con?cern themselves with issues and problems whosesolution is not solely the agent*s business but also thatof others who have a legitimate concern aboutwhether or not the person to whom such a directiveapplies follows it or not. When directives are of thissort it is justifiable for a society to take suitablemeasures to ensure that its members follow them.This seems to me the true kernel of the conviction,which runs through most versions of the WillTheory, that the binding force of obligation claimslies in the fact that the addressees of such direc?tives know that they are liable to incur the sanctionif they do not follow them.What is meant by the phrase, "not solely theagent's business to decide whether to follow thedirective" ? As children grow up, more and more ofthe things they have been directed to do at certaintimes and in certain ways are left to their own dis?cretion. Eventually, whether they follow such direc?tives becomes solely their business. At some stage,there comes an end to a mother's authority to seeto it that her son, using the appropriate system ofprudential and moral reasoning, keeps the rightcompany, drinks the right drinks in the right quan?tities, and regularly attends the right church. Allthe same, we do not think there is an end to every?one's authority in regard to all directives. In regardto some, e.g., the law, it is not solely even anadult's business to decide whether or not to followsuch directives.That it is not solely his business to decide onsome issue means that not all kinds of interferencewith his conduct in these matters are necessarily un?justifiable. Some may even be desirable. By "inter?ference" I mean pressures which are in them?selves obnoxious. I have in mind methods such ashandcuffing, jailing, fining, and possibly simply"condemning," which require justification. I donot mean perfectly legitimate pressures such asreasoning or pleading with a person, which amother may, perhaps should, exert even on anadult son.However, the importance of ensuring compliancewith certain directives may justify even interference.To show that some directive has moral bindingforce, it is not, therefore, enough to show that in agiven society a person's failure to comply withsuch a certain directive is followed by group inter?ference or that the group regards departure fromsuch directives as a signal for hostility, to use Hart'sphrase. If that is the case in a community, and if thecommunity regards such hostility as justified, per?haps its absence as undesirable, then such adirective is indeed regarded as having moral bindingforce. And since such a practice tends to increaseconformity, tends to act as a social pressure backingup the directive, we might say that, in a sense, sucha directive has moral binding force. All the same,this answer which might be quite adequate in asociological context, is not adequate in an epistemological one. The question we must answer iswhether it is rightly so regarded. But are we not now224 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYmoving in a circle ? Directives, we said, have moralbinding force if the question of whether to followthem is not solely the agent's business. It is notsolely the agent's business if it is permissible, per?haps desirable, for certain people to interfere forthe purpose of ensuring conformity with the direc?tive. But does not this mean simply that it ought tobe someone's job or duty to see to it that addresseesof such directives follow them ? And does not thismean that those, whose job it is to see to this, havean obligation to do these things, which means in turnthat they come under directives with moral bindingforce, which implies that someone else has anobligation to see that they follow these directives,and so on ad infinitum ?This looks like a vicious regress but it is not. Itsappearance of viciousness may well be one of thereasons why some philosophers feel that "moralbinding force" should be analyzed in terms of theactual social pressures operative in a community,or at most the community's actual beliefs of theappropriateness of such pressures, but never interms of the truth of such beliefs. The realizationthat there is nothing vicious about this regress mayhelp to make my own answer more acceptable. AsI construe the claim " 'Do x* has moral bindingforce," it implies that "Do #" is a directive inregard to which there ought to be a person whose jobit is to ensure that all those to whom addressees ofthe directive applies follow it. But this means onlythat it is desirable that there should be such a personwith such a job, if that were necessary to ensure thatthe directives are followed. And this may be truewhether or not there is such a person. As the line ofsuch supervisors lengthens, the likelihood increasesthat the remoter ones will carry out their duties ofensuring that those under them do so, withouthaving themselves to be supervised by yet furtherranks in the system. Thus, " 'Do *' has a moralbinding force" does not imply either that there isin fact a person who has such a job giving him theobligation to see to it that the appropriate personsdo x, or that a certain person has an obligation tosee to it that someone is appointed to such a job, letalone that everyone morally ought to take this jobupon themselves. And so there is no vicious regress.(IV?2) The Justification of Moral Direc?tives. If my account of directives with moral bind?ing force is correct, then they are regarded as otherpeople's business, and so as licensing interference.Their existence thus narrows what a person is freeto do, and so it is in need of justification.Here is a sketch of such a justification. My argument takes a number of things for granted. Itassumes, for instance, that a morality is an opera?tive system of practical reasoning, that is, a systemof general end-setting directives which the membersof the group are taught in their childhood as partof the conventional wisdom of the group. Systemsof practical reasoning differ from each other inrespect to the way in which such directives can besupported. The best-understood system is that ofself-interest. In that system, a general directive,such as "Protect your health," would be supportedby showing that they are ways of attaining states ofaffairs (such as being able to do things one wantsto do and to enjoy life) which are necessary condi?tions of the good life for the person in question.Such self-interested directives are capable of cominginto conflict with a person's inclination. For a per?son to be able to follow such directives he must notonly be taught what they are but must be trainedin childhood to follow them even when they gocounter to his inclinations. Such training willrequire certain forms of pedagogic interferenceduring childhood. This we regard as justified onaccount of the great benefits which such trainingbestows on the individual, and because we know ofno other way of enabling him to derive suchbenefits. Of course, since the benefits so derivedcome to him, the question of whether he followssuch directives is solely his business, hence seeingto it that he later follows them is not justifiable.The main distinction to bear in mind is thatbetween the proof of, or support for, the directivesof self-interest, and the need (inherent in any formof practical reasoning) and the justification for in?terfering with a person's inclinations and desires.The first tells us what such directives are, and whythey should be followed. The second tells us theextent to which they should be inculcated and en?forced.A system of general moral directives can bejustified along similar lines, though we must bearin mind the differences as well as the similarities.The main similarities are first that the support forgeneral moral directives presumably must lie in thefact that following them leads to certain desirablestates of affairs, and secondly that, since they mustbe capable of coming into conflict with inclinationsand desires, there is a need to train the young sothat they know what such directives are, and areable to follow them when they conflict with inclina?tion and desire. The main differences are thefollowing: Moral directives must be regarded ascapable of overriding not only inclination but alsoMORAL OBLIGATION 225the directives of self-interest when a person cannotfollow both, hence it will be difficult to train theyoung to follow moral directives. This explains,though it does not by itself justify, the practice ofembodying some of our most important moraldirectives (e.g., "Thou shalt not kill") in our legalsystem and supporting them by severe and sup?posedly effective sanctions. We do, however,believe in the justifiability of this practice of seeingto it that people follow moral directives even whenthey are grown up and have learned what is rightand what is wrong. And we support this belief bysaying that whether or not a person follows moraldirectives is not solely his business but otherpeople's as well. And if this is true, then theseothers are entitled to see to it that people followmoral directives and, within limits, to take measureswhich are necessary to achieve this purpose.We have brought to light an impoitant differ?ence between self-interest and moral directives.Both imply that the practice of teaching thesedirectives, and using pedagogic molding techniquesto make it possible for the young to follow them ifthey want to, can be justified by the improvedlives of those involved. But there the similarityends. For moral directives must be such as to berightly regarded as overriding not only inclinationbut also self-interest; the question of whether or notsomeone follows them must not be solely hisbusiness ; and so the social practice of seeing to itthat everyone follows them must be justified(beyond the training period). Lastly, whereas weknow quite well how we support or prove, and sohow we formulate, the directives of self-interest,it is more difficult to do this for moral directives.Hence in the case of self-interested directives wecan spell out why it is that they are rightlyregarded as overriding inclination, and why societyis justified in inculcating in the young an appro?priate attitude toward these directives during theirtraining but not later, and why it is that the mat?ter of whether or not a person follows them issolely his business and no one else's, hence why noone has what are often misleadingly called "obli?gations to himself."27 But in the case of moraldirectives it is not always easy to spell this out. Whatthen is the formula for constructing moral direc?tives? We already have the clues we need. We canderive it from the premiss that moral directivesmust have a content such as to yield two things:(a) support for saying that they are rightlyregarded as overriding inclination and self-interest,and (b) support for saying that whether or notsomeone follows them is not solely his business.Let us try to derive such a formula. We caneliminate the solitary desert islander, for in his casewhether he follows these directives must be solelyhis business. In fact, the situation we must en?visage is precisely that envisaged by Hobbes: agroup of people following inclination except whenself-interest conflicts with it, and having a will ofthe requisite quality to follow reason rather thaninclination. Such people are then confronted bythe question of whether these principles of actionare adequate for the good life or not. Hobbesmakes an excellent case for saying that they are not.It is based on the following sort of argument.(i) Human needs, wants, and aspirations can bebetter satisfied under conditions of proximity,specialization, and cooperation, than in isolation.(ii) However, the scarcity of goods and the result?ing conflicts of interest, as well as the fear generatedby the justified belief that others will follow aggres?sive inclinations, and the mutually conflictingdirectives of self-interest, tend to lead to harmfuland wasteful expenditures of resources and an un?bearable climate of life, (iii) If there were availablefor guidance a set of directives regarded as over?riding the directives of self-interest and applicableon those occasions when following the latter wouldlead to such harmful and wasteful behavior, theclimate of life and so life for everyone would beimproved, (iv) However, if it is true, as is widelybelieved, that people tend not to do what theythink is contrary to their interest, they will betempted, even after training, not to follow thedirectives of morality but those of self-interest whenthe two conflict, (v) But since the behavior of aperson who yields to the temptation to follow selfinterest and to ignore moral directives will, ipsofacto, detrimentally affect another person's interests,the question of whether or not he follows moraldirectives is ipso facto not solely his business butsomeone else's as well, namely, the business of theperson whose interest would be adversely affected.And since such behavior, unless prevented, wouldadversely affect the climate of life, whether or notpeople follow moral directives, is everyone's business.27 Elsewhere I have dismissed this view much too cavalierly. There I was able to show merely that it is impossible to enterwith oneself into the sort of temporary moral relationship into which one can enter with another. But this impossibility is perfectlycompatible with one's having an obligation to do a certain thing simply because it is the best thing for one. On my present view,one cannot have such an obligation because it is no one else's business whether or not one does what is best for oneself.226 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY(IV?3) The Moral "Calculus." In section(IV?2) we gave the outline of an argument show?ing the need, for a group of people following eitherinclination and/or a system of self-interested direc?tives, to have a set of directives overriding selfinterested ones, in regard to which the decision ofwhether or not to follow them is not solely thebusiness of those to whom they apply. This outlinejustification shows that what creates the need forsuch an overriding system is the fact that followingself-interested directives will often lead to harmfuland wasteful conflict and, if this occurs generally,to a climate of life which fully deserves the title"cold war." These considerations yield up themissing item, the calculus we must employ toarrive at directives satisfying the criteria for beingmoral. Such a formula must spell out how wedetermine the content of the directive and thecircumstances under which it applies.It will be remembered that such directives mustspell out what is to be done in circumstances whentwo people, following directives of self-interest,could not both attain their end and would be driveninto mutually harmful or wasteful efforts to attaintheir own end while preventing the other fromattaining his, and where such efforts would beundesirable, at any rate if prosecuted "with noholds barred." The content must indicate whichone of the interests is to give way or what com?promise is to be made.To understand the peculiarity of moral rules, wemust however bear in mind a second requirement.Where interests conflict, there are many possibleregulations dealing with the conflict. The directiveembodying the regulation would not be properlymoral (as opposed to being legal or conventional)unless it purported to be the best possible way ofregulating such a conflict. Hence, other thingsbeing equal, general moral directives are open tocritical scrutiny and to modification as social con?ditions change and our knowledge of consequencesincreases. The rationale for this second requirementis, of course, that since moral directives from thenature of the case will override someone's concernevery time they apply, everyone must have (as faras possible) the same good reason for accepting sucha general regulation.I offer a simple example : A and B are interestedin renting apartments. Both have looked at a greatmany of them, but have liked a certain apartmentbest. A was the first to inspect it and to pay adeposit. B saw it shortly afterwards, and to secureit, offers to pay a higher rent. The moral rule hereis that the giving of a deposit binds the landlord andso excludes other prospective tenants. All concernedhave the same good reasons for accepting this solu?tion as always overriding. For although on thisoccasion, the rule excludes B and thus goes against2?'s interest, it is still in Z?'s interest just as much asin A9s that there should be such a rule, which willprotect him on future occasions when he is the firstto find a suitable apartment. Hence allocatingobligations is in the end justified by the benefiteveryone receives from this practice.In this essay I have advanced the following majortheses :( i ) All obligation claims are subclasses of generaldirectives with moral binding force, and so are anintegral part of a morality even though some, e.g.,promissory or legal obligations, assign tasks which,but for being thus assigned, would not be moraltasks.(2) The binding force which is characteristic ofsuch moral directives can be characterized by say?ing that the question of whether to follow suchdirectives or not is not solely the business of those towhom they apply.(3) This characterization of the binding force ofsuch moral directives provides the answers to threeimportant ethical questions :(a) Why is it desirable that certain general direc?tives should be universally taught and stringentlyenforced? The answer is that on their beinggenerally followed depends the general climate oflife which is the springboard from which an indi?vidual can, in accordance with his abilities andtastes, build a worthwhile life for himself; andbecause in the absence of such enforcement thelikelihood of their not being followed would bevery great.(b) What is the proper subject-matter for generalmoral directives? The answer is: the general andauthoritative adjudication between conflictingtypes of individual interests and concerns.(c) How can the content of such directives be cor?rectly formulated? The over-all principles onwhich such formulae are constructed is that itshould be the best solution, i.e., the one whichprovides for each of those whose concerns areaffected, as far as possible, an equally good reasonfor accepting this adjudication between conflictingconcerns.

Relational Ethics Frameworks

Until chatbots have built-in safeguards akin to seatbelts and airbags, it will be difficult for students to make truly informed decisions about the risks of powerful A.I. systems.

Fundamental student learning should remain an A.I.-free activity, he said.

Students needed to learn to drive A.I. tools, analyze what’s under the hood, develop guidelines for personal use and design ideal safety policies,

Are you steering the technology or is it steering you?

What is Secondary Care?Secondary care is the next level of care after primary care. Secondary care is defined as “the provision of medical care by specialists who generally do not have first contact with patients.”

At 20 kTA reference scale

CAPEX scaling

Scalable GF technology 50% Switches to “cheap” GF prices Pivotal uncertaint

(e.g., breakthrough growth factor technology but prohibitively expensive financing).

yments:

The slider complements this by letting users explore “what if progress is partial?” scenarios.

If any one of these succeeds at commercial scale, the “cheap” price regime applies

$0.20 – $1.20

Once you have the structure of your paper figured out, and the main idea you will support, you can start with the introduction and conclusion.

To defend the rights of minorities is therefore to defend the rights of all.

The majority can make the law only on issues on which the law must pronounce.

Sovereignty exists only in a limited and relative way. The jurisdiction of this sovereignty stops where independent, individual existence begins.

there is a part of human existence which necessarily remains individual and independent, and by right beyond all political jurisdiction.

A formal outline is a detailed guide that shows how all your supporting ideas relate to each other. This outline helps you distinguish between ideas that are equally important and ones that are less important. You can build your paper based on the framework you created in the outline. There are two types of formal outlines: the topic outline and the sentence outline. Format both types of formal outlines similarly. Place your introduction and thesis statement at the beginning, under roman numeral I. Use roman numerals (II, III, IV, V, etc.) to identify main points that develop the thesis statement. Use capital letters (A, B, C, D, etc.) to divide your main points into parts. Use arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.) if you need to subdivide any As, Bs, or Cs into smaller parts. End with the final roman numeral expressing your idea for your conclusion. Here is what the skeleton of a traditional formal outline looks like. The indentation helps clarify how the ideas are related. Outlining a Paper

Descriptive writing is most effective when it is organized well. Use the following information to decide what organization best fits your goals. Chronological order → best for describing events Spatial order → best for describing places Order of importance →  best for describing objects and people

To help readers visualize something as you want them to see it To create a main impression using the senses (sight, touch, taste, smell, and sound)

Chronological To tell a story or relate an experience To explain the history of an event or a topic To introduce the steps in a process

When you write, your goal is not only to complete an assignment but also to write for a specific purpose—perhaps to inform, to explain, to persuade, or to achieve a combination of these purposes. Your purpose for writing should always be in the back of your mind, because it will help you decide which pieces of information belong together and how you will order them.

Order refers to your choice of what to present first, second, third, and so on in your writing. The order you pick closely relates to your purpose for writing that particular assignment. For example, when telling a story, it may be important to first describe the backstory. Or you may need to first describe a 3-D movie projector or a television studio to help readers visualize the setting and scene. You may want to group your support effectively to convince readers that your point of view on an issue is well reasoned and worthy of belief.

When you write, it is helpful when your ideas are presented in an order that makes sense. The writing you complete in all your courses exposes how analytically and critically your mind works. In some courses, the only direct contact you may have with your instructor is through the assignments you write for the course. You can make a good impression by spending time ordering your ideas.

The textbook English for Business Success explains that your prewriting activities and readings can help you gather information for your assignment. The more you sort through the pieces of information you found, the more you will begin to see the connections between them. Patterns and gaps may begin to stand out. But only when you start to organize your ideas will you be able to translate your raw insights into a form that will communicate meaning to your audience.

Once you begin narrowing down your topic, depending on the type of paper, you may be ready to start drafting. The best point to begin writing your draft also depends on the genre of essay you are writing. If you are writing a research paper, then you will need to follow more steps, which are covered in detail later in this book.

Towards Site-Specific and Self-Sufficient Robotic Fabrication on Architectural Scales

FIBERBOTS: an autonomous swarm-based robotic system for digital fabrication of fiber-based composites

The tradition of fighting only in the summer months changed in late 1776 and early 1777

Be sure to seek out sources that are current or up to date. Depending on the topic, sources may become outdated relatively soon after publication, or they may remain useful for years

To examine the author’s credibility or ethos—that is, how much you can believe of what the author has to say—review their credentials. What career experience or academic study shows that the author has the expertise to write about this topic?

Free online encyclopedias and wikis may seem like a great source of information. They usually appear among the first few results of a web search, they cover thousands of topics, and they include articles with an informal, straightforward writing style. Unfortunately, these sites have no control system for researching, writing, and reviewing articles. Instead, they rely on a community of users to police themselves. At best, these sites can be a starting point for finding other, more trustworthy sources. Never use them as final sources.

You will consider criteria such as the type of source, its intended purpose and audience, the author’s (or authors’) qualifications, the publication’s reputation, any indications of bias or hidden agendas, how current the source is, and the overall quality of the writing, thinking, and design.

Smart researchers continually ask themselves two questions: “Is this source relevant to my purpose?” and “Is this source reliable?” The first question will help you avoid wasting valuable time reading sources that stray too far from your specific topic and research questions. The second question will help you find accurate, trustworthy sources.

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La vía glucolítica

After this treaty was made China opened its doors to them and then they broke the treaty that they had asked for by shutting the Chinese out of their country.

Go send your sons to exile To serve your captives’ need To wait in heavy harness On fluttered folk and wild— Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half devil and half child Take up the White Man’s burden

Wikipedia exists in multiple languages (each governed somewhat independently). When looking at the demographics of who writes the English Wikipedia articles, editors of Wikipedia skew heavily male (around 80% or 90%), and presumably administrators skew heavily male as well. This can produce bias in how things are moderated. For example, Donna Strickland had no Wikipedia page before her Nobel. Her male collaborator did:

14.1.1. Quality Control# In order to make social media sites usable and interesting to users, they may ban different types of content such as advertisements, disinformation, or off-topic posts. Almost all social media sites (even the ones that claim “free speech”) block spam, mass-produced unsolicited messages, generally advertisements, scams, or trolling. Without quality control moderation, the social media site will likely fill up with content that the target users of the site don’t want, and those users will leave. What content is considered “quality” content will vary by site, with 4chan considering a lot of offensive and trolling content to be “quality” but still banning spam (because it would make the site repetitive in a boring way), while most sites would ban some offensive content.